In this essay, the Scanlonian contractualist formula will be understood as follows: Within the domain of morality of what we owe to each other, an action is morally wrong if it follows principles that similarly motivated people can reasonably reject. Consequently, the concept of ‘reasonable rejection’ is the operative element in moral valuation, thus begging the question of what it is for a rejection to be reasonable. The problem of circularity in Scanlon’s contractualism builds upon a reading according to which Scanlon’s explanation of what it is to be ‘reasonably rejected’ seems to be understood as ‘when the action is morally wrong’. If this is the case, then Scanlon’s contractualism refers to its own thesis when performing moral valuations: that is wrong which can be reasonably rejected, and for an action to be reasonably rejected it must be morally wrong. The problem of circularity apparently renders Scanlon’s contractualism ‘empty’ as it cannot explain what it is for an action to be morally wrong without referring to its own thesis. In this essay I will try to clarify the difference between welfarist and structural charges of circularity. I will argue that the structural charges of circularity are due to a fallacious constructivist reading of What We Owe to Each Other. As I understand Scanlon, the constructivist reading places Scanlon’s theory too close to the contractualist tradition. I will also argue that critics holding Scanlon’s contractualism to be circular have failed to note that his theory only claims to cover a narrow domain of morality. Where critics hold Scanlon’s contractualism to refer to its own thesis when performing moral valuations I will argue that the theory refers to moral domains outside that of what we owe to each other. Hopefully my discussion on constructivism and circularity will shed some light on the simple brilliance and practical applicability of Scanlon’s contractualism. I will give a brief overview of What We Owe to Each Other before I present the critique put forth by Onora O’Neill, Mark Timmons and Joseph Raz. Then I will show how Scanlon treats the problem of circularity in his book, and how his defense targets substantial and not structural charges of circularity. I will then show that the structural critique is fallacious by analyzing the domain of morality that Scanlon’s contractualism targets. Finally I will try to apply Scanlon’s formula on personal relationships and on environmental issues. As of this point I will refer to Scanlon’s thesis as ‘contractualism’ while other theories following the contractualist tradition will be referred to as ‘contractarian’.

Rossian moral pluralism’s rejection of a founding moral principle and use of ‘prima facie duties’ as opposed to absolute duties makes it unique from most other major ethical theories. It has been attacked in a myriad of different ways because of this. Brad Hooker has proposed two objections based on these ideas. The first is that moral pluralism is lacking justification because of its rejection of a founding moral principle. The second is that because of this, and its lack of absolute duties, moral pluralism is an indeterminate theory. In this paper I will look at Hooker’s objections as well as two responses that have been proposed as solutions. Having shown these solutions to be insufficient I will then propose a way to look at Ross’ moral pluralism that saves it from Hooker’s objections and clearly lays out Ross’ understanding of how we should deliberate about moral matters.

O objetivo deste trabalho é apresentar argumentos a favor de uma concepção igualitária de liberalismo político. Em primeiro lugar, apresenta-se uma classificação dos diferentes tipos de liberalismos políticos contemporâneos: (i) liberalismo do medo, (ii) liberalismo antifundacionista, (iii) liberalismo ético e (iv) liberalismo igualitário. A partir dos princípios de tolerância desenvolvidos em cada um deles, procura-se defender um ideal de razão pública como o melhor critério de justificação para regular o uso da coerção política entre cidadãos livres e iguais. / The work has two main goals. It attempts to provide arguments for the egalitarian branch of political liberalism. At first place, it is presented four types of possible political liberalisms: (i) the liberalism of fear, (ii) antifoundationalist liberalism, (iii) ethical liberalism and (iv) egalitarian liberalism. Departing from reasons for toleration offered by each of them, it argues that an ideal of public reason is the best way to conceive the use of political coercion on free and equal citizens.

O objetivo deste trabalho é apresentar argumentos a favor de uma concepção igualitária de liberalismo político. Em primeiro lugar, apresenta-se uma classificação dos diferentes tipos de liberalismos políticos contemporâneos: (i) liberalismo do medo, (ii) liberalismo antifundacionista, (iii) liberalismo ético e (iv) liberalismo igualitário. A partir dos princípios de tolerância desenvolvidos em cada um deles, procura-se defender um ideal de razão pública como o melhor critério de justificação para regular o uso da coerção política entre cidadãos livres e iguais. / The work has two main goals. It attempts to provide arguments for the egalitarian branch of political liberalism. At first place, it is presented four types of possible political liberalisms: (i) the liberalism of fear, (ii) antifoundationalist liberalism, (iii) ethical liberalism and (iv) egalitarian liberalism. Departing from reasons for toleration offered by each of them, it argues that an ideal of public reason is the best way to conceive the use of political coercion on free and equal citizens.

The purpose of this study is to seek to an answer to the question of what constitutes a tenable model for global ethics. This is done in part by a critical engagement with four different models of global ethics; two proposals from political philosophy and two contributions from theological ethics. The models analyzed in the study are: (1) the capabilities approach as developed by Martha Nussbaum, (2) Seyla Benhabib’s discourse ethics and model of cosmopolitan federalism, (3) David Hollenbach’s model of the common good and human rights, and (4) the model for responsibility ethics and theological humanism as developed by William Schweiker. These models contain different understandings of global justice, human rights, and sustainable development. The study works with six primary problems: (1) Which are the main moral problems associated with different processes of globalization? (2) What should be the response to these problems, in the form of a normative ethical model? (3) What is the relation between global ethics and universalism? (4) What kind of institutional vision for the international arena does a tenable global ethic promote? (5) Given the human diversity and global pluralism, what would be a reasonable view of the human being included in a global ethic? (6) What kind of ethical theory is sustainable for global ethical reflection? These questions also form the basis for the analysis of the models. The study uses a set of criteria in order to assess the answers that the models offer for these questions. These criteria also constitute the framework within which the author’s contribution to the discussion of global ethics is phrased. The criteria are founded on an idea of what characterizes global ethical reflection. The contention is that a tenable global ethic should be relevant, and it should also be related to a reasonable view of human beings and a plausible ethical theory. Together these support the criterion of communicability, which argues that a global ethic should above all be communicable, i.e. capable of enabling cross-cultural communication. A central argument which this study makes is that a kind of ethical contextualism is more reasonable than an epistemological universalism.