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Mental health services provided through the Youth Offending Service (YOS) are inadequate to meet the needs of young offenders. The differing viewpoints of mental health and criminal justice are not incompatible, but require consideration in terms of how to work together. This has not occurred within youth justice, and there are tensions between the YOS and CAMHS. If the YOS structure better allowed for social justice approaches to occur within practice, these tensions could be avoided and the needs of young people better met. This research looked at the ways in which provision of mental health services impacts upon social justice within the YOS. A case study was constructed looking in detail at mental health provision, the challenges faced by mental health workers and their ability to overcome these problems. Mental health workers and managers within the YOS were interviewed to construct the case study. From this a number of issues were identified within practice that impact upon social justice, and how some youth offending teams had overcome them. From this both long and short-term suggestions and strategies for practice have been created to improve levels of social justice within youth justice practice.

John Rawls' A Theory of Justice stands as the single most important work in the Anglo-American liberal tradition after World War II. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls revives the social contract doctrine in order to determine principles of justice that would be chosen by persons who are free and equal moral individuals. Since Rawls believes that no single conception of the good can establish justice in a pluralistic society, he posits a set of principles of right which are prior to any particular good. Thus his theory, which he calls "justice as fairness," is deontological. Since its publication in 1971, A Theory of Justice has generated extensive critical response from writers all along the philosophical spectrum.

Without doubt, John Rawls's A Theory of Justice is one of the most important statements of Anglo-American political philosophy in the twentieth century. Through a revival of the social contract device, Rawls formulates a set of principles of correct political association ("the right") that he argues must be considered as prior to any conception of the good. These principles apply to all persons as free and equal beings in society, but more importantly they assume some things about the nature of persons in that society. On the institutional aspect of his theory, Rawls conceives of the state as a neutral arbiter of the good. This, coupled with a conception of persons as individuals that affirm the values of autonomy and equality, has drawn extensive critical fire from philosophers within and without liberalism. One such group of critics, the communitarians, claim that Rawls's idea of the person is too abstract or "groundless" to account for shared values, and thus fails to appreciate the extent to which we understand ourselves as embedded within our culture. Michael Sandel has thus argued that Rawls's person so conceived is too abstract to be of any theoretical let alone practical use, while Alasdair Macintyre has argued that such a conception of persons is incoherent: liberal "persons" do not know themselves, and so they cannot know what is right or what is good. This thesis analyzes the liberal-communitarian debate by comparing and contrasting some terms used by both sides in the debate. By analyzing the terms, I will present a liberal conception of the person as properly understood in Rawls's theory. ' Rawls has not been idle since the publication of A Theory of Justice. He has defended his theory in a series of articles and lectures that have developed his position in response to these and other criticisms. Specifically, by positing his theory within liberal-democratic culture, by acknowledging individual formative conceptions of the good, and by emphasizing and relying upon a modus vivendi view as the basis for political liberalism and a liberal culture, Rawls has answered the communitarian objections by incorporating and responding to those pertinent criticisms. I will argue that Rawls's recent emphasis on a theory of political liberalism successfully accounts for his idea of persons because it accords with our considered moral principles, it treats persons as free and equal beings worthy of respect, and it incorporates the only coherent construction of the social embeddedness thesis to a greater degree than communitarians acknowledge or appreciate. Rawls's political liberalism thus surpasses this aspect of the communitarian critique.

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Egalitarian liberal theories of justice – so this dissertation argues – fail to take into accountthe full implications of the way citizens’ socio-cultural backgrounds work to undermine theequal opportunities these same theories demand. While egalitarians support extensiveredistribution of income and wealth from the privileged to the less privileged, and advocateequal opportunities for all, they do not properly attend either to how our shared societalcultures structure social esteem and related advantages, or to how our individual socioculturalenvironments structure the very act of choice. They thus fail to acknowledge ourunequal opportunities to make choices which bring us esteem and related advantages,particularly the advantages that flow from our having established for ourselves lives thatothers consider good. Alternative approaches to the interplay between justice, culture, and choice are rejected forillegitimately restricting the right to go our own way (communitarianism), or for regulatingpolitically that which cannot legitimately be regulated politically (recognition theory).Against the former position it is argued that we should draw on our culturalunderstandings, not to restrict free choice, but to identify opportunities to be safeguarded.Against the latter it is argued that we should not renegotiate prevailing cultural structurespolitically, but rather acknowledge these same structures and ensure that no one falls too farbehind in the competition for the advantages they generate. Suggesting that one of the more thoroughgoing hierarchies of esteem and disesteem is thatattached to our occupational positions, broadly construed, the dissertation concretizes theclaims defended in relation to this hierarchy in particular. It is argued that the just societyowes it to its citizens to protect them from involuntary occupation of positions that comewith potentially harmful disesteem attached. It is not for society to overrule theindependent choices of citizens, however, but rather to provide enduring opportunities totraining and education for more highly regarded positions, thus both equalizingopportunities to esteem and related advantages, and ensuring that those who continue tooccupy positions at the lower end of the hierarchy in question do so through their owngenuinely free choice.

John Rawls's The Law of Peoples has been criticized for focusing on the interests of peoples rather than individuals and for compromising individuals' fundamental human rights in order to tolerate nonliberal ideas of justice. This dissertation develops a new political liberal approach to international justice theory that responds to these concerns. This approach gives explicit moral primacy to the individual while also upholding the political liberal commitment to toleration. I do this by developing a political conception of the person specifically for international justice theory and a global original position of persons for working out principles of international justice. This involves the specification of an idea of freedom that is not parochially liberal and the development of a new political liberal human rights framework. This dissertation does not offer a defense of political liberalism as the right account of justice; the aim of this work is to consider whether a political liberal theory of international justice is able to give the individual moral primacy and to explore how it might do so.

John Rawls's The Law of Peoples has been criticized for focusing on the interests of peoples rather than individuals and for compromising individuals' fundamental human rights in order to tolerate nonliberal ideas of justice. This dissertation develops a new political liberal approach to international justice theory that responds to these concerns. This approach gives explicit moral primacy to the individual while also upholding the political liberal commitment to toleration. I do this by developing a political conception of the person specifically for international justice theory and a global original position of persons for working out principles of international justice. This involves the specification of an idea of freedom that is not parochially liberal and the development of a new political liberal human rights framework. This dissertation does not offer a defense of political liberalism as the right account of justice; the aim of this work is to consider whether a political liberal theory of international justice is able to give the individual moral primacy and to explore how it might do so.

Recently it has been proposed that humans possess an innate, domain-specific moral faculty, and that this faculty might be fruitfully understood by drawing a close analogy with nativist theories in linguistics. This Linguistic Analogy (LA) hypothesizes that humans share a universal moral grammar. In this paper I argue that this conception is deeply flawed. After profiling a recent and appealing account of universal moral grammar, I suggest that recent empirical findings reveal a significant flaw, which takes the form of a dilemma: either there is something wrong with the moral grammar model because we do not actually possess the innate contents (rules, principles, and concepts) it says we have, or the moral grammar model is simply the wrong model of moral cognition. In light of this dilemma, I conclude we ought to be skeptical that the Linguistic Analogy can adequately serve as a general account of moral cognition.

ABSTRACT DECISION MAKING IN INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: ONE INSTITUTION’S JOURNEY TO MAINTAIN TITLE IX COMPLIANCE by John Rowland The allocation of resources and participation opportunities in intercollegiate athletics has been a debate among researchers for nearly 40 years. Title IX and traditionally male-dominated budgeting practices continue to be opposing forces that shape the financial and gender makeup of university athletic departments. In fact, the need to be Title IX compliant often dominates discussions when structural changes occur in athletic departments. This case study analyzed the decision making process of distributing resources and participation opportunities at Division I University from 1998 to 2007 based on John Rawls’ arguments about distributive justice. Division I University administrators focused on the substantiality proportionality clause of the three-part test as the only method to comply with Title IX. The Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act and other gender equity reports completed during certification play an important role in the decision making process. The analysis of the decision making process showed that Title IX was used as a political tool to deflect the controversy of program elimination. This analysis also showed that program elimination was not necessary in order to maintain Title IX compliance. Thus, the decision to eliminate sports was a violation of Rawlsian justice.