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The Conversion of Skepticism in Augustine's Against the AcademicsWills, Bernard Newman January 2003 (has links)
This thesis examines Augustine's relation to Academic Skepticism through a detailed commentary on the dialogue Against the Academics. In it is demonstrated the significance of epistemological themes for Augustine and their inseparability from practical and religious concerns. It is also shown how these issues unfold within the logic of Augustine's trinitarianism, which informs the argument even of his earliest works. This, in turn, demonstrates the depth of the young Augustine's engagement with Christian categories in works often thought to be determined wholly, or almost wholly, by the logic of Plotinian Neo-Platonism. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
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Pyrrhonism sextusian : a development.King, Guy O'Gorman January 1982 (has links)
No description available.
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Hegel's Critique of Ancient SkepticismWood, John 01 August 2012 (has links)
Recent work on the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel has emphasized his interest in skeptical concerns. These contemporary scholars argue that, despite common opinions to the contrary, Hegel actually had a very keen interest in skepticism, one that informed and motivated much of his overall project. While I welcome this recent literature, I argue here that contemporary scholars have overemphasized the importance of skepticism for Hegel. By looking closely at Hegel’s arguments against skepticism in the Phenomenology of Spirit, I argue that Hegel’s anti-skeptical arguments are in fact major failures. Hegel’s failure is at odds with the emphasis that contemporary literature places on Hegel’s interests in skepticism. For a philosopher who was supposedly centrally concerned with skeptical issues, Hegel sure does not act like it. I conclude that the tension here is the result of contemporary scholars’ overemphasis of the role that skepticism plays in Hegel’s project.
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Why We Disagree and Why It MattersBallantyne, W Nathan January 2011 (has links)
This dissertation investigates whether controversial beliefs concerning a range of topics can be rational or reasonable. It proceeds by developing a series of challenges to the putative rationality of belief in such topics. In chapter 1, the project is introduced and motivated. Several challenges are set out in chapters 2-5. Finally, a thought behind one solution to these challenges is examined in chapter 6.
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Evolutionism and Skepticism in the Thought of Robert BrowningLively, John P. 08 1900 (has links)
This thesis has two primary objectives. The first is the presentation and the evaluation of various critical dicta regarding Browning's prowess as a thinker. The second is an attempt to recast Browning's religious and philosophical attitudes into the terms of evolutionism and skepticism.
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Psycho-analysis, group therapy and unbeliefGrimwood, Frank Southgate January 1956 (has links)
No description available.
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The progress and rationality of philosophy as a cognitive enterprise : an essay in metaphilosophy / Joseph Wayne SmithSmith, Joseph Wayne January 1985 (has links)
Bibliography: leaves 358-383 / v, 383 leaves ; 30 cm. / Title page, contents and abstract only. The complete thesis in print form is available from the University Library. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Adelaide, Dept. of Philosophy, 1986
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Nietzsche's Skepticism of AgencyLorentz, Ben 18 December 2012 (has links)
Nietzsche’s view of the self and will seems to culminate in a naturalistic account of human agency. If we understand Nietzsche as primarily a naturalist who thinks philosophy should more or less be modeled on the sciences whose investigations are restricted to empirical observation and whose explanations, like causal explanation, are natural (rather than supernatural), then ascribing a naturalistic account of human agency to Nietzsche is appropriate. However, I argue that attributing a naturalistic account of agency, or any account of agency to Nietzsche, misunderstands Nietzsche’s skepticism. I attempt to demonstrate the primacy of Nietzsche’s skepticism by showing how “his” naturalistic “account” of agency is best understood as an instrument in the service of his purely critical and deflationary project. To show the instrumental character of his “account,” I show how the account is used to oppose traditional notions of agency without itself becoming Nietzsche’s theory of agency.
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The skepticism of Anatole FranceSmith, Helen Belle. January 1927 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin, 1925. / At head of title: Helen B. Smith. Thesis note stamped on t.p. Bibliography: p. [127]-131.
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Farewell to political obligation : toward a new liberal theory of political legitimacyZhu, Jiafeng, 朱佳峰 January 2013 (has links)
Is there a general moral duty to obey the law because it is the law? This is the question of political obligation. The issue of political obligation is allegedly a central topic of political philosophy, because political obligation is often assumed to be necessary for state legitimacy; that is to say, for a state to be legitimate, it must be capable of imposing political obligation on the governed. Nonetheless, the literature has indicated that it is enormously difficult, at least within the liberal doctrine that many find most attractive, to justify political obligation. Given that political obligation is viewed as an indispensable part of state legitimacy, skepticism about political obligation points to a seemingly inescapable yet disturbing conclusion: no existing liberal state is legitimate, no matter how just it is. This skeptical position is also known as philosophical anarchism.
This study aims to show that philosophical anarchism is not as irresistible as it appears. But I do not take the traditional approach of refuting philosophical anarchism by defending or developing theories of political obligation. On the contrary, I devote the first part of my thesis to consolidating the skepticism about political obligation.
The approach I favor is to argue that political obligation is not necessary for state legitimacy. If this point can be established, then even if political obligation is unjustified, it will not automatically lead to philosophical anarchism. This constitutes the second part of my thesis, where I develop a conception of “legitimacy without political obligation” and defend it against the objection that it is either conceptually or morally wrong to claim that a legitimate state need not impose political obligation on its subjects. / published_or_final_version / Politics and Public Administration / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy
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