This thesis analyzes the reasons for Socrates&#039 / being presented as a paradoxical figure in the early dialogues of Plato. Irony as a fundamental philosophical attitude in Socratic philosophy is discussed with reference to some of the major philosophers of the history of philosophy. The thesis also suggests the possibility of seeing philosophy as an ironic activity and it traces the etymology of the concept of irony in terms of its philosophical importance.

The following thesis outlines Hegel’s interpretation of Socrates in order to prove that as a negative dialectician, Socrates constitutes both a world historic personality who met a fate (Schicksal) which was tragic and practiced a philosophy which was tragically ironic. In this undertaking, Hegel’s Theory of Tragedy takes central importance which defines tragedy as two equally justified opposing forces which clash and destroy one another. This Theory of Tragedy is extended to show that through Socrates’ absolutely free will he brought himself to a tragic clash with the Athenian Ethical Life (Sittlichkeit), the Sophists’ arbitrary will, and the phenomenological will of uneducated Athenians. This clash is described in terms of a Hegelian Tragedy within which both Socrates and Athens were right and just in their actions against one another, but in the end were destroyed through those actions. His Method and Dialectic is then argued represent a negative dialectic which through the negation of negativity becomes positive as a midwifery of the consciousness. Next, because his Method and Dialectic begin in negativity and end in positivity, Socratic Elenchus is argued to not be representative of what has been termed “the Socratic Irony,” but instead only the negative moment of the Socratic Method. Finally, the Socratic Irony which Hegel argues is representative of both Socratic Philosophy and world history is defined as a Tragic Irony which sublates the finite consciousness of the phenomenological will, and the Ethical Life (Sittlichkeit), and the infinite arbitrary will of the Sophists in order to become a trans-subjective absolutely free will which becomes infinite itself like the Sophists’ will through reflection on the Ethical Life (Sittlichkeit).

[pt] A presente dissertação trata do conceito de ironia socrático-platônica, com ênfase em excertos nos quais encontram-se registros textuais de eíron e derivados, que possam ser compreendidos como ocorrências irônicas do Sócrates de Platão. O problema é que a palavra (eironeía), no dialeto ático, geralmente, tinha a semântica negativa da dissimulação. Contudo, a origem ambígua do termo também abrangia a ideia de questionamento. Dentre os mais proeminentes autores da antiguidade grega, Platão foi o que mais fez uso de eironeía e congêneres, na maioria das vezes, em contextos nos quais aparece Sócrates, agindo com seu hábito tão peculiar de questionar seus interlocutores. No decurso do tempo, essa correlação entre o termo antigo e o paradoxo filosófico da negação de conhecimento intitulou-se de ironia socrática. As correntes interpretativas dividiram-se, basicamente, entre uma proposta de leitura negativa e a outra positiva para esse evento. Portanto, nesta dissertação, o primeiro e principal objetivo é escrutinar a relevância da eironeía/ironia socrática, a partir da verificação do corpus platonicum. Então, encontram-se os oitos diálogos que contêm instâncias do termo, subdividindo-os entre aqueles em que (1) a eironeía não está diretamente relacionada a Sócrates, a saber, Eutidemo, Crátilo, Sofista e Leis, e os outros nos quais (2) a eironeía está diretamente relacionada ao protagonista platônico, i.e., Apologia, Górgias, Banquete e República. Para tal, organizam-se alguns critérios básicos que auxiliam na delimitação e identificação dos eventos irônicos, a fim de extrair conclusões mais coerentes quanto à natureza e os propósitos da eironeía/ironia socrática. Além disso, esta dissertação tem como segundo objetivo a interpretação da mais pregnante estratégia literária de Platão, a saber, o famoso anonimato, ou ocultação da voz autoral, como uma espécie de dissimulação inerente à eironeía. Então, almeja-se analisar o potencial retórico e epistemológico desse recurso, em seus dois aspectos: o método socrático e a estratégia literária platônica. Contudo, apesar dos desafios hermenêuticos e a polêmica que divide a vasta fortuna crítica a respeito do assunto, o terceiro objetivo desta dissertação é a aproximação de interpretações positivas do termo ou, ao menos, interpretações que o vejam como relevante à prática filosófica. Assim, revisitam-se os clássicos para se pensar a atualidade. Afinal, acredita-se que, quando Platão emprega a eironeía/ironia socrática, o efeito disso é o estímulo à reflexão sobre as virtudes e a verdade dos variados temas encontrados nos diálogos. / [en] This thesis deals with the concept of Socratic-Platonic irony, with emphasis on excerpts in which textual scripts of (eiron) and derivatives are found, which can be understood as ironic occurrences of Plato s Socrates. The problem is that the word (eironeia), in the Attic dialect, generally had the negative semantics of dissembling. However, the ambiguous origin of the term also embraced the idea of questioning. Among the most prominent authors of Greek antiquity, Plato made the most use of eironeia and cognates, most of the time, in contexts where Socrates appears, acting with his very peculiar habit of questioning his interlocutors. Throughout the time, this correlation between the ancient term and the philosophical paradox of the disavowal of knowledge was called Socratic irony. The interpretative currents were divided, basically, between a negative and a positive reading proposal for this event. Therefore, in this thesis, the first and main goal is to scrutinize the relevance of Socratic eironeia/irony, by the verification of the corpus platonicum. Then, we find the eight dialogues that contain instances of the term, subdividing them into those in which (1) the eironeia is not directly related to Socrates, namely, Euthydemus, Cratylus, Sophist and Laws, and others in which (2) the eironeia is directly related to the Platonic protagonist, i.e., Apology, Gorgias, Symposium and Republic. To this end, some basic criteria are organized to help in the delimitation and identification of ironic events, in order to draw more coherent conclusions, regarding the nature and purposes of Socratic eironeia/irony. Furthermore, this thesis has as its second goal the interpretation of Plato s most pregnant literary strategy, namely, the famous anonymity, or concealment of the authorial voice, as a kind of dissimulation, inherent to eironeia. So, we aim to analyze the rhetorical and epistemological potential of this resource, in its two aspects: the Socratic method and the Platonic literary strategy. However, despite the hermeneutical challenges and the controversy that divides the vast critical fortune on the subject, the third goal of this thesis is the approach of positive interpretations or, at least, those which see it as relevant to philosophical practice. Thus, the classics are revisited to think about the present. After all, it is believed that, when Plato employs the Socratic eironeia/irony, the effect of this is the stimulus to reflection on the virtues and on the truth of the various themes found in the dialogues.

Proclus is part of a long exegetical tradition that understands Plato and Homer to be in agreement. The Sixth Essay of his Commentary on Plato’s Republic particularly significant because it is the only extant ancient text that attempts to prove the concord of Plato and Homer philosophically. Yet, despite his uniquely reasoned approach, this endeavour suffers from charges of irrationalism. The necessity that drives him to seek this conciliation is thought to come from the pious attachment he has to Homer as an authority rather than the properly philosophical demands of his rational system. The aim of this thesis is to show that Proclus’ need to show Plato and Homer’s agreement is not an irrational adjunct to an otherwise rational outlook, but that it follows from the central doctrines of his philosophy. This will be accomplished through a detailed consideration of Proclus’ doctrine of the poetic ????????. In looking at how Proclus’ reading of Plato in the Sixth Essay is informed by his understanding of ????????, we will see how Homer becomes the means, both of taking the traditional criticisms of Plato’s apparent self-contradiction seriously and also of defending him against them. In looking in turn at how the soul actually experiences the ??????? of Homer’s inspired poetry, it shall become apparent that Homer does not just save the coherence of rational thought in this exterior way, but that his poetry operates as both the possibility and perfection of the rational soul’s various powers.