Submitted by Carmen Torres (carmensct@globo.com) on 2018-03-28T18:44:47Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Dissertacao_TeoriaNaturalizadaDireito.pdf: 1649286 bytes, checksum: b27ef6f83ae491633661f8303abe1489 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Edisangela Bastos (edisangela@ufpa.br) on 2018-05-23T13:00:30Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Dissertacao_TeoriaNaturalizadaDireito.pdf: 1649286 bytes, checksum: b27ef6f83ae491633661f8303abe1489 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-05-23T13:00:30Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Dissertacao_TeoriaNaturalizadaDireito.pdf: 1649286 bytes, checksum: b27ef6f83ae491633661f8303abe1489 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-02-13 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / A presente dissertação tem por objetivo discutir a metodologia da Teoria Geral do Direito, cujo objetivo é elucidar a natureza ontológica do Direito, desde a perspectiva de uma Teoria Naturalizada do Direito. Em contraste com a abordagem conceitual predominante na Teoria Geral do Direito, que foca na análise conceitual e no recurso às intuições, alguns teóricos têm endossado uma abordagem empírica que recorre a insights sociológicos e antropológicos para avançar nosso entendimento sobre a natureza do Direito. Entre essas abordagens empíricas, destaca-se a proposta de Brian Leiter de naturalização da teoria jurídica, a partir do naturalismo metodológico de Quine, que favorece a continuidade entre a filosofia e as ciências. A Teoria Naturalizada do Direito baseia-se no recurso aos esquemas conceituais que são pressupostos pelas melhores teorias científicas sobre o comportamento social humano para avançar a discussão sobre a real natureza do Direito. Examinam-se as objeções levantadas contra essa metodologia, bem como os limites da versão de Leiter para a teoria jurídica naturalizada, propondo-se uma versão modificada mais robusta da Teoria Naturalizada do Direito, a qual parte de premissas menos controversas e que fica mais em linha com a metafísica analítica e a ontologia social contemporâneas. / The objective of this study is to discuss the methodology and ontology of general jurisprudence, whose aim is to elucidate the ontological nature of the Law, considering a defense of the naturalized jurisprudence. In opposition to the conceptual approach prevalent in contemporary legal theory, focusing about conceptual analysis and resource to intuitions, some theoreticians have accept empirical approaches that resource to sociological and anthropological insights to advance our understanding about the nature of Law. Among these empirical approaches, there is the defense of the naturalization of the general jurisprudence by Brian Leiter, discussing the Quine’s methodological naturalism whose point is the continuity between philosophy and science. The naturalized jurisprudence is founded on the resource to the conceptual schemas that are presupposed by our best scientific theories about the social human behavior for advancing the discussion about the real nature of Law. The criticism against these naturalized methodology and the limits of the Leiter’s version for naturalized jurisprudence are discussed and, in order for answer and/or account these objections, I propose a modified version of naturalized jurisprudence that it is more robust than the Leiter’s one, because it begins from less controversial premises and it conforms to contemporary analytic metaphysics and social ontology.

奎因 (W. V. Quine)的「翻譯的不確定說」(indeterminacy of tran- slation)，不僅在他自己的哲學體系中佔有重要的地位，在當代分析哲學 中也是一個非常重要的理論。「翻譯的不確定說」不僅主張，我們翻譯另 一個語言時，會有翻譯上的不確定性；而且主張，對鄰居語言的翻譯，也 會有不確定的情形；甚至，它也主張，在第一人稱中，我使用的語言所指 涉的東西到底是什麼，仍是不可確定的。本文的目的，是想追究兩個問題 ：第一，奎因以什麼策略或理論論證出「翻譯的不確定說」？第二，「翻 譯的不確定說」可以合理地適用於什麼範圍？關於第一個問題，本文將從 Word and Object 第二章中，奎因所提的「徹底翻譯」(Radical Translation) 的概念開始討論，因為「翻譯的不確定說」是從這裡關始 建立的，而且，在「徹底翻譯」的討論中，可以幫助我們更深入地研究奎 因是以什麼理論支持「翻譯的不確定說」。本文第二章就分別討論三種奎 因對「翻譯的不確定說」的論證進路：「整體論」、「物理理論的不可限 定說」(underdeterminacy of physical theory)和「字詞指涉的不可測 度說」(Inscrutability of reference of terms ) 。最後，本文認為「 整體論」是其中最強的論證進路。關於第二個問題，本文從奎因的「存有 相對性」 (Ontological rela- tivity) 的觀點開始討論。「存有相對性 」主張，除非相對於背景語言，否則不能說對象語言中字詞指涉的東西是 什麼；而這個存有相對性擴展的程度，就是「翻譯的不確定說」適用的程 度。本文認為，它只能適用於對另一個語言、或對另一個言說者的翻譯上 ，並不像奎因所主張的可以適用於第一人稱 (first person) 中、對自己 語言的再詮釋上。本文反對奎因的理由不是基於直覺，而是基於奎因理論 本身的不一致之處，以及基於幾項對第一人稱中翻譯不確定性優缺點的反 省，來反對奎因的這項主張。第一個問題可以幫助我們瞭解第二個問題， 不過它不僅是用來協助我們釐清問題，它本身就是一個需要詳細討論的主 題；第二個問題，也是戴維森 ( Donald Davidson) ，色勒 (John Searle) ，克爾克(Robert Kirk) 以及方萬全先生所關心的問題，它會涉 及私有語言、語意的公共特質和同一語言的判定等若干哲學問題。對這個 問題，本文的立場和方萬全先生最接近，雖然所持的理由不盡相同。在第 一、二章中，討論的是第一個問題，三、四章中討論的是第二個問題。

The purpose of this thesis is to critically examine how W.V. Quine, Michael A. Bishop and J.D. Trout confront the normativity objection against naturalized epistemology. In Chapter One, normativity in epistemology is introduced, followed by a brief look over Quine’s grievances against the traditional approach to epistemology. Quine rejects traditional epistemology and assimilates epistemology with science. The second chapter assesses how Quine naturalizes epistemology, and the third chapter evaluates his engineering response against the normativity objection. Bishop and Trout’s theory, founded upon the Aristotelian Principle, concentrates on reasoning and epistemic excellence instead of belief justification. Strategic Reliabilism’s attempt to dissolve the naturalistic challenge and resolve the normativity objection is inspected in Chapter Four. The final chapter, succinctly, summarizes its preceding chapters and ends by suggesting a closer exploration of the link between epistemology and cognitive sciences, to better understand the underlying mechanics of the objections that face naturalized epistemology. / Graduate / 0422 / 0621 / soushi@gmail.com

Ce mémoire propose une analyse du rôle épistémologique des problèmes scientifiques complexes. En partant du holisme épistémologique hérité des positions philosophiques de Pierre Duhem et de Willard Van Orman Quine, et de la thèse voulant que la pratique scientifique s’effectue toujours à partir d’un champ théorique et conceptuel reconnu, nous développons un modèle de gestion qui propose aux chercheurs l’adoption d’une attitude pragmatique pour réagir aux problèmes complexes. Nous expliquons dans cette recherche que ces problèmes affectent l’applicabilité des théories et concepts qui forment les connaissances scientifiques. Pour les résoudre, il faut initier des recherches qui suivront les étapes d’un processus pragmatique permettant d’évaluer progressivement la situation et d’en acquérir une meilleure compréhension. Durant cette période, les conséquences négatives du problème complexe sont tolérées afin d’assurer le maintien des activités scientifiques, qu’elles visent directement ou non l’atteinte d’une solution. La thèse défendue dans cette étude veut que la gestion des problèmes complexes qu’elle propose se conclut par l’élaboration rationnelle, encadrée par des décisions pragmatiques et une conjoncture favorable, d’une hypothèse ad hoc offrant une solution au problème. Si la communauté scientifique reconnait la valeur épistémologique de cette hypothèse, elle sera intégrée au champ théorique et conceptuel ce qui aura pour effet d’enrichir les connaissances scientifiques et de redonner à la science son statut « normal ». / This thesis proposes an analysis of the epistemological role of complex scientific problems. Starting from the epistemological holism inherited from the philosophical positions of Pierre Duhem and Willard Van Orman Quine, and from the thesis that scientific practice is always based on a recognized theoretical and conceptual field, we develop a management model that proposes that researchers adopt a pragmatic attitude to react to complex problems. We explain in this research that these problems affect the applicability of theories and concepts that form scientific knowledge. To solve them, we must initiate research that will follow the steps of a pragmatic process to progressively assess the situation and gain a better understanding. During this period, the negative consequences of the complex problem are tolerated in order to ensure the maintenance of the scientific activities that it directly targets, or not, the achievement of a solution. The thesis defended in this study is that the management of the complex problems that it proposes is concluded by the rational elaboration, framed by pragmatic decisions and a favorable conjuncture, of an ad hoc hypothesis offering a solution to the problem. If the scientific community recognizes the epistemological value of this hypothesis, it will be integrated into the theoretical and conceptual field which will have the effect of enriching scientific knowledge and giving back to science its "normal" status.

Distinktionen mellan analytiska och syntetiska sanningar spelade en viktig för filosofer som Leibniz, Hume och Kant. Men det var först med Frege som begreppet analyticitet fick en definition som inte bara tycks vara explicit utan som också hade en bred tillämpbarhet. Den förmodade distinktionen analytiskt/syntetiskt har dock senare ifrågasatts av filosofer såsom Quine. Denna uppsats avser i första hand att visa att Quines argument, i artikeln Two Dogmas of Empiricism (1951), mot analyticitet inte är tillräckligt starka för att bevisa att den fregeanska definitionen av analyticitet är cirkulär. I detta sammanhang har uppsatsen även undersökt kronologiskt viktiga epoker där Quine engagerar sig i den analytiska/syntetiska distinktionen i sitt arbete före liksom efter 1951. Den mer moderna traditionen, som delar in analyticitet i två kategorier – metafysisk och epistemisk analyticitet – går tillbaka till Boghossian (1996). Boghossian försvarar en uppdaterad version av Wittgensteins och Carnaps åsikt att analyticitet skall anges i termer av implicita definitioner I motsats till Boghossian anser Williamson att det inte finns något sätt att uppfatta analytiska sanningar som gör analyticitet användbar inom filosofin. Inom ramen för uppsatsens syfte kommer även dessa ’post-quineanska’ försök att beskriva analyticitet och den analytiska förklaringen av a priori att redovisas och kritiskt granskas. / The distinction between analytic and synthetic truths has played an important role for philosophers such as Leibniz, Hume and Kant. However, it was Frege who gave the notion of analyticity a definition that not only appears to be unambiguous but is also widely applicable. However, the supposed analytic/synthetic distinction was later challenged by philosophers such as Quine. This thesis aims primarily to show that Quine’s arguments, in the article Two Dogmas of Empiricism (1951), against analyticity are not sufficient to show that Frege’s definition of analyticity is circular. In this context, the paper has also examined chronologically important periods where Quine is engaged in the analytic/synthetic distinction before and after 1951. The more modern tradition, which separates analyticity into two broad categories – metaphysical and epistemic analyticity – goes back to Boghossian (1996). Boghossian defends an updated version of Wittgenstein’s and Carnap’s view that analyticity should be stated in terms of implicit definitions. In contrast to Boghossian, Williamson believes that there is no way of understanding analytic truths that makes analyticity useful in philosophy. Within the scope of this thesis, these ‘post-Quinean’ attempts to describe analyticity and the analytic explanation of a priori will also be presented and critically reviewed.

No description available.

L'auteur entreprend dans ce mémoire de proposer une interprétation formaliste de la signification et du statut logique de la critique que mène Quine, dans son article Two Dogmas of Empiricism de 1951, à l'encontre de la distinction classique en philosophie entre les énoncés analytiques et synthétiques. Contre l'interprétation standard qui persiste à concevoir cette critique comme un rejet catégorique de la distinction, l'auteur reconstruit la théorie de la signification quinienne afin de relever la distinction renouvelée qu'introduit Quine entre "analytique" et "synthétique" dans son dernier ouvrage, From Stimulus to Science. Par une étude comparative de la conception de Quine et de celles de Churchland et Searle sont spécifiés le sens et le statut que l'on doit assigner à sa notion de "signification". Réinterprétée à la lumière de ces considérations, la critique quinienne se révèle être une remise en question de niveau métaépistémologique de la pratique philosophique de l'empirisme logique. / In this dissertation, the author proposes a formalist interpretation of the meaning and logical status of the critique that Quine put forward against the classical philosophic distinction between analytic and synthetic statements in his 1951 article Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Against the standard interpretation that prevails in the literature, according to which this critique is categorical and without appeal, the author undertakes to rationally reconstruct Quine's theory of meaning in order to reveal the renewed distinction between "analytic" and "synthetic" as it was introduced in his last book, From Stimulus to Science (1995). The meaning and logical status that ought to be assigned to his notion of "meaning" are specified by means of a comparative study between Quine's own conception and that of Churchland and Searle. Reinterpreted in the light of these considerations, the Quinian critique proves to be a metaepistemological reassessment of the logical empiricism's philosophical practice.

MARTINS, Francisco Gomes. A lógica das entidades intencionais. 2012. 130f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2012. / Submitted by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2013-11-12T12:03:43Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2012-DIS-FGMARTINS.pdf: 986022 bytes, checksum: dc59d2215a6ff9289414db0edc6b00d1 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Márcia Araújo(marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2013-11-12T14:25:13Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2012-DIS-FGMARTINS.pdf: 986022 bytes, checksum: dc59d2215a6ff9289414db0edc6b00d1 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-11-12T14:25:13Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2012-DIS-FGMARTINS.pdf: 986022 bytes, checksum: dc59d2215a6ff9289414db0edc6b00d1 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 / A feature of the distinction between extensionalism and intensionalism, which has been widely taken as a criterion to separate the two positions, is that within an extensionalist logic, substitution is possible salva veritate (that is, without thereby changing the truth-value of the statement concerned) with respect to identical instances of some basic logical form – and in an intensionalist logic it is not. The different logical forms with respect to which such substitution might take place accounts for some of the variety of different extensionalisms on offer in the current philosophical landscape. So our starting-point is Frege’s puzzle. This question is frequently accepted as one of the foundations of modern semantics. To explain why a true sentence of the form “a = b” can be informative, unlike a sentence of the form “a = a”, Frege introduced an entity standing between an expression and the object denoted (bezeichnet) by the expression. He named this entity Sinn (sense) and explained the informative character of the true “a=b”-shaped sentences by saying that ‘a’ and ‘b’ denote one and the same object but differ in expressing (ausdrücken) distinct senses. The problem, though, is that Frege never defined sense. The conception of senses as procedures that is developed here has much in common with a number of other accounts that represent meanings, also, as structured objects of various kinds, though not necessarily as procedures. In the modern literature, this idea goes back to Rudolph Carnap’s (1947) notion of intensional isomorphism. Church in (1954) constructs an example of expressions that are intensionally isomorphic according to Carnap’s definition (i.e., expressions that share the same structure and whose parts are necessarily equivalent), but which fail to satisfy the principle of substitutability. The problem Church tackled is made possible by Carnap’s principle of tolerance (which itself is plausible). We are free to introduce into a language syntactically simple expressions which denote the same intension in different ways and thus fail to be synonymous. Tichý’s objectualist take on ‘operation-processes’ may be seen in part as linguistic structures transposed into an objectual key; operations, procedures, structures are not fundamentally and inherently syntactic items, but fully-fledged, non-linguistic entities, namely, constructions. / Um grave problema presente quando aplicamos semântica composicional, que atribui simples valores de verdade a frases, é que quando essas seqüências estão presentes em alguns contextos específicos, a substituição de certas expressões com a mesma referência pode cambiar o valor de verdade da frase maior ou então impedir que inferências válidas sejam realizadas. Por exemplo, da afirmação "Pedro acredita que Alexandre o Grande foi aluno de Aristóteles", não se pode inferir corretamente neste contexto de crença que a substituição de "Alexandre o grande" por "o vencedor da batalha de Arbela" seja válida porque eventualmente Pedro pode não saber que "Alexandre o Grande é o vencedor da batalha de Arbela" e por isso a verdade das premissas não garante a verdade da conclusão: "Pedro acredita que o vencedor da batalha de Arbela foi aluno de Aristóteles". A conclusão não se segue pois ela não depende da relação de identidade efetiva entre “Alexandre o Grande” e “O vencedor da Arbela”, e sim depende, de maneira contingente, do conjunto de crenças de Pedro; ou ainda, segundo Frege, depende do sentido que Pedro associa a descrição “Alexandre o Grande”. Em contextos intensionais a verdade da conclusão (após substituição) depende de uma maneira específica da maneira de conceber o nome em questão, por isso a substituição entre nomes cujo referente é o mesmo, mas que diferem em sentido, não funciona em todos os casos. O fato é que Frege nunca estabeleceu critérios de identidade para o sentido (Sinn), apenas reservou-se a declarar simplesmente que o sentido é o "modo de apresentação" da referência. Pretendemos apresentar critérios de identidade para o sentido em geral, e em contextos intensionais, em particular. Os sucessores de Frege, dentre eles o lógico Alonzo Church e o filósofo Rudolf Carnap foram os primeiros a estabelecer que duas expressões têm o mesmo sentido se e somente se são sinonimamente isomorfas e intensionalmente isomorfas, respectivamente. Tais critérios devem ser entendidos à luz dos pressupostos lógicos de Church em sua Lógica do Sentido e da Denotação (LSD) e das idéias de Carnap – muitas delas constituintes do programa filosófico do Positivismo lógico, em seu livro Meaning and Necessity. Mais recentemente, Pavel Tichý estabeleceu de maneira mais exata o que é o sentido e sua identidade através do Procedural isomorphism o qual constitui um dos fundamentos da Lógica Intensional Transparente (TIL).