What is a nuclear umbrella alliance and how does it differ from other defensive alliances in international politics? Scholars and practitioners frequently refer to this type of pact, but no study has defined it or identified how a nuclear security guarantee, as an umbrella alliance is better-termed, is unique. This dissertation presents and tests a theory of nuclear security guarantee formation and management. In Chapter 1, I establish two factors that make nuclear security guarantees novel: their ambiguous treaty content and unilateral provision of military aid. I present my Theory of Absolute Alliances, positing that these alliance attributes can be explained by the fact that security guarantees aim to establish deterrence by punishment in addition to deterrence by denial. Security guarantees' vague content and one-sided provision of capabilities, however, means that they are also riddled with vexing information problems that patron and client must manage at all stages of their alliance relations. I derive three hypotheses on security guarantee formation, entrapment, and abandonment that are tested in this project. In Chapters 2 and 3 I present a hypothesis on nuclear security guarantee formation, positing that while the presence of shared adversaries among prospective allies may explain the formation of many defense pacts, nuclear security guarantees have more exacting conditions for formation. For security guarantees to form, prospective allies should have exclusive adversaries--that is, one or more shared adversaries and no unshared adversaries--between them. I test this proposition statistically and using case studies of the US decision to deny Israel a formal security guarantee and the formation of the Franco-Russian alliance, a non-security guarantee. In Chapter 4 I hypothesize that security guarantees' ambiguous and unilateral nature may create a heightened risk of crisis entrapment for patrons. These features serve the purposes of general deterrence, but once an ally is involved in a crisis, they also mean that the patron is inclined to intervene to clarify its commitment to a weaker ally that cannot credibly defend itself. I test this hypothesis using summary statistics and qualitative case studies of the US-Taiwan and Sino-Soviet alliances in the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis. I also examine US non-intervention in the Beagle Channel Crisis, a non-security guarantee case. In Chapters 5, I present a hypothesis on client state abandonment fears. Security guarantee clients are prone to particularly acute abandonment fears, and I posit that because of the a priori information deficits in these pacts, abandonment fears can be addressed through the unilateral provision of information on patron strategies and policies. I examine case studies of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group and the Extended Deterrence Dialogues in the US-Japan alliance, and consultation in the US-Thailand alliance, a non-security guarantee. I find significant support for my three hypotheses and conclude this study with directions for future research and policy implications.

The question of use or non-use of nuclear weapons has suddenly got new prominence as part of the search for an effective strategy against international terrorism. This dispute is not new. Within the deterrence strategy, American and NATO nuclear weapons policy over the years shifted from massive retaliation over flexible response towards nuclearweapons only as a last resort. <br>In the multilateral framework, deliberations have focussed on positive and negative assurances for non-nuclear weapons states. The International Court of Justice, in its Advisory Opinion, considers the use of nuclear weapons as generally contrary to the rules of international law. Today, there are strong indications that the U.S. is moving towards giving nuclear weapons a war-fighting role. For future wars, the likelihood of nuclear weapons being used would grow considerably.

Mit diesem Appell unterstützen die ehemaligen Präsidenten Polens Lech Wałęsa und Aleksander Kwaśniewski sowie der ehemalige polnische Ministerpräsident Tadeusz Mazowiecki den Abrüstungsappell des neuen US-Präsidenten Barack Obama. Dieser hat das Ziel einer atomwaffenfreien Welt wieder auf die internationale Agenda gehoben. Angesichts ihrer historischen Erfahrungen befürworten die Polen diese Anti-Atomwaffen-Initiative. Um dieser mehr Rückenwind zu verleihen, könnte auch ein stärkeres Engagement führender deutscher Politiker nicht schaden.

Obamas Rede im Prager Frühling des Jahres 2009 sollte ein neuer Startschuss sein für die atomare Abrüstung. Im Winter 2011 herrscht Ernüchterung. Die Hoffnung auf eine atomwaffenfreie Welt hat sich nicht erfüllt. Neben kleinen Etappenerfolgen sind sogar Aufrüstungstendenzen zu verzeichnen, zwanzig Jahre nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges. Die Forderung nach Global Zero steht weiterhin im politischen Raum. Beziehungsdiagnostik: Von Spannungen zwischen der Türkei und Israel, dem Austausch zwischen China und Deutschland sowie der Zukunft des transatlantischen Verhältnisses berichten weitere Beiträge der aktuellen Ausgabe – klar, pointiert, streitbar.

Säbelrasseln und Bombendrohungen am Persischen Golf. Israelische Politiker sprechen sich für Angriffe auf iranische Nuklearanlagen aus, bevor es zu "spät" sei. US-Verteidigungsminister Panetta hält einen Angriff Israels auf den Iran im Frühling für wahrscheinlich, während sein Präsident abwiegelt: Israel habe noch keine Entscheidung getroffen, man müsse den Sanktionen mehr Zeit geben. Mittlerweile werden aber die Instrumente scharf gemacht. Die 5. Flotte überwacht den Golf; in der Region sind etwa 40.000 US-Soldaten stationiert. Der Iran setzt auf Seemanöver.

Abstract Since being developed in 1956, no matter it¡¦s category, function or quantity, Chinese ballistic missiles have kept renewing and increasing. For example, the development of its strategic missiles has undergone the 1st through the 3rd generation with models from Dongfeng-1 to currently developing Dongfeng-41 Ballistic Missile, and its warhead has been gradually developed from carrier of single nuclear head to combination of both traditional and nuclear warheads and to multiple warheads now. Under such multiple developments, Chinese nuclear strategy according to their official speech has still adopted ¡§minimum deterrence¡¨ claimed by the 1960¡¦s and 1970¡¦s until now, and which has already led to external speculations. They think that Chinese has devoted to modernization of ballistic missiles lately, actively developed more land-based strategic missiles and sea-based nuclear submarines, techniques of multiple warheads and space-based weapons, and reinforced the practicality of tactical nuclear missiles etc. that such development has already exceeded the ¡§minimum deterrence¡¨ strategy, which even develops towards the ¡§limited deterrence¡¨ strategy. Therefore, whether China¡¦s deterrence strategy is changing is one of the assumptions in this study. If China¡¦s deterrence strategy is no longer equipped with the minimum deterrence, then whether the most important features of the minimum deterrence by ¡§no use of nuclear weapons at first¡¨ and China¡¦s¡§three nos principle on nuclear weapons¡¨will be changed accordingly is the second assumption in this study. Chinese ballistic missiles apart from being used as deterrence can also be used to practice coercive and annihilative strategies. Especially in the issue of Taiwan, when Chinese deterrence strategy fails in terms of Taiwan, it may use coercive or annihilative strategies to achieve their political and military objectives. As the ability of Taiwan¡¦s anti-ballistic missile is obviously insufficient; so if Taiwan suffers the attack from Chinese missiles, the result will be unimaginable. Therefore, how to prevent the attack from its missiles is what I would like to discuss in this paper. For the probable battle by the two sides of the Taiwan Strait in the future, in order to quickly facilitate the victory, whether Chinese will use micro-kiloton nuclear warhead to destroy the important and stable military targets in Taiwan to help smooth the warfare and further crash the myth that Chinese will not use nuclear weapons against Taiwan is the 3rd assumption in this paper. Finally how to increase our defense against ballistic missiles and whether we should participate in the TMD (Theatre Missile Defense) provided by America, I will provide several suggestions for references of the related units, hoping to make certain contributions towards Taiwanese prevention against the threat from Chinese ballistic missile.

University of Macau / Faculty of Social Sciences / Department of Government and Public Administration

This thesis is a study of what is said to be at issue in the nuclear weapons debate and constitutes the beginning of an attempt to understand its nature and significance . The technique adopted has been to offer an initial presentation of rival rationales in order to introduce the main concepts and show something of the force of these developed, positions (Vol I pp 7-30) . The two rationales are then related point by point , to give the analytical framework used in the subsequent interviews (pp 31-9) . Each pair of points is expanded and commented upon , and detailed references are given to the books and articles from which the analysis was drawn (pp 40-214) . The next section relates all of this briefly to the main party platforms in Britain , as of June 1987 (pp Zt 1- zt ) Volume II is made up of complete sets of responses to the framework of questions generated in the earlier chapters . The advantages of this method are i that in each case the rationale is laid out verbatim 9 so that premises are explicitly stated and the dependence of subsequent upon prior arguments is clearly seen . This in itself is very rarely done which is why so many proposed policies are so often , and so widely misunderstood . that , because all those consulted have responded to the same set of questions , their alternative sets of answers can be compared with one another point by point . This is the crucial and unique advantage of the approach adopted here . It ensures that what is at issue can be precisely pinpointed. The results as recorded here are in themselves striking and illuminating More important still they open the door to detailed future investigation of a kind which can be done in no other way.

Thesis (M.S.)--Joint Miitary Intelligence College, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 69-72).

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2007. / Cover title. "December 2007." AD-A475 875. Includes bibliographical references. Electronic version available on the Public STINET.