Magister Philosophiae - MPhil / The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was negotiated to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons, resulting from the dangers associated with the use of these weapons well visible during 1945, in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and a nuclear arms race as seen during the Cuban Missile Crisis. During NPT Review Conferences, held every five years, the strength and integrity of this treaty is tested. Evident in NPT review conferences is the disagreement between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states over the role and importance placed on nuclear weapons and the slow pace of nuclear disarmament. The NPT has been in force for over 40 years; however the threat of nuclear weapons still exists. It then becomes necessary to understand what role the NPT plays in the international system, which differs depending on the theoretical lens used to interpret the NPT. A realist perspective of the NPT reveals that this treaty is an instrument used by dominant states to safeguard and legitimise their hold over nuclear weapons, while denying other states access to these weapons, instead protecting their allies through extended nuclear deterrence. A liberal perspective of the NPT highlights the moral influence of this treaty as an instrument for the benefit of the greater good, to shield humanity from the dangers of a nuclear explosion by delegitimizing nuclear weapons, key to shaping the perceptions of the decision makers of states regarding state security and nuclear weapons particularly. A constructivist interpretation of the NPT argues that this treaty is a social construction by states to impose a measure of order in their relations. At particular times in history, the NPT moves between a realist and liberal interpretation based on critical events that inform its direction. Social agents (decision makers of the state) through their thinking and ideas construct and give meaning to “reality” which is constantly negotiated. With that in mind, no interpretation of the NPT is fixed and for that reason, a constructivist conclusion seems ultimately applicable, namely that the NPT is what states make of it.

This study is designed to assess the effectiveness of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime and analyze theories for effectively analyzing countries that are a risk for proliferating nuclear armaments. The initial phase of my research is designed to assess the existing literature and primary theoretical approaches for analyzing nuclear non-proliferation initiatives and potential nuclear proliferators. My main means of analysis will be to examine the national and international actors involved in each case. With this method, I plan to analyze a government at the level of each of its ruling institutions. Each of these institutions will be analyzed in the context of Joseph Cirincione's five drivers and barriers: security, prestige, domestic politics, technology, and economics. This study will then review multiple historical cases of countries and treaties related to the nuclear non-proliferation issue in the context of my method of analysis. In particular, each historical study will discuss major actors and institutions with respect to the five major proliferation concepts, as a means of demonstrating the validity of my method. The primary section of my thesis will be the application of my method to one of the preeminent nuclear proliferation threats today: Iran. After a discussion of the physical status of Iran's nuclear program, I will begin my analysis in terms of my concepts, and will examine the principal actors involved in the Iranian nuclear dispute. These will be the Iran's moderate and conservative factions, as well as the U.S., Israel, the EU-3, and IAEA, and they will be examined in the context of the five drivers and barriers. The final section will be my overall risk analysis for Iran. My preliminary analysis is that regime survival is the most critical issue when it comes to the principal motivations of a state to develop nuclear arms. If this is correct, policy options designed to take advantage of the actors' positions in Iran can be formulated based on the specific conditions that prevail in Iran.

In my dissertation on 'Security Cooperation as a Way to Stop the Spread of Nu-clear Weapons? Nuclear Nonproliferation Policies of the United States towards the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel, 1945-1968', I study the use of security assistance as nonproliferation policy. I use insights of the Structural Realist and the Rational Institutionalist theories of International Relations to explain, respectively, important foreign policy goals and the basic orientation of policies, on the one hand, and the practical workings and effects of security cooperation on states’ behavior, on the other hand. Moreover, I consider the relations of the United States (US) with the two states in light of bargaining theory to explain the level of US ability to press other states to its preferred courses of action. The study is thus a combination of theory proposing and testing and historic description and explanation. It is also policy-relevant as I seek general lessons regarding the use of security cooperation as nonproliferation policy. I show that the US sought to keep the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) from acquiring nuclear weapons in order to avoid crises with Moscow and threats to the cohesion of NATO. But the US also saw it as necessary to credibly guarantee the security of the FRG and treat it well in order to ensure that it would remain satisfied as an ally and without own nuclear weapons. Through various institutionalized security cooperation schemes, the US succeeded in this – though the FRG did acquire an option to produce nuclear weapons. The US opposed Israel’s nuclear weapon ambitions in turn because of an expectation that Arab states’ reactions could otherwise result in greater tension and risks of escalation and a worse balance-of-power in the area. But as also a US-Israel alliance could have led to stronger Arab-Soviet ties and thus a worse balance-of-power, and as it was not in US in-terest to be tied to Israel’s side in all regional issues, the US was not prepared to guarantee Israel’s security in a formal, credible way like it did in West Germany’s case. The US failed to persuade Israel to forgo producing nuclear weapons but gradually, an opaque nu-clear status combined with US arms sales that helped Israel to maintain a conventional military advantage over Arabs emerged as a solution to Israel’s security strategy. Because of perceptions that Israel and the FRG had also other options than cooperation with the US, and because the US ability to punish them for unwanted action was limited, these states were able to offer resistance when the US pressed its nonproliferation stance on them. / In meiner Doktorarbeit ‘Security Cooperation as a Way to Stop the Spread of Nuclear Weapons? Nuclear Nonproliferation Policies of the United States towards the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel, 1945-1968’ forsche ich die Anwendung von Sicherheitshilfe als Nukleare Nichtverbreitungspolitik. Ich benutze Erkenntnisse der strukturell-realistischen und rational-institutionalistischen Theorien der Internationalen Beziehungen um respektive einerseits wichtige aussenpolitische Ziele und die grundlegende Orientierung der Politik, und andererseits Praxis und die Wirkungen der Sicherheitskooperation auf das Verhalten der Staaten zu erläutern. Überdies studiere ich die Beziehungen der Vereinigten Staaten der America (USA) zu der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (BRD) und Israel aus der Perspektive der Verhandlungstheorie, um zu erklären, wie weit die USA fähig waren, die beiden anderen Staaten zu drängen, nach seinen Prefärenzen zu verhalten. Die Studie ist also eine Kombination von Theorie-Vorschlägen und Theorie-Testen und von historischer Beschreibung und Erläuterung. Die Studie ist auch relevant für Politik: ich suche allgemeine Lehren über die Benutzung von Sicherheitskooperation als Nichtverbreitungspolitik. Ich zeige, dass um Krisen mit Moskau und Drohungen gegen die Kohäsion der NATO zu meiden, die USA zu verhindern versucht haben, dass die BRD eigene Kernwaffen schaffen würde. Aber die USA haben gleichzeitig eingesehen, dass es nötig war, die Sicherheit der BRD glaubhaftig zu garantieren und die BRD gut zu behandeln, um zu gewährleisten, dass sie zufrieden als eine Allierte und ohne eigene Kernwaffen bleiben würde. Dieses is der USA durch verschiedene institutionalisierte Anordnungen für Sicher-heitskooperation gelungen – obwohl die BRD sich eine Option angeschafft hat, Kernwaffen zu produzieren. Die USA waren gegen Israel’s Kernwaffenambitionen wegen der Erwartung, dass die Reaktionen der Arabstaaten sonst zu verstärkten Spannungen und Risiken der Eskalation und zu einem verschlechterten Machtgleichgewicht in der Region führen könnten. Aber weil auch eine US-Israel Allianz zu einem stärkeren Arab-Soviet Band und deswegen zu einen verschlechterten Machtgleichgewicht hätte führen können, und da es nicht im Interesse der USA war, in allen regionalen Fragen auf der Seite Israel’s gebunden zu bleiben, waren die USA nicht bereit, wie im Fall von der BRD, die Sicherheit Israel’s auf einer formalen, glaubhaften Weise zu garantieren. Die USA sind daran gescheitert, Israel davon zu überzeugen, auf Kernwaffenproduktion zu verzichten, aber graduell ist ein opaker Kernwaffenstatus, verbunden mit amerikanischen Waffen-verkaufen, die dem Israel geholfen haben, eine konventionelle militärische Überlegenheit über die Araber zu behalten, als eine Lösung zu Israel’s Sicherheitsstrategie entstanden. Wegen der Erkenntnisse, dass Israel und die BRD auch andere Optionen als die Kooperation mit der USA hatten, und weil die Fähigkeit der USA beschränkt war, die zwei Staaten wegen nichterwünschten Aktionen zu bestrafen, waren diese fähig, sich zu widersetzen, als die USA versucht haben, sie zu ihrer Einstellung der Nichtverbreitung zu drängen.

The Research of the Relationship between the U.S., China and Taiwan After the 911 Incident Abstract The traditional diplomacy of America puts its main focus on Europe with little attention on Asia, however after having the 911 Attack in the U.S.2001, Bush junior administration has immediately adjusted the pace of global strategies. The main strategy has shifted its focus towards Asia, it shows that the US makes National Defences the first priority and seeks for the support of counter- terrorism from China in Asia. Before the 911 incident, China was not at the very heart of American policy in Asia policy, as a result of 1999 Chinese Embassy bombing in Belgrade in the former Yugoslavia Republic of Serbia and the April 2001 Hainan reconnaissance plane incident, there had been an awkward tension between U.S. and China. After seeking the cooperation of counter terrorism with China, it presented an opportunity that the U.S. and China can use to improve their relationship. Since the normalisation between U.S. and China, it has been through from the ¡§strategy cooperation relations¡¨ which was established to against Russia to the neorealism of ¡§constructive relations,¡¨ Clinton era formed a ¡§comprehensive association¡¨ with mainland China and advanced it into ¡§ constructive strategy partnership,¡¨ yet, before 911 Attack, the relationship of Bush junior Administration and China were ¡§strategic competitors¡¨, then after 911 incident, due to the strategy transformation of U.S., both parties developed ¡§ Constructive cooperation relations, ¡¨ even though there are still conflicts on the benefits, U.S.-China relation has ameliorated to some extent. As far as U.S. concerns, China is regarded a partner of counter terrorism and benefit exchanger by the world, yet U.S. recognises China as a potential strategic adversary, in some ways, U.S. still exposes the threatening gesture to China. Bush junior has indicated to China that U.S. does not support the independence of Taiwan, but if China force invades Taiwan on the premise that Taiwan does not declare independence, U.S. does not rule out the possibility of assisting Taiwan by the means of miliary. It has shown the U.S. strategy has changed from ¡§strategic ambiguity¡¨ to ¡§strategic clear¡¨ since Clinton to Bush junior. After the 911 incident, the relationship of U.S. and China has definitely improved in a short period, in terms of the long run, both parties still have serious differences regarding to the problem of Taiwan, human rights, economics impacts and anti nuclear proliferation. These conflicts still restrain the development of U.S and China relationship, in addition, U.S. has troops in middle Asia, in terms of the military strategy, the benefit of Mainland China is deprived. In terms of long term U.S-China relationship, it represents a cooperative yet defensive relationship, on the basis of that Taiwan does not declare independence, according to U.S.-Taiwan relationship, U.S. will secure the safety of Taiwan, and maintain the peace cross-straits.

In a recent paper Jan Ruzicka and Nicholas J. Wheeler have posited that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is an example of several ¿trusting relationships¿. The authors assert that ¿since the end of the 1990s the trusting relationships embodied in the NPT have come under strain¿ and that this accounts for the fact that the ¿treaty is facing growing pressures that are eroding what has been an effective barrier to nuclear weapons proliferation¿. This article questions the assumptions underlying this analysis. It argues that the approach taken by Ruzicka and Wheeler fundamentally misconceives the dynamics of nuclear non-proliferation. The policy implications generated by this approach are impractical and downright dangerous as they fail to address the causes of proliferation and instead exacerbate the problem further.

Thesis (M.Sc.)--Memorial University of Newfoundland, 2004. / Restricted until October 2005. Bibliography: leaves 104-113.

The development of nuclear weapons and their proliferation: A comparison of Iran and North Korea Master Thesis Author: Martin Marek Supervisor: PhDr. Vít Střítecký, M.Phil., Ph.D. Year: 2016 Abstract The text deals with nuclear proliferation in the cases of Iran and North Korea. The motives of nuclear ambitions are examined using models of Scott D. Sagan and other selected theoretical concepts. Gradual analysis of exposed states in the perspective of historical development, national security, domestic politics and norms forms the basis for understanding the perception of nuclear weapons by these states and approach to them as to a mean to accomplish certain objectives. Subsequent comparison reveals both similarities and difference between examined states in the perspective of motives of nuclear proliferation and shows explanatory potential of each model, which is various, in given cases. The effort of ensuring national security seems to be the strongest motive in both examined cases. It is followed by domestic influences, whereas norms stand rather for additional factor. Nevertheless, variety in explanatory power of the models is apparent in the cases of Iran and North Korea, notably in relation with their limitations. Other factors, such as regime type or parallel development of other type of weapons of...

In this work, the antineutrino spectrum as specifically generated by nuclear reactors is studied. The topics covered include corrections and higher-order effects in reactor antineutrino experiments, one of which is covered in Ref. [1] and another contributes to Ref. [2]. In addition, a practical application, antineutrino safeguards for nuclear reactors, as summarized in Ref. [3,4] and Ref. [5], is explored to determine its viability and limits. The work will focus heavily on theory, simulation, and statistical analyses to explain the corrections, their origins, and their sizes, as well as the applications of the antineutrino signal from nuclear reactors. Chapter [1] serves as an introduction to neutrinos. Their origin is briefly covered, along with neutrino properties and some experimental highlights. The next chapter, Chapter [2], will specifically cover antineutrinos as generated in nuclear reactors. In this chapter, the production and detection methods of reactor neutrinos are introduced as well as a discussion of the theories behind determining the antineutrino spectrum. The mathematical formulation of neutrino oscillation will also be introduced and explained. The first half of this work focuses on two corrections to the reactor antineutrino spectrum. These corrections are generated from two specific sources and are thus named the spent nuclear fuel contribution and the non-linear correction for their respective sources. Chapter [3] contains a discussion of the spent fuel contribution. This correction arises from spent nuclear fuel near the reactor site and involves a detailed application of spent fuel to current reactor antineutrino experiments. Chapter [4] will focus on the non-linear correction, which is caused by neutron-captures within the nuclear reactor environment. Its quantification and impact on future antineutrino experiments are discussed. The research projects presented in the second half, Chapter [5], focus on neutrino applications, specifically reactor monitoring. Chapter [5] is a comprehensive examination of the use of antineutrinos as a reactor safeguards mechanism. This chapter will include the theory behind safeguards, the statistical derivation of power and plutonium measurements, the details of reactor simulations, and the future outlook for non-proliferation through antineutrino monitoring. / Ph. D.

The objectives of the study were to demonstrate that South Africa's decisions to develop and destroy its nuclear weapon capability were influenced by reactions to domestic security and other issues unrelated to security. South Africa obtained a nuclear weapon capacity because of an incremental approach to the nuclear weapon decision. The threat perceptions in the mind of the decision maker were also dominant factors, especially when the final decision for a nuclear deterrent was taken. The decision to destroy the nuclear weapon capacity was not primarily influenced by the growing non-proliferation norm, but by the changing security environment regionally as well as globally and possibly a realisation that a nuclear weapon capability was a significant security and financial liability for South Africa in the end. / Political Science / M.A. (International Politics)

The objectives of the study were to demonstrate that South Africa's decisions to develop and destroy its nuclear weapon capability were influenced by reactions to domestic security and other issues unrelated to security. South Africa obtained a nuclear weapon capacity because of an incremental approach to the nuclear weapon decision. The threat perceptions in the mind of the decision maker were also dominant factors, especially when the final decision for a nuclear deterrent was taken. The decision to destroy the nuclear weapon capacity was not primarily influenced by the growing non-proliferation norm, but by the changing security environment regionally as well as globally and possibly a realisation that a nuclear weapon capability was a significant security and financial liability for South Africa in the end. / Political Science / M.A. (International Politics)