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Apriority in Naturalized Epistemology: Investigation into a Modern DefenseChristiansen, Jesse Giles 28 November 2007 (has links)
Versions of naturalized epistemology that overlook or reject apriority ignore innate belief-forming processes that provide much of the grounding for epistemic warrant. A rigorous analysis reveals that non-experiential ways of viewing apriority, such as innateness, establish the domain for a plausible naturalistic theory of a priori warrant. A moderate version of naturalistic epistemology that embraces the non-experiential feature of apriority and motivates future cognitive scientific research is the preferred account.
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Confronting the Normativity Objection: W.V. Quine’s Engineering Model and Michael A. Bishop and J.D. Trout’s Strategic ReliabilismMoghaddam, Soroush 04 September 2013 (has links)
The purpose of this thesis is to critically examine how W.V. Quine, Michael A. Bishop and J.D. Trout confront the normativity objection against naturalized epistemology.
In Chapter One, normativity in epistemology is introduced, followed by a brief look over Quine’s grievances against the traditional approach to epistemology. Quine rejects traditional epistemology and assimilates epistemology with science. The second chapter assesses how Quine naturalizes epistemology, and the third chapter evaluates his engineering response against the normativity objection.
Bishop and Trout’s theory, founded upon the Aristotelian Principle, concentrates on reasoning and epistemic excellence instead of belief justification. Strategic Reliabilism’s attempt to dissolve the naturalistic challenge and resolve the normativity objection is inspected in Chapter Four.
The final chapter, succinctly, summarizes its preceding chapters and ends by suggesting a closer exploration of the link between epistemology and cognitive sciences, to better understand the underlying mechanics of the objections that face naturalized epistemology. / Graduate / 0422 / 0621 / soushi@gmail.com
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[en] THE LARRY LAUDANNULLS NORMATIVE METAMETHODOLOGY: NEW FONDATIONS FOR A NATURALIST PERSPECTIVE IN SCIENCE / [pt] A METAMETODOLOGIA NORMATIVA DE LARRY LAUDAN: NOVOS FUNDAMENTOS PARA UMA PERSPECTIVA NATURALISTA EM CIÊNCIAANDRE LUIZ DA SILVA FAYAO 10 August 2004 (has links)
[pt] Esta dissertação busca analisar a proposta filosófica de
Larry Laudan para a superação dos impasses epistemológicos
gerados no debate entre a concepção fundacionista de
ciência dos positivistas lógicos e a crítica relativista
que foi promovida pelos epistemólogos da virada histórica.
Aqui serão discutidas as principais questões levantadas
neste confronto no tocante à metodologia da ciência. Para
tal, nos deteremos sobre a gênese e sobre colapso do
naturalismo lingüístico-descritivo do Círculo de Viena,
mostrando o enfraquecimento de suas teses centrais ora pela
análise de suas contradições internas, ora pela abordagem
das críticas que lhe foram dirigidas por outras escolas de
pensamento, em especial, a crítica histórica. Por fim, nos
deteremos sobre o modelo metametodológico de Laudan e sua
perspectiva naturalista de metodologia científica baseada
em regras normativas. / [en] This essay seeks to analyze Larry Laudan`s philosophical
proposal to overcome the epistemological predicaments
raised in the discussion between positivists and historical
turn`s relativists. Here, we will discuss the main
questions raised in this confrontation about the scientific
methodology. In such case, we will detain over the origin
and breakdown of the linguistic-descriptive naturalism
created by logical positivism. We will present the
feebleness of the positivist`s central thesis, unveiling
the internal contradictions of the proposal and the
critiques from others schools of thought, in special, the
criticism from historical turn`s point of view. At last, we
will focus Laudan`s metamethodological model of science`s
philosophy and its naturalist perspective based in
normative rules.
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