If morally arbitrary features (that is, blind brute luck) should have no impact on the distribution of wealth, then the vast inequality and the disparity in life prospects between countries is a moral catastrophe; birthplace is completely based on luck, and yet has an enormous impact on life prospects. I contend that those in affluent countries, who have benefited from the luck of birthplace, ought to work towards a more egalitarian world, in which luck plays as little a role in life prospects as possible.

The immense inequalities between the world’s poor and the world’s rich have compelledphilosopher Thomas Pogge to develop a moral framework based on the Universal Declarationof Human Rights that challenges our most commonsense political moral views. Poggedisputes minimally and universally that we all have a negative duty not to harm so long as theharm is foreseeable and avoidable, rather than a positive duty to do well. Furthermore Poggeargues for an institutional view of negative duties flown from the fact that we all shape,uphold and impose institutions.With the help of three philosophers; Polly Vizard, Tim Hayward and Mathias Risse, Idebate a number of their raised objections to Thomas Pogge’s theory of institutional globaljustice which all focus on the controversial causal claim that the present global order causesglobal poverty. The objections discussed are (a) Vizard’s scrutinizing of Pogge’s notion ofresponsibility (b) Hayward’s call for a full causal account of how the global order is harmingthe poor and (c) Risse’s alternative baseline for harm. I argue that although Pogge has somepotential problems, he nevertheless is not contradicted by these objections to the extent thatthey themselves claim. I hold that the debated criticism appeals for further investigation andthat in light of the arguments in this thesis we have a negative duty not to harm and a positiveobligation to reform global unjust institutions in responding to global poverty.

Do global financial institutions and the governments of developed nations owe anything to the global poor? I argue that they do. In my view, the global poor are owed a form of assistance because of the unjust harms imposed upon them. The negative rights of the global poor, which are the rights involving freedom from unjust interference, are consistently violated by the global economic order (GEO). I demonstrate that the causal chain that connects global poverty directly with the policies of institutions like the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization reveals that the negative rights of the global poor are being violated. These violations occur through the effects of trade policies, unjustified sovereignty, and loan conditions, which serve to trap the poor in inescapable cycles of poverty. I argue that rather than relying on controversial accounts of the positive rights of the poor, and the appeals to charity that follow from them, we can ground the obligation to alleviate global poverty in negative rights, which are more minimal and widely accepted. My argument establishes that poverty poses a problem even if one does not see inequality as a problem in itself. I argue in support of Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach to poverty, which discusses the effects of poverty as a deprivation of a person’s abilities to do and be what she has reason to value. This approach identifies what is really at the heart of the problem with poverty: a deprivation of the ability to act in ways that allow the expression of basic freedoms, rather than merely a lack of resources or income. The negative rights approach to grounding an obligation to alleviate global poverty has traditionally been based on a conception of wrongdoing as a deprivation of basic needs. However, I contend that wrongdoing should be seen as a deprivation of fundamental capabilities instead. Using capability deprivations as a baseline for wrongdoing presents us with the theoretical resources required to create a foundation for an ecumenical theory of global justice, and the framework within which to demonstrate that the GEO has an obligation to help alleviate global poverty. / 2020-11-27T00:00:00Z

Global poverty is a pressing moral issue that necessitates serious moral reflection. It is inextricably connected with the issue of global justice. In today’s world where there are obvious extreme economic inequalities that impoverishes millions of people in many poor countries, the need for a sound principle of global justice is morally necessary. This thesis proposes Thomas Pogge’s idea of cosmopolitan justice as a feasible and relevant theory which can help and guide in alleviating severe worldwide poverty. Pogge emphasizes the stringent negative duty not to impose, sustain and profit from a global order that deprives the poor of their basic necessities necessary for them to lead a worthwhile human life. Many people are not aware that in participating in an unjust global order, they seriously harm the global poor more than their failure to provide assistance for the poor’s basic needs. So the greater responsibility of restructuring global order in order to meet the demands of global justice lies mainly in the hands of developed nations and their citizens who have profited from the present global arrangement and who have more than adequate means to help those who are deeply affected by extreme global economic inequalities. The stronger obligation not to harm the global poor must be performed by those who make decisions and policies at the global institutional level. They are the ones who decide the fate of the global poor and they are the ones who can easily change the rules underlying the present global order. The first step to poverty eradication and the overseeing that continuous efforts are exerted to realize this aim of helping the global poor are theirs to perform immediately. This task is not optional. It is urgent and a moral necessity.

The aim of this study is to understand the Fair Trade Coffee Business Model by determining how the Fair Trade Coffee Business Model affects the livelihoods of the small scale producers in developing countries. The Fair Trade Coffee Business Model is driven by the mission to improve the well-being of the small scale producers located in developing countries through the lens of the Triple Bottom Line (economic, social and environment). What is the significance of fair trade coffee to the economies of developing countries that produce coffee? The economies are considerably impacted by coffee production as coffee ranks as the second foremost exported commodity from developing countries (European Coffee Federation, 2006). Ensuring the small scale producers receive a fair price for the coffee they grow is only one of the initiatives of the model. Other key initiatives include pre-harvest financing, increased healthcare services, working together for a higher quality coffee, fairer business conduct, improvements in education, and technical assistance. The findings of this study provide some insights into the Fair Trade Coffee Business Model’s effect on the livelihoods of the small scale producers in developing countries through the lens of the Triple Bottom Line. The Fair Trade Coffee Business Model has increased the quality of the coffee bean produced by the small scale producers along with developing long term business relationships throughout the Fair Trade Coffee Business Model supply chain. In sum, the small scale producers reported that the Fair Trade Coffee Business Model has a positive effect on their livelihood and well-being. More specifically, they also indicated that the motivations for them to participate in the Fair Trade Coffee Business Model are receiving a better price for coffee, democratic decision making and farm training. An additional finding affirms that the Fair Trade Coffee Business Model is a sound contributor to the socio-economic stability of the small scale producers, offering a sustainable income-generating alternative market strategy.

<p>Global poverty is a pressing moral issue that necessitates serious moral reflection. It is inextricably connected with the issue of global justice. In today’s world where there are obvious extreme economic inequalities that impoverishes millions of people in many poor countries, the need for a sound principle of global justice is morally necessary. This thesis proposes Thomas Pogge’s idea of cosmopolitan justice as a feasible and relevant theory which can help and guide in alleviating severe worldwide poverty. Pogge emphasizes the stringent negative duty not to impose, sustain and profit from a global order that deprives the poor of their basic necessities necessary for them to lead a worthwhile human life. Many people are not aware that in participating in an unjust global order, they seriously harm the global poor more than their failure to provide assistance for the poor’s basic needs. So the greater responsibility of restructuring global order in order to meet the demands of global justice lies mainly in the hands of developed nations and their citizens who have profited from the present global arrangement and who have more than adequate means to help those who are deeply affected by extreme global economic inequalities. The stronger obligation not to harm the global poor must be performed by those who make decisions and policies at the global institutional level. They are the ones who decide the fate of the global poor and they are the ones who can easily change the rules underlying the present global order. The first step to poverty eradication and the overseeing that continuous efforts are exerted to realize this aim of helping the global poor are theirs to perform immediately. This task is not optional. It is urgent and a moral necessity.</p>

The aim of this study is to understand the Fair Trade Coffee Business Model by determining how the Fair Trade Coffee Business Model affects the livelihoods of the small scale producers in developing countries. The Fair Trade Coffee Business Model is driven by the mission to improve the well-being of the small scale producers located in developing countries through the lens of the Triple Bottom Line (economic, social and environment). What is the significance of fair trade coffee to the economies of developing countries that produce coffee? The economies are considerably impacted by coffee production as coffee ranks as the second foremost exported commodity from developing countries (European Coffee Federation, 2006). Ensuring the small scale producers receive a fair price for the coffee they grow is only one of the initiatives of the model. Other key initiatives include pre-harvest financing, increased healthcare services, working together for a higher quality coffee, fairer business conduct, improvements in education, and technical assistance. The findings of this study provide some insights into the Fair Trade Coffee Business Model’s effect on the livelihoods of the small scale producers in developing countries through the lens of the Triple Bottom Line. The Fair Trade Coffee Business Model has increased the quality of the coffee bean produced by the small scale producers along with developing long term business relationships throughout the Fair Trade Coffee Business Model supply chain. In sum, the small scale producers reported that the Fair Trade Coffee Business Model has a positive effect on their livelihood and well-being. More specifically, they also indicated that the motivations for them to participate in the Fair Trade Coffee Business Model are receiving a better price for coffee, democratic decision making and farm training. An additional finding affirms that the Fair Trade Coffee Business Model is a sound contributor to the socio-economic stability of the small scale producers, offering a sustainable income-generating alternative market strategy.

Even if they do not realize it, readers are perpetually in a condition that is strikingly similar to that of the Good Samaritan. Right now they have access to a vast network of communication that both enhances their senses and increases their sphere of influence. They can, for example, sit down at a computer and click on a certain combination of "sites" and the result will be that, in two weeks (or sooner), a DVD will arrive on their doorstep. Or, they can choose another combination, and the result will be that, in about two weeks (or less), a child will be saved from starvation and dehydration in some distant and destitute nation. Like the Good Samaritan, a reader of this thesis can see the desperate need of others and they have the ability to affect their condition. This perpetual Good Samaritan condition is directly a result of the recent changes the world has undergone as a result of technological advancement. This thesis is an exploration of the ethical implications of the potential perpetual good Samaritan. I will argue that (1) affluent individuals are able to affect positively the global poor and that they have a moral obligation to do so, (2) that this moral obligation is limited insofar as fulfilling the obligation requires a moral agent to sacrifice something of substantial significance (i.e., something that would cause a long term decrease in happiness), and (3) fulfilling this obligation requires specific actions on political, social, and individual levels.

The central question I address is whether the inclusion of a right to subsistence among human rights can be justified. The human right to subsistence is conventionally interpreted as a fundamental right to a basic living standard characterized as having access to the material means for subsistence. It is widely thought to entail duties of protection against deprivation and duties of assistance in acquiring access to the material means for subsistence (Shue 1996, Nickel, 2004, Griffin 2008). The inclusion of a right to subsistence among human rights interpreted in this way has been met with considerable resistance, particularly on the part of those who argue that fundamental rights cannot entail positive duties (Cranston 1983, Narveson 2004, O’Neill 1996, 2000, 2005). My purpose in this dissertation is to consider whether a plausible interpretation of the human right to subsistence can succeed in overcoming the most forceful and persistent objections to it. My main thesis is that a minimal interpretation of the human right to subsistence according to which it is a right not to be deprived of access to the means for subsistence provides the strongest interpretation of this right. Although the idea that the human right to subsistence correlates with negative duties is not new, discussion of these duties has been overshadowed in the literature by debate over the positive duties conventionally thought to be entailed by it. I show that the human right to subsistence interpreted as a right not to be deprived of access to the means for subsistence makes an important contribution to reasoning about the normative implications of global poverty.

Need is a concept that carries intuitive appeal in moral decision-making. As it stands, need is relatively under-theorised, given its currency not just in philosophical argumentation but in news coverage, charitable appeals, and political practice. Need claims carry compelling normative force, and they are amenable to widespread support as our most basic needs are some of the things we most transparently share with our fellow human beings. However, how should we understand that normative force? Is need best understood to compel us as a matter of justice? I begin my account by considering the kind of need relevant to the project. I build from an understanding of need as a three-place relation, which is by its nature needing for a purpose. I suggest that morally important needs are those which aim at the objective interests that all people have in virtue of what is good for each of us qua human beings ('non-arbitrary needs'). Further, I distinguish the existentially urgent subset of those non-arbitrary needs as 'basic needs.' Given this understanding, I consider how basic needs theory relates to its conceptual neighbours. I focus on capabilities as the nearest neighbours, but also comment on wants, interests, and rights. I judge that the theories developed by Martha Nussbaum (capabilities) and Len Doyal and Ian Gough (needs) benefit from a complementary reading, with each supplementing the other. I then draw from Amartya Sen's early writings on capabilities to ultimately see capabilities and needs as two sides of the same coin. This helps to situate needs theory in relation to a mainstream branch of political theory more generally, and indicates that we can recognise the special significance of needs without eschewing other morally important categories. I then move to establish a scope of justice that allows us to distinguish between duties of justice and other moral duties. If we think that duties of beneficence are weak and optional, whereas duties of justice are binding and enforceable, a great deal rides on how we characterise our duties to the global poor. I offer a 'moral enforceability' account, claiming that duties of justice are those which are, in principle, morally enforceable. It is the in-principle enforceability of justice duties which gives them teeth. Returning to need, I then ask how another's need comes to give me a moral reason for action. I canvas a range of existing accounts, many of which furnish important insights. I then propose that it is the morally relevant capacities of the being in need which gives them moral status such that their needing is morally significant. We are morally required to answer this need with responsiveness, as a demonstration of appropriate respect for the sort of being that the human in need is. If this is right, we are morally required to be responsive to need, even if we are not always required to reduce it. Finally, I bring the diverse strands of the foregoing argument together to return to the relationship between need and justice. I consider what a duty of responsiveness might amount to in practice, and suggest that our duties of responsiveness are best thought of as collective duties, grounded in the capacity of the global well-off to contribute. Further, I argue that duties of responsiveness are a matter of justice, as they are the sort of duties that are, in principle, morally enforceable. A wide range of threats to the necessary conditions for human flourishing, and even human life, are on the horizon, and many of these are uniquely collective challenges. The seriousness of those challenges, and the extent to which we have treated our responsibilities to those in need as discretionary in the past, means collective action and problem solving are called for when there are no easy answers.