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An Experimental Examination Of The Effects Of Goal Framing And Time Pressure On Auditors’ Professional SkepticismRobinson, Shani N. 12 1900 (has links)
Professional skepticism is a critical component of audit practice and current auditing standards direct auditors to remain skeptical throughout the duration of each audit engagement. Despite the importance and prevalence of an emphasis on professional skepticism throughout auditing standards, evidence indicates that auditors often fail to exercise an appropriate degree of professional skepticism. Prior accounting research suggests that auditors’ professionally skeptical behavior is affected by individual personality traits as well as situational (state) influences, whereby both factors contribute to auditor professional skepticism. Yet, prior research has primarily focused on trait skepticism; and little research to date has investigated the concept of state skepticism. The purpose if this research study is to experimentally investigate the impact of time pressure and trait skepticism on state skepticism, and to test a potential debiasing procedure on the impact of time pressure on state skepticism. In addition, this study examines the influence of both skepticism types on skeptical behavior.This research offers several contributions to accounting literature and practice. First, I contribute to the existing debate regarding the influences of professional skepticism by providing evidence that professional skepticism may be categorized as a temporary state, induced by situational aspects, in addition to being classified as an enduring trait. Second, I identify certain situational conditions which create differences in the level of state professional skepticism exhibited within an auditing context. Lastly, my findings may also be important to audit firms as they consider tools within their training arsenal equipped to promote an appropriate level of professional skepticism among employees. If auditor skepticism can be influenced by the frames they are provided, then audit firms may create an environment that promotes consistency in auditors’ application of professional skepticism, simply by engaging in goal framing.
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Practical Skepticism: Sextus Empiricus and ZhuangziYork, Brian D. 28 April 2014 (has links)
No description available.
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Contextual Knowledge Ascriptions and Non-Contextual KnowledgeZarella, Michael Stephen Jr. 03 January 2014 (has links)
In this paper I pair a contextualist theory of knowledge ascriptions with a non-contextual definition of knowledge, specifically the principle that knowledge is infallible belief. This combination is unusual because proponents of contextualism, understood as a semantic thesis, either do not engage epistemology or suggest that the criteria for knowledge are also context sensitive. In order to sustain the pairing that I suggest, the truth conditions of a knowledge ascription must be distinct from the criteria for knowledge. I believe that this distinction is important and fruitful for two reasons: 1) the distinction allows us to preserve both the principle that knowledge is infallible belief and the conviction that we know a lot; 2) the distinction explains the paradox that certain skeptical arguments are not obviously unsound even though their conclusion does seem absurd. Since I uphold a definition of knowledge that is not context sensitive, my treatment of skepticism is unlike prominent contextualist treatments. / Master of Arts
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Wittgensteinian epistemology and Cartesian skepticismSalvatore, Nicola Claudio January 2014 (has links)
This work starts from three complementary and interdependent questions: 1) How should we interpret Wittgenstein’s anti-skeptical strategy as presented in On Certainty, and especially the elusive and yet central concept of ‘hinges’? 2) Can Wittgenstein’s strategy, when properly understood and developed, provide a satisfactory response to Cartesian skepticism? 3) Does a Wittgensteinian epistemology license epistemic relativism, and if so to what extent? In Chapter 1, I present Cartesian-style skepticism and its epistemological implications along with the Dretske-Nozick’s ‘relevant alternatives’ theory, based on the rejection of the Closure principle for Knowledge which underlies the skeptical challenge. After a brief discussion of the main concerns raised against this proposal, I argue that this line is untenable and that a successful anti-skeptical proposal has to retain Closure. Having shown the shortcomings of the Dretske-Nozick proposal, I then focus my attention on G. E. Moore’s famous anti-skeptical works, namely “A Defence of Common Sense” (1925, henceforth DCS) and “Proof of an External World”, (1939, henceforth PEW). In these seminal papers, Moore famously argued that it is possible to know several ‘obvious truisms of commonsense’ such as ‘There are external objects’, I have a body’ and so on and that this knowledge can offer a direct response to skeptical worries; the aim of this strategy is then to retain both Closure and our confidence in our everyday knowledge claims. After a detailed presentation of DCS and PEW I will discuss the problems of Moore’s direct response against the skeptic, drawing on the works of distinguished commentators such as Malcolm, Clarke, Stroud and Wright. Roughly, I argue that Moore’s strategy is both unnecessary and unconvincing: unconvincing because Moore’s knowledge-claims cannot refute Cartesian skeptical arguments; unnecessary for they can ‘work’ only within our everyday ‘non-philosophical’ context, thus when no skeptical hypothesis can be sensibly raised. Even if Moore’s anti-skeptical attempts have unanimously been considered unsatisfying, for several reasons his works have nonetheless been extremely influential, to the extent that quite a few contemporary anti-skeptical proposals can be fairly described as ‘Moorean’. In Chapter 2, I present and discuss the dominant ‘Moore-Inspired’ positions, namely Pryor’s Dogmatist Reading of PEW, Neta’s interpretation of the Proof, Greco’s reliabilist account, Fara’s ‘Second Proof’, DeRose’s ‘Moorean contextualism’ and Sosa ‘Neo-Mooreanism’. I criticise these accounts in turn, in order to show that all these strategies inherit the main problems of Moore’s treatment of skepticism and also have unpalatable consequences with regard to the so-called ‘value problem for knowledge’. After having extensively criticised both Moore’s and ‘Neo-Moorean’ epistemologies, in Chapter 3 I focus my attention on Wittgenstein’s On Certainty; given the obscurity and ambiguity of this work, in this chapter I present some of the less contentious aspects of Wittgenstein’s treatment of skepticism and I emphasise the role played by ‘hinges ’ in his anti-skeptical strategy. This will give me the background to assess the different ‘Wittgensteininspired’ anti-skeptical strategies I consider in Chapter 4, namely Conant’s ‘therapeutic’ reading, Wright’s ‘rational entitlement’ account, Williams’ ‘Wittgensteinian contextualism’, McGinn’s ‘framework’ reading and Pritchard’s ‘hinge commitment’ strategy. I argue that these proposals are wanting, both as plausible interpretations of Wittgenstein’s thought and more importantly as viable anti-skeptical strategies. Moreover, I show that McGinn and Williams’ proposals can lead to a form of epistemic relativism, according to which our epistemic practices are the result of pre-rational, social commitments not subject to rational evaluation of any sort; a conclusion which is not more palatable than skepticism itself. Chapter 5 is devoted to presenting Moyal-Sharrock’s ‘non-epistemic’ reading of OC, for which ‘hinges’ such as ‘There are external objects’ or ‘I have a body’ are the expression of a pre-theoretical, animal certainty which she sees as constitutively different from knowledge. While I defend Moyal-Sharrock’s exegesis and her analogy between ‘hinges’ and 'rules of grammar’ as the most plausible interpretation of Wittgenstein’s thought, in this chapter I also criticise her ‘non-epistemic’ account; roughly, I argue that following this strategy we will be forced either to reject the Closure principle, thus inheriting the problems of the Dretske-Nozick’s line, or else to endorse skepticism. Moreover, I also consider some of the relativistic implications of Moyal-Sharrock’s account, which make her proposal vulnerable to the same objections I have raised against McGinn’s framework reading and Williams’ Wittgensteinian contextualism. In Chapter 6, I develop my own anti-skeptical proposal, which is informed by the analogy between ‘hinges’ and ‘rules of grammar’ and their peculiar status. Drawing on Wittgenstein’s reflections on grammatical rules, developed in the socalled second phase of his thought, and especially in his Philosophical Investigations, I argue that ‘hinges’ cannot be object of knowledge but are subject to an altogether different epistemic standing, namely understanding or ‘mastery of techniques’. A promising anti-skeptical implication of this account is that it will help us to dismiss Cartesian-style skepticism as the result of a logical error, based on a misleading way of representing the structure of our epistemic practices, which are not based on propositional beliefs but rather on non-propositional, normative rules. In the rest of Chapter 6, I consider a final problem that a Wittgensteinian epistemology so construed has to face in order to be considered a fully viable antiskeptical position; that is, whether Wittgenstein’s account of ‘hinges’ would lead to epistemic relativism of a kind that is generated by the proposals put forward by Williams, McGinn and Moyal-Sharrock. Chapter 7 is devoted to addressing this question in detail. Drawing on Wittgenstein’s views on mathematics, metrology and religious beliefs, I aim to show that his remarks on ‘hinges’ will help us to dissolve epistemic relativism rather than licensing it. This is so because following Wittgenstein’s remarks on the structure of reason the disagreement between epistemic communities committed to different ‘hinges’ (for instance a community which believes in oracles rather than in science) is either solvable, as different epistemic practices can be compared and assessed if they have similar aims, or is a pseudo-disagreement which stems from a misguided comparison between different practices.
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Achieving epistemic descentCoppenger, Brett Andrew 01 July 2012 (has links)
Traditional accounts of justification can be characterized as trying to analyze justification in such a way that having a justified belief brings with it assurance of truth. The internalist offers a demanding requirement on justification: one's having a justified belief requires that one see what the belief has going for it. Externalists worry that the internalist's narrow conception of justification will lead to unacceptably radical and implausible skepticism. According to the externalist, one need not know what a belief has going for it in order for that belief to be justified. Externalism, though, comes with its own problems.
Ernest Sosa has attempted to bridge the divide between internalism and externalism by pairing the strengths of internalism (assurance) with the strengths of externalism (an answer to skepticism). Sosa distinguishes two kinds of knowledge: animal knowledge that is essentially externalist in character and reflective knowledge that is intended to capture our best intellectual procedure in regards to knowledge. On Sosa's view, one gains reflective knowledge by building upon (by adding further epistemic components to) animal knowledge. As a result, Sosa's view seems to illustrate a bottom-up approach to the analysis of knowledge (or justification): reflective knowledge is the result of animal knowledge and some other epistemic factor.
My project, in contrast to Sosa's, is to argue that one should start with an account of ideal justification (justification that is paradigmatically internalist) and then proceed by loosening the standards on ideal justification in an effort to develop the possibility of non- ideal kinds of justification. The view that I will develop will adopt Sosa's strategy of distinguishing kinds of knowledge (or justification), but will result in a top-down approach to the analysis of justification. Instead of starting with an undemanding standard and layer levels on top, I will start with an ideal standard and strip layers away.
I will also argue that my view has some important advantages over Sosa's. Not only does Sosa's view seem to run into many of the problems that threaten externalism, but his view is incapable of offering the kind of assurance that the internalist is after. The view I develop will maintain the internalist's interest in assurance while also providing a response to some of the skeptical problems that have plagued internalists.
If my project is successful, then, even if the justification that results in many of the cases I will be exploring is (admittedly) not ideal, we can use these conceptions of justification to help explicate how one might have justified beliefs about a great number of things. The essentially internalist account that I have offered will not only illustrate a serious approach to dealing with skepticism, but it will also capture how many of our commonsensically justified beliefs are in fact justified (albeit in a less than ideal sense).
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Knowledge, infallibility, and skepticismStoutenburg, Gregory Douglas 01 August 2016 (has links)
I argue that to know that a proposition is true one must have justification for being certain that the proposition is true. That is, one must have infallible epistemic justification for believing the proposition. It is widely accepted among epistemologists that we rarely, if ever, have such strong justification for our beliefs. It follows that there is precious little that we know. That conclusion is unacceptable to many philosophers. I argue that the positions that lead to the skeptical conclusion are well-motivated and that the skeptical conclusion is implicitly accepted by ordinary speakers.
My dissertation has three main components: a metaphilosophical position, an epistemological position, and an error theory. First, the metaphilosophical position. One very important part of philosophy is the analysis of our ordinary concepts. Analysis of our concepts begins with reflecting on what we are inclined to say about various actual and possible cases when considered under specific descriptions. This traditional method has recently come under attack, due in part to the rise of semantic externalism. I agree with externalists that if ‘meaning is reference’ then there is little reason to think reflecting on our concepts from the armchair will provide insight to the nature of the concepts we investigate. I defend a version of semantic internalism which grounds meaning in factors with which subjects are directly acquainted. That view supports the traditional methodology. Furthermore, as the goal of philosophical analysis is to accurately describe concepts of philosophical interest, the only kind of objection that could be decisive against a proposed analysis is that it does not correctly describe our concept. That opens the door to a skeptical analysis of knowledge.
Second, the epistemological position. I argue that the unacceptability of sentences of the form “S knows that p but it is possible for S that not-p” is best explained by the hypothesis that our concept of knowledge requires having justification for being certain that what one believes is true. I offer as a criterion of justified certainty the idea that when one knows a proposition is true, one is in a position to decisively answer questions about one’s knowledge of that proposition. I survey a number of competing theories of knowledge and show that they allow for the possibility of knowledge when one fails my criterion of decisive answerability. Those views fail my criterion because according to those views there is nothing the subject is aware of that guarantees for the subject that the allegedly known proposition is true. On that basis, I contend that knowledge is direct awareness of the factors that constitute the truth of the proposition one believes.
Third, the error theory. Of course, we rarely have direct awareness of the factors that constitute the truth of the propositions we believe. So, our knowledge attributions are generally false. Yet, they are overwhelmingly natural to make. I argue that competent speakers are often quick to recognize knowledge attributions as a kind of ‘loose talk’ akin to the way we loosely ascribe geometric properties to ordinary objects. We regularly call objects ‘square’ that are not even close to being square, and we are quick to recognize this when challenged. I argue that we do this because we are so accustomed to communicating using strict language to make false claims that we often do not attend to the literal falsity of what we are saying. While we accept very demanding standards for knowledge, the phenomenon of recognizing that our knowledge claims are regularly false is as pervasive as our use of loose speech.
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Theism and explanation : a defence of scientific naturalismDawes, Gregory W, n/a January 2007 (has links)
The modern sciences are characterised by a methodological atheism. Even though religions offer what appear to be explanations of various facts about the world, such proposed explanations are not taken seriously within the sciences. Even if no natural explanation were available, it would be assumed that one exists. Is this merely a sign of atheistic prejudice, as some critics suggest? Or are there good reasons to exclude from science explanations that invoke a supernatural agent? My answer to this question has two parts. On the one hand, I concede the bare possibility that talk of divine action could constitute a potential explanation of some state of affairs, while noting that the conditions under which this would be true are unlikely ever to be fulfilled. On the other hand, I argue that a proposed explanation of this kind would rate poorly, when measured against our usual standards of explanatory virtue. Even if it were the only proposed explanation on offer, we would have good reason to seek an alternative.
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Mapping notions of cyberspace optimism, skepticism, and the issues of identity and spirituality /Widjanarko, Putut. January 2005 (has links)
Thesis (M.A.)--Ohio University, June, 2005. / Title from PDF t.p. Includes bibliographical references (p. [131]-142)
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Kant, Skepticism, and Moral SensibilityWare, Owen 17 February 2011 (has links)
One of the fundamental insights of Kants ethical theory is that moral requirements cannot follow from our understanding of motivational capacities. Ethics must precede psychology. But Kant also believes we can learn new things about what we are capable of from ethics, in particular what it would be like to act out of respect for the moral law. This is the task of Kants moral psychology. It must explain how practical reason can, in place of desire, serve as an incentive for action.
I argue that Kants psychology of the moral incentive plays a crucial, but often ignored, role in his project of moral justification. While our view of human motivational capacities cannot dictate our understanding of moral requirements, we must still show how those requirements become effective in human conduct. That is, we must show how they enter into the structure of human motivation. The challenge for Kants moral psychology is to explain this. The trouble is that the relationship between practical reason and human sensibility is so puzzling that we may begin to doubt their connection. So we face a problem the problem of motivational skepticism.
My dissertation is organized into two parts. First, I argue that Kants project of moral justification in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) fails because it does not specify the psychological conditions required for moral action (PART I). Part of the problem is that Kant thought he could only explain these conditions in causal terms. In the Critique of Practical Reason (1788) Kant abandons this assumption and develops a new analysis of the influence practical reason has on feeling. Secondly, I show that this analysis is meant to address a skeptical worry left unresolved in the Groundwork, namely, the worry that our will may be unfit for morality (PART II). By showing how we are capable of moral sensibility, then, I argue that the second Critique develops a powerful response to skepticism about moral motivation. / PhD
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Det där är ingen icke-zebra! : epistemisk-deduktiv slutenhet och skepticismLindner, Philip January 2011 (has links)
Departing from Fred Dretske’s groundbreaking article, this essay explore the epistemic closure principle: the principle that states that knowledge is closed under known implication. It also explores the relationship to skepticism, various attempts to challenge and defend the principle, as well as developing a new perspective where the skeptical premise is seen as an a priori justified tautology that can be overriden by a posteriori experience. I argue that Dretske’s illuminating example makes it clear that there is an unescapable choice between either rejecting a skeptical premise however intuitive it may seem or inextricably having to admit a skeptical conclusion.
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