Der Dialog über den Rhein hinweg handelt von Griechenland, und die komplette Übersetzung der platonischen Dialoge durch Victor Cousin ins Französische - nach dem Vorbild Schleiermachers in Deutschland - bildet den entscheidenen strategischen Einsatz auf dem Schlachtfeld der europäischen Philosophie.

L’appellation « jeune Marx » désigne les écrits marxiens, souvent publiés à titre posthume, allant de la Dissertation doctorale de 1841 tout au moins jusqu’aux articles des Annales franco-allemandes. Elle recouvre ainsi la période où Marx se réclame de la philosophie. Cette première période théorique a jusqu’à aujourd’hui fait l’objet d’une double et presque totale mise à l’écart théorique. D’une part, ces travaux de jeunesse ont été assimilés aux symptômes d’une formation intellectuelle encore incomplète, dont l’idéalisme aurait été dépassé par le matérialisme de la maturité. Cette approche était représentée en France d’une manière paradigmatique par Althusser. Elle a cependant aussi caractérisé, d’Engels à Cornu, presque toutes les traditions de lecture marxiste. Si des lectures symétriquement opposées, comme celle de Rubel, identifiant dans les théories du jeune Marx le fondement de son matérialisme à venir, ont inversé le diagnostic, elles n’en ont pas moins rejeté aussi l’approche immanente pour interroger les écrits du jeune Marx seulement dans leur intégration à l’évolution marxienne d’ensemble. D’autre part, c’est le contexte et l’intertexte théoriques de développement du jeune Marx, en l’occurrence sa participation au mouvement jeune hégélien, qui ont été mis de côté. Ils n’ont été mobilisés que négativement, servant à la mise en relief de l’originalité théorique et politique de Marx. Or, cette période dite de jeunesse est pour Marx une période d’exploration théorique et politique qui demande à être interrogée pour elle-même. De plus, le travail théorique, voire parfois rédactionnel, de Marx dans cette période passe par la collaboration et la discussion avec des auteurs Jeunes hégéliens. On retient généralement de ces collaborations seulement celle avec Engels – dont on oublie qu’il fut un Jeune hégélien – en masquant celles qui la précédèrent ou furent simultanées, avec Bruno Bauer notamment jusqu’en 1842, avec Arnold Ruge à Paris, puis avec Moses Hess. Dans cette succession de collaborations et de polémiques, construire une théorie, pour le Marx de cette époque, implique toujours, d’une part, de se situer par rapport à Hegel, et d’autre part, de se situer par rapport aux autres Jeunes hégéliens. Notre projet consiste par conséquent, non à opposer Marx à l’ensemble des autres Jeunes hégéliens dont l’unanimité serait postulée, pour en valoriser l’originalité isolée, mais à retracer les évolutions théoriques de Marx en les situant à l’intérieur des débats qui constituent le jeune hégélianisme. Cette approche doit être appliquée, non seulement à la dimension philosophique des textes de « jeunesse » de Marx, mais aussi à ses travaux sur l’histoire, la religion, l’économie, la société et la politique. La « découverte » même de ces trois derniers domaines, généralement identifiée à un congé donné par Marx à la philosophie et à l’idéalisme qu’il laisserait aux Jeunes hégéliens, est à expliquer, du moins partiellement, selon une médiation jeune hégélienne. Comprendre le jeune Marx passe par une lecture génétique, contextuelle et intertextuelle de ses positions à l’intérieur du contexte jeune hégélien dans lequel les propositions de Marx prennent alors leur sens. / The term "young Marx" refers to Marxian writings, often published posthumously, ranging from the doctoral dissertation of 1841 to at least the articles of the Annales franco-allemandes. It thus covers the period when Marx claims to be a philosopher. This first theoretical period has suffered a double and almost total theoretical exclusion. On the one hand, these early writings have been considered as symptoms of an intellectual formation that was not yet complete, whose idealism would have been surpassed by the materialist position of the “mature” Marx. This approach was represented in France in a paradigmatic way by Althusser. However, it has also characterized, from Engels to Cornu, almost all Marxist reading traditions. If symmetrically opposed readings, such as Rubel's, identifying in the theories of the young Marx the foundation of his future materialism, reversed the diagnosis, they nonetheless rejected the immanent approach to question the writings of the young Marx only in their integration with the overall Marxian evolution. On the other hand, it is the theoretical context and intertext of the young Marx's development, in this case his participation in the young Hegelian movement, which have been put aside. They have been mobilized only negatively, in order to highlight the theoretical and political originality of Marx. Now, this so-called youth period is for Marx a period of theoretical and political exploration that requires to be interrogated for itself. In addition, Marx's theoretical and sometimes editorial work in this period involves collaboration and discussion with Young Hegelian writers. What is usually highlighted in this period are the collaborations with Engels – who had been a Young Hegelian, even if this is often forgotten – putting aside other anterior and simultaneous collaborations ; like the one with Bruno Bauer (until 1842), with Arnold Ruge (in Paris) and with Moses Hess. In this succession of collaborations and polemics, Marx’s construction of theories at that time always implies, on the one hand, to situate himself in relation to Hegel, and on the other hand, to situate himself in relation to other Young Hegelians. My project, therefore, is not to oppose Marx to all the other Young Hegelians whose unanimity would be postulated, in order to value its isolated originality, but to trace Marx's theoretical evolutions by situating them within the debates which constitute the young Hegelianism. This approach must be applied not only to the philosophical dimension of Marx's "youth" texts, but also to his work on history, religion, economics, society and politics. Marx’s so-called discovery of the last three domains - usually considered as an evidence for him leaving philosophy and idealism to Young Hegelians - must be explained, at least partially, in reference to Marx’s participation to Youn Hegelianism. Understanding the young Marx involves a genetic, contextual and intertextual reading of his positions within the young Hegelian context in which Marx's propositions make sense.

Der Dialog über den Rhein hinweg handelt von Griechenland, und die komplette Übersetzung der platonischen Dialoge durch Victor Cousin ins Französische - nach dem Vorbild Schleiermachers in Deutschland - bildet den entscheidenen strategischen Einsatz auf dem Schlachtfeld der europäischen Philosophie.

Este trabalho teve por propósito abordar a filosofia de Max Stirner sob a perspectiva de que em seus textos os elementos delineadores do discurso filosófico moderno, dialética do esclarecimento e crítica radical da razão, convergem em uma crítica peculiar da modernidade em seu todo. Pode-se dizer que se, por um lado, tal crítica se encontra em continuidade com a filosofia jovem hegeliana, por outro, apresenta-se enquanto uma espécie de culminação antitética da mesma, colocando-se assim como que ao lado da tradição da crítica radical da razão que remonta a Nietzsche. Segundo essa nossa proposta interpretativa, aí se esboçaria um discurso filosófico da modernidade cuja peculiaridade seria de ora se assemelhar a uma, ora a outra forma de crítica que é feita à racionalidade centrada no sujeito. A análise dos textos de Stirner que então aqui se propõe visa mostrar como tal discurso se constitui e como o filósofo tem a intenção de levá-lo a um ponto culminante de onde não pode prosseguir seu rumo sem negar seus pressupostos. Isso demonstraria que a filosofia stirneriana não participa do discurso filosófico da modernidade como uma tentativa fracassada de sair dele, senão que o afirmaria enquanto momento necessário capaz de nos colocar diante de um novo limiar histórico. A crítica da modernidade que Stirner realiza quer assim, a um só tempo, ser a realização da filosofia moderna, pelas mostras que dá de sua fidelidade ao paradigma da filosofia do sujeito, e sua negação, ao apresentar o niilismo como a sua verdade. Nesse sentido, ela também seria antimoderna, na medida em que só pode se afirmar (paradoxalmente) em função da negação do próprio paradigma a que ainda se encontra vinculada, mas como sua expressão última que se nega ao se autodissolver, revelando, destarte, o único (o nada) como passagem para o absolutamente outro da modernidade. / The purpose of this study was to discuss Max Stirners philosophy from a perspective in which, in his works, the defining elements of modern philosophical discourse, \"dialectic of enlightenment\" and \"radical critique of reason\", converge in a peculiar critique of modernity as a whole. If, on the one hand, this criticism is in continuity with the young Hegelian philosophy, on the other hand, it presents itself as a kind of antithetical completion of this philosophy, placing itself alongside the tradition of radical critique of reason that goes back to Nietzsche. According to this interpretative proposal, it would be outlined a \"philosophical discourse of modernity\" whose peculiarity would be precisely to resemble sometimes one, sometimes the other form of critique that is made to this subject-centered rationality. The analysis of Stirnerian texts that is proposed here, then, aims to show how such discourse constitutes itself and how the philosopher intends to take it to a climax where it cannot continue its original course without denying its assumptions. This would demonstrate that the Stirnerian philosophy does not participate in philosophical discourse of modernity as a \"failed attempt\" to leave it but as a necessary moment, capable of putting ourselves to face a new historical threshold. In this way, it is assumed that the critique of modernity performed by Stirner wants to be at the same time the realization of modern philosophy which can be noted by his allegiance to the paradigm of the philosophy of the subject , and its denial by presenting nihilism as its truth. In this sense, it would also be anti-modern, because it can only affirm itself (paradoxically) on account of a disavowal of the paradigm with which it is committed, though as its ultimate expression, an expression that deny itself when it self dissolves, thus revealing the unique one (the nothing) as a passage to the absolute other of modernity.

Une opération économique, en fin de compte, repose sur une seule chose. Une chose des plus élémentaires qui soient, à savoir, tout simplement : l'emploi d'un objet. C'est bien là le socle de toute action économique. C'est-à-dire de toute action qui, à un moment donné, se veut utile ou rentable. Mais un tel acte a pour effet d'annuler toute la valeur que l'objet peut toujours présenter dans l'instant (comme son charme, sa drôlerie ou, encore, son étrangeté). Autrement dit, l'emploi d'un objet remplace toute la valeur sensible dudit objet par une valeur d'un autre ordre qui n'est autre que la valeur d'usage. Mais, le fait est qu'employer utilement quelque-chose n'a rien d'automatique. C'est qu'un tel acte revient très concrètement à s'opposer délibérément au cours habituel des choses qui, lui, consiste en une dépense inutile de chaque chose... Mais ce n'est pas tout car, au bout du compte, d'un point de vue général, l'action délibérée contre ce cours habituel des choses ne fait en réalité jamais que de l'accroître. Tout simplement parce qu'une telle action (n'étant donc pas automatique) se doit d'abord de dissiper pour son propre compte tout un tas de forces disponibles ; cela, avant même d'avoir pu commencer son œuvre. Tout ceci doit nous forcer à reconnaître que le véritable produit d'une opération économique n'est jamais qu'une meilleure dilapidation des richesses disponibles. Et c'est bien sous cet angle que sera envisagée, dans le cadre de ce travail, la notion de Décroissance. Cela grâce à la mise en perspective de la théorie d' « économie générale » de Georges Bataille avec les travaux de l'économiste Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen. / An economic operation relies, after all, upon one single thing. Upon one of the most elementary things, that is, simply: the use of an object. Such is the root of any economic act, i.e. of any act which, at some time, purports to be useful or profitable. But one effect entailed by such an act is to cancel all the value that such an object may instantaneoulsy present (such as its spell, drollery or, yet, its oddness). In other words, the use of an object implies that the sensitive value of that object be substituted by another sort of value, namely its use value. However, as a matter of fact, the useful employment of something is in no way automatic. Indeed, such a useful employment of things is actually equivalent to a deliberate opposition to the usual course of things, which consists, on the contrary, of a useless expenditure of all things... Still, from a general point of view, such a deliberate act against this usual course of things only achieves, after all, to always increase it. Just because such an act (thus, not being automatic), yet before it may have started to operate, first has to dissipate for itself a whole bunch of available forces. All of this leads us to acknowledge that the true product of an economic operation is always only a better squandering of the riches at disposal. It is according to this point of view that my research has focused on the notion of Degrowth, by combining Georges Bataille’s theory of “general economy” with economist Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen’s works.

Este trabalho teve por propósito abordar a filosofia de Max Stirner sob a perspectiva de que em seus textos os elementos delineadores do discurso filosófico moderno, dialética do esclarecimento e crítica radical da razão, convergem em uma crítica peculiar da modernidade em seu todo. Pode-se dizer que se, por um lado, tal crítica se encontra em continuidade com a filosofia jovem hegeliana, por outro, apresenta-se enquanto uma espécie de culminação antitética da mesma, colocando-se assim como que ao lado da tradição da crítica radical da razão que remonta a Nietzsche. Segundo essa nossa proposta interpretativa, aí se esboçaria um discurso filosófico da modernidade cuja peculiaridade seria de ora se assemelhar a uma, ora a outra forma de crítica que é feita à racionalidade centrada no sujeito. A análise dos textos de Stirner que então aqui se propõe visa mostrar como tal discurso se constitui e como o filósofo tem a intenção de levá-lo a um ponto culminante de onde não pode prosseguir seu rumo sem negar seus pressupostos. Isso demonstraria que a filosofia stirneriana não participa do discurso filosófico da modernidade como uma tentativa fracassada de sair dele, senão que o afirmaria enquanto momento necessário capaz de nos colocar diante de um novo limiar histórico. A crítica da modernidade que Stirner realiza quer assim, a um só tempo, ser a realização da filosofia moderna, pelas mostras que dá de sua fidelidade ao paradigma da filosofia do sujeito, e sua negação, ao apresentar o niilismo como a sua verdade. Nesse sentido, ela também seria antimoderna, na medida em que só pode se afirmar (paradoxalmente) em função da negação do próprio paradigma a que ainda se encontra vinculada, mas como sua expressão última que se nega ao se autodissolver, revelando, destarte, o único (o nada) como passagem para o absolutamente outro da modernidade. / The purpose of this study was to discuss Max Stirners philosophy from a perspective in which, in his works, the defining elements of modern philosophical discourse, \"dialectic of enlightenment\" and \"radical critique of reason\", converge in a peculiar critique of modernity as a whole. If, on the one hand, this criticism is in continuity with the young Hegelian philosophy, on the other hand, it presents itself as a kind of antithetical completion of this philosophy, placing itself alongside the tradition of radical critique of reason that goes back to Nietzsche. According to this interpretative proposal, it would be outlined a \"philosophical discourse of modernity\" whose peculiarity would be precisely to resemble sometimes one, sometimes the other form of critique that is made to this subject-centered rationality. The analysis of Stirnerian texts that is proposed here, then, aims to show how such discourse constitutes itself and how the philosopher intends to take it to a climax where it cannot continue its original course without denying its assumptions. This would demonstrate that the Stirnerian philosophy does not participate in philosophical discourse of modernity as a \"failed attempt\" to leave it but as a necessary moment, capable of putting ourselves to face a new historical threshold. In this way, it is assumed that the critique of modernity performed by Stirner wants to be at the same time the realization of modern philosophy which can be noted by his allegiance to the paradigm of the philosophy of the subject , and its denial by presenting nihilism as its truth. In this sense, it would also be anti-modern, because it can only affirm itself (paradoxically) on account of a disavowal of the paradigm with which it is committed, though as its ultimate expression, an expression that deny itself when it self dissolves, thus revealing the unique one (the nothing) as a passage to the absolute other of modernity.

Ce n’est guère le mouvement jeune-hégélien qui vient immédiatement à l’espritlorsque sont évoqués les noms de Bakounine, d'Engels, de Marx ou même deStirner. Le premier et le dernier sont généralement associés à l’anarchisme,les deux autres, plus indubitablement encore, au marxisme. L'histoire de cespersonnages et le devenir de leurs œuvres n'ont pu que faire de l'ombre à leurappartenance commune et concomitante, trente ans avant que ne se cristallisentlesdits courants politiques, à ce qui a parfois été apparenté à une écolephilosophiqueLa présente thèse propose une lecture immanente, laquelle ne s'efforce pasmoins de restituer un contexte, des principaux écrits rédigés par ces auteursentre 1842 et 1843. La pensée de chacun d'entre eux est présentée dans sesinterrogations et ses enjeux propres, en s'intéressant aux emprunts et auxinnovations conceptuelles réalisées pour y répondre et tout en maintenantd’incessants aller-retours avec le champ problématique relatif au mouvementdans lequel elle prend corps et s’introduit.Il ne s'agit pas, par là, de procéder à une simple mise au point en matièred'histoire des idées. L'un des intérêts majeurs des textes abordés réside dansce qu'ils nous disent, dans une perspective post-hégélienne, de la philosophie.Les descriptions du présent que l'on trouve dans ces textes concordent, eneffet, quant à l'impossibilité d'établir l'unité du rationnel et de l'effectif.Tout reste encore à faire pour qui ne renonce pas à la réalisation de laliberté dans l'histoire. À suivre Hegel, pourtant, la philosophie doit secontenter de décrire ledit procès ou ses résultats. Doit-on se résoudre à ceque la philosophie ne puisse concourir à un destin dont elle a donné la clé ?N'est-il pas possible de la renouveler ? Et comment ? S'agit-il plutôt d'ensortir et d'imaginer d'autres formes d'intervention théoriques et pratiques ?Et qu'en est-il alors de ce qui reste de philosophique ? / The names of Bakunin, Engels, Marx, or Stirner are hardly ever associated withthe Young Hegelian movement. Bakunin and Stirner are generally associated withanarchism and Marx and Engels with marxism. Their lives and the fate of theirworks could do no more than obliterate the mutual and concomitant contributionsof these authors to what has sometimes been described as a philosophicalschool. This participation, in any case, occured thirty years before thecristallisation of the aforesaid political movements.This research proposes an immanent, and at the same time contextual, reading ofthe main texts written by these authors between 1842 and 1843. The theories ofeach of them are presented in accordance with their own questions and issues,focusing on the conceptual borrowings and innovations realised as aconsequence. They are expounded through a perpetual to and fro between theproblematic field related to the movement from which they were born and inwhich they participated.Nevertheless this study cannot be reduced to a mere contribution to the historyof ideas. One of the key interests of the analysed texts lies in what they tellus, from a post-hegelian perspective, about philosophy. When they describetheir epoch, they all conclude that there is no identity of the rational andthe real. There is still much to do for those who do not abandon the idea of therealisation of freedom in history. However, according to Hegel, philosophy canonly describe the process or the results of this realisation. Cannot philosophycontribute to the destiny it revealed? And if not, is it possible to renewphilosophy? How? Would an exit from philosophy be preferable? Other forms oftheoretical and practical intervention could be invented. But then, what aboutthe "philosophical" that remains?

<h1>Abstract</h1> <p>Axel Adolf Laurell (1800–1852), theoretical philosopher by training, was Professor of Dogmatics at the University of Helsinki 1836–1852. In the history of Finnish theology, he has been rather ignored. The aim of this doctoral thesis has been two-fold: to analyze both Laurell and the later theological tradition that ignored him.</p> <p>Laurell was one of the intellectually oriented theologians in Finland representing the view that university theology was a field of rational study, not a way of practicing religion. His qualifying thesis, already approved of by the official opponent, was rejected by the Faculty of Theology and by the Lutheran archbishop E. G. Melartin. However, Laurell gained the support of the Academic Senate and was appointed professor by Nikolai I.</p> <p>Archive material depicting Laurell´s lectures on theology shows that he lectured, among other things, on the German controversy between rationalism and supranaturalism. He seems to have supported the idea of mediation between these two, an approach typical of to the school of <i>Vermitttlungstheologie</i>. Laurell began his career as a Hegelian, rejected Hegelianism in the 1840s and became interested in the questions of empirical study. Laurell was one of the Finnish academics who adopted ideas both from Herder and Hegel.</p> <p>Laurell, during his formative years a member of the Saturday Society, a circle of reform-minded young intellectuals, was the most notable Finnish representative of pedagogics during his time. He was one of the founders of Helsingfors Lyceum in 1831 and the first headmaster of this school with its new, modern-type curriculum. According to him, “state” and “church” should not interfere in the matters of education.</p> <p>Taking into account Mythologies by Roland Barthes and some international discussions on nationalistic myths, I have delineated the previously unrecognized myth of Genuine Finnish theology. Influential Finnish revivalist theologians adopted the biblical theology of Johann Tobias Beck during the latter part of the 19^th century. From this standpoint they and notably history professor Ernst Gustaf Palmén, invented a religious-nationalistic interpretation of the 19^th-century Finnish history. Scientifically significant theologians had been Beckians or revival movement sympathizers while Laurell, among other actual forerunners of rational research, were marginalized and forgotten.</p> / <h1>Tiivistelmä</h1> <p>Väitöskirjani tarkastelee Lauantaiseuran jäsenen ja Helsingin yliopiston dogmatiikan ruotsinkielisen professorin Axel Adolf Laurellin (1800–1852) näkemyksiä ja toimintaa 1830-luvulta 1850-luvun alkuun sekä autonomian kaudesta kertovaa suomalaisen teologian oppitraditiota. Laurell on yksi tämän oppitradition vähättelemistä 1800-luvun teologeista. Teologinen tiedekunta sekä luterilaisen kirkon arkkipiispa E. G. Melartin yrittivät 1830-luvulla torjua Laurellin professorinvirasta hylkäämällä hänen väitöskirjansa, jonka vastaväittäjä oli jo hyväksynyt. Hänellä oli kuitenkin yliopiston professorikunnan enemmistön tuki, ja Nikolai I nimitti hänet dogmatiikan professoriksi.</p> <p>Teologian oppitraditiota, historiallisista lähteistä piittaamatonta keksittyä historiaa, kutsutaan tässä tutkimuksessa Oikean teologian myytiksi. Se on hahmoteltu soveltaen Roland Barthesin ja eräiden nationalismitutkijoiden myyttitulkintoja. Myytti on arvioinut aiempien tutkijoiden tieteellistä merkittävyyttä sen perusteella miten he suhtautuivat herännäisyyteen ja olivatko he suomenkielisiä. Myytin keskeinen muotoilija oli historian professori Ernst Gustaf Palmén ja sen syntyedellytyksenä olivat suomalaisen yliopistoherännäisyyden muuttuminen beckiläiseksi raamattufundamentalismiksi 1850-luvulta alkaen sekä lähdetutkimuksen laiminlyöminen. Aiempien tutkijoiden tulkintaa autonomian kauden teologiasta toistettiin sittemmin vuosikymmenestä toiseen tarkistamatta heidän tulkintojensa paikkansapitävyyttä alkuperäislähteistä.</p> <p>Laurellin luennoista säilynyttä käsikirjoitusaineistoa on käytetty selvittämään mitä hän opetti Helsingin yliopiston teologian opiskelijoille. Yksi luentojen keskeinen aihe oli saksalaisen rationalismi-supranaturalismi -kiistan käsittely. Luennot viittaavat siihen, että Laurell edusti välitysteologiseksi kutsuttua koulukuntaa, joka nimensä mukaisesti pyrki edustamaan välittävää kantaa näiden kahden välillä.</p> <p>Laurell oli aikansa merkittävin suomalainen pedagogi, Helsingfors Lyceumin johtaja ja yksi sen perustaja, koulutukseltaan teoreettisen filosofian dosentti ja aikansa maltillinen, kristillisestä luomisuskosta kiinnipitänyt rationalisti, joka hegeliläisyydestä luovuttuaan kiinnostui empiirisestä tutkimuksesta. Laurellin ajattelussa näkyy monelle muullekin 1800-luvun alkupuolen toimijalle tyypillinen hegeliläisten ja herderiläisten vaikutteiden rinnakkaisuus. Teologina Laurell edusti näkemystä, jonka mukaan yliopistoteologia on uskonnon tarkastelua, ei yliopistossa tapahtuvaa uskonnonharjoitusta.</p>

Abstract Axel Adolf Laurell (1800–1852), theoretical philosopher by training, was Professor of Dogmatics at the University of Helsinki 1836–1852. In the history of Finnish theology, he has been rather ignored. The aim of this doctoral thesis has been two-fold: to analyze both Laurell and the later theological tradition that ignored him. Laurell was one of the intellectually oriented theologians in Finland representing the view that university theology was a field of rational study, not a way of practicing religion. His qualifying thesis, already approved of by the official opponent, was rejected by the Faculty of Theology and by the Lutheran archbishop E. G. Melartin. However, Laurell gained the support of the Academic Senate and was appointed professor by Nikolai I. Archive material depicting Laurell´s lectures on theology shows that he lectured, among other things, on the German controversy between rationalism and supranaturalism. He seems to have supported the idea of mediation between these two, an approach typical of to the school of Vermitttlungstheologie. Laurell began his career as a Hegelian, rejected Hegelianism in the 1840s and became interested in the questions of empirical study. Laurell was one of the Finnish academics who adopted ideas both from Herder and Hegel. Laurell, during his formative years a member of the Saturday Society, a circle of reform-minded young intellectuals, was the most notable Finnish representative of pedagogics during his time. He was one of the founders of Helsingfors Lyceum in 1831 and the first headmaster of this school with its new, modern-type curriculum. According to him, “state” and “church” should not interfere in the matters of education. Taking into account Mythologies by Roland Barthes and some international discussions on nationalistic myths, I have delineated the previously unrecognized myth of Genuine Finnish theology. Influential Finnish revivalist theologians adopted the biblical theology of Johann Tobias Beck during the latter part of the 19th century. From this standpoint they and notably history professor Ernst Gustaf Palmén, invented a religious-nationalistic interpretation of the 19th-century Finnish history. Scientifically significant theologians had been Beckians or revival movement sympathizers while Laurell, among other actual forerunners of rational research, were marginalized and forgotten. / Tiivistelmä Väitöskirjani tarkastelee Lauantaiseuran jäsenen ja Helsingin yliopiston dogmatiikan ruotsinkielisen professorin Axel Adolf Laurellin (1800–1852) näkemyksiä ja toimintaa 1830-luvulta 1850-luvun alkuun sekä autonomian kaudesta kertovaa suomalaisen teologian oppitraditiota. Laurell on yksi tämän oppitradition vähättelemistä 1800-luvun teologeista. Teologinen tiedekunta sekä luterilaisen kirkon arkkipiispa E. G. Melartin yrittivät 1830-luvulla torjua Laurellin professorinvirasta hylkäämällä hänen väitöskirjansa, jonka vastaväittäjä oli jo hyväksynyt. Hänellä oli kuitenkin yliopiston professorikunnan enemmistön tuki, ja Nikolai I nimitti hänet dogmatiikan professoriksi. Teologian oppitraditiota, historiallisista lähteistä piittaamatonta keksittyä historiaa, kutsutaan tässä tutkimuksessa Oikean teologian myytiksi. Se on hahmoteltu soveltaen Roland Barthesin ja eräiden nationalismitutkijoiden myyttitulkintoja. Myytti on arvioinut aiempien tutkijoiden tieteellistä merkittävyyttä sen perusteella miten he suhtautuivat herännäisyyteen ja olivatko he suomenkielisiä. Myytin keskeinen muotoilija oli historian professori Ernst Gustaf Palmén ja sen syntyedellytyksenä olivat suomalaisen yliopistoherännäisyyden muuttuminen beckiläiseksi raamattufundamentalismiksi 1850-luvulta alkaen sekä lähdetutkimuksen laiminlyöminen. Aiempien tutkijoiden tulkintaa autonomian kauden teologiasta toistettiin sittemmin vuosikymmenestä toiseen tarkistamatta heidän tulkintojensa paikkansapitävyyttä alkuperäislähteistä. Laurellin luennoista säilynyttä käsikirjoitusaineistoa on käytetty selvittämään mitä hän opetti Helsingin yliopiston teologian opiskelijoille. Yksi luentojen keskeinen aihe oli saksalaisen rationalismi-supranaturalismi -kiistan käsittely. Luennot viittaavat siihen, että Laurell edusti välitysteologiseksi kutsuttua koulukuntaa, joka nimensä mukaisesti pyrki edustamaan välittävää kantaa näiden kahden välillä. Laurell oli aikansa merkittävin suomalainen pedagogi, Helsingfors Lyceumin johtaja ja yksi sen perustaja, koulutukseltaan teoreettisen filosofian dosentti ja aikansa maltillinen, kristillisestä luomisuskosta kiinnipitänyt rationalisti, joka hegeliläisyydestä luovuttuaan kiinnostui empiirisestä tutkimuksesta. Laurellin ajattelussa näkyy monelle muullekin 1800-luvun alkupuolen toimijalle tyypillinen hegeliläisten ja herderiläisten vaikutteiden rinnakkaisuus. Teologina Laurell edusti näkemystä, jonka mukaan yliopistoteologia on uskonnon tarkastelua, ei yliopistossa tapahtuvaa uskonnonharjoitusta.

TITLE: The Philosophy of Louis Althusser in his ‚theoreticist' period AUTHOR: Petr Kužel DEPARTMENT: Social Sciences and Philosophy, Department SUPERVISOR: Mgr. Michael Hauser Ph.D. ABSTRACT: The thesis focuses on a philosophy of Louis Althusser in his "teoreticist" period, i.e. 1960-1967. The work is divided to four essentials sections: epistemology, ontology, psychoanalyse and ideology. We put accent on epistemological problematic, which is in this period of a development of Althusser's philosophy unequivocally dominant. In introduction of this text is explained historical and political context, in which Althusser realized his "theoretical intervention". The thesis treat on Althusser's conviction, that inadequate theory leads to deformed political practice and that Marxist theory exists till now in his "applied form", notably in The Capital. According to Althusser this Marxist theory wasn't adequately theoretically formed. Our work characterises Althusser's tentative to create and theoretically formulate this theory. This Althusser's tentative is connected with an effort to draw a "line of demarcation" between the Marxism and the pre-Marxist idealist notions, which are foreign to authentic Marxism. Althusser's critique focuses on Stalinism, "theoretical humanism", empiricism and Hegelianism. In present...