Thesis (Ph. D.)--Columbia University, 1941. / Published also without thesis note. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Bibliography: p. [173]-175.

Submitted by Marlene Santos (marlene.bc.ufg@gmail.com) on 2016-08-12T21:02:23Z No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertaçao - Marcus Renato Alves Araújo - 2005.pdf: 1005611 bytes, checksum: 6433fcaab30afbca145ab9b78e615f14 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Luciana Ferreira (lucgeral@gmail.com) on 2016-08-15T13:21:00Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertaçao - Marcus Renato Alves Araújo - 2005.pdf: 1005611 bytes, checksum: 6433fcaab30afbca145ab9b78e615f14 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-15T13:21:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertaçao - Marcus Renato Alves Araújo - 2005.pdf: 1005611 bytes, checksum: 6433fcaab30afbca145ab9b78e615f14 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005-10-28 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / This is a study on Duhem-Quine thesis. Its purpose was to investigate epistemological differences and affinities between the holistic positions of Willard Quine and Pierre Duhem. This analysis showed that two quite different interpretations of Duhem-Quine thesis are possible: a weak version, argued by Duhem, and a strong version, more radical, argued by Quine in his article Two dogmas of empiricism. The study of holism, in this perspective, highlighted the importance of this subject to the Philosophy of Science and Language and how this approach can shed light on important philosophical issues, such as the relationship between scientific observations and theories; the thesis of the empirical underdetermination of theories; the theory-ladenness of observation sentences; the theory choice process; the inscrutability of reference; the theory of linguistic learning; among others. / O presente trabalho tem por objeto a tese Duhem-Quine. O que procuramos, durante o desenvolvimento da nossa dissertação, foi investigar as diferenças e afinidades epistemológicas existentes entre as posições holistas de Willard Quine e Pierre Duhem. Ao longo desse estudo, por meio da análise da obra destes dois autores, buscamos mostrar que se pode ter duas interpretações bastante diferentes da tese Duhem-Quine: uma fraca, defendida por Duhem, e uma forte, mais radical, defendida por Quine em seu artigo Dois dogmas do empirismo. Ao investigar o holismo, nessa perspectiva, tentamos destacar a importância desse tema no âmbito da Filosofia da Ciência e da Linguagem e de que forma esta abordagem pode lançar luz sobre importantes problemas filosóficos, tais como a relação entre observações e teorias científicas, a tese da subdeterminação empírica de teorias, a impregnação teórica dos enunciados observacionais, o processo de escolha de teorias, a inescrutabilidade da referência, a teoria do aprendizado linguístico, entre outros.

Le mérite et la gloire de Galilée sont largement reconnus par ses commentateurs. La grande majorité des historiens lui octroie la paternité de la science moderne. Mais les lieux communs s’arrêtent à ces considérations. Tout se passe comme si le physicien florentin refusait tout enfermement méthodologique préférant prendre la couleur idéologique de ses exégètes. Il constitue un sujet de premier ordre en philosophie des sciences. Le développement de cette dernière, conçue comme discipline à part entière au début du XXe Siècle, s’est accompagnée en France d’une réflexion accrue sur lascience moderne et la philosophie qui la sous-tend. La glorification rationaliste des Lumières et du positivisme avait fait de Galilée le héros qui a permis de mettre la mécanique classique en lieu et place de l’ancienne physique aristotélicienne. Il était considéré par Comte comme l’inventeur de la Science. Au début du XXe S., le temps des révisions était venu. L’empirisme des Lumières et les faits généraux d’Auguste Comte laissent place à une conception aprioriste de la physique moderne défendue par Paul Tannery. La philosophie des sciences en France telle que nous la connaissons estnée avec les travaux de Tannery et de Gaston Milhaud. Si l’image de Galilée dans la pensée de Tannery est très proche de la perception d’Alexandre Koyré de la science moderne, Pierre Duhem, lui, se met en désaccord avec ses deux compatriotes en défendant l’idée d’une continuité entre la science médiévale et la science classique. / Galileo’s merit and fame are largely acknowledged by his commentators. The majority of philosophers refer to him as the father of modern science. But commonplaces stop with these considerations. Everything takes place as if the Florentine physicist refused any methodological imprisonment and did not mind taking the ideological color of his interpreters. His work constitutes a first-rate subject in philosophy of science. The development of the latter as a full-fledged discipline at the beginning of the 20th Century was accompanied in France with an intense reflection on modern science and the philosophy which underlies it. The rationalistic glorification of the Enlightenment and positivism had made Galileo the hero who allowed classical mechanics to replace astrological physics. He was considered by Comte to be the creator of Science. At the beginning of 20th Century it was time for a reevaluation. The empiricism of the Enlightenment and the general facts of Auguste Comte yielded to an aprioristic comprehension of modern physics defended by Paul Tannery. Philosophy of science as it is practiced today in France was shaped by the endeavours of Tannery and Gaston Milhaud. If the image of Galileo in Tannery closely resembles that found in Alexandre Koyré, Pierre Duhem, who defended the idea of a continuity between Medieval Science and Classic Science, stands apart.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Nesse trabalho apresentamos a função e determinamos a natureza das convenções e hipóteses para os fundamentos científicos segundo a corrente convencionalista que surgiu na França na virada do século XIX para o XX, composta por Henri Poincaré, Pierre Duhem e Édouard Le Roy. Além disso, analisamos a relação que as convenções e hipóteses podem estabelecer com teses metafísicas através dos critérios utilizados pelos cientistas para determinar a preferência por certas teorias. Para isso, promovemos uma interpretação imanente das obras publicadas entre 1891 e 1905. Como resultado, revelamos que os autores, apesar de serem classificados como pertencentes a uma mesma corrente, não possuem apenas posições comuns, mas também divergências. Poincaré e Le Roy concordam que as convenções geométricas são escolhidas de acordo com o critério de conveniência. Contudo, eles discordam sobre o valor que a conveniência agrega ao conhecimento científico. Em relação aos fenômenos naturais, os três autores concordam que a realidade não pode ser descrita univocamente por um mesmo conjunto de convenções e hipóteses. Porém, Poincaré e Duhem acreditam que há critérios que tornam umas teorias mais satisfatórias que outras. Analisamos os critérios experimentais, racionais e axiológicos que justificam a satisfação dos cientistas com certas teorias e apontamos como estes critérios se relacionam com a metafísica. Concluímos que os convencionalistas, mesmo que cautelosamente e de modo implícito, buscaram se aproximar da metafísica com o intuito de justificar a própria atividade científica. / In this work, we present the function and we determine the nature of conventions and hypotheses for the scientific foundations according with the conventionalist doctrine that arose in France during the turning of the XIX century to the XX. The doctrine was composed by Henri Poincaré, Pierre Duhem and Édouard Le Roy. Moreover, we analyze the relation that conventions and hypotheses can establish with metaphysical thesis through criteria used by scientists in order to determine the preference for certain theories. Thereunto, we promote an immanent interpretation of published works between 1891 and 1905. As result, we reveal that the authors, though being classified as belonging to the same doctrine, don't have only common grounds, but also divergences. Poincaré and Le Roy agree that geometrical conventions are chosen in accordance with convenience criteria. However, they disagree about the value convenience aggregate to scientific knowledge. In regards to natural phenomena, the three authors agree that reality can't be described univocally by the same set of conventions and hypotheses. Yet, Poincaré and Duhem both believe that there are experimental, rational and axiological criteria that justify scientists satisfaction with certain theories and we indicate how those criteria are related with metaphysics. We conclude that conventionalists, even if warily and implicitly, searched to approach metaphysics in order to justify scientific activity.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Nesse trabalho apresentamos a função e determinamos a natureza das convenções e hipóteses para os fundamentos científicos segundo a corrente convencionalista que surgiu na França na virada do século XIX para o XX, composta por Henri Poincaré, Pierre Duhem e Édouard Le Roy. Além disso, analisamos a relação que as convenções e hipóteses podem estabelecer com teses metafísicas através dos critérios utilizados pelos cientistas para determinar a preferência por certas teorias. Para isso, promovemos uma interpretação imanente das obras publicadas entre 1891 e 1905. Como resultado, revelamos que os autores, apesar de serem classificados como pertencentes a uma mesma corrente, não possuem apenas posições comuns, mas também divergências. Poincaré e Le Roy concordam que as convenções geométricas são escolhidas de acordo com o critério de conveniência. Contudo, eles discordam sobre o valor que a conveniência agrega ao conhecimento científico. Em relação aos fenômenos naturais, os três autores concordam que a realidade não pode ser descrita univocamente por um mesmo conjunto de convenções e hipóteses. Porém, Poincaré e Duhem acreditam que há critérios que tornam umas teorias mais satisfatórias que outras. Analisamos os critérios experimentais, racionais e axiológicos que justificam a satisfação dos cientistas com certas teorias e apontamos como estes critérios se relacionam com a metafísica. Concluímos que os convencionalistas, mesmo que cautelosamente e de modo implícito, buscaram se aproximar da metafísica com o intuito de justificar a própria atividade científica. / In this work, we present the function and we determine the nature of conventions and hypotheses for the scientific foundations according with the conventionalist doctrine that arose in France during the turning of the XIX century to the XX. The doctrine was composed by Henri Poincaré, Pierre Duhem and Édouard Le Roy. Moreover, we analyze the relation that conventions and hypotheses can establish with metaphysical thesis through criteria used by scientists in order to determine the preference for certain theories. Thereunto, we promote an immanent interpretation of published works between 1891 and 1905. As result, we reveal that the authors, though being classified as belonging to the same doctrine, don't have only common grounds, but also divergences. Poincaré and Le Roy agree that geometrical conventions are chosen in accordance with convenience criteria. However, they disagree about the value convenience aggregate to scientific knowledge. In regards to natural phenomena, the three authors agree that reality can't be described univocally by the same set of conventions and hypotheses. Yet, Poincaré and Duhem both believe that there are experimental, rational and axiological criteria that justify scientists satisfaction with certain theories and we indicate how those criteria are related with metaphysics. We conclude that conventionalists, even if warily and implicitly, searched to approach metaphysics in order to justify scientific activity.

In science all hypothesis-testing rely on a multitude of background assumptions.However, the Quine-Duhem thesis tells us that upon refutation, or disconfirma-tion, there is no principled way of determining which of these assumptions shouldbe abandoned in light of the evidence. Attempts have been made to provideBayesian models that can provide a logic to resolve this problem. In this paperI identify, describe, compare and evaluate two such models. The first is dueto John Dorling and the second to Michael Strevens. I argue that Dorling’ssolution to the problem presented by the Quine-Duhem thesis is preferable tothat proposed by Strevens. / <p>Spring semester 2024</p>

Ce mémoire propose une analyse du rôle épistémologique des problèmes scientifiques complexes. En partant du holisme épistémologique hérité des positions philosophiques de Pierre Duhem et de Willard Van Orman Quine, et de la thèse voulant que la pratique scientifique s’effectue toujours à partir d’un champ théorique et conceptuel reconnu, nous développons un modèle de gestion qui propose aux chercheurs l’adoption d’une attitude pragmatique pour réagir aux problèmes complexes. Nous expliquons dans cette recherche que ces problèmes affectent l’applicabilité des théories et concepts qui forment les connaissances scientifiques. Pour les résoudre, il faut initier des recherches qui suivront les étapes d’un processus pragmatique permettant d’évaluer progressivement la situation et d’en acquérir une meilleure compréhension. Durant cette période, les conséquences négatives du problème complexe sont tolérées afin d’assurer le maintien des activités scientifiques, qu’elles visent directement ou non l’atteinte d’une solution. La thèse défendue dans cette étude veut que la gestion des problèmes complexes qu’elle propose se conclut par l’élaboration rationnelle, encadrée par des décisions pragmatiques et une conjoncture favorable, d’une hypothèse ad hoc offrant une solution au problème. Si la communauté scientifique reconnait la valeur épistémologique de cette hypothèse, elle sera intégrée au champ théorique et conceptuel ce qui aura pour effet d’enrichir les connaissances scientifiques et de redonner à la science son statut « normal ». / This thesis proposes an analysis of the epistemological role of complex scientific problems. Starting from the epistemological holism inherited from the philosophical positions of Pierre Duhem and Willard Van Orman Quine, and from the thesis that scientific practice is always based on a recognized theoretical and conceptual field, we develop a management model that proposes that researchers adopt a pragmatic attitude to react to complex problems. We explain in this research that these problems affect the applicability of theories and concepts that form scientific knowledge. To solve them, we must initiate research that will follow the steps of a pragmatic process to progressively assess the situation and gain a better understanding. During this period, the negative consequences of the complex problem are tolerated in order to ensure the maintenance of the scientific activities that it directly targets, or not, the achievement of a solution. The thesis defended in this study is that the management of the complex problems that it proposes is concluded by the rational elaboration, framed by pragmatic decisions and a favorable conjuncture, of an ad hoc hypothesis offering a solution to the problem. If the scientific community recognizes the epistemological value of this hypothesis, it will be integrated into the theoretical and conceptual field which will have the effect of enriching scientific knowledge and giving back to science its "normal" status.