The concept of Strategic Culture was developed during the Cold War years as a tool to analyse the nuclear policies of the Soviet Union and the United States, in an effort to assess the likelihood of their utilising their nuclear capabilities. Strategic Culture provides a useful lens through which we may understand the context, outlook and behaviour of states, shedding light on the way they perceive the international community and their role within it. As the Cold War came to an end, the focus of Strategic Culture literature shifted from the nuclear bipolarity that characterised U.S.-Soviet relations, to focus on other states and issue areas that dominated the international agenda within the New World Order. This thesis seeks to return to the original tenets of Strategic Culture, bringing attention back to the initial remits of this area of study, that is, the nuclear strategic cultures of the U.S.A. and Russia. Further to identifying the strategic cultures of the United States and Russia, this research questions whether these have been impacted by the change in international order brought on by the end of the Cold War. This work will also question whether nuclear weapons contorted their respective strategic cultures, or whether their strategic cultures were insulated from the impact of nuclear weapons. It will also assess whether the differences in strategic cultures have brought about differences in nuclear policy.

The thesis is a sociological study of the Greenham Common Women's Peace Camp. It addresses the question of how it is possible for women to act collectively to promote social change: primarily, to resist and transform relations of male domination and female subordination, and, secondarily, to resist the forces of militarism. It highlights the importance for feminist sociology of theoretical and substantive attention to women's agency. The thesis offers an analysis of the origins of Greenham, thereby developing a critique of the gender-ignorance of previous theoretical work on social movements and arguing the importance of attention to macro-, ineso- and micro-level processes in the studying of the creation of collective politA.cal action. The particular character and ethos of Greenham as a form of feminist politics is explored, both in terms of the internal workings of the movement and in its actions confronting the outside world. The responses of the forces which were challenged by Greenham are analyzed, in order to assess its impact. Finally, the transformations in consciousness and identity experienced by women who had been involved with Greenham are discussed, contributing both theoretically and substantively to feminist understandings of women's consciousness and identity.

Thesis (M.S.)--Oregon State University, 2009. / Printout. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 53-54). Also available on the World Wide Web.

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Hugh Gaitskell was leader of the Labour Party between 1955-63. The Cold War was at a critical level and bi-partisanship in international affairs was expected. With Gaitskell's accession this appeared to end, marked in particular by the disputes over Suez, the independent nuclear deterrent and Britain's application to join the European Economic Community. Simultaneously, he was challenged by the Left over nearly every aspect of Labour's foreign and defence policy. Despite these major controversies, Gaitskell's influence over international affairs remains a neglected area of research, and he is remembered more for the domestic controversies over nationalisation, his ill-fated attempt to revise Clause IV and defeat at the 1960 Scarborough conference. This thesis addresses that imbalance by examining Gaitskell's contribution to foreign affairs and the following inter-related areas: bi-partisanship; policy formulation; internal divisions and the power struggle between Left and Right. In addition, it also considers how the structure of the Labour Party benefited the leadership during this turbulent period. The conclusions revise Gaitskell's reputation as a figure of unyielding principle, and demonstrates that his leadership was marked by a mixture of finesse and blunder. His responsibility for the end of bi-partisanship can be discounted, as Labour remained firmly committed to the policies laid down and followed since 1945. Yet, the personal control over policy that he exercised, allied to his determination to mould the Labour Party in his own image, needlessly accelerated the internal struggles for power. While the Scarborough defeat illustrates the limitations of his authority, Suez and Europe display his acute political awareness of the requirements needed to balance national interests, electoral prospects and maintain party unity.

This dissertation investigates the social construction and discursive emergence of US nuclear weapons policy against the backdrop of the nuclear taboo and its associated anti-nuclear discourse. The analysis is drawn from poststructuralism with a focus on the discourses that construct the social world and its attendant “common sense,” and makes possible certain policies and courses of action while foreclosing others. This methodology helps overcome the overdetermined nature of foreign policy, or its tendency to be driven simultaneously by the international strategic environment, the domestic political environment, and powerful domestic organizations, and while being shaped and delimited by the discourses associated with the nuclear taboo. I apply this method to three different cases of presidential administration policymaking: Eisenhower, Reagan, and George W. Bush. In each, the analysis illuminates the coherent discourses that emerged, crystallized, and either became policy, or were usurped by competing discourses and their associated policies. I follow the actions of key actors as they stitched together existing discourses in new ways to create meaning for nuclear weapons and the US arsenal, as well as to limit what could and should be done with that arsenal. The case studies reveal the content of the strategic international, domestic political, organizational, and normative bases of US nuclear weapons policy. These results suggest that most challenges to the nuclear policy status quo emerge from new presidents whose own discourse is built upon personal conviction and critiques of their predecessors. Upon taking office, these sources compete with discourses emerging from organizations, especially the nuclear weapons complex, and anti-nuclear forces including: activists, the scientific community, the international public, US allied governments, and the US public. It was this political conflict and confrontation that made possible the pattern of nuclear weapons policy that characterized each administration. This work points to the strength of the nuclear taboo, and the effort that must be expended for its associated discourses to impact presidential policymaking. This insight provides an opening for managing the nuclear threat posed by the Trump administration’s new nuclear weapons policy.

North Korea began opening an the path towards warmer international relations policy in early 2018, after making several threats against the United States and a series of missile test launches and nuclear tests. This paper argues that North Korea is warming relations because they identify as a nuclear state. If a country as openly hostile towards the United States as North Korea believes itself a nuclear power, then any diplomatic act is made with the knowledge that North Korea has the ability to attack the United States if anything goes wrong. North Korea knows that the United States would have more reasoning to deal diplomatically with the country instead of aggressively when these actions could risk mutually assured destruction. The paper explores the history of North Korea and their nuclear abilities to see if these actions could be predicted given their past behavior. Next the paper explores international relations on why states cooperate and how nuclear weapons have effected state behavior. Then a variety of case studies of U.S. interactions with new nuclear powers seek to predict how the United States will interact with North Korea as s new nuclear power based off of previous dealings with other emerging nuclear states. The paper concludes that North Korea has the right to claim themselves as a nuclear state and craft agreements under the pretense of nuclear brinkmanship. However, the United States will not likely give up their policy of nonproliferation or easily accept North Korea's status. As a result, in line with both North Korea's own cyclical history of hostility and diplomacy, and realist motivations behind policy, it is unlikely that the current rounds of warming tension between the United States and North Korea will continue.

Thesis (LL. M.)--Judge Advocate General's School, United States Army, 1965. / "April 1965." Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 76-80). Also issued in microfiche.

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Europe, Eurasia))--Naval Postgraduate School, September 2008. / Thesis Advisor(s): Yost, David. "September 2008." Description based on title screen as viewed on November 10, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 65-74). Also available in print.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1967. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.