Since the early days of corporate societal marketing, managers and researchers alike have considered perceived marketer motives as a key factor in eliciting positive consumer response. However, little is known as to how the perception of marketer motives is formed. This dissertation research looks into a number of factors that may influence the process of perceived marketer motives formation. In particular, the roles of corporate societal marketing type, cognitive capacity, ad skepticism, and cause-involvement are examined. In addition, the underlying structure of perceived marketer motives is also explored. The results showed that the effect of corporate societal marketing type on perceived marketer motives was not significant. Cognitive capacity did have a significant effect that subjects with unconstrained cognitive capacity perceived higher community-oriented motives than those with constrained cognitive capacity. The effect of ad skepticism was equivocal. Ad skepticism had a significant effect on perceived marketer motives in Study 1, but not in Study 2. The key methodological difference between the two studies is that ad skepticism was measured along with other constructs in Study 1 whereas it was measured two weeks prior to the lab experiment in Study 2. Cause-involvement had no significant effect on perceived marketer motives, although it did affect the subsequent consumer response. As for the structure of perceived marketer motives, data from both studies suggest that there are three dimensions: community-oriented motives, company-oriented motives, and manipulative motives. These three dimensions appeared to be independent from one another; each of them had unique effects on subsequent consumer response. Most notably, company-oriented motives had no significant effect on company evaluation, attitude toward the company, or purchase intent. As expected, community-oriented motives had positive effects on all three indicators of consumer response whereas manipulative motives had negative effects. Limitations in the current investigation are discussed and suggestions for future research are proposed. / text

<p>This study examines whether the policy breadth and the alternatives in European politics affect variations in voter turnout between member states in elections to the European Union Parliament.</p><p>The theoretical approach assumes that; a larger political polarization, an increase in EU-skeptical parties and a greater voting mobilization among groups with less means results in higher voter turnout figures. The study also consider four other variables; whether the election is held on weekends or weekdays, whether elections coincide with other national elections, whether a country has held the presidential of the EU during or the immediate term prior to the election and finally the turnout figures from national elections.</p><p>The research design is based upon a quantitative analysis using data from EP elections, national elections and databases from the European Elections Studies (EES). Study unit is twelve member-state countries and their four latest EP elections (1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009). The selected member-states origin from the EU-15 excluding Belgium, Greece and Luxembourg due to their compulsory voting laws.</p><p>The study found relationships between higher turnout figures in EP-elections and increase in EU-skeptical parties, greater mobilization among groups with less means, elections held on weekends, elections coinciding with other, national elections and an increase in voter figures in national elections.</p>

<p>Heightened awareness of the evolutionary, socio-cultural, and psychological origins of our moral judgments pushes many of us in the direction of moral skepticism, in the direction of doubting the objective truth of our moral judgments. But should awareness of the origins of our moral judgments shake our confidence in them? Are there good moral debunking challenges or debunking arguments from premises concerning the accessible origins of our moral judgments to skeptical conclusions regarding them? In vigorous pursuit of these questions, this dissertation sifts three promising moral debunking challenges to moral realism, namely Richard Joyce's (2001) evolutionary debunking argument from epistemic insensitivity, Sharon Street's (2006) "Darwinian Dilemma," and David Enoch's (2010) "Epistemological Challenge." It is argued that each challenge faces cogent objections that not only demonstrate the inadequacy of the best debunking challenges available but also instructively guide us to the development of new and more forceful debunking challenges to moral realism. This dissertation develops two new and forceful debunking challenges, both of which target the epistemic reliability and justification of our moral judgments on realist views of the moral facts. The first new debunking challenge starts from the premise that the best explanation of our moral judgments does not appeal to their truth and invokes a new species of epistemic insensitivity to secure the conclusion that our moral belief-forming processes are epistemically unreliable. The second new debunking challenge reasons that the best explanation of the fact that moral realists have no good explanation of the reliability of our moral belief-forming processes is that there is no such reliability.</p> / Dissertation

[pt] A presente dissertação intitulada Ecos de Ceticismo na Criação Ensaística de Michel de Montaigne parte do pressuposto de que é possível escrutinar um conteúdo filosófico das diversas formas literárias e tem como objetivo explorar a relação específica que a filosofia cética, tal como apropriada por Michel de Montaigne, mantém com a criação da forma ensaística. Ainda que pensamento e estilo sejam esferas indissociáveis em Michel de Montaigne, optou-se aqui pela clareza da análise e, neste sentido, por tratar separadamente ambas as dimensões. Enquanto a primeira parte é dedicada ao exame dos argumentos céticos quer teriam sido por este autor apropriados, na segunda, a atenção é voltada para aspectos fundamentais da forma ensaística, que revelariam uma afinidade com o proceder dubitativo típico dos céticos, expondo, assim, a contribuição desta corrente filosófica na formação da novidade ensaística. / [en] The dissertation Echoes of Scepticism in the Essayistic Creation of Michel de Montaigne presupposes the possibility to scrutinize a philosophical content from different literary forms. At the same time it intends to explore the specific relation between the skeptical philosophy, as appropriated by Michel de Montaigne, and the creation of the essayistic form. Although thought and style are usually considered inseparable dimensions in the Essays, we will, for analytical purposes, treat them separately. The first part of the dissertation examines, in this sense, the existence of skeptical arguments throughout Montaigne`s work, while the second part explores the fundamental aspects of the essayistic form that seem to reveal a proximity with the dubitative procedure typical of the skeptics, exposing the contribution of this philosophical tradition in the development of the essayistic novelty.

Recent studies have shown that skepticism about human-caused climate change has increased among people in Europe and the United States. Researchers have tried to examine the causes behind this trend. What some of the studies have found is that there could be connectivity between populistic and nationalistic ideologies and climate skepticism. The purpose of this study has been to, through an idea analysis, examine the American president Donald Trump to see what type of climate sceptic he is according to the typology created by Rahmstorf. Furthermore, the study seeks to understand if the scepticism could be linked to the theories of populism and nationalism. The study is based on interviews done by newspapers and tv-shows but also tweets written by Trump. The study found that Trump’s climate scepticism could be classified into all of Rhamstorf’s different levels of skepticism. It also found that Trump’s argumentation in the interviews and in his tweets could, in accordance with earlier research, be linked to populism and nationalism.

[pt] A pesquisa concentra-se na discussão da literatura de Machado de Assis, tendo como foco principal o humor machadiano - ironia e sátira - como procedimento de desconstrução da discursividade cínica de seu leitor implícito. Para ilustrar essa hipótese, a principal referência será o livro Memórias póstumas de Brás Cubas. Serão abordados também os demais romances da segunda fase, os contos A teoria do Medalhão, O espelho e O alienista, e dois de seus mais importantes escritos críticos: O instinto de nacionalidade e A nova geração. A dissertação pretende, com tal procedimento, estabelecer a relação da produção literária de Machado de Assis com o projeto analítico presente em seus textos críticos, além de discernir sua contribuição e atualidade no debate cultural brasileiro. / [en] The research concentrates on the discussion of Machado de Assis literary work. The main focus is the Machadian humor as a deconstruction procedure of the implied reader s cynical discourse. In order to illustrate this hypothesis, the main reference will be the book Memórias póstumas de Brás Cubas. Other romances of Machado s second phase will be discussed; the short stories A teoria do medalhão, O espelho, and O alienista, along with two of his most important critical writings: O instinto de nacionalidade and A nova geração. The dissertation intends, with such procedure, establish the relationship of the literary production of Machado de Assis with the present analytic project in his critical texts, and also, discern his contribution and relevance in the Brazilian cultural debate.

A presente dissertação visa avaliar o tratamento que Ludwig Wittgenstein oferece ao tradicional problema cético da existência do mundo exterior. É sobretudo em Sobre a Certeza que encontramos reflexões relevantes sobre o tema, como discussões sobre o sentido da dúvida cética e de alegações de conhecimento. Wittgenstein basicamente rejeita o problema. Contra o ceticismo, Wittgenstein defende que nossas certezas básicas estão fora do âmbito da dúvida e funcionam como condição de possibilidade de qualquer jogo de linguagem (inclusive o da própria dúvida). Contra Moore e a tradição filosófica em geral, denuncia a ausência de sentido não só da própria apresentação de uma resposta ao falso problema do mundo exterior, como da vinculação de nossas certezas básicas a um vocabulário epistêmico. Meu objetivo é o de apontar problemas às críticas de Wittgenstein. Começarei apresentando uma versão forte do ceticismo sobre o mundo exterior, para então mostrar que suas críticas só funcionam contra um ceticismo fraco, que não está em questão. Quanto aos seus ataques contra Moore, defendo que eles só funcionam pagando o preço caro de inconsistência com suas concepções metafilosóficas. A conclusão a que pretendo chegar é a de que o problema do mundo exterior permanece vivo, apesar da tentativa de Wittgenstein de desqualificá-lo. / This thesis aims to evaluate Ludwig Wittgensteins treatment of the traditional skeptical problem of the existence of the external world. It is especially in On Certainty where we find relevant thoughts on the topic, such as discussions about the meaning of skeptical doubt and about knowledge claims. Wittgenstein essentially rejects the problem. Against skepticism, Wittgenstein maintains that our basic certainties are outside the scope of doubt and are also a condition for the possibility of any language game (including that of doubt). Against Moore and the philosophical tradition in general, he intends to show not only that it is meaningless to give a response to the false problem of the external world, but also to associate our basic certainties with an epistemic vocabulary. My goal is to point out problems in Wittgensteins criticisms. I first present a strong version of skepticism about the external world, and then show that his criticisms only work against a weaker version of skepticism. As for his attacks against Moore, I argue that they only work at the high cost of inconsistency with his own metaphilosophical views. The conclusion that I want to reach is that the problem of the external world remains alive, despite Wittgensteins attempts to reject it.

Este trabalho tem o objetivo de apresentar uma interpretação da filosofia de Hume com ênfase na sua epistemologia. Após uma exposição sobre diversos tópicos que estão presentes na sua teoria do conhecimento, aborda-se o ceticismo moderado, mitigado, e as influências filosóficas sobre Hume. A construção do conceito de natureza humana deve-se, em parte, ao método que ele herdou da filosofia natural, uma influência decisiva na sua metodologia. Essa direção da pesquisa permite ler o ceticismo humeano aplicado ao conhecimento com uma preocupação menos dogmática do que, geralmente, se atribui a ele. Pode-se admitir, se houver uma compreensão clara dos conceitos de experiência, teoria, explicação e razão, uma possibilidade falibilista da epistemologia de Hume. Essa abordagem permite aproximar a teoria do conhecimento humeana do falibilismo de Peirce, em certa medida. Assim, ao apresentar o que é uma teoria em Hume, chega-se ao resultado de que ele fez uma teoria que não tão cética, mas deve ser aceita como a única e, portanto, a melhor teoria. / This paper aims to present an interpretation of Hume\'s philosophy with its emphasis on epistemology. After a presentation on various topics that are present in his theory of knowledge, addresses the moderate skepticism, mitigated, and the philosophical influences on Hume. The construction of the concept of human nature is due, in part, he inherited the method of natural philosophy, a decisive influence on his methodology. This direction of research enables read Humean skepticism applied to knowledge with a concern less dogmatic than it usually is attributed to him. You can assume if there is a clear understanding of the concepts of experience, theory, explanation and reason, a possibility fallibility of Hume\'s epistemology. This approach allows us to approach the Humean theory of knowledge of Peirce\'s fallibilism to some extent. Thus, in presenting what is a theory in Hume, one arrives at the result that a theory that he did not so skeptical, but must be accepted as the only and therefore a better theory.

Neste trabalho, desenvolvemos uma discussão sobre a relação entre ceticismo e filosofia no idealismo alemão, notadamente em Hegel. Em particular, no interessa o papel que essa relação desempenha no problema da autodeterminação racional, problema que, a nosso ver, é central para o projeto de filosofia moderna adotado pelos autores do idealismo alemão, e de grande importância para a sua compreensão. Pretendemos mostrar como a confrontação dos autores deste período com os céticos, em particular com Hume, Schulze, Maimon e Sexto Empírico, desempenha um papel central na formação de suas concepções sobre a filosofia, sobre tarefa desta e sobre como ela poderia realizar essa tarefa apenas pela incorporação do ceticismo. Mais do que isso, visamos a mostrar como a confrontação com o ceticismo será fundamental para o desdobramento da concepção que os idealistas alemães têm da autodeterminação racional já que seria como resposta ao ceticismo que eles veriam a necessidade de desenvolver mais profundamente essa concepção do que os seus predecessores haviam o feito o que ajudaria a explicar porque, de um projeto crítico baseado na determinação dos limites do entendimento humano, passamos para filosofias segundo as quais toda filosofia tem que e só pode começar pelo absoluto. Esperamos contribuir para a compreensão desses importantes filósofos do idealismo alemão, bem como para a compreensão do ceticismo, mostrando como essas duas formas de filosofia podem se enriquecer mutuamente por meio do debate em torno do problema da autodeterminação racional. / In this work, we attempt to discuss the relationship between skepticism and philosophy in german idealism, specially in Hegel. We are particularly interested in the role this relationship plays in the problem of rational self-determination, which, as we see it, lies at the core of the project of modern philosophy adopted by the authors of german idealism, and is of great importance for their comprehension. We aim to show how the confrontation of authors of this period with the skeptics, in particular with Hume, Schulze, Maimon and Sextus Empiricus, has an important role in the constitution of their conceptions of philosophy, its task and how it could accomplish said task. Moreover, we will attempt to show that the confrontation with skepticism is fundamental for the development of the conception of rational self-determination held by the german idealists, since it is as an answer to skepticism that they find it necessary to develop this conception further than it had been done by their predecessors which would help explain why, from a critical project of determining the limits of human understanding, we go to philosophies to which all philosophies must start with the absolute. We hope to contribute to the comprehension of these important philosophers of german idealism, as well as to the comprehension of skepticism, by showing how these two forms of philosophy can mutually enrich each other through the debate around the rational self-determination problem.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Diego dos Anjos Azizi.pdf: 534294 bytes, checksum: e9835de43d4906f483a4b892ad4b0477 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-09-15 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This paper sets forth a criticism of a certain interpretation of the influence of Michel de Montaigne s skepticism on the philosophy of René Descartes. This interpretation is upheld by Alexandre Koyré and Etienne Gilson, and leads to the conclusion that Montaigne, while searching for a kind of certainty about himself in the Writings and abandoning his search for certainty in the world, ultimately encounters nothing other than doubt. Descartes would be the overcoming of Montaigne s failure, with Discourse on the Method being a victorious text. Nonetheless, we shall demonstrate that Montaigne did not fail in his Essays, nor was his supposed skepticism responsible for having an overwhelming influence on Cartesian philosophy / O presente trabalho estabelece uma crítica à certa interpretação da influência do ceticismo de Michel de Montaigne sobre a filosofia de René Descartes. Tal interpretação é sustentada por Alexandre Koyré e Etienne Gilson, e leva a concluir que Montaigne ao buscar alguma certeza sobre si nos Ensaios e abandonar a busca de certeza sobre o mundo, acaba não encontrando nada além de dúvida. Descartes seria a superação do fracasso de Montaigne, sendo o Discurso do Método, um texto vitorioso. Contudo, mostraremos que, nem Montaigne fracassou em seus Ensaios, e nem seu suposto ceticismo foi o que influenciou preponderantemente a filosofia cartesiana