Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2002. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 108-114). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2002. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 108-114). Also available on the Internet.

published_or_final_version / Housing Management / Master / Master of Housing Management

published_or_final_version / Politics and Public Administration / Master / Master of Public Administration

published_or_final_version / Housing Management / Master / Master of Housing Management

Over the last 10 years, the solar photovoltaic (PV) market has experienced tremendous growth due in part to government incentive programs. However the effect and welfare analysis of these policy instruments remain ambiguous. In the first chapter of my dissertation, we estimate a dynamic model of households investment decisions on rooftop PV systems to understand the impact of these programs on residential solar installations and evaluate the outcome of alternative incentive policies. The model separately evaluates the effect of system prices, up-front subsidies, tax credits and production revenues using a 5-year data set collected by the California Solar Initiative program, which subsidized solar installations in California. The results indicate that capacity-based subsidies are equally effective as production-based subsidies, but that the latter are more efficient. With a $100 social cost of carbon, the total subsidies in California would be welfare neutral. If California were only as sunny as Frankfurt, Germany, this value has to be $200 to be welfare neutral. We find that without subsidies, 85% of the existing installations would not have occurred. The second chapter of my dissertation is on the political economics of corruption. This is a relevant question in the Environmental Economics due to the human factors involved in government regulations. We investigate the effects of unhindered corruption in the entry-certifying process of an industry on market structure and social welfare. To gain entry, a firm must pay a bribe-maximizing official an exogenous percentage of anticipated profit, in addition to the usual set up cost. This would lead to a monopoly, but only in markets without pre-existing firms. A benevolent social planner may use bribery to the benefit of society by either manipulating the number of pre-existing firms in the market, or by setting up independent (corrupt) licensing authorities. A socially optimal number of firms in the market may be reached by choosing the right number of pre-existing firms or by having exactly two licensing authorities. These mechanisms may be seen as restoring second-best efficiency in settings characterized by two major sources of distortion: Imperfect competition and corruption.

No abstract available. / Thesis (M.Housing)-University of Natal, 2003.

Encore une fois, il semble que la question des subventions agricoles ait refait surface comme l'élément clé du présent cycle de négociations commerciales multilatérales à l'Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC). Pourtant, le cycle d'Uruguay, qui s'est achevé en 1994, avait tenté de rétablir l'agriculture comme un secteur «normal» de négociations à l'OMC. Or, il semble que plutôt que d'en faire un secteur comme les autres en ce qui a trait aux subventions, le cycle d'Uruguay ait surtout contribué à établir un régime de disciplines pour l'agriculture qui se distingue à plusieurs égards du régime général établi par l'Accord sur les subventions et les mesures compensatoires (SMC). Une analyse des disciplines en place lors du système GATT (1947-1994) démontre que ce double régime n'avait pas formellement été mis en place avant la conclusion, en 1994, de l'Accord SMC et de l'Accord sur l'agriculture. En fait, malgré quelques distinctions qui sont apparues graduellement, ce clivage ne s'est véritablement effectué qu'à partir du cycle d'Uruguay. Tant sur le plan des subventions à l'exportation que du soutien interne, il apparaît que le système actuel impose des règles beaucoup moins contraignantes pour les subventions de produits agricoles que pour tout autre produit. Cette situation s'explique, en partie, par le haut degré de sensibilité politique de l'agriculture, de même que par certaines particularités économiques intrinsèques à cette industrie. L'avenir de ce double régime demeure encore incertain. Il semble cependant qu'aucun changement en profondeur ne peut être anticipé pour le présent cycle de Doha. / Once again, it seems that the issue of agricultural subsidies has emerged has the key concern of the current round of WTO multilateral trade negotiations - even as the Uruguay Round, which was completed in 1994, had tried to bring agriculture back into a "normal" negotiating sector at the WTO. Rather, it seems that instead of making it a sector like any other concerning subsidies, the Uruguay Round has above al1 contributed to establish a regime of disciplines for agriculture that distinguished itself in many respect from the general regime established by the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM). An examination of disciplines in place during the GATT system (1947-1994) shows that this double regime was not formally instituted before the conclusion, in 1994, of the SCM Agreement and of the Agreement on Agriculture. In fact, despite a few distinctions that evolved gradual1y, this division only real1y established itself from the Uruguay Round onwards. With regard to export subsidies as wel1 as to domestic support, it appears that the current system subjects subsidies in the field of agriculture to rules are substantially less restricting than subsidies in other fields. This situation can be explained in part by the high degree of political sensitivity in agriculture, as wel1 as by some of the intrinsic economic characteristics of this sector. The future of this double regime remains uncertain. However, it seems that no major change can be expected during the current Doha Round. / "Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de maîtrise en droit (LL.M) option recherche"

No description available.

The airline industry has undergone an unprecedented crisis in the aftermath of the events of September 11th, 2001 in the United States. At that time, the U.S. federal government rapidly moved to create and implement an important rescue package to ensure the sustainability of the U.S. airlines. Contrarily, the European Commission decided to keep the existing legislations and policies regarding state aid, allowing limited support from the Member States to their national carriers. For the Commission, the U.S. state-involvement in the air industry, as well as similar developments in other countries, was bound to create distortions of competition. This situation led the EU to submit a proposal to the Council and the European Parliament for a Regulation with aims to protect the Community airlines from the unfair pricing practices of state-aided non-Community air carriers. The text, modeled after the legislation applicable in the field of trade of goods, would fill a "legal void" and be a new efficient legislative tool for the Commission. Questions did arise, however, about its political legitimacy as well as its legal basis.