This study sets out to reclaim the ontological epistemology of Saint Thomas Aquinas which serves as a unifier of knowledge in being, within the philosophical milieu of being’s forgottenness. Post-Humean and Kantian thought made appearance rather than being solely accessible to the thinking subject. The consequence has been the marginalisation of being as reflected in truth – influenced by scientistic and postmodern paradigms – which has contributed to both the paucity of meaningless metaphysics, and the conceptualisation of science and faith as necessarily opposing categories. To the end of establishing that science and faith have points of intersection, it is argued that the reclamation of Thomist natural philosophy leads to the defence of a clarified form of realism. Establishing the “real” implies that the metaphysical dimensions of the problem of existence can be explored. Within this realist model, the “pre-Modern” Thomistic theory of “scientia” is employed to bring physical and natural science and metaphysics into relationship as components of true knowledge of being. Consequently, the author puts forth that “scientia” is exemplified in, amongst others, the particular science of cosmology since the rudimentary point of engagement between physical and metaphysical science occurs in the act of creation, that is, when being comes into existence. Whilst metaphysics is often disregarded, it is consistently proposed that the causal nature of being demands – by its presence – a more robust account than physical and natural science can offer. The contribution made by this work rests in its ontologically-formed epistemic typology whereby “hard” science and faith are related in boundary areas of knowledge, that is, when metaphysical problems emerge from within physical and natural science. By reimaging “hard” science and reasonable faith within “scientia”, both approaches are conceived as adequating to truth when their content is reflective of being. / Thesis (DPhil)--University of Pretoria, 2014. / lk2014 / Philosophy / DPhil / Unrestricted

Afrikaans: In hierdie proefskrif word 'n postmoderne weergawe van die filosofiese redekritiek gesitueer binne die hermeneutiese raamwerke van die onderskeie eietydse diskoerse van die filosofie en die gangbare teologie in die Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk van Afrika. Vanuit 'n Kantiaanse oriëntering word aangetoon dat daar pogings was om die spanning tussen moderne filosofie en die gangbare teologie in die Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk te bestendig. Die vrugbare gesprek in die Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk oor die verhouding teologie-filosofie gedurende die negentigerjare word in hierdie verband krities geresumeer en van 'n analitiese forum voorsien. Postmoderniteit word vervolgens geanaliseer en beskryf as wesenlik redekritiek met dringende identiteitskritiese implikasies. Hier kry die kandidaat se teologiese aansluiting by 'n filosofiese kontinuum waarvan Nietzsche die oorsprong was en wat eietyds verteenwoordig word deur veral Foucault en Adorno, reliëf. Vanuit hierdie weergawe van die postmoderne redekritiek tree die kandidaat, met verwysing na 'n "negatief-dialektiese teologie" en 'n "postmoderne hermeneutiek", met die gevestigde etiese-, konfessionele- en dialektiese tradisielyne in die gangbare teologie in die Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk en die neerslagte daarvan in hierdie kerk se lewe en werk, in gesprek. English: From the premise of a (postmodern) critique of instrumental reason, this dissertation explores some consequences of such a critique for church and theology. The candidate finds an intimate relation between the philosophical critiques of reason in the work of Nietzsche, Adorno, Foucault and his own theological position which is being described as a "negative dialectical theology". A postmodern critique of reason as presented here is very specific in its relation to history, society and knowledge. It has as its main influence or philosophical source the Kantian project of limiting conventional theoretical rationality. From this Kantian position it proceeds to show how Nietzsche exploited the Kantian notion of the limits of reason and how Adorno and Foucault extended Nietzsche's position to its most extreme but, nevertheless, logical socio-historical consequences. This critique of reason boils down to a somewhat subversive stance. By teaming up with Adorno and Foucault, the candidate describes both modernity and Enlightenment as something to be overcome, to be transgressed, exactly because of the dangerously ambivalent nature of modernity's favorite presentation of rationality: instrumental reason, which focuses on identity thinking, cognitive results and the formalization of reality. The implications of a postmodern critique of reason extend towards a deep rooted pessimism of modern culture, a critique of its systems of knowledge and actions, a critique (or at least recognition) of the typical-modern configuration of power into "normal" socio-historical discourses such as those we find in the institusionalised church and in theology, a critique of identity thinking, a critique of rational propositions (without necessarily agitating for an epistemological relativism), an encouragement to honour the inherent flaws in language and linguistic constructions, the ability to recognize and honour singularity whilst shifting the focus away from universal claims or "master narratives" and, last but not least, the critical recognition of "Otherness" or non-identity. These consequences are brought forward into the socio-historical reality, life and work of the Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk van Afrika and its current theology by strategic means of a negative dialectical theology, a theology which is mutually Nietzschean, Adornian and Foucauldian in its philosophical nature and eventually, in its theological convictions. / Thesis (DPhil (New Testament))--University of Pretoria, 2007. / New Testament Studies / unrestricted

The book of Qoheleth (Ecclesiastes) is perhaps the most intriguing book in the Old Testament. Readers of every age can appreciate its theme, dealing with the futility of seeking to uncover life’s mystery. Yet Qoheleth has been interpreted in many different ways. The interpretations have ranged from tragic pessimism to a triumph of piety over skepticism. It is the contention of this thesis that a proper perspective on Qoheleth’s intention can best be gained in terms of the author’s use of tradition. Qoheleth displays an awareness of such Hebrew traditions as Wisdom, the Pentateuch, Israelite history and the prophets. Though Qoheleth does not refer specifically to the Law or to Yahweh, the God of Israel, he does not deny them. Moreover, he seems familiar with both the Pentateuch (e.g. the creation account) and the historical writings in the prophets (e.g. the account of Solomon). Qoheleth is also consistent with Old Testament theology in holding that God’s ways cannot be comprehended by man, and that it is good for man to enjoy the life that God has given him. It is also likely that Qoheleth was familiar with the traditions of Greece and the Near East. There are many parallels between Qoheleth and these cultures, but all that these seem to represent is parallel development. For Qoheleth does not reveal any dependence on the traditions of these cultures. Rather Qoheleth differs sharply in that he refutes both the Hellenistic belief in an after life (3:21) and the tragic pessimism of Ancient Near Eastern documents. When Qoheleth is understood in terms of the author’s use of tradition, this book is found to be true to Hebrew tradition. In this way readers are afforded a proper perspective as to how Qoheleth is best interpreted. The book is found to be practical, advising the reader to enjoy life rather than despair of it.

Thomas Hobbes’s knowledge of religious doctrine, typology, and use religious rhetoric in his writings is often glossed over in an over-eager attempt to establish his preeminence as a founder of modern political theory and the social contract tradition. Such action, however is an injustice to Hobbes himself, who recognized that in order to establish a new, and arguably radical, political position founded upon reason and nominalist materialism he had to reform people’s understanding of religious revelation, and Christianity specifically. Rather than merely move to a new epistemological foundation, Hobbes was aware that the only way to ensure religion does become a phoenix was to examine and undermine the foundations of religious thought in its own terms. This reformation of religious language, critique of Christianity, and attempt to eliminate man’s belief in their obligation to God was done in order to promote a civil society in which religion was servant of the state. Through reforming religious language, Hobbes was able to demote religion as a worldview; removing man’s fear of the afterlife or obligation to obey God over a civil sovereign. Religious doctrine no longer was in competition with the civil state, but is transformed into a tool of the state, one which philosophically founds the modern arguments for religious toleration.

The genre of apocalypse has an irresistible draw. The concepts of beginning and end to humankind as well as the cosmos situate themselves in our daily stories, microcosmic narratives that repeat through time, placing the footprint of humankind a little more firmly into the earth, a place we have called our home from beginning and, naturally, to the end. In a world that constantly pushes forward to the next piece of technological equipment, reducing mass pandemics to mere over the counter solutions, and extending its hand into the abyss of the unknown universe, humanity craves the elusive next chapter in the novel of the world. But what is to be attained when we reach the climax? When we are situated in the denouement? And finally, what happens when all is at an end? There is a universal truth of birth, and a universal truth of death (despite our advances to elude it). By that logic there must exist a macrocosmic version, a global scale birth, termed creation by many, and thus a large scale death. But since death of the individual remains a complete mystery, many diverse factions exist. This extends to the global picture then, not only seeking inquiry into what happens after we (as in the individual) but when the entire world ceases to exist. This thesis is an attempt to explore the genre of apocalypse for a deeper understanding of these questions and notions. With various systems in place, such as those put forth by John J. Collins and other apocalypse scholars, there exists a possibility to examine various iterations of apocalypses. By examining paradigm traits and tiers and the complications that arise with systemization, this thesis develops a methodology in which to include the functional take on various case studies of apocalypse. Generally reserved for examinations of sacred text, the expanded methodology presented here will seek to not only look at an example of said text, but also a secular text, two examples of ‘sacred function’, and one ideological example of a secular function. This study is not about changing the makeup of the paradigm, nor is it an effort to disprove criteria, nor tack on additional items. The goal is to use the paradigm to identify a more well-rounded view of the genre, and then see what can be gleaned from those categories and their prototypes. In doing so, the definition of the apocalypse genre will be more comprehensive, and thus beneficial for any avenue of study to which it is applied.

The pastoral problem being addressed has to do with the culture of consumerism and individualism that have influenced the culture of the Church. Within Western society, the “ism” culture, consisting of factors such as: hedonism, consumerism, materialism, secularism, relativism and individualism, has become very prominent. Christians often operate no differently than non-Christians, and this is problematic since Christians are called to be salt for the earth and light for the world (Matthew 5:13-16), a people set apart. In John 15:19, we are told that we were not made to be of this world, so we need to stop being influenced by the culture and instead allow the beauty of the Christian faith to influence the world. What is presented here is not just a hope to overcome consumerism and individualism, but an entire revamping of what it means to be Christian. It suggests the need for a culture change, which if Christians and church leadership focus on, has the power to solve other pastoral and ethical issues as well. Such a cultural change will lead to vibrancy among believers and will attract more people to the faith, as well.

This thesis examines the twenty-two passages in the Gospels in which God’s forgiveness of human sin is explicitly addressed. Using modern textual, literary, form, redaction, and historical criticisms as exegetical tools, the examination maps out the development of these biblical vignettes so as to extract from the process an understanding of what the Gospel writers wanted to convey to Jesus’ followers about God’s forgiveness. Four distinct forgiveness modes were discovered: repentance leads to forgiveness (e.g. proclaim repentance and forgiveness to all nations in Lk 24:47), faith acts as a conduit to forgiveness (e.g. sinful woman kissing Jesus’ feet in Lk 7:48b-50), one must forgive in order to be forgiven (e.g. the Lord’s Prayer in Lk 11:4 and Mt 6:12), and forgiveness is a free gift based solely on God’s mercy (e.g. on the cross, “Father, forgive them” in Lk 23:34). None of these views represents a majority Gospel vision of forgiveness, with each of the four viewpoints having four to seven episodes occurring in the Gospel cannon. Seldom are any of these pathways to forgiveness mentioned together. Despite a plethora of information about forgiveness, nowhere do the Gospels present a wholistic explanation of divine forgiveness. The Gospel writers, like their Hebraic ancestors, were comfortable with a multivariant view of God’s forgiveness and showed no propensity to develop a wholistic theology of forgiveness. However, underlying this untidy approach was an emphasis on God’s mercy and compassion that had roots in the Old Testament understanding of Yahweh as gracious and merciful and abounding in steadfast love. In addition, the seedling concepts of sin as an unpayable debt or of the importance of faith in Jesus appeared in the background of multiple Scripture passages from each of the four forgiveness themes.

The COVID-19 is still causing many deaths globally. Thus authorities have implemented strict public measures designed to reduce and limit the interactions between people. Such measures have impacted the pastoral ministry in many ways. There has never been such a great crisis for the pastoral ministry, especially the pastoral cares to the grievers. The grief in the bereaved has challenged the pastoral care in parish in numerous ways with regard to how to deal with them. In this circumstance, the pastoral care to the grievers comes to the surface with a totally different paradigm. Pastoral care to the grievers is best when rendered by and within a particular religious tradition such as religious rituals, faith ideology and cultural patterns. Therefore the local parish and staff have to try all means possible to connect with the grievers, while exercising discretion and creativity to minimize physical contact during the pandemic times. Now is the high time for the pastoral care service to the grievers to stand up for it. Now is the opportunity for the pastoral ministry to the grievers to provide a compassionate leadership.

Loving God is our highest perfection for Leibniz. It secures our belief and trust in the Creator, which is integral to the sciences as well as faith. Those who love God have justification for reasoning, that is, they can rationally expect to arrive at truth. This is because love is a receptivity to the perfection all of things; loving God, then, is a disposition and tendency toward the most perfect being, the ens perfectissimum. Individuals who perceive the divine nature “do not merely fear the power of the supreme and all-seeing monarch,” Leibniz writes, “but are assured of his beneficence, and lastly—and what brings everything together—burn with a love of God above all else.”1 In my dissertation, I argue that Leibniz’s qualification should be taken seriously: love of God “brings everything together.” The subject of my dissertation can be stated schematically. It consists of two pairs of claims, one pair philosophical, the other theological: A moral quality is required to secure our reason. From a most perfect unity, a moral quality follows. Love of God is our highest perfection. Love of God secures our reasoning. Both concern the security of reason, by which I mean the rational motivation for reasoning itself. They are reasons we ought to expect reasoning to lead to truth. Yet they do not form a tight demonstration: while an inference is clearly at work in the first pair, there are no inferences in the second. Also, there is a distinction between a moral quality and love for God. Unless they are identified, Leibniz’s philosophy and theology secure reasoning apart from one another. In 1686, Leibniz wrote his well-known “Discourse on Metaphysics.” A few months after, he composed a theological treatise, Examination of the Christian Religion. These texts, I argue, should be read side by side, and the first chapter compares how divine perfection secures our reasoning in both texts. Some Moderns’ notion of perfection—namely, Descartes’, Spinoza’s, and Malebranche’s—fail to secure our reasoning because their views entail arbitrariness in the world and the divine nature. But a proper sense of perfection, one that includes a moral quality, secures our reasoning by ensuring that everything is amenable to reason. Descartes also sought to secure our reasoning, and for the second and third chapters I compare his account with Leibniz’s own, then draw out the latter’s criticisms. For Descartes, the deity’s moral quality is characterized by an indifferent will, which is eminently and formally revealed throughout creation. Although recognizing the infinite source of all things directs our attention appropriate in the Cartesian system, Leibniz criticizes Descartes’ detached and indifferent God. When our disposition toward God is not characterized by love, we are less rational than otherwise. Leibniz finds intolerable moral implications in the Cartesian system, and I work out these implications in chapter three. Descartes’ criteria of true and false ideas does not settle dispute, but relies on “interior testimony.” Proper reasoning, then, does not tend toward unity among persons, and this is especially problematic in religious debate. Descartes’ method is Stoic, which also leads to trouble when it comes to church unity: one remains in the church by a sheer act of will, which can violate reason. Leibniz views such a detachment of faith and reasoning as dangerous, besides impoverishing the concept of reason altogether. Leibniz’s notions of God and perfection secure our reason by engendering love for God. “Discourse” and Examen begin with a moral disposition and tendency. In the last chapter, I argue that this is the case by considering two criteria Leibniz adopts—his test for perfection and the kinds of knowledge—as well as the foundation of his logic at the time. Leibniz can tolerate provisional beginnings, hypothetical truths, and original sin because of his robust conception of love. He distinguishes two ways we love God: spes, or hope, is a disposition or tendency to natural perfection, and caritas, or esteem, affection, or love, regards divine perfection. These states orient us according to the divine plan. Miracles are within the world as an effect of the deity’s moral quality: they are a means God personally relates to rational beings. Miracles reveal the moral effects of our perception of phenomena generally, included the regularity observed and classified by science. So, to conclude, I compare Leibniz’s discussion of revelation in Examen with his discussion of miracles in “Discourse” to draw out the significance of miracles for him. Besides much debate on the implications of miracles for his conception of substance, I argue that there is a moral motivation for retaining miracles, even those of the second rank.

This study explores the semiotic development of Islamic nationalism as a form of political theology during its formative period of 1857-1947 as articulated in the writings of prominent Urdu-speaking theologians. The study presents Islamic nationalism as a project of Muslims’ collective emancipation from colonialism and the possible subjugation of Islam and Muslims to the post-colonial secular state. Islamic nationalism’s constructive task is to interpret Islamic symbols in political terms toward articulating a modern Muslim nationalism. Its critical task is to critique the modern ideas of secularism, nationalism, and colonialism, on the one hand; and Muslim history with respect to a historiography centered on the primacy of caliphate as a spiritual-political institution, on the other hand. Politically, Islamic nationalism seeks, albeit in modern forms, Muslims’ religio-cultural autonomy and/or political sovereignty. In semiotic terms, Islamic nationalism integrates the Islamic symbols of islām, God, Prophet Muhammad, the Qur'an, qaum, sharīʿat, millat, ummat, and khilāfat with the symbols of secular nationalism, namely, nation, freedom, equality, and popular sovereignty. The extent and nature of the integration is determined by the internal consistency of the Islamic symbolic system which requires the national symbols to be interpreted in light of Islam’s sacred symbols. Islamic nationalism thus amounts to the desecularization/decolonization of Muslim imagination and the public sphere. Among the different forms of Islamic nationalism, the study explores the proto-nationalist Sayyid Ahmad Khan; the proponents of a secular post-colonial India, Abul Kalam Azad and Jamʻiyyatul ʿUlamā Hind; the critics of secular nationalism, Muhammad Iqbal and Sayyid Abu’l Aʻlā Maududi; and the advocates of separatism Jamʻiyyat ʿUlamā-i Islām. The study concludes that, despite the diversity of approaches to Islam and nationalism, nearly four decades of political theology proved decisive in popularizing the idea that Muslim nationality (qaumiyyat) was based on religion, that Islam as the consummate religion brooked no division between private-religion and public-politics, and that the obligation to implement Islamic law and ethics (sharīʿat) necessitated territorial sovereignty.