ix, 325 p. / This dissertation examines the development of skeptical views concerning causation from the medieval to the early modern period. While causal skepticism is often overlooked by intellectual historians, I argue that, in spite of its typical motivation as a religious response to shibboleths of ancient philosophy that stood askance from the dogmas of Abrahamic theology, causal skepticism was the greatest intellectual development of post-antiquity and ultimately culminated into modern Science. The first chapter examines Hume's famous analysis of causation and serves as a foil for the prior history of causal skepticism addressed in the subsequent chapters. The second chapter addresses the dispute over causation in medieval Islamic philosophy. I argue that virtually the entirety of Hume's analysis was anticipated, and in some cases superseded, by al-Ghazali in the eleventh century. The third chapter examines Averroes' critique of al-Ghazali, as well as the development of Aristotelian causal metaphysics in the Christian West. The fourth chapter concerns the development of the nominalist tradition skeptical attitude towards efficient causal explanation in the aftermath of the anti-Aristotelian condemnations of 1277. The fifth chapter addresses the Cartesian occasionalist tradition and its skeptical stance on secondary causation and the relation between this causal skepticism and central doctrines of Cartesian physics and metaphysics. The sixth and final chapter of my dissertation concerns the collapse of occasionalism and its many offspring. My ultimate thesis is that the hallmarks of both modern philosophy and modern science trace their origin to the failure of occasionalism to resolve its own internal contradictions. / Committee in charge: Dr. Naomi Zack, Chairperson; Dr. Cheney Ryan, Member; Dr. Colin Koopman, Member; Dr. Malcolm Wilson, Outside Member

A presente tese investiga a forma pela qual a ideia de reconhecimento poderia nortear a leitura das interpretações fáusticas da primeira metade do século XX, a saber: Tragédia Subjectiva de Fernando Pessoa, Dr. Fausto de Thomas Mann e Meu Fausto de Paul Valéry. Ou seja, as apropriações do mito por Thomas Mann, Pessoa e Paul Valéry seriam apreensões distintas da tragédia do conhecimento cujo desenvolvimento residiria na ideia de uma falha de reconhecimento: falência ou impossibilidade de reconhecer. O conceito de reconhecimento será estudado a partir dos ensaios e livros do filósofo americano Stanley Cavell, entendendo-se reconhecimento enquanto denominador comum entre a ideia de tragédia e do ceticismo: ambos resultam de falhas no reconhecimento. Assim, o presente estudo busca compreender como as três interpretações fáusticas vivem a falência do reconhecimento reiterando, dessa maneira, o afastamento da tradição goetheana / This thesis aims at investigating the way in which the idea of acknowledgment could guide the reading of the Faustian interpretations written in the first half of the twentieth century: Tragédia Subjectiva by Fernando Pessoa, Dr. Fausto by Thomas Mann and Meu Fausto by Paul Valéry. That is, the appropriations of the myth by Thomas Mann, Pessoa and Paul Valéry would all be different interpretations on the tragedy of knowledge whose development lies in the idea of a failure of acknowledgement: failure or impossibility to acknowledge. The study of the concept of acknowledgment will be based on Stanley Cavells essays and books, by understanding that acknowledgment is the common denominator between the ideas of tragedy and skepticism: both result from a failure or impossibility to acknowledge. Thus, this present studys aim is to understand how the three Faustian interpretations deal with the failure of acknowledgment and therefore reiterate their distance from Goethes tradition

A presente tese investiga a forma pela qual a ideia de reconhecimento poderia nortear a leitura das interpretações fáusticas da primeira metade do século XX, a saber: Tragédia Subjectiva de Fernando Pessoa, Dr. Fausto de Thomas Mann e Meu Fausto de Paul Valéry. Ou seja, as apropriações do mito por Thomas Mann, Pessoa e Paul Valéry seriam apreensões distintas da tragédia do conhecimento cujo desenvolvimento residiria na ideia de uma falha de reconhecimento: falência ou impossibilidade de reconhecer. O conceito de reconhecimento será estudado a partir dos ensaios e livros do filósofo americano Stanley Cavell, entendendo-se reconhecimento enquanto denominador comum entre a ideia de tragédia e do ceticismo: ambos resultam de falhas no reconhecimento. Assim, o presente estudo busca compreender como as três interpretações fáusticas vivem a falência do reconhecimento reiterando, dessa maneira, o afastamento da tradição goetheana / This thesis aims at investigating the way in which the idea of acknowledgment could guide the reading of the Faustian interpretations written in the first half of the twentieth century: Tragédia Subjectiva by Fernando Pessoa, Dr. Fausto by Thomas Mann and Meu Fausto by Paul Valéry. That is, the appropriations of the myth by Thomas Mann, Pessoa and Paul Valéry would all be different interpretations on the tragedy of knowledge whose development lies in the idea of a failure of acknowledgement: failure or impossibility to acknowledge. The study of the concept of acknowledgment will be based on Stanley Cavells essays and books, by understanding that acknowledgment is the common denominator between the ideas of tragedy and skepticism: both result from a failure or impossibility to acknowledge. Thus, this present studys aim is to understand how the three Faustian interpretations deal with the failure of acknowledgment and therefore reiterate their distance from Goethes tradition

Nothing is more important, more strategic and more urgently needed than the local Church (Hybels 1995:203). What people need most in life is to have a relationship with Christ, therefore one of the main thrusts of the Church should be evangelism. Hybels repeatedly declares that lost people matter to God and therefore should matter to the Church (1995:186). The Church has used a myriad of ways to evangelize their communities. A relatively unknown (in South Africa) tool for evangelism is a special service designed to attract and convert seekers. The leaders of Willow Creek Community Church do not believe it is possible to minister optimally to both seekers and believers within the confines of one service. Seekers have a need to hear and receive the gospel message in an atmosphere of anonymity whereas believers, on the other hand, need to regularly participate in worship as a body and to receive biblical teaching that enables them to more fully live their lives as believers. In honouring the needs of both groups, Willow (Willow Creek Community Church in South Barrington, Illinois which is pastored by Bill Hybels) and Saddleback (Saddleback Valley Community Church in Orange County, Southern California which is pastored by Dr. Rick Warren) has chosen to minister to each group through separate services. They believe that seekers can be optimally reached in a type of service geared primarily to them. The type of service that has been developed there, to serve this purpose is the Seeker Service. Although both these Churches employ the seeker service to fulfill the Great commission, they approach the service from different perspectives. Hybels’ version of the seeker service could be more aptly termed a “Seeker-driven service”, whereas Warren’s approach is a “seeker-sensitive service”. In the seeker service, conversion is seen as a process and not a momentary experience, where the so-called “journey of a seeker” is identified and legitimized. Some mainstream Churches and theologians question and oppose the validity of separate services designed to attract and entertain seekers only. They are convinced that the seeker service is a humanistic attempt to please the unchurched and raise the concern for more sensitivity to God and not man. Proponents of the seeker service maintain that although the message of the Gospel should remain untouched, the methods should reform to reach a changing generation with the gospel. They are convinced that the seeker service is an excellent tool to reach the lost. What every Church needs to figure out, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, is how to fulfill the front end of the Great Commission (Hybels 1995:175). The specific goal that I have in mind is to evaluate the seeker service to determine it’s validity as an evangelistic tool for the Church today and the Church tomorrow and to find possible practical recommendations for interested parties. / Dr. Johan Geyser

Philosophers such as Clark and Leiter propose that Nietzsche’s position on the concept of truth, while controversial in his early and middle periods, developed into something far less radical in his later works. They claim that Nietzsche should be understood as a naturalist who contends that we can attain truth, and that his falsification thesis, along with skeptical interpretations of it, is incoherent due to self-contradiction. I challenge these thinkers and what I call the naturalist interpretations because if Nietzsche’s middle period is incoherent then little or nothing can be seen as valuable in GS, Z, or BGE. In order to defend Nietzsche from his alleged self-contradiction I examine positions offered by Clark & Dudrick and Berry who attempt to offer a coherent interpretation of his middle period. While neither provides a convincing position, they help me reveal that what Nietzsche calls “strong skepticism” is integral towards his project. Strong skepticism is the notion that we should continuously perpetuate inquiry, while also creating new values. Nietzsche’s project is to get beyond good and evil, which can be achieved by recognizing untruth as a strong skeptic. To get beyond good and evil, Nietzsche asserts that the thing-in-itself must be properly rejected along with any other metaphysical faith. In so doing philosophers of the future can create new values by being honest about their personal judgements as well as recognizing that falsification is necessary for getting around in the world. Ultimately, I conclude that Nietzsche is neither a skeptic nor a naturalist, and instead utilizes elements from both without committing to either.

Our beliefs utilize various sources: perception, memory, induction, etc. We trust these sources to provide reliable information about the world around us. My dissertation investigates how this trust could be justified. Chapter one introduces background material. I argue that justification rather than knowledge is of primary epistemological importance, discuss the internalism/externalism debate(s), and introduce an evidentialist thesis that provides a starting point/framework for epistemological theorizing. Chapter two introduces a puzzle concerning justification. Can a belief source provide justification absent prior justification for believing it's reliable? Any answer appears to either make justifying the reliability of a source intellectually unsatisfying or all together impossible. Chapter three considers and rejects a plethora of proposed solutions to our puzzle. Investigating these solutions illustrates the need to further investigate evidence, evidence possession, and evidential support. Chapter four discusses the metaphysics of evidence. I argue that evidence always consists of a set of facts and that fact-proposition pairs stand in confirmation relations isomorphic to those holding between pairs of propositions. Chapter five argues that justification requires what I call actually connected possession of supporting evidence: a subject must be aware of supporting evidence and of the support relation itself. Chapter six argues that the relation constitutive of a set of facts being justificatory evidence is a sui generis and irreducible relation that is knowable a priori. Chapter seven begins by showing how Richard Fumerton's acquaintance theory meets the constraints on a theory of justification laid down in previous chapters. I modify the theory so as to: (i) make room for fallible foundational justification, and (ii) allow inferential justification absent higher-order beliefs about evidential connections. Chapter eight applies the developed theory of justification to our initial puzzle. I show how my modified acquaintance theory is in a unique position to vindicate the idea that necessarily a source provides a person with justification only if she is aware of evidence for the reliability of that source. However, this awareness of evidence for a source's reliability falls short of a justified belief and thereby avoids impalement from our dilemma's skeptical horn.

Critics discussing Mark Twain's early skepticism have, to date, confined their explorations to short studies (articles or book chapters), brief references in passing, or buried their insights in discussions on other topics. Other critics ignore Twain's atheistic statements and see his beliefs as theistic or deterministic. Others ascribe his attitudes in the "dark writings" to late life disappointments. This study demonstrates that Twain's later attitudes towards religion, determinism, social reform and institutions were products of his family heritage, his social environment, and his early reading. Chapter 1 introduces the major premises of the study, and Chapter 2 reviews the critical background. Chapter 3 discusses the family and hometown influences: on Twain's skeptical thought, and Chapter A discusses Twain's early literary and philosophical influences. Chapter 5 examines Twain's early writings in letters and frontier tales and sketches, showing the development of his anti-religious attitudes. Chapter 6 concludes the study.

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This is an essay that compares the epistemological theories of skepticism and foundationalism in two different ways. The first comparison is to look at the logic behind both theories. Skepticism is a theoretically strong theory, that presents counter arguments towards any theory positioning itself as positive. We’ll also look at foundationalism, and the rationale of assuming foundational propositions for knowledge. Despite it being difficult to defend against the arguments of skepticism, it seems to be close to what we perceive knowledge to be in everyday situations. Skepticism as a theory does not allow us to know. But within it can still be built a theory about something else, close to knowledge, that can be achieved. Foundationalism, as well, does not allow for knowledge with total certainty. The common rationale between both theories seems to be some sort of fallibilism — an uncertainty about knowledge. However, foundationalism and skepticism seem to have opposite functions in our quest for sharpening our theory of knowledge. Skepticism acts as an ideal, a counter argument that constantly challenges every theory about what knowledge is, demanding to be defeated. Foundationalism acts as a grounding force, challenging our theories of knowledge to stay somewhat close to what has generally considered to be the action of knowing.