No description available.

No description available.

The person of the counsellor, or what is sometimes referred to as the counsellor�s self, is the focus of this thesis. How the counsellor�s self is described and manifested during therapy constitute the two main research questions. Various perspectives are presented from psychoanalysis, behaviour therapy, cognitive behaviour therapy, person centered therapy and systems therapy. While issues pertaining to the counsellor�s self have been explored predominately by systems therapists, this study extends previous research by involving interviews with counsellors from a range of orientations. The study is conducted within an interpretative research paradigm, and data are collected and interpreted according to a qualitative approach. Semi-structured interviews with 16 counsellors, from a range of theoretical orientations, constitute the primary method of data collection. Other data sources include a short questionnaire sent to the same counsellors, the researcher�s reflective journal as well as recorded meetings between a peer debriefer and the researcher. Study participants describe the counsellor�s self as a multifaceted, positive and integrated entity. The counsellor�s self includes participant�s professional knowledge and skills as well as their beliefs, values, thoughts, feelings, personal style and an unknown aspect of self that some participants referred to as their unconscious. While somewhat influenced by past relationships and the client, the counsellor�s self is primarily autonomous and defined by the individual counsellor. Although the counsellor�s self has the capacity to change over time, in different environments and with different clients, the self also includes notions of stability and consistency. The counsellor�s self is involved in therapy as an inevitable presence, a deliberate tool and a stance. Participants highlighted the importance of self-awareness and various professional and personal constraints on the involvement of self. A central function of the self in therapy is in the therapeutic alliance. The study has implications for the training and supervision of counsellors and future psychotherapeutic research.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Rutgers University, 2007. / "Graduate Program in History." Includes bibliographical references (p. 221-229).

Thesis (S.T.M.)--Trinity Lutheran Seminary, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 126-130).

Diss. jur. Fak. Bern, 1896.

Mannheim, Univ., Diss., 2004.

Thesis (S.T.M.)--Trinity Lutheran Seminary, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 126-130).

Edmund Gettier' s article Is justified true belief knowledge? raised substantial interest in the concept of epistemic justification, especially in Anglo-American epistemology. Discussions of the concept of epistemic justification form a large and varied field of study, covering a large number of related aspects. Not all these aspects are dealt with in this study. The distinction between 'structural' and 'perspectival' aspects is introduced as a theoretical tool to limit the scope of the study to covering only 'perspectival' aspects. These refer to aspects related to the perspective from which justification is carried out, i.e. whether it be from a first-person or from a third-person perspective. The first chapter gives a brief characterisation of the nature of epistemic justification, describing how it is related to the aim of maximising truth and minimising falsity. The concept of epistemic justification also has a normative character, defining justification in terms of blameworthiness. In the second chapter a concept of justification defined in terms of blameworthiness is discussed. A conception of justification construed along normative lines is properly termed 'deontological'. Criticism against such a conception centres around the problem of the voluntariness of belief. Two varieties of control over belief-formation, direct and indirect control, are discussed. A deontological conception of justification makes it possible for someone to be justified in holding a belief, even though the belief is false. For this reason some epistemologists reject justification defined in deontological terms. The discussion of the deontological conception of justification brings the main problem of first-person justification to the fore, i.e. how to determine, from such a perspective, whether one's belief-formation will lead to truth. Chapter 3 discusses the merit and problems of first-person justification in general. The matter of intersubjective principles as a means to achieve objective truth from a subjective perspective is investigated. The existence and nature of such principles are much-contested matters. Many epistemologists deny that such principles exist innately. However, without intersubjective, truthconducive rules that someone can appeal to, the possibility exists that someone's beliefs may constitute mere belief, in whatever way they are supported by the person's other beliefs. This compels some to reject subjective justification as a valid conception of epistemic justification. In chapter 4 'internalism', the most recent term for subjective justification, is discussed in comparison with internalism's main contemporary rival, 'externalism'. The different levels of internalism that result from different requirements set for someone's awareness of his justifiers are also discussed, as well as the relationship between internalism and deontology, and between internalism and truth. Chapter 5 deals with the main criticism that externalists level against internalism, i.e. that it creates an infinite justificational regress. Analysis of the structure of the internalist regress shows that a vicious regress is not involved. It is concluded that the notion of justificational perspective has to be incorporated into a theory of epistemic justification in order for such a theory to be able to deal with first-person epistemic situations. This also provides a strategy for accommodating immediate justifiers in an 'internalist' conception of justification without creating an infinite justificational regress. Furthermore it lays foundations for an internalismjexternalism integration theory. AFRIKAANS : Edmund Gettier se artikel getiteld Is justified true belief knowledge?, epistemiese het ongekende regverdiging belangstelling in veroorsaak, veral die in kwessie van die Engels- Amerikaanse kennisleer. Die bespreking van die begrip 'epistemiese regverdiging' vorm 'n bre~ studieveld wat 'n groat verskeidenheid verwante aspekte insluit. Al hierdie aspekte kon onmoontlik bespreek word in dié studie, daarom is 'n onderskeid getref tussen 'strukturele' aspekte en 'perspektiwiese' aspekte. Die omvang van die studie is daarvolgens beperk tot die bespreking van aspekte wat verband hou met die gesigspunt waaruit regverdiging plaasvind, dit wil se, hetsy dit uit 'n eerstepersoonsgesigspunt of uit 'n derdepersoonsgesigspunt plaasvind. In die eerste hoofstuk word 'n kort oorsig gegee van die aard van epistemiese regverdiging. Epistemiese regverdiging het die verkryging van waarheid en die vermyding van vals oortuigings as doelwit. Epistemiese regverdiging is ook normatief van aard, en dit maak 'n definisie daarvan in terme van blaam en aanspreeklikheid moontlik. In die tweede hoofstuk word só 'n definisie, wat bekend staan as 'n deontologiese opvatting van epistemiese regverdiging, bespreek. Die hoofbeswaar teen so 'n opvatting raak die vraagstuk of dit moontlik is om na willekeur beheer uit te oefen oor die verwerwing van oortuigings. Twee soorte beheer, direkte beheer en indirekte beheer, word bespreek. 'n Deontologiese opvatting van epistemiese regverdiging maak dit A moontlik vir iemand om geregverdig te wees om 'n oortuiging te he, selfs al is die oortuiging vals. Party epistemoloë verwerp die deontologiese opvatting vir hierdie rede. Die bespreking van die deontologiese opvatting bring die hoofprobleem van eerstepersoonsregverdiging na vore. Dit is hoe om uit 'n eerstepersoonsgesigspunt vas te stel of die manier waarvolgens 'n mens se oortuigings gevorm word, na waarheid sal lei. Hoofstuk 3 bespreek die probleme omtrent, en die meriete van, eerstepersoonsregverdiging in die algemeen. Die kwessie van intersubjektiewe beginsels, wat na veronderstelling 1 n persoon wat uit 'n subjektiewe gesigspunt te werk gaan, sal lei na waarheid, word ondersoek. Dat sulke beginsels bestaan en wat hulle aard mag wees, is sake wat baie bespreking uitlok. Baie epistemoloë ontken dat sulke aangebore beginsels bestaan. Sonder intersubjektiewe beginsels wat ook na waarheid lei, bestaan die moontlikheid egter dat iemand se oortuigings niks meer mag wees nie as blote oortuigings, ongeag hoe hulle ook al onderling saamhang. Op grond hiervan verwerp sommige epistemoloë die moontlike definisie van epistemiese regverdiging in terme van blaam en aanspreeklikheid. In hoofstuk 4 word 'internalismé , wat die jongste benaming vir subjektiewe regverdiging is, bespreek in vergelyking met 'eksternal1sme', wat internal1sme se kontemporêre teëvoeter is. Die verskillende vlakke van internalisme word bespreek. Hierdie vlakke ontstaan as gevolg van verskillende vereistes waaraan 'n persoon se bewustheid van die gronde van sy oortuigings gemeet word. Internalisme word ook bespreek in verwantskap met die deontologiese opvatting en in verwantskap met waarheid. In hoofstuk 5 kom eksternaliste se hoofbeswaar teen internalisme onder bespreking. Dit behels die bewering dat internalisme 'n oneindige regressie tot gevolg het. 'n Ontleding van die internalistiese regressie laat egter blyk dat die beswaar op 'n foutiewe veronderstelling rus. Die gevolgtrekking word gemaak dat dit noodsaaklik is om die kwessie van die gesigspunt waaruit regverdiging plaasvind in te sluit in 'n teorie van epistemiese regverdiging. Dit is noodsaaklik ten einde vir so 'n teorie om by vermoë te wees om ook eerstepersoons epistemiese situasies aan te spreek. Sodoende word 'n strategie daargestel waarvolgens direkte gronde van regverdiging in 'n internalistiese opvatting van epistemiese regverdiging ingesluit kan word, sonder om 'n oneindige regressie te veroorsaak. So 'n werkwyse lê ook grondslae vir die ontwikkeling van 'n teorie waarin internalisme en eksternalisme verenig kan word. Copyright / Dissertation (MA)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Philosophy / unrestricted

This thesis aimed to critique the research on person centred care (PCC) in neurorehabilitation, and consider how PCC in this setting can be further developed. Paper One reviews the extant literature on PCC in neurorehabilitation. The literature search returned 27 papers, which were critiqued for quality, how they conceptualised PCC, how they practiced PCC and the feasibility of PCC. Conceptualisations of PCC used varied from narrow conceptualisations of PCC as participation in goal setting, to broader ones which also incorporated issues such as shared decision making, outcomes, respect and emotional support. Similarly, methods of practicing PCC primarily used goal setting, with a minority of papers addressing outcomes and communication aspects of PCC. The review found that PCC is feasible for neurorehabilitation, with important benefits for clients and professionals. Providing PCC in neurological rehabilitation can be challenging and the literature review discusses ways to overcome barriers to PCC. The literature review highlights the need for methods to assess and develop PCC which are suitable for people with and without cognitive impairments. Paper Two addresses this need, by presenting research investigating the feasibility of using Dementia Care Mapping (DCM) on a neurorehabilitation ward. DCM is an observational method aims to document the quality of care from the perspective of the patient. DCM was found to be feasible for use on a neurorehabilitation ward, as shown by the suitability of the coding system. Q-methodology was used to assess staff perceptions of DCM. This further supported DCM feasibility, with staff reporting that DCM provided useful information for staff that they could use to improve the care they provided. DCM required some minor amendments in order to be used in a hospital rehabilitation environment and further amendments could improve its suitability for use in neurorehabilitation settings. Paper Three is a critical appraisal of both the literature review and research paper. The strengths and weaknesses of the use of both DCM and Q-methodology are critiqued, and consideration given to the limitations of the research.