Submitted by Irene Nascimento (irene.kessia@ufpe.br) on 2015-03-05T19:16:32Z No. of bitstreams: 2 TESE Clóvis Marinho de Barros Falcão.pdf: 4039807 bytes, checksum: 565ae2cf1c485ebe16c1797caf9a7eab (MD5) license_rdf: 1232 bytes, checksum: 66e71c371cc565284e70f40736c94386 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-05T19:16:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 TESE Clóvis Marinho de Barros Falcão.pdf: 4039807 bytes, checksum: 565ae2cf1c485ebe16c1797caf9a7eab (MD5) license_rdf: 1232 bytes, checksum: 66e71c371cc565284e70f40736c94386 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-08-23 / A teoria do direito atual apresenta fortes tendências céticas e relativistas, relacionadas à queda da modernidade e do ideal de ciência cartesiano. Essa é uma linha coerente, mas não a única possível. O olhar pragmatista, menos exigente em relação aos métodos racionais, não pressupõe uma tão séria crise da razão. A verdade estética do pragmatismo clássico reconhece a importância de elementos sutis da argumentação, permitindo uma melhor convivência com o ambiente de incerteza da filosofia. Essa aceitação dos frágeis critérios de verdade pósmodernos permite que se enxergue melhor a importância de justificações modestas, contextuais. Ao aceitarem construir teorias da justiça a partir desse conceito deflacionado de verdade objetiva, John Rawls e Ronald Dworkin mostram, com a cautela de suas teorias, os elementos racionais do consenso público sobre valores morais. Esse modelo menos exigente da ordem pública, como reação às dificuldades da epistemologia pós-moderna, é bem adaptado ao ambiente de incerteza. Esta tese defende não haver contradição entre o ceticismo pós-moderno e as verdades absolutas em discussões morais, uma vez aceita a verdade estética do pragmatismo clássico de William James, Henri Bergson e John Dewey.

M.A. (Philosophy) / Imagine a hypothetical couple, Jane and John Smith. The Smiths have been together for a couple of years, and they both have good jobs with a solid income. They are both physically healthy and happy, and have a good relationship built on mutual trust. The Smiths feel ready to take, what so many call, 'the next step' - they want a child. This sounds like a commonplace scenario in any middle-class society around the world. But let me add to their considerations the one about the existence of orphans - almost 145 million of them worldwide (UNICEF 2009). A dilemma now occurs for the Smiths: Should they have their own, biological child, or should they adopt an orphan? Like most people, they would like to have their own child, but realise that there are so many children already in existence who need a home. They consider that, instead of having a biological child for no other real reason than their own desires, they can really change one (or more) child's life by adopting her. There simultaneously exists an inherent dilemma for any state: Should the state interfere in people like the Smiths' option to reproduce naturally in order to increase the adoption of orphans? There are millions of orphans who will never be adopted, and yet every year millions of babies are born. The existence of orphans is therefore a socio-economic problem for any country, especially third world countries that cannot provide the orphan with adequate care and education. In this thesis, I examine how the existence of orphans in the world should influence anybody's decision to reproduce and what the state's role should be therein. The millions of orphans in the world raise serious moral questions for those people planning to have a biological child. Difficult questions arise like, if there are so many children already in the world who are in dire need of parents, is it ethical to bring another human being into the world? What duties, if any, do prospective parents have towards orphans? Do orphans deserve moral consideration above people's yet unborn 'flesh and blood'? Additionally, questions arise about the role of the state: Can it be just for a state to interfere in people's decision to reproduce? Will it be permissible to punish people if they do not adopt? Is the existence of orphans ultimately the responsibility of the state or also of the citizens within the state?

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Luck egalitarianism is the view that justice requires that we hold people accountable for the choices that they make but not the circumstances that they find themselves in. My aim in this thesis is to reject luck egalitarianism. My argument builds on the recent critique of luck egalitarianism by Elizabeth Anderson. Anderson rejects luck egalitarianism in favor of a view she calls "democratic equality." The aim of democratic equality is to create a community in which citizens relate to one another as equals. This requires, among other things, that we provide citizens with the necessary capabilities and functionings needed in order for them to function as free and equal citizens. In this thesis I argue that Anderson's critique of luck egalitarianism, although successful against the standard luck egalitarian view, does not undermine a weaker version of luck egalitarianism. This position — which I call moderate luck egalitarianism — claims that we ought to apply the choice/circumstance distinction always and only when doing so does not compromise the aims of democratic equality. This is because it is always unfair, according to luck egalitarians, when some people are worse off than others through no fault of their own. Since Anderson's view does not correct for this, we need to combine the aims of democratic equality and luck egalitarianism in the name of fairness. I argue, however, that this is not necessary. Not all inequalities that are the result of people's unchosen circumstances are unfair or unjust; inequalities in income and wealth are unfair only to the extent that they inhibit the ability of individuals to function as free and equal citizens. Thus, luck egalitarians have given us no reason to conjoin the aims of democratic equality and luck egalitarianism: democratic equality suffices. / Master of Arts

Although moral individualism is sufficient for making fair moral decisions, it is itself supported by our implicit moral commitments; Rawls (and consequently Rowlands) uses the original position as a method for making moral decisions that are both fair and consistent without proposing a normative moral code, and DeGrazia adds content to this method by spelling out what interests are and which individuals are capable of having interests - and thus being morally considerable. Rawls does not go far enough in the process of bracketing off undeserved, unearned properties; he fails to see that properties such as rationality and species are undeserved. Using Rowlands' interpretation of Rawls, I argue that the revised intuitive equality argument provides the justification for the social contract argument - that is, for bracketing off the properties that are arbitrary. I use DeGrazia to make the case for sentience as being essential for moral consideration. Sentience is necessary and sufficient for having interests, and having interests is sufficient for being worthy of moral consideration. From this, I conclude that because there are many sentient nonhuman animals, there are many nonhuman animals that are worthy of moral consideration. Being morally considerable is not equivalent to having substantial moral status. Rachels' moral individualism allows us to make moral decisions based upon the properties or characteristics of the individual, and this is particularly useful for pinpointing our treatment of humans and our justification for doing so and then simply extending this line of thought to nonhumans. This method allows us to isolate what is indeed relevant to the situation at hand and to consider if both individuals under consideration share it. In the case of moral status, sentience will play an important role because it is a property shared by humans and at least some nonhuman animals. Using Rawls, Rowlands, DeGrazia and Rachels as support, I conclude that at least some animals have significant moral status. / Master of Arts

“Uma Teoria da Justiça" de John Rawls surgiu como uma proposta renovada para abordar a equidade das instituições. Uma característica que faz o conceito de Rawls distinto é a aplicação de sua teoria a um escopo restrito: instituições que constituem a estrutura básica da sociedade. Além disso, esse conceito de justiça deve ser imparcial em relação às concepções de Bem dos indivíduos. Essa dissertação explora as razões que levaram Rawls e seus seguidores a escolher essa abordagem e sugere possíveis desafios não resolvidos por sua teoria. / “A Theory of Justice" of John Rawls emerges as a renewed proposition to approach the fairness of institutions. A distinctive characteristic of Rawls concept is the application of his theory towards a limited scope: institutions that constitute the basic structure of the society. Moreover, such concept of justice must be impartial in regard to individuals’ conceptions of good. This dissertation explores the reasons that led Rawls and his followers to choose this approach, and suggests possible challenges unsolved by his theory.

O objetivo deste trabalho é apresentar argumentos a favor de uma concepção igualitária de liberalismo político. Em primeiro lugar, apresenta-se uma classificação dos diferentes tipos de liberalismos políticos contemporâneos: (i) liberalismo do medo, (ii) liberalismo antifundacionista, (iii) liberalismo ético e (iv) liberalismo igualitário. A partir dos princípios de tolerância desenvolvidos em cada um deles, procura-se defender um ideal de razão pública como o melhor critério de justificação para regular o uso da coerção política entre cidadãos livres e iguais. / The work has two main goals. It attempts to provide arguments for the egalitarian branch of political liberalism. At first place, it is presented four types of possible political liberalisms: (i) the liberalism of fear, (ii) antifoundationalist liberalism, (iii) ethical liberalism and (iv) egalitarian liberalism. Departing from reasons for toleration offered by each of them, it argues that an ideal of public reason is the best way to conceive the use of political coercion on free and equal citizens.

O presente trabalho discute o liberalismo abrangente de Ronald Dworkin, como alternativa ao liberalismo político de John Rawls. Dworkin interpreta o liberalismo como uma teoria contínua entre ética e moralidade, ou seja, sem uma separação entre as doutrinas abrangentes e nossas concepções políticas para justificação dos fundamentos constitucionais, respeitando o pluralismo razoável presente na sociedade democrática. O liberalismo abrangente se apresenta como uma teoria liberal na qual a liberdade, a igualdade e a comunidade fazem parte de um único ideal político. / The present study discusses Ronald Dworkins comprehensive liberalism as an alternative to John Rawlspolitical liberalism. Dworkin construes liberalism as a continuous theory between ethics and morality, that is, without a separation between comprehensive doctrines and our political conceptions so as to justify constitutional grounds, thus respecting the reasonable pluralism existing in democratic society. Comprehensive liberalism presents itself as a liberal theory in which freedom, equality and community merge into a single political ideal.