This thesis is about consciousness and representation. More specifically, the big picture issue in the background throughout is the relationship between consciousness (or "phenomenology") and representation (or "intentionality") in the life of the mind. Phenomenology and intentionality are inarguably the two central topics in philosophy of mind of the last half-century. The question of phenomenology is, "how can there be something it feels like, from a subjective viewpoint, for a physical being to experience the world?" The question of intentionality is, "how can something physical, such as a brain state, be about, or represent, some other thing out in the world?" Not too long ago, the majority opinion was that these two questions addressed two essentially independent domains. However, in recent years the views of many philosophers have swung dramatically in the opposite direction. An important theme of analytic philosophy of mind in the last decade or two has been the exploration of the groundbreaking idea that these two domains might be fundamentally linked in previously unrecognized ways. Perhaps phenomenal properties are reducible to certain kinds of intentional properties. Perhaps the mind's non-derivative intentionality is grounded in phenomenology. Perhaps we should think of phenomenology and intentionality as "intertwined, all the way down to the ground" (Chalmers 2004, 32). This thesis addresses one crucial question within this larger framework: whether, and how, thoughts are phenomenally conscious. Thoughts are an important test case for theories about the relationship between phenomenology and intentionality, because they have long been considered paradigmatic intentional states, in contrast to perceptual and sensory experiences, which are paradigmatic phenomenal states. While there is something it is like, from the inside, for an individual to undergo a perceptual experience such as an olfactory experience of roasted coffee beans, by contrast entertaining a thought might seem to lack such a distinctive qualitative "feel". The thought is clearly intentional: it involves carrying informational content about objects and properties in the world. But is there also something it is like for a subject to experience thinking itself? To answer this question in the affirmative is to accept the existence of a phenomenology of thought, so-called "cognitive phenomenology" (CP). The literature on this topic so far has focused primarily on the question of whether CP exists. Here I will focus on the subtly different, and largely neglected, question of whether a kind of CP exists that is able to determine thought's intentional content. Many proponents of CP seem to be motivated by the hope that it can, since they believe that in the case of other conscious states, the phenomenology accounts for the intentionality. However, in what follows I argue that this ambitious project is doomed to fail, because CP is not suited to determine the intentional content of thought.

This thesis aims to present and defend an account of affective perception. The central argument seeks to establish three claims. 1) Certain emotional bodily feelings (and not just psychic feelings) are world-directed intentional states. 2) Their intentionality is to be understood in perceptual terms: such feelings are affective perceptions of emotional properties of a certain kind. 3) These ‘emotion-proper properties’ are response-dependent in a way that entails that appropriate affective responses to their token instances qualify, ipso facto, as perceptions of those instances. The arguments for (1) and (2) appeal directly to the phenomenology of emotional experience and draw heavily from recent research by Peter Goldie and Matthew Ratcliffe. By applying Goldie’s insights into the intentional structure of psychic feelings to the case of emotional bodily feelings, it is shown that certain of the latter—particularly those pertaining to the so-called ‘standard’ emotions—exemplify world-directed intentionality analogous to the perceptual intentionality of tactile feelings. Adapting Ratcliffe’s account of the analogy between tactile feelings and what he terms ‘existential feelings’, it is argued that standard emotional bodily feelings are at the same time intrinsically intentional world-directed perceptual states (affective perceptions) through which the defining properties of emotional objects (emotion-proper properties) are apprehended. The subsequent account of these properties endorses a response-dependence thesis similar to that defended by John McDowell and David Wiggins and argues that tokening an appropriate emotional affective state in response to a token emotion-proper property is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for perception of that property (Claim (3)). The central claim is thus secured by appeal both to the nature of the relevant feelings and the nature of the relevant properties (the former being intrinsically intentional representational states and the latter being response-dependent in a way that guarantees the perceptual status of the former).

This thesis develops and explores a constitutive approach to colour vision, which serves as an alternative to the standard experiential view of colour vision operating in the philosophy of colour. The approach seeks to describe the nature or essence of colour vision qua psychological kind. I argue that it is constitutive of colour vision that an organism possesses the ability to achieve colour constancy. An important feature of my account is that colour constancy is characterised as the ability to discriminate differences in surface reflectance properties across changes in illumination conditions. This differs from the standard ‘appearance invariance view’, which characterises colour constancy by appealing to the phenomenology of apparent colour. I consider an important objection to the appearance invariance view posed by the argument from illumination, which might also seem to carry over to the reflectance discrimination view. The objection is based on the claim that in standard cases of colour constancy the phenomenology of apparent colour is partly illumination-dependent. I argue that the reflectance discrimination view is perfectly able to accommodate this point. As a case study in applying the constitutive approach to illuminate the distinctive nature of colour vision, I argue that a vivid feature of our ordinary experience of colour known as categorical perception should be dissociated from our colour vision abilities. Although colour ontology often is not at the forefront of discussion, these constitutive theses support the ontological view of colour known as reflectance physicalism. I critique the argument from colour similarity, which many take to pose the greatest threat to reflectance physicalism. The thrust of the argument is that colours phenomenally appear to stand in similarity relations that do not correlate with the similarities that are evident among reflectance properties. This argument lacks much force, however, as it fails to acknowledge the extreme context sensitivity of similarity and the presentation sensitivity of our knowledge of similarities.

This thesis examined the developmental differences in inhibition and theory-of-mind of 4-8 year olds as a function of the suggested presence of a supernatural agent. All children played four games designed to assess their current level of inhibition and theory-of-mind performance; Children in the experimental condition, only, were also introduced to an invisible Princess Alice and were told that she was watching during the games. Following these measures, all children engaged in a resistance-to-temptation task to determine any differences in inhibition resulting from Princess Alice's suggested presence. I found that children exhibiting a well-developed theory-of-mind were more likely to express belief in Princess Alice than were children lacking this cognitive ability. This research provided support that cognitive maturity, rather than immaturity, may be necessary for children to express belief in novel supernatural agents, and highlighted the importance of context as a mediating factor in children's behavioral inhibition. / by Ashley King. / Thesis (M.A.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2009. / Includes bibliography. / Electronic reproduction. Boca Raton, Fla., 2009. Mode of access: World Wide Web.

Bering and colleagues (2004, 2005) reported that the expectation that conscious mental states cease with the onset of death (discontinuity reasoning) emerges developmentally, and discontinuity reasoning for some states (emotions, desire, epistemic) remains lower than for others (psychobiological, perceptual). Cormier (2005) reported very similar findings for the context of sleep and proposed a modular explanation of these effects (“intentional persistence”) and suggested that intentional persistence represents an evolved adaptation designed to maintain vigilance and behavioral preparedness while in the presence of animals of ambiguous agency status (e.g., death, sleep, hibernation, feigned death). The current study extended this line of research to realistic animal characters. Although results revealed patterns of discontinuity reasoning and intentional persistence that were consistent with those of previous studies, the prediction that intentional persistence would be more pronounced for predators was not fulfilled. A newly proposed evolutionary product, “Cooptation,” was introduced to further explain the results. / Includes bibliography. / Dissertation (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2014. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

This thesis will explore whether those interested in Buddhist practices such as mindfulness but who approach such practices from a broadly secular perspective can be offered reasons to take rebirth seriously as an afterlife possibility. It will begin by exploring some of the history of mindfulness and its adoption from Buddhism to show how foundational cosmological elements such as rebirth have been side-lined as part of a wider movement to bring Buddhism in line with modernist, particularly scientific, discourses. The thesis will investigate the philosophical principles behind the Buddhist multi-life perspective in order to see whether arguments could be rallied in defence of it. This will involve focussing specifically on the argument in defence of rebirth offered by Dharmakīrti and show how its premises draw from philosophical principles adopted by the earliest Buddhist philosophical systems. Dharmakīrti’s argument will be examined within the context of contemporary philosophy of consciousness where philosophers such as Evan Thompson and Galen Strawson have challenged the view that consciousness could arise from entirely unconscious factors. This challenge aligns with a key premise of Dharmakīrti’s argument for rebirth as well as Buddhist Abhidharma principles. Arguments against the emergence of consciousness from unconscious factors strengthen the case for claiming that consciousness cannot simply appear at the beginning of life and disappear at death. Whilst supporting Strawson’s arguments, the thesis will ultimately reject his claim that an individual consciousness could be constructed from, and ultimately collapse into, multiple consciousnesses. From here it will be argued that conscious experiences arise as part of an unbroken stream that can neither arise from nor collapse into rudimentary factors that are devoid of the distinctive characteristics of consciousness. The argument will conclude by suggesting that the stream of consciousness involves an inseparable capacity for retention and recall. This capacity provides the possibility for the sort of psychological continuity between lives that, within traditional Buddhist cosmology, allows an ordinary being to cultivate the extraordinary personal qualities of a Buddha.

Choy E Hang. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 83-99). / Abstract in English and Chinese. / ABSTRACT --- p.2 / ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS --- p.4 / Chapter CHAPTER I: --- INTRODUCTION --- p.7 / Theory of Mind Hypothesis --- p.7 / Executive Dysfunction Hypothesis --- p.10 / Inhibitory Control --- p.12 / The Present Studies --- p.15 / Hypotheses --- p.17 / Chapter CHAPTER II: --- STUDY 1 --- p.18 / Method --- p.19 / Participants --- p.19 / Materials --- p.19 / Measures --- p.20 / Procedures --- p.23 / Results --- p.25 / Examining Hypothesis 1 --- p.21 / Examining Hypotheses 2 and 3 --- p.28 / Discussion --- p.35 / Chapter CHATPER III: --- STUDY 2 --- p.38 / Method --- p.39 / Participants --- p.39 / Materials --- p.39 / Measures --- p.40 / Procedures --- p.44 / Results --- p.45 / Examining Hypothesis 1 --- p.48 / Examining Hypotheses 2 and 3 --- p.48 / Discussion --- p.52 / Chapter CHATPER IV: --- STUDY 3 --- p.55 / Method --- p.56 / Participants --- p.56 / Materials --- p.56 / Measures --- p.57 / Procedures --- p.61 / Results --- p.62 / Examining Hypothesis 1 --- p.64 / Examining Hypotheses 2 and 3 --- p.64 / Discussion --- p.76 / Chapter CHAPTER V: --- GENERAL DISCUSSION --- p.78 / Conclusion --- p.82 / REFERENCES --- p.83

Wong, Wai Kin. / "November 2011." / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 113-116). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter Chapter 1: --- The problem of mental causation for physicalism --- p.7 / Chapter 1.1 --- Mental causation´ؤintroduction to the problem --- p.7 / Chapter 1.2 --- The problem of mental causation for physicalism --- p.8 / Chapter 1.2.1 --- "A brief introduction to physicalism´ؤlayered model, supervenience, and physical closure" --- p.8 / Chapter 1.2.2 --- What is the mind from a physicalist perspective? --- p.12 / Chapter 1.3 --- Non-reductive physicalism stated --- p.14 / Chapter 1.3.1 --- Commitments and generally accepted claim of physicalism --- p.14 / Chapter 1.3.2 --- Reductive physicalism and non-reductive physicalism --- p.15 / Chapter 1.3.3 --- The non-reductive physicalist's view on mental causation --- p.19 / Chapter 1.4. --- What is next? --- p.20 / Chapter Chapter 2: --- Kim's supervienience/exclusion argument against non-reductive physicalism --- p.21 / Chapter 2.1 --- Introduction --- p.21 / Chapter 2.2 --- Supervenience argument --- p.22 / Chapter 2.3 --- Exclusion argument --- p.25 / Chapter 2.4 --- Implications of the supervenierice/exclusion argument --- p.28 / Chapter 2.5 --- Objections to the supervenience/exclusion argument --- p.29 / Chapter Chapter 3: --- Kim on the principle of causal/explanatory exclusion --- p.33 / Chapter 3.1 --- Introduction --- p.33 / Chapter 3.2 --- Kim's realist commitment --- p.35 / Chapter 3.3 --- Kim's argument for explanatory exclusion --- p.36 / Chapter 3.4 --- From the principle of explanatory exclusion to the principle of causal exclusion --- p.38 / Chapter 3.5 --- Kim's view on non-standard overdetermination and how the gap between EEP and CEP is bridged --- p.39 / Chapter 3.6 --- Kim's view on causation --- p.43 / Chapter 3.7 --- Further implications of production causation for the exclusion argument --- p.47 / Chapter Chapter 4: --- Two concepts of causation and the supervenience/exclusion argument --- p.53 / Chapter 4.1 --- The counterfactual analyses of causation´ؤa general overview --- p.55 / Chapter 4.2 --- How the dependence conception of causation helps non-reductive physicalists to avoid the causal exclusion principle --- p.59 / Chapter 4.3 --- Production conception vs. dependence conception? The debate between Kim and Loewer (I) --- p.62 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- Loewer's objections to the use of production conception in the formulation of the supervenience/exclusion argument --- p.63 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- The first reason put forward by Loewer --- p.63 / Chapter 4.3.3 --- Loewer's argument for (2) --- p.68 / Chapter 4.4 --- Production conception vs. dependence conception? The debate between Kim and Loewer (II) --- p.73 / Chapter 4.4.1 --- Can a non-reductive physicalist distinguish epiphenomena from a genuine causal process by the dependence conception of causation? --- p.74 / Chapter 4.4.2 --- Does agency require production? --- p.78 / Chapter 4.4.3 --- Kim's third objection on omissions --- p.79 / Chapter 4.4.4 --- Loewer's responses to Kim's second and third objections --- p.82 / Chapter 4.4.5. --- Further discussion on Kim's second and third objections --- p.84 / Chapter 4.5 --- Conclusion --- p.87 / Chapter Chapter 5: --- Does Yablo's determination proposal help to solve the exclusion problem for non-reductive physicalism? --- p.88 / Chapter 5.1. --- Yablo's idea elaborated --- p.89 / Chapter 5.1.1 --- Yablo's argument for the determination proposal --- p.91 / Chapter 5.1.2 --- The primacy of the causal status of mental events --- p.94 / Chapter 5.2 --- Evaluating Yablo's idea --- p.96 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- Are mental properties determinables of physical properties? --- p.97 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- The story is not ended. The crux of the issue is not whether the determination proposal is literally true --- p.100 / Chapter 5.2.3 --- Why is proportionality constraint not the solution? --- p.102 / Chapter 5.3 --- What about the causal exclusion principle? --- p.107 / Chapter 5.4 --- Conclusion --- p.108 / Chapter Chapter 6: --- The final conclusion´ؤthe exclusion problem remains unsolved --- p.110 / Responses to the external review --- p.Error! Bookmark not defined. / Bibliography --- p.113

In the always connected and fast-paced modern world we live in, questions about who we are, what our values are, and how to act are more pertinent than ever. What better way to reconcile these questions than turning to a seemingly out of touch 19th century German philosopher, Friedrich Nietzsche? Interestingly enough, Nietzsche lamented that his contemporaries would never understand his work; similarly, he thought of his own work as directed towards ‘philosophers of the future.’ As any present moment passes and as history progresses, we, in a sense, run away from ourselves. This projecting of oneself into the future is unavoidable. Could one ever strictly pin down oneself in such a way to eliminate this problem of time? Of course not! This is an absurd question. What we should really be asking is can we at least exist in a way that is at one with the movement of time and the immediacy of modern technology? The purpose of this paper is to illuminate what would be involved in the task of figuring out how to authentically be-alongside-oneself in this way, qua Nietzsche. However, once we, if successful, are able to achieve a mode of being-alongside- ourselves, it is fruitless, in a sense; we are always being thrown into the future and are therefore no longer alongside-ourselves as such. This is why we shall pivot at the end of this paper in order to suggest how it is possible to orient our being- thrown-into-the-future in the most useful and timely way.

The purpose of this thesis is to explore a thought-provoking consequence of the functionalist theory of mind. Given the current organizational structure of Earth and field theories of consciousness in neuroscience, Earth is probably conscious. The argument is explored through an examination of the current organizational structure of Earth and field theories of consciousness in neuroscience, which leads to the conclusion that Earth is conscious. Various theories of mind have been proposed by neuroscientists and philosophers alike in an attempt to qualify what consciousness is and what provides the basis for consciousness to occur. Support, in the form of data and information, for this thesis was found through reviews of philosophic and neuroscientific literature. Using a functionalist argument and field theories of consciousness, I argue for the possibility of Earth’s consciousness due to its organization. Based on the likelihood of human consciousness being spatially distributed, I illustrate how Earth’s organization is sufficiently similar. However, there is controversy surrounding functionalist theories of mind. This is detailed with Ned Block’s (1978) objection to functionalism, the Chinese Nation thought experiment. I place this objection in conversation with Paul and Patricia Churchland’s (1981) work on inverted qualia, absent qualia, and the method to identify systems with and without qualia. A further objection to my conclusion is explored with Kammerer’s (2015) Sophisticated Anti-Nesting Principle is addressed. Finally, this thesis draws some inspiration from Eric Schwitzgebel’s (2014) paper “If Materialism is True, the United States is Probably Conscious,” but the conclusion is projected to a larger scale, resulting in implications for morality, politics, and theories of mind.