吳國志. / 稿本(據電腦打印本複印) / Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學, 1989. / Gao ben (ju dian nao da yin ben fu yin) / Includes bibliographical references: leaves 80-83. / Wu Guozhi. / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 1989. / 簡語表 --- p.i / 導論 --- p.1 / Chapter 第一章 --- 剌激意義 --- p.3 / Chapter 1.1 --- 對心靈語意學的批判 / Chapter 1.2 --- 如何建構剌激意義 / Chapter 1.3 --- 對景語句和持存語句 / Chapter 1.4 --- 行為主義的語意觀 / Chapter 第二章 --- 翻譯不確定論旨 --- p.17 / Chapter 2.1 --- 同義與翻譯 / Chapter 2.2 --- 始基翻譯與分析假設 / Chapter 2.3 --- 翻譯不確定論旨與物理理論的不足決定性 / Chapter 2.4 --- 對心靈實體進一步的揚棄 / Chapter 第三章 --- 整體主義與語意理論 --- p.29 / Chapter 3.1 --- 溫和的整體主義 / Chapter 3.2 --- 整體主義與翻譯不確定論旨 / Chapter 3.3 --- 方法論上的一元論 / Chapter 3.4 --- 整體主義與自然主義 / Chapter 第四章 --- 論何物存在 --- p.42 / Chapter 4.1 --- 語言與本體論 / Chapter 4.2 --- 本體論的許諾 / Chapter 4.3 --- 物理主義的概念架構 / Chapter 4.4 --- 卡納普和奎因對抽象實體看法之異同 / Chapter 第五章 --- 本體論的相對性 --- p.55 / Chapter 5.1 --- 指涉的不透視性 / Chapter 5.2 --- 本體論相對性論旨 / 結論 --- p.67 / 注釋 --- p.69 / 參考書目 --- p.80 / 論文撮要

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Doctor of Philosophy / Many criticisms of the prevalent deflationary theories of truth stem from some misunderstanding. Clarification can be found from considering Quine's reasoning on the disquotational feature of the truth predicate. Quine's disquotationalism and Horwich's minimalism are similar theses with respect to the concept of truth, though the difference between the choices of the primary truth bearers and the divergence in their accounts of meaning and reference are striking. Chapter Two is devoted to making plain Quine's reasoning regarding the disquotational concept of truth, and to constructing a disquotational theory of truth. Also in this chapter, the topic of how to enhance the deductive power of this theory is discussed. The following chapter aims to square Quine's theses of inscrutability of reference and ontological relativity, with an account of the disquotational schema of reference. Whether or not a disquotational schema of reference and all its instances can be seen as providing a genuine reference scheme, as claimed by Horwich and most deflationists, is also discussed. In Chapter Four, after an introduction of Horwich's minimalist conception of truth, there are a number of issues considered, in particular Horwich’s use-theoretic account of meaning and compositionality, along with the divergence between his account of meaning and Quine's. The final chapter, Chapter Five, provides a thorough analysis of three important factors regarding the disquotational theory and the minimal theory of truth. Among them, the first factor discussed is what sort of equivalence relation occurs within each instance of the disquotational schema or each axiom of the equivalence schema. Following this, there is an analysis of in what way the disquotationalist and the minimalist can explain all general facts involving truth. The last factor involves considering the proper ascription of the disquotational or the minimal truth predicate. Along with the analysis of these three factors, the issue regarding which theory of truth is preferable is elaborated.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2003. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 215-225). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

No description available.

No description available.

Doctor of Philosophy / Many criticisms of the prevalent deflationary theories of truth stem from some misunderstanding. Clarification can be found from considering Quine's reasoning on the disquotational feature of the truth predicate. Quine's disquotationalism and Horwich's minimalism are similar theses with respect to the concept of truth, though the difference between the choices of the primary truth bearers and the divergence in their accounts of meaning and reference are striking. Chapter Two is devoted to making plain Quine's reasoning regarding the disquotational concept of truth, and to constructing a disquotational theory of truth. Also in this chapter, the topic of how to enhance the deductive power of this theory is discussed. The following chapter aims to square Quine's theses of inscrutability of reference and ontological relativity, with an account of the disquotational schema of reference. Whether or not a disquotational schema of reference and all its instances can be seen as providing a genuine reference scheme, as claimed by Horwich and most deflationists, is also discussed. In Chapter Four, after an introduction of Horwich's minimalist conception of truth, there are a number of issues considered, in particular Horwich’s use-theoretic account of meaning and compositionality, along with the divergence between his account of meaning and Quine's. The final chapter, Chapter Five, provides a thorough analysis of three important factors regarding the disquotational theory and the minimal theory of truth. Among them, the first factor discussed is what sort of equivalence relation occurs within each instance of the disquotational schema or each axiom of the equivalence schema. Following this, there is an analysis of in what way the disquotationalist and the minimalist can explain all general facts involving truth. The last factor involves considering the proper ascription of the disquotational or the minimal truth predicate. Along with the analysis of these three factors, the issue regarding which theory of truth is preferable is elaborated.

Hamburg, Universiẗat, Diss., 2001. / Erscheinungsjahr an der Haupttitelstelle: 2000.

Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 1991. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 105-108).

Texte remanié de: Diss.--Philosophischen Fakultät--Universität Düsseldorf, 1988. / Bibliogr. p. 541-550. Index.