Hegel&#039 / s system, with a purpose of being the newest philosophy, represents a turning point in the history of thought. In contrast to the philosophical thoguht of Enlightenment which seperates branches of knowledge, or that of philosophy, Hegel tries to recombine them. In this study, I intend to reveal the close connection of the concepts appeared in the two works of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, namely, The Phenomenology of Spirit (Ph&auml / nomenologie des Geistes) and Elements of the Philosophy of Right (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts). These concepts are consciousness, self-consciousness, desire, recognition, freedom and intersubjectivity that are very important for considering self-actualization of the individual and for understanding also the process of human socialization. In this sense, Hegel&rsquo / s philosophy, in general, is an attempt to analyze modern society through the light of these conceptions which are still central to our aspirations as reflective social beings.

Contemporary developments in cognitive sciences have uncovered strong correlations between mental events and nervous activity. Despite their achievements, cognitive sciences are still unable to provide an adequate explanation for the concept of conscious selves. There are two main reasons behind this inability. The first one is the mismatch between the distributed nature of the nervous information processing and the unified nature of the consciousness. The second one is the fundamental differences between conscious experiences and the objects and events in classical physics. This thesis aims to provide a basis for a theory for consciousness and conscious selves by using certain findings of modern physics, neuroscience and philosophy. The argumentation is based on the biological necessity of having neural mechanisms that act like a self and quantum-theoretical approaches to consciousness. Consequently, it is shown that, the concept of conscious self is just a concept that we use to encompass several related concepts and experiences rather than being an ontological reality that is assumed by our common-sense intuitions.

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Nietzsche is a name not often invoked in relation to the topic of responsibility. This study reveals, however, that his work engages vigorously with the problem of responsibility in modernity on both the conceptual and methodological levels. In the concept of &quote; bad conscience,&quote; Nietzsche presents a " dangerous and multi-coloured " alternative to the more monochrome varieties of self-consciousness which ground theories of individual responsibility in the work of other modern philosophers, such as Locke and Kant. The complexity of Nietzsche's approach to self-consciousness allows him to shed light on the range of interconnected practices of responsibility and irresponsibility that characterize modern life. It also raises pressing questions about the possibility and conditions of philosophy in modernity. In grappling with " bad conscience" within the performative structures of his own thought, Nietzsche makes experimental use of methodological resources drawn from both the ancient and modern traditions of Western philosophy. In particular, this study examines Nietzsche's appropriation and " reinterpretation" of meditational methods which form part of the ancient philosophical " art of living," and which re-emerge in altered form, in the work of Descartes. In Nietzsche's writings, such methods are used to provoke and reflect upon the passions of " bad conscience," a dangerous practice which involves the risk of exacerbating this " illness," but which also promises to give birth to new insight and skill in confronting the problem of responsibility in modernity.

Thesis (M.A.)--Kutztown University, 1986. / Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 45-06, page: 2775. Abstract follows appendices. Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 118-125).

Thesis (PH.D.)--Michigan State University. Social Work, 2008. / Title from PDF t.p. (viewed on Aug. 11, 2009) Includes bibliographical references (p. 169-173). Also issued in print.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Committee on Social Thought, Jun. 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 187-196). Also available on the Internet.

Software piracy, the illegal and unauthorized duplication, sale, or distribution of software, is a widespread and costly phenomenon. According to the Business Software Alliance, more than one third of the PC software packages installed worldwide in 2006 were unauthorized copies. This behavior costs the software industry billions of lost dollars in revenue annually. Software piracy behavior has been investigated for more than thirty years. However, there are two voids in the literature: lack of studies in Non-Western countries and scarcity of process studies. As such, this study contributes to the literature by developing a software piracy model to understand the decision making process that underlies this illegal behavior among Jordanian university students. Based on a literature review in various disciplines, including social psychology, psychology, and criminology, several important variables have been incorporated into the proposed model. The model was tested using data collected from a sample of 323 undergraduate business students. The resulting data was analyzed by two main statistical techniques, structural equation modeling (SEM) and hierarchical multiple regression. The results indicated that the model was useful in predicting students' intention to pirate software. Seven out of eight hypotheses were supported. Consistent with The Theory of Reasoned Action, attitudes toward software piracy and subjective norms were significant predictors of intention to pirate software. However, our findings are inconsistent with previous studies with regard to the relative importance of attitude and subjective norms; subjective norms had a stronger effect. Also, the results suggested that ethical ideology, public self-consciousness, and low self-control moderated the effect of these variables on intention to pirate software. Lastly, the results indicated that the effect of subjective norms on afintention to pirate software was both direct and indirect through attitudes. The results have important practical implications for the software industry and governments to curtail software piracy. Limitations of the study and recommendations for future studies are discussed as well.

L’appellation « jeune Marx » désigne les écrits marxiens, souvent publiés à titre posthume, allant de la Dissertation doctorale de 1841 tout au moins jusqu’aux articles des Annales franco-allemandes. Elle recouvre ainsi la période où Marx se réclame de la philosophie. Cette première période théorique a jusqu’à aujourd’hui fait l’objet d’une double et presque totale mise à l’écart théorique. D’une part, ces travaux de jeunesse ont été assimilés aux symptômes d’une formation intellectuelle encore incomplète, dont l’idéalisme aurait été dépassé par le matérialisme de la maturité. Cette approche était représentée en France d’une manière paradigmatique par Althusser. Elle a cependant aussi caractérisé, d’Engels à Cornu, presque toutes les traditions de lecture marxiste. Si des lectures symétriquement opposées, comme celle de Rubel, identifiant dans les théories du jeune Marx le fondement de son matérialisme à venir, ont inversé le diagnostic, elles n’en ont pas moins rejeté aussi l’approche immanente pour interroger les écrits du jeune Marx seulement dans leur intégration à l’évolution marxienne d’ensemble. D’autre part, c’est le contexte et l’intertexte théoriques de développement du jeune Marx, en l’occurrence sa participation au mouvement jeune hégélien, qui ont été mis de côté. Ils n’ont été mobilisés que négativement, servant à la mise en relief de l’originalité théorique et politique de Marx. Or, cette période dite de jeunesse est pour Marx une période d’exploration théorique et politique qui demande à être interrogée pour elle-même. De plus, le travail théorique, voire parfois rédactionnel, de Marx dans cette période passe par la collaboration et la discussion avec des auteurs Jeunes hégéliens. On retient généralement de ces collaborations seulement celle avec Engels – dont on oublie qu’il fut un Jeune hégélien – en masquant celles qui la précédèrent ou furent simultanées, avec Bruno Bauer notamment jusqu’en 1842, avec Arnold Ruge à Paris, puis avec Moses Hess. Dans cette succession de collaborations et de polémiques, construire une théorie, pour le Marx de cette époque, implique toujours, d’une part, de se situer par rapport à Hegel, et d’autre part, de se situer par rapport aux autres Jeunes hégéliens. Notre projet consiste par conséquent, non à opposer Marx à l’ensemble des autres Jeunes hégéliens dont l’unanimité serait postulée, pour en valoriser l’originalité isolée, mais à retracer les évolutions théoriques de Marx en les situant à l’intérieur des débats qui constituent le jeune hégélianisme. Cette approche doit être appliquée, non seulement à la dimension philosophique des textes de « jeunesse » de Marx, mais aussi à ses travaux sur l’histoire, la religion, l’économie, la société et la politique. La « découverte » même de ces trois derniers domaines, généralement identifiée à un congé donné par Marx à la philosophie et à l’idéalisme qu’il laisserait aux Jeunes hégéliens, est à expliquer, du moins partiellement, selon une médiation jeune hégélienne. Comprendre le jeune Marx passe par une lecture génétique, contextuelle et intertextuelle de ses positions à l’intérieur du contexte jeune hégélien dans lequel les propositions de Marx prennent alors leur sens. / The term "young Marx" refers to Marxian writings, often published posthumously, ranging from the doctoral dissertation of 1841 to at least the articles of the Annales franco-allemandes. It thus covers the period when Marx claims to be a philosopher. This first theoretical period has suffered a double and almost total theoretical exclusion. On the one hand, these early writings have been considered as symptoms of an intellectual formation that was not yet complete, whose idealism would have been surpassed by the materialist position of the “mature” Marx. This approach was represented in France in a paradigmatic way by Althusser. However, it has also characterized, from Engels to Cornu, almost all Marxist reading traditions. If symmetrically opposed readings, such as Rubel's, identifying in the theories of the young Marx the foundation of his future materialism, reversed the diagnosis, they nonetheless rejected the immanent approach to question the writings of the young Marx only in their integration with the overall Marxian evolution. On the other hand, it is the theoretical context and intertext of the young Marx's development, in this case his participation in the young Hegelian movement, which have been put aside. They have been mobilized only negatively, in order to highlight the theoretical and political originality of Marx. Now, this so-called youth period is for Marx a period of theoretical and political exploration that requires to be interrogated for itself. In addition, Marx's theoretical and sometimes editorial work in this period involves collaboration and discussion with Young Hegelian writers. What is usually highlighted in this period are the collaborations with Engels – who had been a Young Hegelian, even if this is often forgotten – putting aside other anterior and simultaneous collaborations ; like the one with Bruno Bauer (until 1842), with Arnold Ruge (in Paris) and with Moses Hess. In this succession of collaborations and polemics, Marx’s construction of theories at that time always implies, on the one hand, to situate himself in relation to Hegel, and on the other hand, to situate himself in relation to other Young Hegelians. My project, therefore, is not to oppose Marx to all the other Young Hegelians whose unanimity would be postulated, in order to value its isolated originality, but to trace Marx's theoretical evolutions by situating them within the debates which constitute the young Hegelianism. This approach must be applied not only to the philosophical dimension of Marx's "youth" texts, but also to his work on history, religion, economics, society and politics. Marx’s so-called discovery of the last three domains - usually considered as an evidence for him leaving philosophy and idealism to Young Hegelians - must be explained, at least partially, in reference to Marx’s participation to Youn Hegelianism. Understanding the young Marx involves a genetic, contextual and intertextual reading of his positions within the young Hegelian context in which Marx's propositions make sense.

Submitted by Irene Nascimento (irene.kessia@ufpe.br) on 2016-08-18T18:20:32Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 1232 bytes, checksum: 66e71c371cc565284e70f40736c94386 (MD5) dissertação final - revisada 02maio2016.pdf: 583195 bytes, checksum: 87ae33044b75e7ee2cb74ba1f0cd5036 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-18T18:20:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 1232 bytes, checksum: 66e71c371cc565284e70f40736c94386 (MD5) dissertação final - revisada 02maio2016.pdf: 583195 bytes, checksum: 87ae33044b75e7ee2cb74ba1f0cd5036 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-05-10 / Capes / O objetivo desse trabalho é compreender a significação, surgimento e desenvolvimento do conceito de angústia (Angst) na Fenomenologia do Espírito (2007). Para tanto, desenvolveremos um estudo pormenorizado do novo conceito de subjetividade como consciência-de-si, para compreender o próprio modus operandi dessa consciência que tenta salvaguardar o que acredita ser sua verdade, mas, porque, em contraponto com sua necessidade intrínseca de ir sempre além de toda e qualquer satisfação limitada, a angústia surge, devendo esta, ser suprassumida, para que uma nova figura da consciência apareça em sua maior riqueza de determinações. No caminho das transformações da relação indivisível sujeito-objeto, que é o próprio núcleo formador da consciência, logo de sua verdade, a consciência produz formas diferentes de experiência, e este caminho necessário, mas angustiante, pela perca incessante, mas necessária de suas verdades, é o procedimento da própria formação do sujeito para o saber, uma descoberta de si-mesmo e de seu tempo como momentos de um processo de formação para a ciência, espírito que se sabe desenvolvido. Assim, buscaremos mostrar que a angústia aparece nesse interstício entre o deparar-se da consciência com uma nova verdade, em contraste paradoxal com a verdade que tinha até agora, cobrando da própria subjetividade um atirar- se nesse novo desconhecido, realizando, assim, o caráter de possuir em si-mesmo seu limite. / The objective of this work is understand the meaning, emergence and development of the anguish concept (Angst) in the Phenomenology of Spirit of Hegel. To do so, we develop a detailed study of the new concept of subjectivity as self-consciousnes, to comprehend how their anguish concept arises, while modus operandi of this consciousness that tries to safeguard what you believe is your truth, but because, in contrast to their intrinsic necessity of always beyond any limited satisfaction, which must be overcome, so that a new figure of consciousness appear in your greatest wealth of determinations. In the way of transformations of the indivisible relationship of the subject-object, which is the very core of consciousness trainer, then its truth, consciousness produces different forms of experience, and this way necessary, but painful, miss the incessant but necessary truths of their , the procedure is the very formation of the subject to learn, a discovery of self and moments of his time as a process of training for science, spirit that knows developed. Thus, we try to show that anguish appears that interstitial encounter between consciousness with a new truth in paradoxical contrast with the fact that he had so far, charging one's own subjectivity shoot themselves in this new unknown, thus conducting the character of possess itself your limit.