Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2004. / Supervisor: Jacqueline Woolley. Vita. Includes bibliographical references. Also available from UMI.

Thesis (M.A.)--The University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 2009. / Directed by Susan D. Calkins; submitted to the Dept. of Psychology. Title from PDF t.p. (viewed May 17, 2010). Includes bibliographical references (p. 30-39).

Theses (M.A.)--University of Canterbury, 2009. / Typescript (photocopy). Includes bibliographical references (leaves 98-103). Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Canterbury, 2009. / Typescript (photocopy). Includes bibliographical references (leaves 297-329). Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (B.A.)--Haverford College, Dept. of Philosophy, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 2009. / Title from title screen (site viewed July 22, 2010). PDF text: viii, 174 p. : ill. ; 884 K. UMI publication number: AAT 3386839 . Includes bibliographical references. Also available in microfilm and microfiche formats.

No description available.

Thesis (M.A.)--Saint Mary's University, 2008. / Includes abstract. Supervisor: Peter March. Includes bibliographical references (leaf 81).

This thesis is about the relationship between a belief being justified and it being true. It defends a version of the view that the fundamental point of having a justified belief is to have a true one. The particular version of that view it defends is the claim that belief is subject to a truth norm – i.e. a norm or standard that says that one should believe something if and only if it’s true. It claims that belief being subject to such a truth norm can explain which beliefs count as justified and which do not. After introducing the idea of a truth norm (Ch. 1), the argument of my thesis involves two main stages. Part One of the thesis (Chs. 2-3) contains the first stage, in which I argue that my way of arguing for a truth norm, on the basis of its explanatory role in epistemology, is much more likely to be successful than a more popular way of arguing for a truth norm, on the basis of its explanatory role in the philosophy of mind. Part Two (Chs. 4-7) contains the second stage, in which I argue that the truth norm can indeed explain justification in the way I’ve outlined. I do this by answering four criticisms that have been made of the claim that belief is subject to a truth norm. These criticisms claim that a truth norm should be rejected because, in turn, a truth norm cannot guide belief formation (Ch. 4), because a truth norm prescribes believing all the truths (Ch. 5), because a truth norm never prescribes suspending judgement (Ch. 6), and because a truth norm in some cases prescribes making problematic trade-offs of having one false belief for the sake of having many true beliefs (Ch. 7). I argue that all of these criticisms fail. But it is through answering these criticisms that we can see the contours of a defensible explanation of justification in terms of the truth norm.

ALMEIDA JÚNIOR, José Gladstone. Análise da teoria da superveniência da consciência. 2014. 93f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2014. / Submitted by Gustavo Daher (gdaherufc@hotmail.com) on 2017-04-17T13:51:41Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_dis_jgalmeidajunior.pdf: 899840 bytes, checksum: f0a8006c5240ce9c03215b521157f24a (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2017-04-18T11:01:02Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_dis_jgalmeidajunior.pdf: 899840 bytes, checksum: f0a8006c5240ce9c03215b521157f24a (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-04-18T11:01:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_dis_jgalmeidajunior.pdf: 899840 bytes, checksum: f0a8006c5240ce9c03215b521157f24a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 / Certainly consciousness is something extremely familiar and, at the same time, enigmatic for us. Its phenomenal aspect, called phenomenal consciousness, imposes a number of barriers to reductionist approaches proposed by physicist/functionalist framework. Such are the difficulties raised by phenomenal consciousness to that reductionist approaches that the problem concerning that aspect of consciousness is the “hard problem of consciousness”. Considering its apparent irreducibility, it is necessary to analyze a framework which have as core an attempt to conciliate the phenomenal consciousness with a minimum commitment with physicalism, insofar as the necessity of a physical substrate that instantiates our conscious experiences is presupposed. Given that impasse the supervenience of consciousness theory arises with the aim of demonstrating a relation of dependence/determination established between the set of consciousness proprieties and the set of physical proprieties of the brain without, however, necessarily entailing a reduction of the former to the last set. Thus, the aim established in this work consist in analyzing in details the supervenience of consciousness theory and the framework which it inserts and, posteriorly, arguing about the reasons that make that theory unable to provide a substantial relation between consciousness and its physical substrate. / Certamente a consciência é algo extremamente familiar e, ao mesmo tempo, enigmático para nós. Seu aspecto fenomenal, denominado de consciência fenomenal, impõe inúmeras barreiras às abordagens reducionistas propostas pelo quadro teórico fisicista/funcionalista. Tamanhas são as dificuldades suscitadas pela consciência fenomenal a estas abordagens reducionistas que o problema referente a este aspecto da consciência constitui o “problema difícil da consciência”. Considerando sua aparente irredutibilidade, se faz necessário analisar um quadro teórico que tenha como cerne a tentativa de conciliar a consciência fenomenal com um compromisso mínimo com o fisicismo, na medida em que se pressupõe a necessidade de um substrato físico que instancie nossas experiências conscientes. Diante deste impasse a teoria da superveniência da consciência surge com o objetivo de demonstrar uma relação de dependência/determinação estabelecida entre o conjunto de propriedades da consciência e o conjunto de propriedades físicas do cérebro sem, no entanto, implicar necessariamente em uma redução do primeiro ao segundo conjunto. Desta forma, o objetivo estabelecido neste trabalho consiste em analisar pormenorizadamente a teoria da superveniência da consciência e o quadro teórico no qual esta se insere e, posteriormente, argumentar sobre os motivos que fazem desta uma teoria incapaz de fornecer uma relação substancial entre a consciência e seu substrato físico.