Submitted by Marilene Donadel (marilene.donadel@unioeste.br) on 2017-09-13T20:09:38Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Christiano_Tortato_2016.pdf: 863895 bytes, checksum: ec6491f63449726f4136da22bebea99d (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-09-13T20:09:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Christiano_Tortato_2016.pdf: 863895 bytes, checksum: ec6491f63449726f4136da22bebea99d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-08-05 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / Hegel’s Phenomenology of the Spirit presents itself divided into eight chapters, which find themselves harmonically structured in three sections: A – Consciousness, composed by three chapters in which the first three levels of the consciousness are investigated: Sensible Certainty, Perception and Understanding; B – Self-Consciousness, composed by a chapter entitled The truth about the certainty of yourself; and C – Spirit, composed by four chapters, Certainty and the true reason, The Spirit, The Religion and the Absolute Knowledge. Our work has as its main objective to investigate the transition made by the consciousness towards the self-consciousness as from a reflection about the dialectics method of exposition adopted by Hegel. In this perspective we’ll represent the arduous trajectory made by the consciousness as from the varied levels of experience that he stablishes with his objects in the unrolling of the first four chapters of Phenomenology. We will follow all the development of the consciousness presented in the first section, centralizing our investigation to the self-consciousness possible. In other words, we search the determinations that make the transition of the consciousness possible, that in a first moment presents itself immersed in a sensible and perceptible world characterized by the knowledge-of-another-one, for a second moment, a moment in which the consciousness starts to relate to another consciousness and only in this way presents itself with the determination of the knowledge-of-oneself. / A Fenomenologia do Espírito de Hegel apresenta-se dividida em oito capítulos, os quais encontram-se harmonicamente estruturados em três seções: A – Consciência, composta por três capítulos nos quais se investiga os três primeiros níveis da consciência: Certeza Sensível, Percepção e Entendimento; B – Consciência-de-si, composta por um capítulo único intitulado A verdade da certeza de si mesmo; e C – Espírito, composta por quatro capítulos, Certeza e verdade da razão, O espírito, A religião e O saber absoluto. Nosso trabalho tem como principal objetivo investigar a transição realizada pela consciência rumo à consciência-de-si a partir de uma reflexão sobre o método dialético de exposição adotado por Hegel. Nessa perspectiva, reapresentaremos a árdua trajetória realizada pela consciência a partir dos diversos níveis de experiências que estabelece com os seus objetos no desenrolar dos quatro primeiros capítulos da Fenomenologia. Acompanharemos todo o desenvolvimento da consciência presente na primeira seção, centralizando nossa investigação nas determinações que possibilitam a transição da consciência para a consciência-de-si. Em outras palavras, buscamos as determinções que possiblitam a transição da consciência, que num primeiro momento apresenta-se imersa num mundo sensível e perceptível caracterizada pelo saber-de-um-outro, para um segundo momento, momento em que a consciência passa a se relacionar com uma outra consciência e somente assim se apresenta com a determinação do saber-de-si-mesma.

No intuito de realizar um «eu puro» («moi pure»), o poeta Paul Valéry (1871- 1945) dedica-se ao culto do «Ídolo do intelecto» («Idole de lintellect»), a um método cético de auto-consciência, expresso numa escrituração extremamente fragmentada sobre os processos mentais e o fazer artístico (na sua obra pública e, principalmente, nos seus Cahiers). Uma das principais conseqüências desse método é uma digressiva e ambígua critica à filosofia, a qual esta Tese postula e desenvolve mediante os seguintes estudos: sobre a elaboração de um modo de vida relativamente autônomo, simultaneamente prático e contemplativo (principalmente nos seus ensaios sobre Léonard de Vinci e Edmond Teste); sobre a diferença entre filosofia e ciência, na perspectiva de que todo saber é poder; sobre a compreensão dos problemas metafísicos como contra-sensos, como resultados do «automatismo verbal» («automatisme verbal»), da falta de consciência do funcionamento da linguagem; sobre a poética da poesia pura como abolição do récit e conciliação entre poesia e pensamento abstrato; sobre a inversão do platonismo, em obras híbridas de ficção (principalmente nos seus diálogos socráticos, como Lâme et la danse e Eupalinos - Ou larchitecte). Em todos esses estudos, a filosofia é compreendida não como uma ciência, mas, tal como a poesia, como um gênero artístico, uma forma pessoal de organizar esteticamente o caos do mundo. / In order to realize a «pure self» («moi pure»), the poet Paul Valéry (1871-1945) dedicates to the «intellect Idol» («Idole de lintellect») cult, a self-consciousness skeptic method, expressed in an extremely fragmented writing about the mental processes and the artistic making (in his public work and, mainly, in his Cahiers). One of the main consequences of this method is a digressive and ambiguous critic of philosophy, which the present Thesis postulates and develops through the following studies: about the elaboration of a relatively autonomous life style, at the same time practical and contemplative (mainly in his Léonard de Vinci and Edmond Teste essays); about the difference between philosophy and science, understanding that all knowledge is power; about the comprehension of metaphysical problems as nonsense, as result of the «verbal automatism» («automatisme verbal»), the lack of the language operation consciousness; about the pure poetry poetic as the récit abolition and conciliation between poetry and abstract thought; about the Platonism inversion, in hybrids works of fiction (mainly in his socratic dialogues, as Lâme et la danse and Eupalinos - Ou larchitecte). In all these studies, philosophy is understood not as a science, but, such as poetry, as an artistic gender, a personal form of organizing aesthetically the world chaos.

This thesis examines the moderating effect of dispositional reinvestment upon ‘choking’ in cognitive based tasks such as decision-making. Study 1 tested sixty-three participants’ performances on low- and high-complexity tests of motor skill, psychomotor skill and working memory under low- and high-pressure conditions. The association between reinvestment and choking was shown to extend beyond the motor skill domain to cognitive tasks, particularly those that tax working memory, with task complexity moderating this relationship. Next, a psychometric scale to identify individuals more susceptible to impaired decision-making under pressure was developed. A 13-item decision-specific version of the Reinvestment Scale (Masters, Polman, & Hammond, 1993) measuring an individual’s propensity to engage in conscious control and manifestations of ruminative thoughts emerged following factor analysis. Initial assessment of the scale’s predictive validity showed scores were highly correlated with coaches’ ratings of players’ tendency to choke. The final two studies examined choking using sport specific decision-making tasks. Initial findings were inconclusive, as choking was not observed. It was suggested the task lacked the sufficient cognitive demands to induce reinvestment. The last study, manipulating task complexity, found dispositional reinvestment to be associated with choking in the high complexity condition. The Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale was also shown to be a better predictor of choking than the original scale. Overall, support was found for the hypothesis that Reinvestment is detrimental to performance under pressure in cognitive based tasks; however may not be the sole cause of disrupted performance. Masters and Maxwell’s (2004) concept of a working memory based explanation and Mullen and Hardy (2000) attentional threshold hypothesis offer a potential explanation to the findings.

Syftet med den här undersökningen är att ta reda om det finns ett samband i relationen mellan social ångest och publik självmedvetenhet och hur denna relation skiljer sig mellan ålder samt kön. Med hjälp av vår enkät som innehöll två mätinstrument som dels mäter social ångest; Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998), och som mäter självmedvetenhet; Self-Consciousness Scale (Scheier & Carver, 2013), fick vi 319 deltagare där 232 var kvinnor, 94 var män och 2 var icke-binära. Det vi kunde se var att det fanns en relation mellan social ångest och publik självmedvetenhet, och även att yngre åldrar (18–30) kan förutse publik självmedvetenhet tillsammans med social ångest. Det är även tydligt att kvinnor rapporterar mer social ångest än män, men enligt analyserna finns det ingen skillnad mellan kvinnor och män i rapporterad publik självmedvetenhet. Med hjälp av våra analyser hoppas vi väcka större intresse för sambandet mellan publik självmedvetenhet och social ångest, och hur det skiljer sig mellan olika åldrar och kön. / The purpose of this study is to find out whether there is a connection between public self-consciousness and social anxiety, and how this connection differs in different ages and between the sexes. By our questionnaire using two measures that 1; measures social anxiety; Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998) and 2; measures self-consciousness; Self-Consciousness Scale (Scheier & Carver, 2013), we got 319 participants of which 232 were women, 94 were men and 2 were non-binary. What we could see from the research was that there is a relationship between social anxiety and public self-consciousness, and that younger adults (18-30) can predict public self-consciousness along with social anxiety. It is also clear that women report higher levels of social anxiety, but according to the research there is no difference between women and men in reported public self-consciousness. With the help of our research, we hopefully contribute to answering the question of why these feelings arise in people, or arouse interest in the relationship between social anxiety and public self- consciousness and how it differs between different ages and sexes.

京都大学 / 0048 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(人間健康科学) / 甲第22650号 / 人健博第77号 / 新制||人健||5(附属図書館) / 京都大学大学院医学研究科人間健康科学系専攻 / (主査)教授 稲富 宏之, 教授 青山 朋樹, 教授 髙橋 良輔 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Human Health Sciences / Kyoto University / DFAM

of thesis titled: Fichte's Transcendental Approach to Being 1801-02 submitted by Leonard Ip for the degree of Master of Arts in Philosophie in the programme Erasmus Mundus Master EuroPhilosophie, July 2021 This paper attempts to reconstruct the development of the problem of being within the framework of Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre after 1800 in its initial approach. Textually, it deals mainly with the Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre from 1801/02. This text is considered the main document with which Fichte's so-called "late philosophy" begins after the first "Jena" period of his philosophising. The main result of the reconstruction presented is the demonstration of a "positive" concept of being, which goes beyond the concept of being explicitly determined as "negative" in Fichte's Jena Wissenschaftslehre and is defined in the Darstellung as "absolute being". In order to show that the positive concept of being is both demanded and legitimised on the basis of the Wissenschaftslehre as transcendental idealism, the reconstruction of this concept is carried out through an analysis of the first part of the Darstellung, i.e. the theory of absolute knowledge. The three chapters of this thesis carry out this analysis in three steps: in the first chapter, the systematic demand for absolute being is...

The theme of our work is concentrated on basic sources of inspiration of french thinker, Simone de Beauvoir. As we are trying to show, ways of conceptualization of human existence, that are common to works of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre, are main focus stones, on which is being build individualization of existential phenomenological thought of Simone de Beauvoir. Therefore, our interpretation is aimed on making visible those themes, that are most important as ilustrations of these interpretations. To achieve this goal we are using She Came to Stay, the first novel of Beauvoir, where we are seeing first manifestations of main themes of her later works.

In this dissertation, I examine the nature and structure of consciousness. Conscious experience is often said to be phenomenally unified, and subjects of consciousness are often self-conscious. I ask whether these features necessarily accompany conscious experience. Is it necessarily the case, for instance, that all of a conscious subject's experiences at a time are phenomenally unified? And is it necessarily the case that subjects of consciousness are self-conscious whenever they are conscious? I argue that the answer to the former is affirmative and the latter negative. In the first chapter, I set the stage by distinguishing phenomenal unity from other species of conscious unity. A pair of conscious states is phenomenally unified if they are experienced together as part of a single experience that encompasses them both. In this and the next two chapters I defend the thesis that, necessarily, for any subject (of conscious mental states) at any time, all of that subject's conscious mental states (at that time) are part of a single, maximal state of consciousness. I call this thesis the "Unity Thesis." I proceed by considering some preliminary questions that might be raised about the Unity Thesis. For instance, the thesis presupposes that it is coherent to talk about parts of mental states. I consider objections by Tye and Searle and argue that the notion of an experiential part is unproblematic. In the remaining pages of the chapter, I present the source of the biggest challenge to the Unity Thesis: the data gathered from split-brain subjects. The Unity Thesis is formulated using the notion of a maximal state of consciousness. In the second chapter, I attempt to precisify this notion in a way that does not pre-emptively decide the debate over the Unity Thesis. In informal terms, a maximal state of consciousness is a sum of conscious states that are i) simultaneous, ii) have the same subject, and iii) all have a conjoint phenomenology. I call this the Consensus View. I then consider two unorthodox views that the Consensus View does not take off the table: the views that a "collective consciousness" and a "spread consciousness" are possible. A collective subject is one that can enjoy the experiences of an indeterminate number of "lesser" subjects of consciousness by sharing them together with those subjects. A spread subject is one that can enjoy the experiences of an indeterminate number of lesser subjects of consciousness, but it does so, not by sharing those experiences with the lesser subjects, but by absorbing the lesser subjects of experience into itself, thereby erasing the traditional boundaries between the entities we intuitively think of as subjects of experience. I argue that, although the Consensus View does not decide against them, these views stretch the bounds of coherence and should not, therefore, be accepted. Having presented an account of what maximal state of consciousness is, I define a stream of consciousness in terms of a maximal states of consciousness. In the rest of chapter two, I consider and argue against a number of different ways of interpreting the split-brain data that are either inconsistent with the Unity Thesis or attribute more than one subject of consciousness to split-brain subjects. Among the views I consider are Lockwood's partial-unity view and the views, by theorists such as Sperry, Koch, Puccetti, Marks, and Tye, that split-brain subjects have two non-overlapping streams of consciousness. In chapter three, I consider a recent attempt by Bayne to account for the split-brain data in a way that does not attribute two streams of consciousness to them. According to Bayne's Switch Model, the consciousness of split-brain subjects can be likened to that of a ball that is passed back and forth between the two hemispheres of the upper-brain. The hemispheres take turns supporting a single stream of consciousness. I consider the empirical data in some detail and argue that the data is not as compatible with the Switch Model as Bayne claims. I close the chapter by presenting the rough outline of an interpretation of the split-brain data that is consistent with both the Unity Thesis and the split-brain data. In chapter four, I turn from defending the Unity Thesis to examining an attempt to account for conscious unity. Rosenthal has offered a theory of conscious unity as an extension of his higher-order theory of consciousness. I consider his account of conscious unity in light of a well-known objection to his theory: the (Representational) Mismatch Objection. It can be asked what it is like for a subject of experience when a higher-order state misrepresents its target first-order state. If what it is like for the subject corresponds to the content of the higher-order state, then it appears as though higher-order representation is unnecessary for conscious experience, for it would appear as though it is possible for a state to be conscious without being represented by a higher-order state. If what it is like corresponds to the content of the lower-order state, then it would again seem as though representation at the higher-order level is unnecessary for conscious experience, for the higher-order state would not seem to be doing any work in generating the experience. I consider and argue against two recent defences of Rosenthal's higher-order theory from the Mismatch Objection. Then I turn to Rosenthal's account of conscious unity. Rosenthal's account posits two mental mechanisms. I refer to the ways of accounting for conscious unity via these two mechanisms as the "gathering strategy" and the "common-ascription strategy" respectively. Both of these strategies, I argue, appear to locate the basis for certain phenomenal facts in higher-order representational facts. This raises a prima facie question: does Rosenthal's account of conscious unity land him square within the sights of the Mismatch Objection? Although the gathering strategy may ultimately be understood in a way that does not make it subject to the Mismatch Objection, Rosenthal has certain commitments that bar this strategy from serving as a complete account of conscious unity. This is problematic for Rosenthal, I argue, because his common-ascription strategy faces some difficult questions. This strategy makes conscious unity due to an implicit expectation a subject of consciousness has that, whenever he or she engages in introspection, an explicit sense of conscious unity will be generated. I argue that it is very difficult to see how such an implicit sense could both avoid the Mismatch Objection and do the work it needs to do in order to account for conscious unity. In chapter five, the discussion turns from the unity of consciousness to self-consciousness. The question that is considered in this and the last chapter is the question whether conscious experience is necessarily accompanied by self-consciousness. The affirmative answer to this question I call the Ubiquity Thesis. I spend some time distinguishing robust conceptions of self-consciousness from minimal conceptions of self-consciousness. The notion of self-consciousness invoked by the Ubiquity Thesis is a minimal one. In spite of the fact that the Ubiquity Thesis invokes only a minimal or thin conception of self-consciousness, I believe the thesis to be false and argue against it. In this chapter I take up the views of Husserl. Husserl is often regarded as the progenitor of the phenomenological tradition, a tradition in which many philosophers affirm the Ubiquity Thesis. I examine and argue against an interpretation of Husserl's work, one defended by Zahavi, according to which Husserl could be seen to defend the Ubiquity Thesis. One claim that Husserl makes is that, in order for an object to become the intentional target of a conscious state, it must be given to consciousness beforehand. It is possible, during acts of deliberate introspection, for consciousness to take itself as its object. On Husserl's view, this requires consciousness to be given to itself beforehand. This self-givenness of consciousness, argues Zahavi, can be seen as a kind of minimal self-consciousness. Husserl has also offered an account of this self-givenness of consciousness and it appears in his discussion of inner time-consciousness. I attempt to argue, using some of Husserl's other views regarding psychological stances (or standpoints), that consciousness is not given to itself outside of the adoption of a certain psychological standpoint. I also offer an alternative way of accounting for inner time-consciousness, one that does not have, as a built-in feature, that consciousness always has itself as a secondary object. In the sixth and final chapter, I take up a contemporary defence of the Ubiquity Thesis. Kriegel, a higher-order theorist like Rosenthal, has argued that every conscious state is conscious in virtue of the fact that it represents itself. This self-representation is understood as a kind of self-consciousness and, thus, his theory can be seen as affirming the Ubiquity Thesis. In the first part of the chapter, I take issue with the way in which Kriegel lays out the conceptual terrain. In particular, Kriegel countenances a property he calls "intransitive state self-consciousness." I argue that this way of speaking is confused. I then turn to considering Kriegel's account. Kriegel identifies the species of self-consciousness that pervades all of conscious experience with a peripheral awareness of one's own mental states. I argue that such a peripheral inner awareness does not accompany all of our mental states and, thus, that Kriegel's views do not give us reason to accept the Ubiquity Thesis.

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