Esta tesis doctoral pretende estudiar ordenadamente los escritos de Alasdair MacIntyre sobre el derecho. Se propone un itinerario desde los años cincuenta hasta 2010. Se sostiene que para la comprensión de la filosofía del derecho de MacIntyre es necesario conocer su filosofía de la acción. Tras un análisis de ésta, se estudia su deriva naturalista en la ética, sus consecuencias en la teoría de la justicia y su defensa del derecho natural. Su postura en el marco del iusnaturalismo se distingue de otras corrientes en el seno del aristotelismo y del tomismo y propone una interpretación ecléctica, no exenta de problemas. / This thesis aims to study orderly Alasdair MacIntyre's writings on Law. A way is proposed from the fifties until 2010. This thesis claims for understanding the Philosophy of Law of MacIntyre it is necessary to know his philosophy of action. Following this analysis, it is studied his naturalistic turn in Ethics and its implications for the Theory of Justice and defense of Natural Law. Their position within the Natural Law debates differs from other opinions within the Aristotelianism and Thomism and it proposes an eclectic interpretation, although this is not without problems.

[pt] O presente trabalho baseia-se na obra de Joseph Raz e consiste em uma investigação teórica sobre os conceitos de normas e de sistemas jurídicos no interior do positivismo analítico. A análise dos modelos de Austin, Kelsen e Hart evidencia a necessidade de reformulação dos critérios de identidade do direito. Um critério que leve em conta a atuação dos órgãos primários de aplicação do direito mostra-se superior na medida em que reconhece que as normas identificadas, de alguma forma, se ligam com razões para a ação. Porque essa dimensão prática das normas não pode ser desconsiderada, o critério proposto por Raz desponta como uma descrição melhor e mais fiel daquilo que se entende por sistema jurídico. / [en] The present work is based on Joseph Raz work and consists in a theoretical investigation about the concepts of legal norms and systems in the boundary of analytic positivism. The analysis of the models developed by Austin, Kelsen and Hart prove the necessity of reformulation of the criteria of identity of Law. A criterion that takes into account the activity of the primary law-applying organs is superior because recognizes the fact that the identified norms, in a certain way, are connected with reasons for action. Because this practical dimension of the norms can not be disregarded, the criterion proposed by Raz proportions a better and more faithful description of a legal system.

To interpret is to seek understanding. This formulation hides as much as it reveals and I propose to unpack it. I argue that interpreting is only a part of what legal theorists and practitioners do. In Part I, I attempt an ‘in vitro’ analysis and present the bare concept of interpretation: interpretation is an activity that needs an object; interpreting is reasoning about meaning when there is a possibility of mistake about that meaning. Part II focuses on two domains of interpretation: musical performance and adjudication. I rely on Joseph Raz’s account of interpretation as explanation or display and identify the former domain as a paradigm of display and the latter as a paradigm of explanation. Both are examples of interpretation for others and involve a claim to theoretical authority on the part of interpreters. But, unlike musicians- who interpret only works of music- judges interpret a great variety of objects. Musical interpretation is identified by its object, whereas legal interpretation is not. Legal interpretation is explanation of legal meaning. I then discuss the tenets of the minimalist view of legal interpretation: (i) legal rules are not interpretable and legal texts are not primary objects of legal interpretation; (ii) there is a difference between interpretative authority (a form of theoretical authority) and legal authority (a form of practical authority) and interpretative conclusions can be theoretically authoritative without being exclusionary reasons for action; (iii) Interpreting and adjudicating are different activities. Interpretation explains, adjudication resolves. Legal interpreters do not produce legal rules: they are required to be guided by them.

The aim of this thesis is to explore Bernard Williams' moral philosophy in its entirety. This objective is motivated by the critique which is sometimes being forced against Williams. This criticism is based on the objection that his thinking is thoroughly destructive in relation to philosophical ethics. The purpose to explore Williams' thinking in its entirety implicitly questions such an objection for it basically consists in the identification of the constructive moments of Williams' thinking and linking them with his skeptical attitudes. Accordingly, the project of this thesis is to show how Williams' attack on morality and moral system is being completed in notions of shame, truthfulness, and authenticity, which he develops in his late work and which delineate the alternative conception of ethics and ethical life to prevailing legalistic model.

This thesis explores reasons and disagreement in ethics, and their connection to personal identity. I begin by arguing that reasons are open; what gives them direction is how they feature in my life and weigh with me. Of course, this does not tell us what reasons are available to a person when they act. In this connection I argue against Bernard Williams’ internal reasons thesis, showing that there are occasions when we will want to say someone has a reason to act even though they are unable to see it. Continuing with Williams, I explore moral necessity, drawing also on the works of Winch, Rhees and Cordner, arguing that Williams too readily conflates psychological with ethical limits. In particular, the possibility of recanting what we took to be necessary should inform our view of moral necessity, since it can show that I had misconstrued the nature of the limits I took myself to have reached. Following this use of recantation, I explore narrative in detail, arguing that my narrative is partly constitutive of who I am. My agency is therefore interpretive. This has ramifications for thinkers such as Christine Korsgaard and Jonathan Dancy, whose work I explore in two excursuses. In different ways, both fail to appreciate the significance of our interpretive identities.