The purpose of this study was to determine the level of satisfaction of selected teacher spokespersons toward Indiana Public Law 217, the collective bargaining law for teachers.A survey instrument consisting of forty-six items in five Likert-response categories was mailed to 125 randomly selected teacher spokespersons in Indiana. Space was provided for respondents to write comments or rationale for their answers. Fifty-seven teacher spokespersons responded to the survey.The following rank order was utilized for each of the sections of Indiana Public j 217 ranging from (5) highly dissatisfied, (4) somewhat dissatisfied, (3) neutral, (2) somewhat satisfied to (1) highly satisfied based on the mean scores.Findings1. Selected teacher spokespersons rated four section items between 4.00 and 5.00.2. Of the forty-six section items that were surveyed, seventeen sections were rated between 3.00 and 3.99.3. Negotiators for the teachers ranked seventeen sections of Indiana Public L&7_ between 2.00 and 2.99.4. Eight section items were rated between 1.00 and 1.99 by the teacher spokesperson.Conclusions1. Teacher spokespersons were dissatisfied with the inability to strike and the penalities for unlawful strikes.2. Teacher spokespersons were dissatisfied with the procedures and restrictions governing bargaining and discussions.3. Teacher spokespersons were dissatisfied with the provisions and procedures of fact-finding, arbitration and maintaining a status quo contract.4. Teacher spokespersons were dissatisfied with the sections of the law dealing with the rights of the employer5. Teacher spokespersons were dissatisfied with the stated intent of the law.6. Teacher spokespersons were dissatisfied with the structure and powers of the Indiana Education Employment Relations Board.7. Teacher spokespersons were satisfied with the definitions of certificated employees and exclusive representative.8. Teacher spokespersons were satisfied with the procedures of unfair practices as stated in the law.9. Teacher spokesperson were satisfied with the procedures of dues deductions as stated in the law.

No description available.

<p>Judicial remedies are, amongst others, a vehicle through which respect, protection, promotion and fulfilment of human rights can be delivered to those who need them. A remedy is the perspective from which litigants judge either the success or failure of judicial decisions. Judicial remedies make the rights whole, they complete the justiciability of human rights because without them human rights remain statements of legal rhetoric. The nature of the remedies that the courts grant is not only based on the normative nature of the rights they seek to enforce. They are also influenced by factors such as the goals and objectives of judicial remedies as defined, amongst others, by the ethos of either corrective or distributive forms of justice. This thesis explored these factors and their impact on judicial remedies. Stress is put on the impact of the separation of powers doctrine, institutional competence concerns and on the forms of justice pursued by courts. The study is based on the judicial enforcement of the socio-economic rights protected in the South African 1996 Constitution. The research undertaken here was intended to guide scholars, legal practitioners and judicial officers who confront socio-economic rights issues as part of their daily work.</p>

Diss. Uppsala : Uppsala universitet, 2005.

Diss. Uppsala : Uppsala universitet, 2005.

Univ., Diss.--Toulouse, 2002.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität, Freiburg, 2003/2004.

Diss., Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, 2006/07. / "The Shaping of Procedural Rules by the ICTY in View of the Right to a Fair Trial (English Summary)"

Les droits européens altèrent l’exorbitance du droit public. De par leur primauté, ils imposent leur conception du droit reposant sur le monisme juridique, l’appréciation restrictive des concepts emportant régimes exorbitants, la reconnaissance de droits subjectifs, le cantonnement de l’intérêt général national. Autant de phénomènes qui affectent les fondements de l’exorbitance du droit public français et, subséquemment, les manifestations de cette exorbitance, à savoir les fonctions de gestion et d’autorité publiques. Il n’est cependant pas possible de se cantonner à une lecture interniste du droit public. Aussi, est-il permis de percevoir le droit public dans une nouvelle perspective de type européaniste. Ce contexte est alors propice à la réévaluation de l’exorbitance du droit public qui peut être envisagée sous l’angle du droit public européen. Les fondements de l’exorbitance changent de dimension et se retrouvent dans les principes de droit public européen. L’exorbitance se situe désormais à mi-chemin entre l’autonomie des droits publics nationaux et l’unité du droit public européen. Les manifestations de l’exorbitance peuvent dès lors faire l’objet d’une réévaluation. Si les activités de protection publique présentent un caractère exorbitant indéfectible, une nouvelle fonction exorbitante se déploie, la régulation publique. Reste à savoir si, eu égard à toutes ces activités et fonctions, l’exorbitance relève plus de la maîtrise des Etats ou de celle de l’Europe et qu’elle en est l’efficacité. / European rights alter the exorbitance of public law. By their primacy, they impose their concept of the law based on legal monism, a restrictive appreciation of the concepts dominating exorbitant regimes, the recognition of subjective rights and on confining the national general interest. All of these phenomena impact the bases of exorbitance in French public law and, subsequently, the manifestations of this exorbitance, namely the public authority and management functions. However, it is impossible to confine oneself to an internalist reading of public law. In addition, is it permissible to perceive public law from a new, europeanist, perspective. This context is conducive to re-assessing the exorbitance of public law, which may be viewed from the perspective of European public law. The extent of the bases of exorbitance change and are found in the principles of European public law. The exorbitance is now situated midway between the autonomy of national public laws and the unity of European public law. This is where manifestations of the exorbitance may be reassessed. Although public protection initiatives have an unshakeable exorbitant character, a new exorbitant function is emerging: public regulation. Given its activities and functions, it remains to be seen whether the exorbitance more closely resembles the authority of States or of Europe and how effective it is.

L’objet de cette étude consiste à rendre raison du phénomène de l’autorité, dans les deux sens du terme : en définir la nature et en examiner la justification. Ainsi est-ce seulement par un examen critique des usages de la raison qu’il paraît possible d’en déterminer les principes. Dans une première partie, nous nous attachons à dégager pour lui-même un usage critique et réflexif de la raison par opposition aux usages visant la production de connaissances objectives. Nous dégageons de ce fait l’espace dévolu à la philosophie politique dans la configuration moderne des savoirs, entre sciences de la nature et sciences humaines. Dans un second temps, nous examinons les fondements modernes de l’autorité sous sa forme étatique, à savoir la notion de volonté individuelle, sous ses deux modes de théorisations positives que sont, sur son versant épistémologique, l’anthropologie politique, et sur son versant pratico-légal, la théorie de la représentation. Nous nous attachons ainsi, en particulier, à analyser ce qu’on peut entendre par le terme d’institution, et ce qu’il y a de démocratique dans la notion de gouvernement représentatif. Dans un troisième temps, nous nous tournons vers les modalités concrètes de l’autorité à travers l’esquisse d’une généalogie des institutions gouvernementales. Prenant appui notamment sur les origines doctrinales du droit administratif français, nous sommes ainsi conduits à identifier deux modalités essentielles du gouvernement moderne : « l’Etat social », défini par les médiations collectives de la liberté individuelle, et « l’Etat régulateur », défini par l’assomption individuelle des mythes caractéristiques de la modernité. / The aim of this study is to give an account of the phenomenon of authority, so as to define its nature as well as to examine its justifications. Hence, it seems that it is only by a critical study of the ways of using reason that it is possible to determine such principles. First of all, we try to identify as such a critical and reflexive use of reason, as opposed to those aiming at the production of some objective knowledge. Thereby we define the proper place of political philosophy among the diverse forms of knowledge characteristic of modernity, especially natural and human sciences. Second, we examine the modern foundations of authority in its statist form, namely individual will, through its two main theoretical expressions, political anthropology on the epistemic side, and the theory of representation on the legal-practical one. In particular, we examine the meaning of the notion of institution, and the democratic character of representative government. Thirdly, we look at the concrete modalities of authority through the sketch of a genealogy of governmental institutions. Drawing on the doctrinal origins of the French administrative law, we are thus led to identify two essential modalities of modern government: the “Social State”, defined by the collective mediations of individual liberty, and the “Regulatory State”, defined by the individual assumption of the myths characteristic of modernity.