Luck egalitarianism is the view that justice requires that we hold people accountable for the choices that they make but not the circumstances that they find themselves in. My aim in this thesis is to reject luck egalitarianism. My argument builds on the recent critique of luck egalitarianism by Elizabeth Anderson. Anderson rejects luck egalitarianism in favor of a view she calls "democratic equality." The aim of democratic equality is to create a community in which citizens relate to one another as equals. This requires, among other things, that we provide citizens with the necessary capabilities and functionings needed in order for them to function as free and equal citizens. In this thesis I argue that Anderson's critique of luck egalitarianism, although successful against the standard luck egalitarian view, does not undermine a weaker version of luck egalitarianism. This position — which I call moderate luck egalitarianism — claims that we ought to apply the choice/circumstance distinction always and only when doing so does not compromise the aims of democratic equality. This is because it is always unfair, according to luck egalitarians, when some people are worse off than others through no fault of their own. Since Anderson's view does not correct for this, we need to combine the aims of democratic equality and luck egalitarianism in the name of fairness. I argue, however, that this is not necessary. Not all inequalities that are the result of people's unchosen circumstances are unfair or unjust; inequalities in income and wealth are unfair only to the extent that they inhibit the ability of individuals to function as free and equal citizens. Thus, luck egalitarians have given us no reason to conjoin the aims of democratic equality and luck egalitarianism: democratic equality suffices. / Master of Arts

If morally arbitrary features (that is, blind brute luck) should have no impact on the distribution of wealth, then the vast inequality and the disparity in life prospects between countries is a moral catastrophe; birthplace is completely based on luck, and yet has an enormous impact on life prospects. I contend that those in affluent countries, who have benefited from the luck of birthplace, ought to work towards a more egalitarian world, in which luck plays as little a role in life prospects as possible.

En 1989, François Delalande présentait pour la première fois, après dix ans d’élaboration, la notion de « conduites d’écoute » servant à distinguer différentes manières d’écouter une même œuvre. La méthodologie employée limitait les conclusions qui pouvaient en être tirées, mais la perspective proposée ouvrait un nouveau champ de recherches, dans lequel différentes conduites d’écoute pouvaient servir de base à diverses manières, parfois exclusives ou contradictoires, d’analyser une même œuvre. De plus, les expériences préliminaires de Delalande autour d’un extrait de Pierre Henry sont encore aujourd’hui l’une des rares occurrences de recherche sur l’écoute des musiques acousmatiques faisant appel à des auditeurs réels. Avec la reproduction et l’extension des résultats de Delalande, en parallèle de l’intérêt grandissant pour l’écoute au sein de la communauté musicologique ces vingt dernières années, il semblait nécessaire de faire le point sur l’état des recherches concernant les conduites d’écoute afin d’en évaluer la validité opérationnelle et de proposer un cadre théorique solide pour leur étude et leur description. C’est l’objet de ce travail, qui part d’une revue des discours sur l’écoute en musicologie, en psychologie de la musique et en pédagogie de la musique, avant de procéder à un examen critique des méthodologies existantes autour du modèle des conduites d’écoute, pour en arriver à une réévaluation de ce modèle avec des méthodologies plus robustes. Trois analyses esthésiques d’une même œuvre sont alors proposées pour faire émerger les besoins d’approfondissement et les perspectives d’application de ce modèle. / In 1989, after ten years of research, François Delalande presented for the first time the idea of “listening behaviours,” distinguishing several ways to listen to the same piece of music. The methodology did not allow for many conclusions, but the approach began a new field of research, where diverse listening behaviours could serve as a basis for diverse, exclusive (or even contradictory) analyses of the same work. Furthermore, Delalande’s preliminary research based on an extract from Pierre Henry’s music is still one of the few instances of research about acousmatic music listening that addresses actual listeners. The last twenty years have seen the reproduction and extension of Delalande’s results, as well as a growing interest for listening in musicological circles. For this reason, it seems necessary to review research about listening behaviours to evaluate their operational validity and to propose a robust theoretical framework for their study and description. This is the thesis of this dissertation, beginning with a review of the musicological, psychological and pedagogical discourses about listening, following with a critical study of existing methodologies about listening behaviours frameworks in order to re-evaluate them with more robust methodologies. Three esthesic analyses of the same work are then used to propose a need for further investigation and possible applications of the framework.

Under what is arguably the single most dominant approach in modern economic theory, to act rationally is to act in accordance with one’s self-interest, and it is only “rationality as self-interest” that explains behavior in the market sphere. Many economists attribute this idea to Adam Smith, often referred to as the “father of economics.” Yet, in his The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith expands the notion of rationality to reasonableness, or the standards one has reason to value and act on, and includes in this concept both self-interested virtues, such as prudence, and other regarding virtues, such as beneficence. Other academics, such as Elizabeth Anderson, have followed Smith’s lead in expanding the notion of rationality to include values outside of self-interest, but have failed to integrate fully Smith’s moral framework as they accept the problematic tenet of reasonableness as self interest in the market sphere. In this thesis, I propose and explore in four chapters the Smith-inspired interpenetrating spheres of association model as a framework for decision-making that is superior both to the economist’s rationality as self-interest model and to Anderson’s sphere differentiation model. Importantly, the model I propose transcends these former models by concurrently assuaging collective action problems, revealing the immorality of women’s double bind situations in the workplace, and sustaining efficient market transactions.

This paper presents a critique of John Tomasi’s free market fairness: a theory that seeks to combine a robust conception of social justice with a thick conception of economic liberty. The main difference, according to Tomasi, between free market fairness and justice as fairness is that the former emphasizes the value of citizens’ agency, whereas the latter emphasizes the equal status of citizens. Focusing on the labor market and workplace governance, I argue that an argument for free market fairness cannot be made on agency grounds, and furthermore, that the theory is in fact damaging to the agency of workers. I do this by interpreting Elizabeth Anderson’s theory private government through the lens of agency, whereby I show how free market fairness fails to consider the agency – or lack of – after an employment contract has been entered. Moreover, I show how some of its principles conflict with strategies that are important for securing the agency of workers.

I uppsatsen presenterar jag “luck egalitarianism” och specifikt Dworkins teori om jämlika resurser. Målet med Dworkins teori är att sammanväva de två till synes motstridiga principerna om lika hänsyn och lika respekt. Dworkin försöker föra samman principerna genom att nå en fördelning som är ambitions-känslig samtidigt som den är talang-okänslig. Han försöker uppnå detta ideal genom att kombinera en fri marknad som visar lika respekt för medborgarnas valfrihet och ansvar, med en försäkringsmarknad som visar lika hänsyn till medborgarna genom möjligheten att teckna försäkring mot oförutsägbara konsekvenser under lika möjlighet och lika risk. Elizabeth S. Anderson påstår att Dworkins teori misslyckas i att kombinera principerna om lika hänsyn och lika respekt på ett rimligt sätt och presenterar två övergripande invändningar: hårdhetsinvändningen och förnedringsinvändningen. Den första invändningen (hårdhetsinvändingen) påstår att teorins ramverk för att fastslå vilka av de utsatta som har rätt till kompensation inte visar lika hänsyn till alla som är utsatta. Den andra invändningen (förnedringsinvändingen) påstår att grunderna för kompensation är förnedrande och inte visar lika respekt för alla medborgare. Målet med uppsatsen är att analysera Dworkins teori och undersöka om den vederläggs av Andersons invändningar. Den slutsats jag skall försvara är att så inte är fallet. Forskningsfrågan är följande: Påvisar Andersons invändningar att Dworkins teori om jämlika resurser inte visar lika hänsyn och respekt för alla medborgare?