Submitted by ALINE DE PAULA SANCHES null (alinepaulasanches@gmail.com) on 2017-08-10T04:12:51Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Defesa10_modificada 09-08-2017.pdf: 2013568 bytes, checksum: ca3ff36ff336a306c7f01255c8eebee4 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by LUIZA DE MENEZES ROMANETTO (luizamenezes@reitoria.unesp.br) on 2017-08-15T17:07:06Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 sanches_ap_me_ilha.pdf: 2013568 bytes, checksum: ca3ff36ff336a306c7f01255c8eebee4 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-08-15T17:07:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 sanches_ap_me_ilha.pdf: 2013568 bytes, checksum: ca3ff36ff336a306c7f01255c8eebee4 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-07-06 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / Com a disseminação de dispositivos eletrônicos cada vez menores e o advento de novas tecnologias. A busca por métodos de minimização de funções booleanas tem sido a base para eletrônica digital. Neste trabalho apresenta-se a implementação da primeira fase do método Quine-McCluskey Estendido que utiliza-se de estruturas AND-XOR-XNOR para a geração de implicantes primos. O objetivo do trabalho foi comprovar que, na maioria das vezes, a implementação de uma função Booleana utilizando expressões AND-XOR-XNOR requerem menor quantidade de termos produtos, quando comparado com implementação com expressões AND-OR. A fase de cobertura dos mintermos em ambos os métodos foi formulada como um problema de programação linear inteira 0 e 1 que através do programa Lp_solve obteve a solução de menor custo. Na comparação da eficiência dos métodos foram analisados os custos dos circuitos mínimos gerados, a quantidade de memória utilizada e o tempo de execução. Com os resultados obtidos pode-se concluir que, para a maioria dos casos executados, o método Quine-McCluskey Estendido gera uma solução de menor custo. No entanto, com relação ao desempenho computacional (tempo de execução e memória), o método Quine-McCluskey Estendido apresentou-se inferior se comparado ao Quine-McCluskey. / With the dissemination of smaller and smaller electronic devices and the advent of new technologies. The search for methods of minimizing Boolean function has been the basis for digital electronics. This work presents the implementation of the first phase of the Extended Quine-McCluskey method, which uses AND-XOR-XNOR structures to generate prime implicants. The goal of this work is to prove that, in most cases, the implementation of a Boolean function using the expressions AND-XOR-XNOR requires fewer product terms than the implementation with AND-OR expressions does. The stage of mini terms covering in both methods was formulated with the 0-1 integer linear programming problem, which obtained lower cost through the Lp_Solve program. While comparing the efficiency of these methods we analised: the costs of the minimum circuits generated, the amount of memory that has been used and the runtime. With the obtained results it is possible to conclude that, for most of the executed cases, the Extended Quine-McCluskey method generates a solution of lower cost. On the other hand, with regards to the computational performance (runtime and memory), the Extended Quine-McCluskey method has shown itself inferior when compared to the Quine-McCluskey method.

Zugl.: Basel, Univ., Diss., 2002

Este trabajo analiza la crítica que muchos filósofos han dirigido contra la tesis de la indeterminación del significado inspirados por la idea que J. Searle desarrollara en su célebre artículo de 1987, "Indeterminacy, Empiricism and the First Person". Searle defiende que la tesis constituye una reducción al absurdo de sí misma, ya que precisa hacer uso de distinciones semánticas que ella misma declara inexistentes. Esta reducción al absurdo se debe, siempre según Searle, a la perspectiva de tercera persona que adoptan los defensores de la tesis - Searle analiza aquí la exposición de la tesis de sus dos más ilustres defensores: W. V. O. Quine y D. Davidson - . Nuestro trabajo intenta mostrar cómo esta línea de ataque no dispone de argumentos satisfactorios. La tesis se estructura en tres grandes capítulos. En el primero se expone la tesis de la indeterminación del significado en sus dos grandes vertientes: la conocida como indeterminación de la traducción y la inescrutabilidad de la referencia. Se expone la tesis tal y como aparece en Quine primero y en Davidson después, analizando elementos de enorme relevancia para la tesis, como el holismo del significado y la relación entre la indeterminación y la infradeterminación.En la segunda parte se expone la mencionada crítica de Searle, con especial atención a cómo desarrollaron esta idea de rechazar la indeterminación apelando a una noción de significado desde la perspectiva de la primera persona autores como P. Alston y S. Soames. En la tercera parte se estudia la forma más novedosa que ha adoptado esta visión de "significado de primera persona", a saber, la apelación a las intuiciones lingüísticas de los hablantes. Ha sido D. Bar-On quien más ha ahondado en esta idea. Se defiende aquí la teoría davidsoniana acerca de la autoridad de la primera persona respecto al significado de sus palabras. Se defiende, en particular, la forma davidsoniana de conjugar la indeterminación con la autoridad de la primera persona.Cierra el trabajo una sección de "conclusiones y perspectivas", donde se resumen las conclusiones alcanzadas y se apuntan cuestiones que, tras las conclusiones obtenidas, merecen una profunda revisión. / This work analyzes the criticism that many philosophers have made to the thesis of meaning indeterminacy inspired by the idea exposed by J. Searle in his celebrated article, from 1987, "Indeterminacy, Empiricism and the First Person". Searle defends that the thesis supposes a reductio ad absurdum of itself due to the fact that it requires semantic distinctions that it itself declares non-existent. This reductio is due, according to Searle, to the third person perspective adopted by the defenders of the thesis - Searle analyzes here the exposition of the it made by its two more distinguished defenders, namely, W. V. Quine and D. Davidson - . Our work tries to show that this line of attack does not have satisfactory reasons. This work is organized into three large chapters. The first one is devoted to exposing the thesis in its two aspects: the one known as indeterminacy of translation and the inscrutability of reference. The thesis is exposed as it appears firstly in W. V. Quine and later in D. Davidson, studying different relevant factors for the it, as meaning holism or the relation between indeterminacy and underdetermination. The mentioned Searle's criticism is developed in the second chapter. The work analyzes here the arguments presented by the authors who have rejected the thesis by appealing to a first person perspective - viz. P. Alston or S. Soames - . The third chapter is devoted to studying the most current form this "first person meaning" has adopted, namely, the appellation to the linguistic intuitions of speakers. D. Bar-On has been the most prolific author following this line. We defend here the Davidsonian theory about first person authority with respect to the meaning of her words. We defend, in particular, Davidson's way of combining indeterminacy and first person authority. The work finishes with a section of "Conclusions and Perspectives", where the reached conclusions are summarized and some issues are brought up which, following on from our conclusions, need in-deepth revision.

This thesis intends to explore whether endurantism is compatible with realism. This is done by presenting an alternative approach, where instead of starting with Quine’s postulate, that being and existence are the same thing, those are treated as different things. By using minimal realism, where you only say that something exists independently of a creature, and an ontological theory based on affordances, a thesis that endurantism is compatible with realism is presented. Affordance ontology means that what something is depends on what actions it can offer a certain human. Objections that this might lead to relativism are answered, as actions are independent of a specific creature. Objections that minimal realism isn’t realism are answered on the grounds of it being independent of a human, and thus is realism. Finally, the thesis is concluded to be true, but more work is needed to explain temporal facts. / Uppsatsen syftar till att utforska om endurantism är förenlig med realism. Detta görs genom att presentera en alternativ ansats, där man istället för att utgå från Quines postulat att vara och att existera är samma sak, särskiljer dessa. Med hjälp av minimal realism, där man bara konstaterar att något existerar oberoende av en varelse, och en ontologisk teori byggd på affordanser, så presenteras tesen att endurantism är förenlig med realism. Affordansontologi innebär att vad något är är beroende av vilka handlingar det kan erbjuda en viss människa. Invändningar som att det skulle leda till relativism bemöts, då handlingar är oberoende av en specifik människa, och att minimal realism är så intetsägande att det inte rör sig om realism, bemöts med argumentet att det är oberoende av en människa, och därmed är det faktiskt realism. Slutligen konstateras att tesen är sann, men att mer arbete behövs gällande tid och affordansontologi, för att förklara tidsatta fakta.

No description available.

La vérité, dit-on, est un des buts de la science. Mais quelle est la place de la notion de vérité elle-même dans le langage de la science ? Cette notion peut-elle être suffisamment clarifiée ? Et si oui, quelle peut être sa contribution au discours scientifique, pour quels usages la notion de vérité peut-elle être mobilisée ? Ce travail cherche à répondre à ces questions. Sa thèse principale est que la notion de vérité s'apparente à une notion logique. Cette idée s'inscrit dans un courant de réflexion contemporain sur la vérité appelé "déflationnisme", mais la formulation des thèses déflationnistes que nous proposons est nouvelle, comme sont nouveaux les arguments et les idées mises en œuvre pour l'étayer. Négativement, une critique détaillée d'une tentative influente de réfutation a priori des thèses déflationnistes est présentée. Positivement, nous caractérisons d'une part une classe critique d'affirmations mettant en jeu la notion de vérité comme ensemble de moyens d'expliciter des contenus déjà implicitement acceptés, et nous introduisons d'autre part des considérations et des outils permettant de comprendre le lien entre la thèse de la logicité de la notion de vérité et les thèses déflationnistes classiques relatives aux emplois légitimes de cette notion.

This dissertation considers the “strategic naturalism” of Sandra Harding’s standpoint theory in the philosophy of science, and it should be applied to epistemology. Strategic naturalism stipulates that all elements of inquiry are historically and culturally situated, and thereby subject to critical reflection, analysis, and revision. Allegiance to naturalism is de rigueur, yet there is no clear agreement on the term’s meaning. Harding’s standpoint theory reads the lack of definition as indicative of its generative possibilities for epistemic progress. The driving question is why Harding’s approach has not been considered a viable candidate for determining progress in epistemology. Beyond the fact that epistemic labor, in its scientific and non-scientific forms, is a social activity, Harding’s approach recognizes that it is situated in and reinforced by a broader network of social institutions, beliefs, and practices. Harding’s strategic naturalism would invigorate epistemology by increasing the awareness, acceptance, and respect for epistemic difference and drive epistemic progress that not only acknowledges pluralistic ways of knowing but also gives a more accurate account of the knowing subject. Chapter one is a discussion of non-naturalized epistemology and Quinean Naturalized Epistemology (QNE), framed by Harding’s historical account of the related projects of modern epistemology and science. This chapter highlights two important issues. The first issue is that epistemology is more complex than the story Quine offers. The second, and decisive issue is that the shared history of modern epistemology and science demonstrates the influence of social and cultural values on that history, and the long shadows they cast on naturalism debates in epistemology, science, and philosophy of science. Chapter two is an exegetical account of the origins of and motivations for critical feminist responses to both the received epistemological theory and QNE discussed in chapter one. The justifications for the feminist critiques and the problematic issues that motivate these critiques provide the backdrop for the initial, positive response to QNE, as well as their disenchantment with Quine’s influential proposal. Ultimately, feminist epistemologists and philosophers of science assess QNE as not naturalized enough to address their concerns. Chapter three considers several feminist standpoint theories to show that they are more naturalistic and better at providing a multi-faceted theory that is based on actual scientific practice, and re-introduces social values and interests as having a positive influence on epistemology and philosophies of science. This chapter shows that given the closely shared histories and assumptions of modern epistemology and science, FSE would be a viable resource for a more naturalistic epistemology. The final chapter argues that the project of naturalizing epistemology could incorporate FSE insights and the positive role FSE’s controversiality would play in naturalizing epistemology and philosophies of science. If we are to take seriously the concept of situatedness and what that entails, then naturalism must also be situated, and revisited with a critical and reflective eye. The implications on both our epistemic theories and our accounts of what kinds of knowing subject we are would foster epistemic progress.

Au sein de cette dissertation, j'avance la thèse que la pensée quinienne systématise une épistémologie des sciences et que son système veut avant tout donner une réponse, partant d'un point de vue empirique unique,à ce que Quine estime être la question centrale de l'épistémologie, à savoir "comment construisons-nous notre théorie du monde?".

While naturalistic theories have come to dominate the philosophical landscape, there is still little consensus on what “naturalism” means. I trace the origins of contemporary naturalism to a view, called the “fundamental naturalistic impulse,” that originates in Quine’s turn against Carnap and which I take to be necessary for naturalism. In light of this impulse, some “substantively naturalistic” theories are examined: a weak version of non-supernaturalism, Railton’s a posteriori reduction of moral terms, and “Canberra plan” conceptual analyses of moral property terms. I suggest that if we take the fundamental naturalistic impulse seriously, then there is no need to differentiate substantive versions of naturalism over and above methodological versions. Substantive thesis in ontology or semantics can be had on account of one’s methodological commitments. This not only cuts against the distinction between methodological and substantive naturalisms, but also demonstrates just how far method can reach.

In this thesis I study the problem of logical constants with respect to logical truth and logical consequence. In order to do that, I focused on the following two questions. First, what is a logical constant and what kind of relation there is between a logical truth, logical consequence and logical constant? Second, what are the solutions to the problem and to what extent these criteria can solve it? The main argument of my thesis is to determine that all of the examined systems are satisfactory to considerable level still none of these is completely acceptable.