Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 1994. / Includes bibliographical references (leaf 30).

Heidelberg, Univ., Diss., 2000. / Erscheinungsjahr an der Haupttitelstelle: 1999. Computerdatei im Fernzugriff.

Heidelberg, Univ., Diss., 2000. / Erscheinungsjahr an der Haupttitelstelle: 1999. Computerdatei im Fernzugriff.

Heidelberg, Universiẗat, Diss., 2000. / Erscheinungsjahr an der Haupttitelstelle: 1999.

Diss.--Universität Freiburg (Breisgau), 1995. / Bibliogr. p. 187-200.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The project of naturalization of the epistemology proposed by Willard V. O. Quine it supplies a new way to do epistemology. Starting from that proposal, everything that is had to build knowledge on the world they are the sensitive evidences and the results obtained in the several scientific investigations, among them, the own empiric philosophical investigations. The naturalized epistemology doesn't intend to proceed of a privileged point of view in relation to the other sciences. For Quine that point of view is not possible, always originates from a world theory for since then, to reconstruct her revising and rejecting some beliefs. Starting from those conclusions of the quinean proposal it is noticed explicit rejection of the knowledge and justification a priori second which what would guarantee the beliefs ultimately on the world it would be a rational intuition given independently of the experience. Front to that, Laurence BonJour criticizes the project of naturalization of the epistemology proposed by Quine, because this proposal when not accepting a logic a priori would not be any reason to sustain, it would destroy yourself. This work tries to evaluate the critics of BonJour to the project of naturalization of the epistemology proposed by Quine. Intends to come a possible answer in the quinean project that there is not a logic a priori, but a naturalized reason developed starting from the experience that connects the sentences of the web. / O projeto de naturalização da epistemologia proposto por Willard V. O. Quine fornece uma nova maneira de fazer epistemologia. A partir dessa proposta, tudo o que se tem para construir conhecimentos sobre o mundo são as evidências sensíveis e os resultados obtidos nas diversas investigações científicas, entre elas, as próprias investigações filosóficas empíricas. A epistemologia naturalizada não pretende proceder de um ponto de vista privilegiado em relação às outras ciências. Para Quine esse ponto de vista não é possível, sempre se parte de uma teoria de mundo para a partir daí, reconstruí-la revisando e rejeitando algumas crenças. A partir dessas conclusões da proposta quineana percebe-se uma clara rejeição do conhecimento e justificação a priori segundo o qual o que garantiria as crenças sobre o mundo em última instância seria uma intuição racional dada independentemente da experiência. Frente a isso, Laurence BonJour critica o projeto de naturalização da epistemologia proposto por Quine, pois esta proposta ao não aceitar uma lógica a priori não teria nenhuma razão para se sustentar, seria auto-destrutiva. Este trabalho procura avaliar as críticas de BonJour ao projeto de naturalização da epistemologia proposto por Quine. Pretende-se apresentar uma possível resposta no projeto quineano de que não há uma lógica a priori, mas uma razão naturalizada desenvolvida a partir da experiência que conecta as sentenças da teia.

Quine and late Wittgenstein have often found themselves being compared for similarities and dissimilarities, we can attribute the allure of this subject to both philosophers being similar advocates of holism and epistemological relativity despite taking on different subject matters. Pieranna Garavaso attempted an inquiry of this type, where she compares Quine’s view on holism, relying mainly on “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, with Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. Garavaso shows in her essay that there is a high level of correspondence between On Certainty and “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” but ultimately concludes that despite any actual agreement between Quine and Wittgenstein, their views end up ultimately incompatible. I will argue that this is wrong; Quine’s conception of holism, and Wittgenstein’s conception of holism found in On Certainty are compatible, and even complementary. I will begin my text by giving a short presentation of Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”. I will then raise the similarities, and dissimilarities between the two texts before giving my final argument against the supposed conflict between them.

The aim of this thesis is to examine the theoretical commitments informing W.V. Quine’s rejection of alethic modality and to advance a Quinean response to Saul Kripke’s arguments in support of modal metaphysics. The novelty of this thesis consists in it being the first detailed explanation of how Quine’s arguments against modality are situated within his system and informed by his epistemological and ontological views and the first adequate study of the epistemological and metaphysical criticisms Quine would advance against Kripke’s defence of modality. The Quinean response to Kripke presented here is guided by four tenets that Quine takes to be central to the current scientific worldview and which he consequently adopts as the guiding methodological constraints of his own project: empiricism, regimentation, physicalism and simplicity. I explain how Quine’s referential opacity and mathematician-cyclist arguments against modality hang together with the rest of his philosophical project; and I show that while these arguments may seem unpersuasive and easily refuted by Kripke when taken in isolation, they are quite powerful when understood within the context of Quine’s entire system and seen in light of his guiding methodological constraints. By the end of this thesis, it will be clear why Quine remains unconvinced by Kripke’s arguments in support of modal metaphysics and how his response to Kripke is grounded in his deepest methodological constraints. He ultimately rejects Kripke’s arguments because they conflict with the tenets he takes to be the deepest commitments of the scientific worldview. Quine’s arguments against modality must be understood within the context of his philosophical system as a whole and are best seen not as arguments to be met by Kripke on Kripke’s terms but as illustrations of why, from the standpoint of Quine’s project and the standards it adheres to (the standards of science, as Quine understands it), modality is a flawed and unnecessary addition to reconstructed scientific theory. While there may well be reasons for rejecting Quine’s views about modality – and even reasons that would compel Quine, on his own terms, to reject his views – I argue that Kripke does not provide them.

This dissertation examines the Carnap-Quine debate on analyticity with the objective of identifying exactly what is at stake. Close scrutiny of Quine’s criticism of the definitions of analyticity reveals that most of his objections are convincing only if they are considered in relation to the definitions of analyticity in natural language. Carnap, however, defines analyticity in artificial languages. The dissertation also shows that Carnap can meet the objections to his definitions by using a perspective based within his own philosophy. After examining the presumptions of each party to the debate, the dissertation concludes that the disagreement between Carnap and Quine on the notion of analyticity is rooted in their different approaches to empiricism and that there is nothing said by either philosopher which proves that one approach has ultimate advantages over the other. It is thus impossible to identify a winner in the Carnap-Quine debate on analyticity. The process of arriving at this conclusion starts with a discussion in the first three chapters of Carnap’s philosophy followed by a critical and detailed discussion of his syntactical and semantical definitions of analyticity and the advantages and disadvantages of each. Chapter Four examines Quine’s objections to Carnap’s definitions of essential predication and shows that his objections do not undermine Carnap’s definitions of this notion in artificial languages. It also shows how vital providing a proper definition of essential predication in natural language is for Carnap’s philosophy and examines whether or not he is able to do so. Chapter Five analyzes Quine’s objections to Carnap’s definitions of logical truth and demonstrates that Carnap is able to respond to all of them when the discussion is situated within his philosophical system. Again, Quine’s objections to definitions of logical truth are meaningful only if they are considered in relation to natural language, which is not Carnap’s concern. The dissertation concludes by showing that both Carnap and Quine arrived at their conclusions with respect to the nature of logical sentences, based not on the arguments in their debate on analyticity, but on their philosophical considerations regarding the principle of empiricism: for Carnap, logical sentences are out of the realm of knowledge and independent of matters of fact whereas, for Quine, these are as empirical as other sentences. Nothing either says in their debate can convince the other to accept a different viewpoint.

The aim of this thesis is to examine the theoretical commitments informing W.V. Quine’s rejection of alethic modality and to advance a Quinean response to Saul Kripke’s arguments in support of modal metaphysics. The novelty of this thesis consists in it being the first detailed explanation of how Quine’s arguments against modality are situated within his system and informed by his epistemological and ontological views and the first adequate study of the epistemological and metaphysical criticisms Quine would advance against Kripke’s defence of modality. The Quinean response to Kripke presented here is guided by four tenets that Quine takes to be central to the current scientific worldview and which he consequently adopts as the guiding methodological constraints of his own project: empiricism, regimentation, physicalism and simplicity. I explain how Quine’s referential opacity and mathematician-cyclist arguments against modality hang together with the rest of his philosophical project; and I show that while these arguments may seem unpersuasive and easily refuted by Kripke when taken in isolation, they are quite powerful when understood within the context of Quine’s entire system and seen in light of his guiding methodological constraints. By the end of this thesis, it will be clear why Quine remains unconvinced by Kripke’s arguments in support of modal metaphysics and how his response to Kripke is grounded in his deepest methodological constraints. He ultimately rejects Kripke’s arguments because they conflict with the tenets he takes to be the deepest commitments of the scientific worldview. Quine’s arguments against modality must be understood within the context of his philosophical system as a whole and are best seen not as arguments to be met by Kripke on Kripke’s terms but as illustrations of why, from the standpoint of Quine’s project and the standards it adheres to (the standards of science, as Quine understands it), modality is a flawed and unnecessary addition to reconstructed scientific theory. While there may well be reasons for rejecting Quine’s views about modality – and even reasons that would compel Quine, on his own terms, to reject his views – I argue that Kripke does not provide them.