Thesis (Ph. D.)--City University of New York, 1994. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 424-436).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--George Washington University, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 353-370).

Thesis (Ph. D.) -- Ohio State University, 2004. / Includes vita. Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 214-222). Also available via Internet from the Ohio Library and Information Network electronic theses public database. Adobe Acrobat reader required. Address as of 1/5/2006: http://www.ohiolink.edu/etd/send-pdf.cgi?osu1085083063.

Doctor of Philosophy / Security Studies Interdepartmental Program / David R. Stone / Best known for being a ‘rollercoaster’ and a ‘marriage of convenience’, various scholars have tried to reflect upon the true nature of Pak-U.S. relationship under this banner. However, no matter how one examines this relationship one thing is certain –– the experience for both countries has been harrowing. After India settled for non-alignment early in the Cold War, Pakistan seized the opportunity and aligned itself with the United States in the East-West struggle and pledged allegiance to fight communism in Asia. But that was not the only motive –– Pakistan secretly hoped that an alliance with the U.S. would provide it security against India with whom Pakistan had an antagonistic relationship over their outstanding territorial dispute of Kashmir. When the U.S. did not rescue Pakistan as it had hoped for during its war with India in 1965 and sanctioned both countries with an arms embargo, Pakistan felt betrayed. From that period onwards, Pakistan’s list of grievances against the U.S. developed into a narrative of betrayal and abandonment fed by several episodes in their relationship during and after the Cold War –– a period in which Pakistan developed and tested its nuclear weapons –– duly exploited by Pakistani leaders as a tool for populist politics. This dissertation provides the first scholarly account of Pakistan’s narrative and tests its merit against the U.S. non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan under five administrations from Ford to Clinton and finds that Pakistan’s narrative of betrayal and abandonment is uneven and misleading with respect to the objectives and successes of U.S. non-proliferation policy. This dissertation uses multi-archival documents to offer a counter-narrative which argues that Pakistan, although a small state, was able to brilliantly maneuver its way through restricted spaces in its relationship with the U.S. in the past five decades to not only acquire a decent conventional capability through U.S. military assistance but also nuclear weapons due to the fickleness of U.S. non-proliferation policy. This research concludes that the compromises made by the U.S. to accommodate Pakistan and its inconsistency in enforcement of non-proliferation laws has implications for the efficacy and success of U.S. non-proliferation policy with prospective proliferants.

The nuclear age provided U.S. soldiers and statesmen with unprecedented challenges. the U.S. military had to incorporate a weapon into strategic calculations without knowing whether the use of the weapon would be approved. Broad considerations of policy led President Dwight Eisenhower to formulate a policy that relied on nuclear weapons while fully realizing their destructive potential. Despite the belief that possession of nuclear weapons provided strategic superiority, the U.S. realized that such weapons were of little value. This realization did not stop planners from attempting to find ways to use nuclear weapons in Korea and Indochina.

Though many international relations theorists have speculated that the spread of nuclear weapons may diminish the frequency - if not the severity - of military conflict among states, there are five reasons to expect that increased proliferation will increase the likelihood that nuclear weapons will be employed for coercive or destructive purposes. These dangers are independent of one another; that is, they are not interconnected as causes and effects. First, as nuclear weapons spread, the notion that these weapons are useful for purposes other than deterrence will spread concomitantly. Those who argue that the spread of nuclear weapons will diminish conflict wrongly assume that the leaders of new nuclear states will consider nuclear weapons useful only for deterrence. Second, actors within states may support policies that undermine deterrence stability. Specifically, such actors could support the deployment of weaponry and other technologies that could - in certain strategic contexts - provide incentives for pre-emptive attacks by one side or the other. Third, one side of an inter-state rivalry may acquire nuclear weapons long in advance of its vulnerable adversary. Often, the leaders of states that enjoy such advantages contemplate attacking their rival before it can acquire nuclear weapons, too. Fourth, though new nuclear states will be assumed to be as careful with their weapons as the older nuclear states, proliferation may nevertheless cause the probability of such accidents to grow at an accelerating rate. As the number of nuclear states increases, the distances between these states decrease, and some of them may assume dangerous launch-on-warning force postures to compensate for their perceived vulnerability to sudden attack. Launch-on-warning increases the danger that accidents could escalate into nuclear violence. Fifth, surreptitious attempts may be made by third parties to instigate nuclear war between other states. The likelihood that the provocateur of such an incident would remain undiscovered increases as the number of nuclear states grows - as does the temptation to instigate such an event.

Yes / This report supports the second in a series of briefings on Trident to be published during 2007 and 2008 as part of the Bradford Disarmamenet Research Centre's programme on Nuclear-Armed Britain: A Critical Examination of Trident Modernisation, Implications and Accountability.

Yes / This briefing paper is the first in a series to published through 2007 and 2008 as part of the Bradford Disarmament Research Centre¿s programme on ¿Nuclear-armed Britain: A Critical Examination of Trident Modernisation, Implications and Accountability¿. The programme has been generously funded by the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust. / Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust

Yes / This briefing paper is the third in a series to be published during 2007 and 2008 as part of the Bradford Disarmament Research Centre¿s programme on Nuclear-Armed Britain: A Critical Examination of Trident Modernisation, Implications and Accountability. / Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust

Yes