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Yes / Professor Paul Rogers gives a brief overview of the present status of international legal prohibitions against both nuclear and chemical weapons. He then goes on to discuss the need to strengthen the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

Technology tends to evolve over time, leading over things to evolve with it. One example may be the evolution of weapons with technological advancement. When these weapons change, it changes how war is conducted. This paper seeks to delve into the specifics of this phenomena. With technological advancement, the world has seen new threats such as lethal autonomous weapons (LAWs) and cyber weapons. New weapons have been, at times, too threatening. They have created so much stigma around themselves the international community ultimately decided against their use. These weapons may then receive a weapon taboo, discouraging their use. This paper seeks to analyze whether the aforementioned emerging technology weapons – LAWs and cyber weapons – may deserve a taboo. The paper will utilize case studies by examining weapons which were previously given a taboo. By determining why other weapons - specifically chemical and biological weapons (CBWs) and nuclear weapons - received a taboo, this paper will determine whether LAWs and cyber weapons also meet the criteria.

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Russia’s nuclear signaling since the start of the war in Ukraine has been prevalent but far fromeasy to understand. Nuclear threats are often ambiguous and vague—prompting one to wonderjust how effective they are as a coercive tool in general and in the Ukraine war in particular.The destructive potential of nuclear weapons has been described as providing nuclear states witha coercive advantage towards non-nuclear states. Not only as a tool of deterrence but as a tool ofcompellence. However, there may be certain communicative and credibility issues in the way ofsuccessful nuclear coercion. We use data of Russian nuclear signaling in the first 18 months ofthe war in Ukraine and investigate whether these signals are recognized by the Ukrainiangovernment and whether their credibility is questioned. The investigation concludes that Russiannuclear threats are recognized and that the credibility of nuclear threats are sometimesquestioned albeit not consequently. This suggests that the responses to nuclear threats may bejust as ambiguous and vague as the actual threats themselves.

This research investigates the strategic intentions behind the Iranian state's programs for acquiring nuclear weapons. Using Graham Allison's Rational Actor Model of national decision-making, this thesis investigates three questions: 1) Iran's motivations for obtaining nuclear weapons; 2) Iran's strategies for actual use of nuclear weapons; and, 3) alternative political frameworks for the U.S. to use with Iran to minimize the negative effects of a nuclearized Iran. This study asserts that Iran would most likely acquire nuclear weapons for the purposes of self-reliance, a greater international voice, to make up for deficiencies in conventional weapons, and for deterrence. Some scholars argue that since Iran should be designated a "rogue" state, it may become aggressive or hostile once obtaining nuclear weapons. Yet, Iran's political actions actually seem to have become increasingly pragmatic. Hence, it appears that Iran would use this arsenal to induce caution among its rivals to avoid major wars, as well as a tool for deterrence. While current political differences between Iran and America are considerable, this research recommends pursuing greater political engagement with Tehran, focusing on mutual benefits. American policymakers should implement policies which rely on positive inducements for change as well as sanctions for non-compliance. If no rapprochement takes place prior to Iran's nuclearization, however, the U.S. will need to employ tactics for minimizing the significance of Iran having nuclear weapons. This research suggests that Washington could begin by implementing economic, technical and material sanctions, establishing a Middle East missile defense system, and beefing-up U.S. coastal defenses. / Master of Arts

Thesis explores the relationship between insecurity experienced by a State and the creation of a nuclear weapons program, and concludes that with an increase in insecurity, there is an increase in the likelihood that a State will start a nuclear weapons program. The word insecurity is defined in the Merriam Webster Dictionary as "not adequately guarded or safe," and this insecurity can come from threats or aggressive action taken by a State or a group of States. This positive relationship will be explored by looking at Pakistan, North Korea, and South Africa as case studies. The main theory that will be explored is the security dilemma that was first proposed as a theory of international Relations by John H. Herz in his book Political Realism and Political Idealism, and further explored by Herbert Butterfield in History and Human Relations. The main argument in this theory is that States will escalate a conflict among one another if they experience insecurity even if they do not wish to actually go to war but are not willing to communicate and work out their differences diplomatically. Throughout this study, there is a clear connection between these two factors and the security dilemma is a factor in all three case studies. The main conclusion of the paper is that more emphasis should be put on preventing countries from resorting to nuclear weapons programs and creating an environment where diplomacy is used instead of the threat of force, which is a large factor in these countries starting their nuclear weapons programs.

The purpose of this thesis is to explain why states obtain nuclear weapons and the role various actors and interests play in the making of states´ nuclear policies. The main questions are as follows: (1) What big theories exist concerning states obtaining nuclear weapon and nuclear armament in International Relations and what relevance do they have of the post cold-war period?, (2) What is the meaning of the perspective of the Military-Industrial Complex (MIC)?, and (3)Are there empirical studies which supports the existence of a MIC in the United States? The focus lies on actors and driving forces that are internal to states and it is also important to investigate if the theories have relevance for the post 9/11-era. The study uses the method of qualitative literature-study with some quantitative segments. It is claimed that states might be interested in justifying their behaviour in a morally appealing way and that real reasons may be hidden. There are many reasons for states to obtain and keep nuclear weapons and related technology (which includes many of the most lucrative elements of the arms industry´s sales). Among this reasons are that arms and related technology may be used to influence other states and nuclear weapons-construction and modernisation might be used to protect the state from external threats, stop unwanted interference from other actors, secure job and gain recognition and prestige in world politics. For security reasons states might hold onto their own nuclear weapons and try to hinder other actors from getting access to them. The internal actors and driving forces we look at are bureaucratic, economical and political, and the MIC-perspective. The military can be said to have interests in as much resources and capabilities as possible, which includes advanced weaponary such as nuclear weapons and related technologies, at its disposal because of the goal to defend the state from all possible threats and for officers career reasons. Much of its influence is said to come from its expert knowledge and position and it is said to be especially influential in matters of foreign policy, military spending and foreign policy. The major economical actors mentioned are big corporations involved in military spending and these have interests in maximizing profits. Nuclear weapons making and maintenance and the related areas of missile defense and delivering methods for nuclear weapons seem to be areas with high changes of being profitable for the involved major companies. The actors wield influence for example through lobbying and campaign contributions. An economic driving force claim is that state spending is necessary for stimulating the economy and defense spending is easily justified in other ways. Political actors and driving forces concerns politicians interest in promoting the interests of supporting groups, there are indications that the weapon industry is such a group. Research have shown various results about the extent politicians tend to further the interests of supporting groups. The MIC-perspective talks about groups with interest in high levels of military spending. Most researchers seem to agree that the complex exists but there are different opinions about what actors belongs to it and its power on various issues. There is some mention of the core of the complex consisting of such internal actors as mentioned above. MIC-related empirical research has been conducted and this author finds that the MIC is a relevant analytical tool for the post cold war – and 9/11 era.