A questão das armas nucleares continua a figurar como um ponto central das Relações Internacionais Os esforços e ações concretas para o desarmamento, a não-proliferação e o controle das armas nucleares continuam sendo temas que geram tensões recorrentes entre os Estados. No entanto, no Brasil, são poucas as análises de caráter acadêmico acerca destes temas e, no que tange ao posicionamento corrente e prospectivo do Estado brasileiro no Regime de Não-Proliferação de Armas Nucleares, os estudos e análises são ainda mais escassos, ou incipientes. Tendo como objeto de estudo o Tratado sobre a Não-Proliferação de Armas Nucleares (TNP), o Regime dele decorrente e o processo de inserção do Estado brasileiro nesse Regime, a dissertação está estruturada em três eixos: o primeiro contempla o papel das armas nucleares na percepção de segurança dos Estados; o segundo abrange o TNP e o Regime dele decorrente; o terceiro analisa o processo de inserção do Estado brasileiro no Regime em pauta. Assim, em síntese, a pesquisa efetuada contemplou os motivos que levam os Estados à decisão de desenvolver armas nucleares; a gênese do TNP e a evolução da percepção do significado desse Tratado por parte dos Estados; bem como o processo e o grau de inserção do Brasil no Regime de Não-Proliferação de Armas Nucleares. A pesquisa efetuada buscou colocar o presente objeto de estudo no debate mais amplo das Relações Internacionais, tomando como base as abordagens consagradas da disciplina na questão do gerenciamento da segurança dos Estados, isto é, as duas abordagens que constituem o mainstream da disciplina, a perspectiva teórica liberal (e suas variantes neoliberais) e o pensamento realista (e neo-realista). Dessa forma, as conclusões obtidas valeram-se de lentes teóricas distintas, porém necessárias para a compreensão das partes específicas de um conjunto complexo e das conexões causais entre essas partes. / The issue of nuclear weapons continues to appear as a focal point of International Relations. The efforts and concrete actions on disarmament, non-proliferation, and nuclear arms control are still issues that generate recurring tensions between States. However, in Brazil, there is little analysis of an academic nature about these issues and, with respect to current and prospective position of the Brazilian State in the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Regime, studies and analysis are even more scarce, or incipient. The present dissertation has as its object of study to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Regime arisen from NPT, and the Brazilian State insertion process in this Regime. Therefore our research work is structured in three areas: the first one is about the role of nuclear weapons in States security perception, the second is about NPT and its Regime, the third runs over the insertion of the Brazilian state in this regime. So, in summary, the research performed included the reasons that make a State to develop nuclear weapons, the NPT genesis and evolution of the perception of the meaning of that Treaty by the States, and the process and the degree of insertion of Brazil in the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Regime. The inquiry sought to place this object of study in the broader debate on Foreign Relations, based on the approaches of the discipline devoted to the question of managing the security of States, id est, the two approaches that constitute the mainstream of the discipline: the perspective theoretical liberal (and neoliberal variants) and realistic thinking (and neo-realist). Thus, we have used different theoretical lenses, which we think necessary for understanding the specific parts and causal connections between these parts of a complex issue.

This thesis is about the importance of nuclear weapons to Australian defence and strategic policy in Southeast Asia between 1953 and 1973. It argues that Australia's approach to nuclear issues during this period, and its attitude towards the development and acquisition of nuclear weapons in particular, was aimed exclusively at achieving narrowly defined political objectives. Australia was thus never interested in possessing nuclear weapons, and any moves seemingly taken along these lines were calculated to obtain political concessions - not as part of a 'bid' for their acquirement. This viewpoint sits at odds with the consensus position of several focused studies of Australian nuclear policy published in the past decade. Although in general these studies correctly argue that Australia maintained the 'nuclear weapons option' until the early 1970s, all have misrepresented the motivation for this by contending that the government viewed such weapons in exclusively military terms. The claim that Australia was interested only in the military aspect of nuclear weapons does not pay due attention to the fact that defence planning was based entirely on the provision of conventional forces to Southeast Asia. Accordingly, the military was interested first and foremost with issues arising from extant conventional planning concepts, and the government was chiefly concerned about obtaining allied assurances of support for established plans. The most pressing requirement for Australia therefore was gaining sway over allied countries. However, the Australian government was never in a position to overtly influence more powerful allies against an undertaking that could escalate into limited war, and was similarly incapable of inducing its allies to retain forces in the region in spite of competing pressures. It was for this reason that Australia would seek to manipulate the nuclear weapons option. Indeed, access to such weapons offered Australia the opportunity to achieve greater integration in formulating allied planning, while the threat to manufacture them provided a means of convincing regional partners to maintain a presence in the area. The thesis therefore concludes that Australia carefully presented its options for procuring nuclear weapons to gain influence over its allies in response to strategic developments in Southeast Asia.

<p>The purpose of this thesis is to explain why states obtain nuclear weapons and the role various</p><p>actors and interests play in the making of states´ nuclear policies. The main questions are as</p><p>follows: (1) What big theories exist concerning states obtaining nuclear weapon and nuclear</p><p>armament in International Relations and what relevance do they have of the post cold-war period?,</p><p>(2) What is the meaning of the perspective of the Military-Industrial Complex (MIC)?, and (3)Are</p><p>there empirical studies which supports the existence of a MIC in the United States?</p><p>The focus lies on actors and driving forces that are internal to states and it is also important to</p><p>investigate if the theories have relevance for the post 9/11-era. The study uses the method of</p><p>qualitative literature-study with some quantitative segments. It is claimed that states might be</p><p>interested in justifying their behaviour in a morally appealing way and that real reasons may be</p><p>hidden. There are many reasons for states to obtain and keep nuclear weapons and related</p><p>technology (which includes many of the most lucrative elements of the arms industry´s sales).</p><p>Among this reasons are that arms and related technology may be used to influence other states and</p><p>nuclear weapons-construction and modernisation might be used to protect the state from external</p><p>threats, stop unwanted interference from other actors, secure job and gain recognition and prestige</p><p>in world politics. For security reasons states might hold onto their own nuclear weapons and try to</p><p>hinder other actors from getting access to them. The internal actors and driving forces we look at</p><p>are bureaucratic, economical and political, and the MIC-perspective. The military can be said to</p><p>have interests in as much resources and capabilities as possible, which includes advanced</p><p>weaponary such as nuclear weapons and related technologies, at its disposal because of the goal to</p><p>defend the state from all possible threats and for officers career reasons. Much of its influence is</p><p>said to come from its expert knowledge and position and it is said to be especially influential in</p><p>matters of foreign policy, military spending and foreign policy. The major economical actors</p><p>mentioned are big corporations involved in military spending and these have interests in</p><p>maximizing profits. Nuclear weapons making and maintenance and the related areas of missile</p><p>defense and delivering methods for nuclear weapons seem to be areas with high changes of being</p><p>profitable for the involved major companies. The actors wield influence for example through</p><p>lobbying and campaign contributions. An economic driving force claim is that state spending is</p><p>necessary for stimulating the economy and defense spending is easily justified in other ways.</p><p>Political actors and driving forces concerns politicians interest in promoting the interests of</p><p>supporting groups, there are indications that the weapon industry is such a group. Research have</p><p>shown various results about the extent politicians tend to further the interests of supporting groups.</p><p>The MIC-perspective talks about groups with interest in high levels of military spending. Most</p><p>researchers seem to agree that the complex exists but there are different opinions about what actors</p><p>belongs to it and its power on various issues. There is some mention of the core of the complex</p><p>consisting of such internal actors as mentioned above. MIC-related empirical research has been</p><p>conducted and this author finds that the MIC is a relevant analytical tool for the post cold war – and</p><p>9/11 era.</p>

Thesis (M.S.)--Oregon State University, 2009. / Printout. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 52-54). Also available on the World Wide Web.

Master thesis analyzes two NATO Member States, the Netherlands and Norway, and their approach to the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) which was signed on 7 July 2017. Both countries decided not to support the TPNW by either voting against it or abstaining from the negotiations. Research aims to explain why some countries refuse to ban nuclear weapons and what factors influenced the positions of the States on the TPNW. For this purpose, a model-based approach with three models (security, domestic and norm model) developed by Scott Sagan is being applied in each case. These models reflect three international relations theories: neo-realism, liberal institutionalism and constructivism. The security model takes into consideration the security environment that a state is in, whether regionally or globally. It considers security threats to be the fundamental cause of nuclear proliferation. The second model focuses on the domestic actors who encourage or discourage governments from pursuing the bomb, public society and domestic institutions. The last model examines the norms which prevail in the society and form state identity of the State. Based on these three different levels of analysis, the thesis explains what factors were critical in formulating the Dutch and Norwegian positions on...

<p>The aim of this paper is to analyze the North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il’s personality and its influence on North Korea’s negotiating behavior regarding the nuclear issue. Through the theory of social identity shaping and personality disorder, this study has generated a hypothesis by the operationalization of the theoretical framework. By using these analytical methods the following conclusions have been drawn:</p><p>Kim Jong-Il had experienced a sense of loss and damaged self-esteem in his childhood. He had tried to compensate for these feelings through the film industry (which served as an ideological tool) in order to regain his father’s affection, and he succeeded in becoming recognized for his political ability. However, he overcompensated for these feelings of low self-esteem by removing his potential political enemies. The experiences made him acquire an idiosyncratic character and personality disorder. This study has found that North Korea’s nuclear negotiations with the United States since 1993 have reflected Kim Jong-Il’s personality.</p><p>The model of the study can be used as a basis for further academic studies in the practical exploration of the correlations between a country’s foreign policy and its leader’s personality.</p>

This research was conducted to determine the effectiveness of using commercial satellite data to detect covert nuclear weapons programs. Seven-band Landsat Thematic Mapper data covering the Pahute Mesa (an area within the United States Nevada Nuclear Testing Site), acquired on October 16, 1985, were analyzed to determine if underground nuclear test sites were spectrally distinguishable from the surrounding area. The analysis consisted of four steps: (1) analyzing the raw data, (2) manipulating the raw data through contrast stretching, filter application, matrix algebra, and principal components analyses, (3) identifying parameters that affect classification of underground nuclear tests and (4) selectively limiting parameters. The results of limiting parameters showed that a supervised classification of a signature created with a five-original-pixel seed of one representative, known test site provided an accurate classification of most known test sites. To further eliminate erroneous classification of roads and other areas of similar reflectance, these areas were seeded to create a second signature. This signature, whose spectral responses were different, was then used in a simultaneous classification. This classification further eliminated erroneous classification of non-test site areas, demonstrating that commercial satellite digital data can aid in the detection of covert nuclear weapons programs, in this case, underground nuclear testing. An application of the classification scheme used is proposed to confront a scenario in which a country seeks additional verification of another party's proposed violation of test ban treaties. / Department of Physics and Astronomy

The United States-Japanese missile defense cooperation signals yet another step in Japan's continuing trend of "normalization" and official acknowledgement that Japan has a significant military force. This thesis analyzes the current status of the Japanese missile defense debate and assesses factors shaping the Japanese commitment to joint missile defense with the United States. Three major inter-related trends mark the course of Japanese post- Cold War SDF evolution, relations with the United States and the missile defense debate. These include a willingness to relax legal considerations on the use of military force, the expansion of the roles for the JSDF, and the responsiveness of Japanese decision makers to external factors, notably the requirement to improve relations with the United States and the threat perceived from North Korea. This represents a shift to a more military-based security outlook away from the traditional notion of "comprehensive security." These trends point invariably to the amendment of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. To maximize U.S. interests, Washington must pursue a balanced and limited missile defense in East Asia and actively undertake measures to avoid the perception of a threat to Chinese nuclear deterrence.

This thesis analyzes the current intelligence reform initiatives in light of multiple recommendations from post-9/11 commissions tasked with studying intelligence shortcomings. Using North Korea as a case study, it examines how reform efforts will increase capabilities to better understand Pyongyang's WMD programs and affect U.S. strategy on North Korea. Three reform sets should significantly improve U.S. understanding of North Korea's WMD programs. Collection reforms should allow intelligence agencies to gather more information to gain increased insight into Pyongyang's WMD programs. Analysis reforms will develop alternative methods and create streamlined procedures to avoid failures such as those witnessed in Iraq. Collaboration reforms should enable the Intelligence Community to shed its "stovepipe" mentality, facilitating unity of effort in reducing intelligence gaps on North Korea's dangerous programs. Intelligence reform, while necessary, is insufficient to deal with the North Korean threat. An engagement strategy could help the Intelligence Community better understand North Korea and its WMD programs by bringing Pyongyang into the international fold and lowering its isolationist tendencies. Engagement could increase intelligence collection opportunities and give decisionmakers more relevant information yielding better decisions and improved counterproliferation efforts. Finally, ongoing reforms should better equip policymakers to tackle broader issues such as terrorism and counterproliferation.

Since the end of the Cold War, the emphasis on nuclear deterrence has declined. The rise of China has generated a voluminous literature on power transition theory and whether China and the United States can avoid the “Thucydides Trap.” A lacuna in this literature is the role that nuclear deterrence plays in the strategic dynamic between the United States, Japan, and China. This dissertation fills this lacuna by analyzing the role that nuclear deterrence plays in the military strategies of Japan, China, and the United States. How do China and Japan internalize and understand nuclear deterrence theory in ways that depart from the Cold War paradigm? What effect do dissimilar conceptions of nuclear deterrence theory have on the nuclear and conventional force structure and strategies of each country? To understand the reasons for variation in nuclear strategy in East Asia, I argue that contra systemic theories Japan legitimizes its military capabilities in an extended nuclear deterrence framework based on ideationally driven constitutional theory. Departing from Japan’s strategic mindset during the Cold War, China now occupies the place of the “Other” in Japanese national identity, thus in part explaining its shift to a more pro-active military posture. This is to say that it is not China’s rise that preoccupies Japan, but China’s rise that influences Japanese strategic behavior. Lastly, I argue that China’s assertive foreign policy behavior and nuclear strategy are driven not by structural incentives dictated by the international system, but by ideational and historical imperatives under the rubric of the “China Dream (zhongguo meng)” and “National Rejuvenation (minzu fuxing).” Using analyses of Japanese and Chinese language sources, e.g., official government and defense documents, newspapers, books, and journal articles, this dissertation makes two major contributions. First, departing from the dominant and acultural structural realist and game theoretic approaches to nuclear deterrence theory, it offers an alternative “thin constructivist approach” that considers distinct ideational determinants of each country’s approach to nuclear deterrence theory and their effect on nuclear strategy. Second, it uncovers dissimilar approaches to nuclear escalation that depart from Cold War-derived models.