Spelling suggestions: "subject:"[een] SKEPTICISM"" "subject:"[enn] SKEPTICISM""
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Self Esteem: Its Overall Effect on Professional SkepticismBlix, Leslie Helen 01 May 2017 (has links)
The performance evaluation process is both an important tool for accounting firms to assess the performance of employees and provides supervisors an opportunity to provide feedback to their subordinates. Supervisions, such as managers, will provide feedback to subordinates (senior auditors) numerous times throughout a fiscal year. Prior research has shown that performance evaluations are largely based on results of the subordinate based on task completion and budgeted hours. These types of performance evaluations have been linked to employee dissatisfaction and a decrease in overall job performance. Utilizing psychology based theories, an experimental task was conducted to investigate whether the manager’s feedback orientation (positive/negative and tasks/goals) within a senior auditor’s performance evaluation will increase an auditor’s self-esteem and professional skepticism. Results show that positive and goal-oriented performance evaluations do increase an auditor’s self-esteem and supportive performance evaluations increase an auditor’s professional skepticism. These results provide valuable information to accounting firms to assist with their current restructuring of the performance evaluation process.
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[en] THE GETTIER PROBLEM AND THE SCEPTICISM / [pt] O PROBLEMA DE GETTIER E O CETICISMOROGERIO SOARES DA COSTA 04 August 2011 (has links)
[pt] Desde a publicação do famoso artigo do americano Edmund Gettier sobre as condições do conhecimento diversos pensadores apontaram para as conseqüências céticas advindas do questionamento do conceito de conhecimento como crença verdadeira justificada. A despeito de tal afirmação, poucos foram aqueles que se dedicaram elucidar em que exatamente consiste a ameaça cética. O objetivo da presente tese é formular um conceito de ceticismo que esteja de acordo com suas expressões mais relevantes, no passado e na atualidade, e averiguar se o problema de Gettier a ele pode realmente conduzir. / [en] Since the publishing of the famous article from the american Edmund Gettier on the definition of knowledge several thinkers pointed out to the sceptical consequences derived from questioning the concept of knowledge as justified true belief. Despite such affirmation, few were those who dedicated themselves to clarify of what exactly consists the sceptical threat. This thesis objective is to formulate a concept of scepticism according to its most relevant expressions, in the past and nowadays, and to test if the Gettier problem can truly lead to it.
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O que faz do conselheiro Aires um cético? / What makes councelor Aires skeptic?Luciano Oliveira Camara 24 November 2011 (has links)
Há um consenso nos meios crítico e acadêmico de que Joaquim Maria Machado de Assis é o maior ficcionista brasileiro. Além da qualidade inegável, sua ficção é notável por sua dimensão, atingindo uma dezena de romances e mais de duzentos contos. Com esta união singular entre extensão e qualidade, a obra machadiana acumulou a maior fortuna crítica no Brasil e uma das maiores da literatura universal. Ainda assim, sua fortuna é a que mais cresce no Brasil. Diante de tamanha dedicação dos estudiosos, em que seria relevante a apresentação de mais uma dissertação sobre o Bruxo do Cosme Velho? Acreditando que, apesar do tamanho da investigação que já se fez sobre Machado, alguns dos aspectos cruciais da vida e da obra do escritor ainda não foram devidamente elucidados, este trabalho nasce com a intenção de contribuir para a diminuição dessa lacuna. Um desses aspectos é o conteúdo filosófico da ficção machadiana. Durante muitas décadas, a ideia de que Machado de Assis se alinhara filosoficamente ao pessimismo foi hegemônica. Entretanto, muitas características da ficção machadiana, tais como o humour e a ironia, podem ser sinais de outra orientação filosófica: o ceticismo. A identificação entre Machado e ceticismo não é, entretanto, algo novo, mas durante a maior parte do tempo, a crítica identificou o ceticismo de Machado com a acepção popular do termo: descrença no campo metafísico e desengano no campo político-social. Este modo de ver o ceticismo acaba por aproximar o termo, e reaproximar Machado de Assis, ao pessimismo. Por outro lado, há algumas décadas, alguns estudiosos brasileiros começaram a verificar que a filosofia da ficção machadiana estaria de fato associada ao ceticismo, mas a outro tipo de ceticismo, o ceticismo pirrônico ou filosófico, iniciado com Pirro de Elis, filósofo grego que viveu entre 360 e 270 a.C., e estabelecido pelos escritos de Sexto Empírico, filósofo e médico do século 2. Fazendo jus à origem grega do termo skepticós, aquele que investiga, o ceticismo pirrônico prima não pela descrença, mas pela busca contínua da verdade. Esta busca se mantém indeterminada em virtude da limitação dos sentidos e do pensamento humanos. Não podemos alcançar a verdade das coisas, mas apenas descrever como elas aparentam. Esta impossibilidade não conduz o pirrônico ao pessimismo, o conduz, ao contrário, à tranquilidade, pois ele aceita a sua limitação, não fica se debatendo contra ela. Na ficção machadiana, o conselheiro Aires é o personagem cético por excelência, a começar pelo tão famoso tédio à controvérsia. Entretanto, apesar da semelhança entre a ficção de Machado de Assis e a filosofia cética, há um problema a ser enfrentado: como o escritor poderia ter criado um personagem tão próximo do pirronismo se Machado nunca chegou a ler uma página de Sexto Empírico? / Joaquim Maria Machado de Assis is the most important Brazilian fictionist, according to the critics and the academy. Together with its undeniable quality, his fiction is notable for its dimension, reaching ten novels and over two hundred short stories. Because of its unique union between quality and size, Machados work has garnered the biggest critical fortune among Brazilian writers and one of the greatest in literature all over the world. Still, his fortune is the fastest growing in Brazil. Faced with such dedication of the scholars, it would be relevant to present a new paper on the Warlock of Cosme Velho? Believing that some of the crucial aspects of his life and work have not been elucidated, despite of the size of the research that has been done on Machado, this work comes with the intention to contribute reducing this gap. One of these aspects is the philosophical content of Machado's fiction. For many decades, the idea that Machado de Assis is philosophically aligned with pessimism was hegemonic. However, many features of Machado's fiction, such as humour and irony, may be signs of other philosophical orientation: skepticism. However, the identification between Machado and skepticism is not something new. But during most of the time, the critics identified the skepticism of Machado with the popular sense of that word: disbelief concerning metaphysical dimension and disappointment concerning politics and social environment. This view of skepticism, however, approximates the term to pessimism; and reconnects Machado de Assis to it. Decades ago, some Brazilian scholars began to see that the philosophy of Machado's fiction was actually associated with skepticism, but another kind of skepticism, the Pyrrhonian or philosophical skepticism, which began with Pyrrho of Elis, a Greek philosopher who lived between 360 and 270 BC, and was established by the writings of Sextus Empiricus, philosopher and physician of the second century. True to the Greek origin of the term skepticos, the one who inquires, the Pyrrhonian skepticism is distinguished not by disbelief, but by its continual search for the truth. This search remains undetermined due to the limitation of human senses and thought. We cannot reach the truth of things, but only describe how they look. This failure does not lead the Pyrrhonian to pessimism, leads him instead to the tranquility, because he accepts his limitations and is not struggling against them. In Machado's fiction, counselor Aires is the skeptical character par excellence, starting with his famous aversion to controversy. However, despite the similarity between the fiction of Machado de Assis and skeptical philosophy, there is a problem to be faced: Machado had never read a single page from Sextus Empiricus. So, how could the writer created a so closed to the Pyrrhonism character?
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O que faz do conselheiro Aires um cético? / What makes councelor Aires skeptic?Luciano Oliveira Camara 24 November 2011 (has links)
Há um consenso nos meios crítico e acadêmico de que Joaquim Maria Machado de Assis é o maior ficcionista brasileiro. Além da qualidade inegável, sua ficção é notável por sua dimensão, atingindo uma dezena de romances e mais de duzentos contos. Com esta união singular entre extensão e qualidade, a obra machadiana acumulou a maior fortuna crítica no Brasil e uma das maiores da literatura universal. Ainda assim, sua fortuna é a que mais cresce no Brasil. Diante de tamanha dedicação dos estudiosos, em que seria relevante a apresentação de mais uma dissertação sobre o Bruxo do Cosme Velho? Acreditando que, apesar do tamanho da investigação que já se fez sobre Machado, alguns dos aspectos cruciais da vida e da obra do escritor ainda não foram devidamente elucidados, este trabalho nasce com a intenção de contribuir para a diminuição dessa lacuna. Um desses aspectos é o conteúdo filosófico da ficção machadiana. Durante muitas décadas, a ideia de que Machado de Assis se alinhara filosoficamente ao pessimismo foi hegemônica. Entretanto, muitas características da ficção machadiana, tais como o humour e a ironia, podem ser sinais de outra orientação filosófica: o ceticismo. A identificação entre Machado e ceticismo não é, entretanto, algo novo, mas durante a maior parte do tempo, a crítica identificou o ceticismo de Machado com a acepção popular do termo: descrença no campo metafísico e desengano no campo político-social. Este modo de ver o ceticismo acaba por aproximar o termo, e reaproximar Machado de Assis, ao pessimismo. Por outro lado, há algumas décadas, alguns estudiosos brasileiros começaram a verificar que a filosofia da ficção machadiana estaria de fato associada ao ceticismo, mas a outro tipo de ceticismo, o ceticismo pirrônico ou filosófico, iniciado com Pirro de Elis, filósofo grego que viveu entre 360 e 270 a.C., e estabelecido pelos escritos de Sexto Empírico, filósofo e médico do século 2. Fazendo jus à origem grega do termo skepticós, aquele que investiga, o ceticismo pirrônico prima não pela descrença, mas pela busca contínua da verdade. Esta busca se mantém indeterminada em virtude da limitação dos sentidos e do pensamento humanos. Não podemos alcançar a verdade das coisas, mas apenas descrever como elas aparentam. Esta impossibilidade não conduz o pirrônico ao pessimismo, o conduz, ao contrário, à tranquilidade, pois ele aceita a sua limitação, não fica se debatendo contra ela. Na ficção machadiana, o conselheiro Aires é o personagem cético por excelência, a começar pelo tão famoso tédio à controvérsia. Entretanto, apesar da semelhança entre a ficção de Machado de Assis e a filosofia cética, há um problema a ser enfrentado: como o escritor poderia ter criado um personagem tão próximo do pirronismo se Machado nunca chegou a ler uma página de Sexto Empírico? / Joaquim Maria Machado de Assis is the most important Brazilian fictionist, according to the critics and the academy. Together with its undeniable quality, his fiction is notable for its dimension, reaching ten novels and over two hundred short stories. Because of its unique union between quality and size, Machados work has garnered the biggest critical fortune among Brazilian writers and one of the greatest in literature all over the world. Still, his fortune is the fastest growing in Brazil. Faced with such dedication of the scholars, it would be relevant to present a new paper on the Warlock of Cosme Velho? Believing that some of the crucial aspects of his life and work have not been elucidated, despite of the size of the research that has been done on Machado, this work comes with the intention to contribute reducing this gap. One of these aspects is the philosophical content of Machado's fiction. For many decades, the idea that Machado de Assis is philosophically aligned with pessimism was hegemonic. However, many features of Machado's fiction, such as humour and irony, may be signs of other philosophical orientation: skepticism. However, the identification between Machado and skepticism is not something new. But during most of the time, the critics identified the skepticism of Machado with the popular sense of that word: disbelief concerning metaphysical dimension and disappointment concerning politics and social environment. This view of skepticism, however, approximates the term to pessimism; and reconnects Machado de Assis to it. Decades ago, some Brazilian scholars began to see that the philosophy of Machado's fiction was actually associated with skepticism, but another kind of skepticism, the Pyrrhonian or philosophical skepticism, which began with Pyrrho of Elis, a Greek philosopher who lived between 360 and 270 BC, and was established by the writings of Sextus Empiricus, philosopher and physician of the second century. True to the Greek origin of the term skepticos, the one who inquires, the Pyrrhonian skepticism is distinguished not by disbelief, but by its continual search for the truth. This search remains undetermined due to the limitation of human senses and thought. We cannot reach the truth of things, but only describe how they look. This failure does not lead the Pyrrhonian to pessimism, leads him instead to the tranquility, because he accepts his limitations and is not struggling against them. In Machado's fiction, counselor Aires is the skeptical character par excellence, starting with his famous aversion to controversy. However, despite the similarity between the fiction of Machado de Assis and skeptical philosophy, there is a problem to be faced: Machado had never read a single page from Sextus Empiricus. So, how could the writer created a so closed to the Pyrrhonism character?
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Proving the Dead: Doubt and Skepticism in the Late Medieval Lives of Saints Æthelthryth and EdithJanuary 2018 (has links)
abstract: Anglo-Saxon women wielded a remarkable amount of power in the early English church. They founded some of the country’s most influential institutions, and modern Christians continue to venerate many of them as saints. Their path to canonization, however, was informal—especially compared to men and women who were canonized after Pope Gregory IX’s decree in 1234 that reserved those powers for the pope. Many of Anglo-Saxon England’s most popular saints exhibited behaviors that, had they been born later, would have disqualified them from canonization. This project examines how the problematic lives of St. Æthelthryth of Ely and St. Edith of Wilton were simultaneously doubted and adopted by post-Norman Christians. Specifically, it considers the flawed ways that the saints, petitioners, and their communities were simultaneously doubted and legitimized by late-medieval hagiographers. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation English 2018
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Peirce, Wittgenstein y Davidson: coincidencias anti-escépticasKalpokas, Daniel 09 April 2018 (has links)
Peirce, Wittgenstein and Davidson: Anti-skeptic Coincidences”. This paper shows some similarities among Peirce’s, Wittgenstein’s and Davidson’s answers to skepticism. In each case, the response to Cartesian skepticism consist in pointing out the contradictory character of the skeptical doubt in itself.More specifically, those philosophers agree on the following points: (i) in order to face the challenge of skepticism we have to examine its bases without conceding the terms of the challenge; (ii) the skeptic cannot doubt without assuming some propositional contents as true. In this sense, the skeptic commits performative contradiction; (iii) in his challenge, the skeptic omits the practical dimension of language and knowledge. That is the source of his difficulties. / Este artículo pone de manifiesto algunos puntos comunes en lasrespuestas al escepticismo de Peirce, Wittgenstein y Davidson. En cada caso, la respuesta al escepticismo cartesiano consiste en señalar el carácter contradictorio de la misma duda escéptica. Más específicamente, los tres filósofos están de acuerdo en los siguientes puntos: (i) a fin de hacer frente al desafío escéptico,debemos examinar sus bases sin conceder los términos en los que se plantea el desafío; (ii) el escéptico no puede dudar sin asumir algunos contenidos proposicionales como verdaderos. En este sentido, el escéptico incurre en contradicción performativa; (iii) en su desafío, el escéptico omite la dimensión práctica del lenguaje y del conocimiento. Ese es el origen de sus dificultades.
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Limites epistemológicos da apologética de Blaise Pascal / Epistemological limits of the apologetics of Blaise PascalRicardo Vinícius Ibañez Mantovani 04 December 2014 (has links)
Os fragmentos que compõem a obra que, hoje, conhecemos como Pensées, são notas preparatórias de uma apologia da religião cristã que Blaise Pascal pretendia escrever. Ao nos debruçarmos sobre as anotações do filósofo francês, chama-nos a atenção o fato de o autor, em nenhum momento, propor qualquer demonstração metafísica da existência de Deus ou mesmo pretender provar, de modo inquestionável, algum dos dogmas católicos. A total ausência de demonstrações que se pretendam perfeitamente probantes explica-se, a nosso ver, pelo fato de Blaise Pascal ser um filósofo cético, ou seja, pelo fato de Pascal não crer que a razão humana é um instrumento capaz de apreender a Verdade. Assim, trata-se, aqui, de, primeiramente, estipular a plausibilidade da hipótese de leitura segundo a qual Pascal pode, com justiça, ser considerado um pensador cético. Isto feito, tratar-se-á de analisar os motivos que levaram nosso filósofo a não se utilizar de nenhuma das tradicionais provas da existência de Deus e a não considerar como plenamente probantes os raciocínios por ele elaborados em prol da religião cristã fatos que caracterizamos como limites epistemológicos da apologética de Blaise Pascal. / The fragments that compose the book that today we know as Pensées are preparatory notes of an apologetics of the Christian religion that Blaise Pascal intended to write. When examining the annotations on the French philosopher, our attention is attracted by the fact that the author never proposes any metaphysical demonstration of God\'s existence, neither intends to prove, unquestionably, some of the Catholic dogmas. The total absence of demonstrations presented as definitive is explained, in our point of view, by the fact that Blaise Pascal is a skeptical philosopher, ie, because Pascal does not believe that human reason is an instrument capable of grasping the Truth. Thus, it is here to, first, establish the plausibility of the hypothesis of the interpretation according to which Pascal may justly be regarded as a skeptical thinker. This done, well analyze the reasons why our philosopher did not use any of the traditional proofs of God\'s existence and did not consider as fully demonstrative the reasonings he elaborated himself in favor of the Christian religion - facts that we consider as epistemological limits of the apologetics of Blaise Pascal.
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Impossibilidade da dúvida radical: uma resposta ao ceticismo no livro Da Certeza de Wittgenstein / Impossibility of radical doubt: an answer to skepticism in Wittgenstein´s On CertaintyMaira de Cinque Pereira da Costa 09 December 2011 (has links)
Trata-se de mostrar alguns argumentos, desenvolvidos por Ludwig Wittgenstein nos seus últimos escritos, contra uma espécie de investida cética que pretende colocar em suspensão a certeza que temos a respeito da existência do mundo. Para tanto, procuramos, primeiramente, a partir da exegese do parágrafo 308 de Da Certeza, explorar a relação estabelecida entre os conceitos de dúvida, saber e certeza a fim de esclarecer a concepção de que a dúvida apenas pode ser aplicada sobre proposições empíricas e jamais sobre proposições gramaticais. Em segundo lugar, mostramos que, ao entender que a dúvida ( o ato de duvidar) sobre qualquer coisa faz sentido apenas quando aceitamos um sistema de proposições, Wittgenstein a (o) coloca como dependente da estabilidade da gramática de nossa linguagem. Nesse sentido, buscamos elucidar a maneira como o filósofo caracteriza a lógica demonstrando-a, de um lado, como algo constante um quadro de referência que possibilita o curso das proposições relacionadas à experiência e, de outro, como algo inconstante que comporta fissuras, quebras e até desmoronamento. Por fim, desenvolvemos a ideia de que essa precária condição de nossa gramática não impede que confiemos nela e que, unicamente por conta disso, possamos dizer que algumas proposições fundamentam nossos jogos de linguagem. É nesse sentido que o cético, ao tentar colocar uma proposição fundante em nossos jogos tal qual o mundo existe em dúvida, suspende sem perceber a fluência do jogo assertivo que pretende estabelecer e, por que não dizer, sua lógica. / This work aims to show some arguments, developed by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his later writings, against a kind of skeptical assault that wants to put in suspension our assurance about the existence of the world. First, we should clarify the conception that a doubt can only be applied on empirical propositions and never on grammatical ones, from the relationship established between the concepts of doubt, know and certainty. Secondly, we aim to show that by identifying that raising a question makes sense only when we accept a system of propositions, Wittgenstein puts it as dependent on the stability of our grammar. Accordingly, we seek to elucidate how the philosopher characterizes grammar as something stable, on one hand as a reference framework which enables the course of the propositions that refer to the experience and, on the other, as something unstable that can crack, break and even collapse. Finally, we developed the idea that this precarious condition of our grammar does not prevent us to trust her and solely because of that we can say that some propositions underlie our language games. In this sense, the skeptic, when trying to put a founding proposition for our language games like \"the world exists\" in doubt, suspend without notice the fluency of the assertive game he intended to stablish, its consistency and, for that matter, its logic.
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Raymond Queneau ou la quête de bonheur - À la lumière de la sagesse chinoise / Raymond Queneau's pursuit of happiness - From a perspective of chinese philosophy wisdom / 雷蒙·格诺的幸福追求与中国智慧Ji, Jing 03 September 2014 (has links)
Des soucis les plus réels aux affres métaphysiques, Queneau est constamment angoissé par le malheur existentiel et cherchent ainsi l’apaisement spirituel par plusieurs moyens, dont les traditions de l’Orient. Par le biais de René Guénon et des sinologues, il a accès à la pensée chinoise en lisant des classiques et se sent surtout proche des idées du taoïsme. L’intérêt de Queneau à l’orientalisme provient d’une introspection sur les valeurs modernes occidentales. En doutant si l’homme serait capable de distinguer le réel de l’illusion, le vrai du faux, il montre l’attitude sceptique envers le rationalisme. Bien qu’il conçoive ses romans autour du principe de dualité, il met en relief l’interaction et la dépendance mutuelle entre les mondes opposés, tout comme le couple Yin-Yang. Il fait combiner des qualités contradictoires chez un même être, ce qui passe pour une tentative de conciliation des contraires. Les doutes de Queneau s’inscrivent sur trois plans, à savoir la capacité, l’objet et l’outil de connaissances, et présentent bien des analogies avec le scepticisme de Tchouang-tseu. Par l’abdication du désir, Queneau recommande d’abord la simplicité et l’humilité comme recettes de vie. Puis, il préconise l’extinction de l’égo et le détachement spirituel, afin de dépasser des contraintes corporelles et d’apaiser les angoisses existentielles. Il dépeint des personnages heureux à l’image du sage taoïste, qui se caractérisent par l’innocence, l’indifférence et la tranquillité. En suivant la sagesse de non-intervention, on accepte tout dans la vie avec une âme imperturbable et retrouve la béatitude parfaite, incarnée par l’état serein et vital à la naissance. / Raymond Queneau hides his anxious and pessimistic soul under his humorous appearance. To get rid of the anxiety of human being and acquire peaceful mind - true essence of happiness in his viewpoint, he keeps keen interest to orient cultures. Through wide readings, such as the literature of Rene Guénon, many sinologists and the translations of the Taoist classics, Queneau mentions frankly in his diary that he has deeply resonance with ancient China sages.Queneau’s devotion to the orient religion and culture comes from his reflection to Western modern civilization and value. Queneau expresses his confusion of “life is but a dream” with doubts about Logos. Although his productions are filled with “binary pattern”, he emphasizes the interpenetration of opposite sides, which is exactly the same with Chinese Yin-Yang ideology. He deliberately obscures the boundary of opposite sides to combine the seeming inconsistent characteristics into the one unit, which can be regarded as his attempt to reconcile contradiction and shows the bud of relativism. From three aspects of cognition, that is, capacity limitations of cognitive subject, instability of cognitive object and fraudulence of humain language, his novels have lots of similarities with Zhuang-zi’s skepticism. Queneau regards human greed as the source of evil, and proposes the recipe of keeping simple and humble. To break the shackles of time and history, and realize true quiet and spiritual freedom, we need to overcome egoism. Queneau’s characters, like Taoist Sages, are natural and indifferent to the exterior world. They master the way of not-doing, take what comes and be contented. Going back to the original state of infant, they can reach the real inner happiness.
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A response to external world scepticismThorpe, Joshua January 2015 (has links)
In this thesis I give a response to external world scepticism. I first argue that scepticism arises when we accept that it is an empirical question whether I am in a sceptical scenario, that is, a scenario in which my beliefs are coherent, and yet my empirical beliefs are false. The idea that it is an empirical question whether I am in a sceptical scenario gets its plausibility from the realist claim that our empirical beliefs have an objective subject matter. I then attempt to give a response to scepticism that is compatible with this realist claim. Three promising responses to scepticism are considered, but are found to be inadequate. Seeing why these responses are inadequate helps us to appreciate some of the conditions on an adequate response to scepticism. By drawing on the work of Donald Davidson I develop a response to scepticism that is compatible with the realist claim, and that meets these conditions. According to this response, when we get clear about the concept of belief we see that sceptical scenarios are a conceptual impossibility. Thus, just as it is not an empirical question whether I am a married bachelor, it is not an empirical question whether I am in a sceptical scenario, and the argument for scepticism breaks down.
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