Univ., Diss. u.d.T.: Schmitt, Annette: Alles graue Theorie?--Mainz, 2004.

Thèses (M.A.)--Université de Sherbrooke (Canada), 2000. / Titre de l'écran-titre (visionné le 20 juin 2006). Publié aussi en version papier.

No description available.

This paper will examine John Rawls’s views regarding the make up of society and, in particular, it will investigate the question of whether or not Rawls’s theory of justice is dependent upon accepting and endorsing the view that society is, or, at least, resembles an association. The aim of the paper will be to defend the position that Rawls’s theory of justice is in fact dependent upon an associational conception of society, and that it, therefore, relies upon the idea that the individuals in a society share a common interest or purpose. Thus, far from providing a liberal conception of society, this paper will attempt to illustrate that Rawls actually presents a more communitarian outlook of society than many might expect from a purportedly liberal thinker. In order to best prove the essential link to an associational conception of society, I discuss three principles that provided Rawls with reasons for preferring the difference principle to other modes of justice, and suggest that these founding principles provide sufficient evidence for connecting Rawls’s theory of justice to an associational conception of society. By advocating such a vision of society, Rawls betrays a fundamental premise of his own political liberalism, namely, the idea that individuals do not necessarily share a common interest or purpose with one another. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2007-09-25 19:19:43.637

No description available.

Mémoire de maîtrise - Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières, 2003. / Bibliogr.: f. 97-100.

Mémoire (M.A.)--Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières, 2003. / Bibliogr.: f. 105-112.

Mémoire (M.A.)--Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières, 2003. / Bibliogr.: f. 118-125.

Univ., Diss.--Kiel, 2000. / Literaturverz. S. 533 - 559.

O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar o papel da religião em sociedades democráticas liberais. Inicialmente, descrevo os principais elementos das teorias exclusivas e inclusivas da religião. Os argumentos de tais teorias dizem respeito à (in)validez da justificação de razões religiosas para leis estatais de caráter coercitivo. Após apresentar estas linhas gerais, trago ao debate duas posições liberais a respeito da tolerância religiosa: primeiro, a de Ronald Dworkin, depois a de John Rawls com o intuito de defender uma concepção liberal igualitária de tolerância religiosa. Embora Rawls esteja normalmente situado entre os teóricos ditos exclusivistas, pretendo lançar mão de alguns elementos de sua teoria que sugerem, no entanto, a presença de uma certa visão inclusiva em seu argumento, ou ao menos uma visão menos restritiva de sua ideia / ideal de razão pública. Por fim, avalio os limites da teoria normativa rawlsiana ante as formulações de Jürgen Habermas a respeito dos desafios que a religião suscita em sociedades pós-seculares. / This work has the main goal of analyzing the role of religion in liberal democratic societies. First, I describe the main tenets of the exclusive and inclusive theories of religion. These theories concern the (in) validity of religious reasons to justify state laws of a coercive nature. After presenting the general outlines of the debate, I discuss how two different liberal theories, the Ronald Dworkins normative framework and then the rawlsian one, are both able to offer a liberal-egalitarian defense for a conception of religious tolerance. Although normally located among theories called exclusive I intend to use some elements of John Rawls theory that suggest, nonetheless, the presence of a certain inclusive vision in his argument, or at least a less restrictive view of his idea/ideal of public reason. Finally, I take up Jürgen Habermas assumptions on the place of religion in post-secular societies in order to test some normative limits which the theory of John Rawls must face.