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Nietzsche's Skepticism of AgencyLorentz, Ben 18 December 2012 (has links)
Nietzsche’s view of the self and will seems to culminate in a naturalistic account of human agency. If we understand Nietzsche as primarily a naturalist who thinks philosophy should more or less be modeled on the sciences whose investigations are restricted to empirical observation and whose explanations, like causal explanation, are natural (rather than supernatural), then ascribing a naturalistic account of human agency to Nietzsche is appropriate. However, I argue that attributing a naturalistic account of agency, or any account of agency to Nietzsche, misunderstands Nietzsche’s skepticism. I attempt to demonstrate the primacy of Nietzsche’s skepticism by showing how “his” naturalistic “account” of agency is best understood as an instrument in the service of his purely critical and deflationary project. To show the instrumental character of his “account,” I show how the account is used to oppose traditional notions of agency without itself becoming Nietzsche’s theory of agency.
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Descartes, Husserl and radical conversionMacDonald, Paul S. January 1996 (has links)
Phenomenology has been one of the most influential and far-reaching developments in 20th Century Philosophy and has had a great impact on the disciplines of philosophy of logic and math, theory of knowledge, and theory of meaning. The most profound influence on Edmund Husserl (1859 - 1938), the founder of phenomenology, was Rene Descartes (1596 - 1650), whose radical rethinking of philosophy’s overall project provided Husserl with both the historical and conceptual point of departure for his foundation of prima philosophia. Despite this explicit and well-known influence, there is no book- length study of their thematic parallels; numerous Journal articles focus almost entirely on the phenomenological reduction and, aside from this, are fairly unsatisfactory. The purpose of the present work is to elucidate systematic convergences (and divergences) between Descartes and Husserl throughout their respective philosophical developments. This comprises explication of several central topics: 1. The parallel between 17th C. skepticism, which Descartes attempted to overthrow, and 19th C. psychologism and relativism, which Husserl reacted against. 2. The striking similarity at the level of formal ontology between Descartes' simple and complex natures and Husserl's part-whole theory. 3. A clarification of the Cartesian sense of methodical doubt and how Husserl's mistaking of this shaped the initial formulation of the reduction. 4. Convergence in the maturation of the primitive notion of intuition as "clear and distinct seeing" and "seeing of essences" for both thinkers. 5. An analysis of the modes of methodical doubt, in terms of steps in the cognitive act of doubting, and not merely in the content of that which is doubted. 6. Far-reaching divergences in that Descartes was motivated to establish with scientific certainly an entirely new world of being, whereas Husserl was concerned to disclose an entirely new sense of the world. As such, thematic convergences between Descartes and Husserl are not due to accidental intersections of interest, nor are they curiosities of the comparative method in historical research. These parallels are intrinsic and systematic due to an overarching congruence in their visions of the starting point, methodological procedures, and reaction to pseudo-scientific matters-of-fact in the founding of a genuine philosophical project.
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Die philosophische Richtung des Cornelius Celsus ein kapitel aus der geschichte der pyrrhonischen skepsis.Sepp, Simon, January 1893 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Erlangen. / Cover title. "Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde der Philosophischen Fakultät der kgl. Universität Erlangen vorgetragen von Simon Sepp." Pages 51-149 have the title Pyrrhonëische studien. Includes bibliographical references.
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The skepticism of Anatole FranceSmith, Helen Belle. January 1927 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin, 1925. / At head of title: Helen B. Smith. Thesis note stamped on t.p. Bibliography: p. [127]-131.
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Against Pyrrhonian equipollenceButton, John Everett. January 2009 (has links)
Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2009. / Title from file title page. Tim O'Keefe, committee chair ; Stephen Jacobson, Sebastian Rand, committee members. Electronic text (46 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed July 31, 2009. Includes bibliographical references (p. 46).
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The relationship between Hegel and skepticismLampros, Alex. Bowman, Brady, January 2009 (has links)
Thesis (B.A.)--Pennsylvania State University, 2009. / Mode of access: World Wide Web. Thesis supervisor: Dr. Brady Bowman.
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Die philosophische Richtung des Cornelius Celsus : ein kapitel aus der geschichte der pyrrhonischen skepsis.Sepp, Simon, January 1893 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Erlangen. / Cover title. "Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde der Philosophischen Fakultät der kgl. Universität Erlangen vorgetragen von Simon Sepp." Pages 51-149 have the title Pyrrhonëische studien. Includes bibliographical references.
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A vindication of logical necessity against scepticismPhilie, Patrice January 2002 (has links)
Some philosophers dispute the claim that there is a notion of logical necessity involved in the concept of logical consequence. They are sceptical about logical necessity. They argue that a proper characterisation of logical consequence - of what follows from what - need not and should not appeal to the notion of necessity at all. Quine is the most prominent philosopher holding such a view. In this doctoral dissertation, I argue that scepticism about logical necessity is not successful. Quine's scepticism takes three forms. Firstly, he is often interpreted as undermining, in his classic paper 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', the very intelligibility of notions such as meaning, necessity, and analyticity. If the notion of necessity is meaningless, it is clear that ascriptions of logical necessity are also meaningless. In the thesis, I defend Quine's criticism of these notions by situating it in its historical context and emphasising that the real target in those writings is not the intelligibility of these notions as such, but only their Platonistic interpretation. I agree with Quine that a good theory about meaning, necessity, or analyticity must avoid such an ontological commitment. Secondly, Quine advocates, in the same paper, a holistic picture of knowledge and claims that in this picture, ascriptions of logical necessity are superfluous. I then show that holism a la Quine is committed to admit the necessity of statements of logical consequence. Thirdly, there is Quine's substitutional account of logical consequence (as exposed in his (1970)). He contends that this theory makes no use of logical necessity, thus showing its superfluousness. I show that any plausible account of logical consequence needs to appeal to logical necessity, thus undercutting Quine's claim - and, more generally, undercutting scepticism about logical necessity.
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Dilemmas From DisagreementReed, Andrew 01 January 2018 (has links)
When interpretations vary for the same set of evidence, what should be done? Options include just agreeing to disagree, maintaining one’s initial beliefs, or going all the way to completely suspending judgment. Taking this final option binds an agent to some interesting views, including an acceptance of epistemic dilemmas. However, the kind of total skepticism some philosophers want out of disagreement is probably a pipe dream – if there is no best option, no option can be eliminated.
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Scepticism versus dogmatism: an internal analysis of Sextus Empiricus’ Against mathematicians, book VIIOberti, Margherita January 1979 (has links)
Scepticism, as depicted by Sextus Empiricus, presents itself as a philosophy whose ultimate justification rests on the conviction that truth is unattainable and that consequently the only chance left to man is that of suspending judgement (epoche). From epoche derives that state of mental quietitude (ataraxia) which alone allows man to lead a happy life. Thus, Scepticism is inevitably a polemic against all those philosophers who assert truth to be apprehensible and to whom Sextus refers by the term "Dogmatists".
This study of Book VII of Against Mathematicians seeks to analyze the epistemological premises of Sextus' Scepticism as well as the Sextian arguments directed against the Dogmatists, and particularly those against the Stoics. Truth is unattainable because no such a thing as a criterion of truth exists. This is Sextus' conclusion to his criticism of the Dogmatists' doctrines.
Although Sextus' Scepticism is shaped against the background of the doctrines he intends to combat, I intend to isolate his methodology as well as the the theoretical aspects of his philosophy from the polemical ones. Chapter II outlines Sextus' philosophical background as well as his skeptical terminology. Chapter III examines Sextus' methodology and explains why the criticism of the criterion of truth provides him with the necessary theoretical justification for his Scepticism.
Sextus1 attack against the Dogmatists is preceded by a lengthy and fairly accurate account of his opponents' views. These views and particularly the Stoic doctrine of phantasia kataleptike are examined in Chapters IV and V. In Chapters VI to VIII, I examine Sextus' response to the Dogmatists. In Chapter VI I argue that Sextus1 criticism of man as criterion, and of the definition of man, are biased by his failure to understand some Dogmatic terms such as "universal concept" and "essence". Chapter VII investigates Sextus' criticism of senses and intellect as criteria of truth, and it is maintained that the arguments used by Sextus to deny the possibility of self-apprehension establish an epistemological principle whose value is dogmatically confined by Sextus to the particular instance he criticizes. Had Sextus been consistent in his use of such a principle, he ought to have declared himself a nihilist rather than a Sceptic.
Chapter VIII deals with Sextus' criticism of the notion of phantasia and particularly with his attack against the Stoic doctrine of phantasia kataleptike as criterion of truth. Special attention is paid to the accusation of circular reasoning made by Sextus against the Stoic criterion and
in the discussion in Chapter IX. There I argue that Sextus
and with him most students of ancient philosophy, misrepresent
the meaning of the Stoic doctrine because they identify the
term to hyparchon (a key element in the Stoic definition of
phantasia kataleptike) with the real (external) object. I
oppose this view and offer a tentative re-interpretation of
the Stoic criterion, which, if correct, may both free the
Stoics from the Sextian accusation of circular reasoning and,
at the same time, avoid some of the philological and philosophical
difficulties involved in the Sextian and standard interpretation
of the Stoic definition of phantasia kataleptike. / Arts, Faculty of / Classical, Near Eastern and Religious Studies, Department of / Graduate
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