Th. doc. : Droit : Toulouse : 1935. / Bibliogr. p. [235]-238.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, Los Angeles, 2007. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Zürich, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references and index.

O objetivo deste trabalho é investigar se a probabilidade dos trabalhadores do mercado formal serem demitidos aumenta quando esses são elegíveis ao recebimento do seguro-desemprego. Utilizando da Relações Anuais de Informações Sociais (RAIS), a alteração na elegibilidade ao auxílio promovida pela MP665/2014 permitiu uma estimação de diferenças em diferenças a fim de identificar esse efeito. O resultado encontrado aponta uma queda de 0,73 p.p. na probabilidade de demissão sem justa causa dos grupos que eram elegíveis no período anterior à mudança e deixaram de ser após sua entrada em vigor, em comparação com os não-elegíveis nos dois períodos. A partir desse número, conclui-se que pelo menos 13% das demissões sem justa causa são induzidas. Os efeitos são maiores para os indivíduos empregados em firmas pequenas, que tenham baixa escolaridade e que não estejam no setor de serviços ou indústria. Utilizando a Pesquisa Mensal do Emprego (PME) em uma análise complementar, conclui-se que 34% dos indivíduos que saem do formal para acessar o seguro-desemprego se empregam no setor informal no mês subsequente. / This study investigates whether the probability of Brazilian formal workers being laid-off increases when they are elegible to receive the unemployment insurance. Using an administrative data, Relações Anuais de Informações Sociais (RAIS), for the universe of formal workers, we estimate the effect of a change in the elibility criteria on the probability of lay-off for the workers using a diff-in-diff model. The results point out to a 0,73 p.p. decrease in this probability for groups who were elegible before the change and became inelegible afterwards, in comparison to the non-eligible workers in both periods. We conclude that fake layoffs accounts for at least 13% of total layoffs. The effects are more relevant for workers employed in small firms, with low education level and not employed in service or industrial sectors. In an additional analysis using a survey of labor force, Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego (PME), we find that 34% of workers engaged in fake layoffs are reemployed in the informal sector in the next month.

No description available.

This dissertation studies different Unemployment Insurance (UI) systems and how critical design and institutional features affect individual behavior. In the first chapter, I analyze the UI system in Chile, whose benefits are primarily financed by work- ers’ own savings in Individual Savings Accounts (ISA). In 2002 Chile implemented a mandatory savings system for the formal labor sector. Every worker accumulates funds to be withdrawn in future unemployment spells, accompanied by a Solidarity Fund (SF) that may provide benefit extensions in case of low savings balances. Using administrative records of the Chilean formal labor market, I exploit the SF extension’s eligibility conditions to identify its effect on nonemployment duration. I estimate a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) that uses the eligibility for SF extension as an instrument for its take-up. Results show that an additional potential monthly installment financed by the SF extension increases nonemployment durations by 11.4 days, similar to what the literature documents for other developing economies. The second chapter builds on the previous one by empirically examining the im- pact of an additional monthly installment of UI benefits financed by ISAs. I implement a dynamic panel data model with individual fixed effects controlling for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. Using this empirical strategy, I find that nonemployment durations, on average, increase by 5.1 days when the unemployed have an additional monthly payment financed by their savings. Finally, I combine these two reduced-form outcomes to perform a decomposition of the disincentive effect of a more generous UI system funded by general taxes. Job search effort is depressed via a substitution effect when UI benefits increase (moral hazard). Still, there is also an incentive to exert less effort because the household’s consumption is sensitive to cash-on-hand (liquidity effect). I extend the existing literature by proposing a ratio pertinent to a system based on ISA that measures the liquidity effect over the total disincentive effect. Results show that around one-third to one-half of the negative impact of a UI extension on job search effort can be attributed to moral hazard, which this design of UI system eliminates. In the 1990s, Germany saw a massive rise in unemployment of workers in their late 50s compared to younger workers. In the third chapter (joint with Matthew Gudgeon, Johannes Schmieder, Simon Trenkle, and Han Ye), we show that a large share of this increase can be explained by the interaction of UI and the retirement system, where UI benefits affect labor supply by inducing individuals to leave employment. We show considerable bunching in UI inflows at age thresholds that allow for using UI as a bridge to early retirement. The bunching mass moves as the age threshold moves due to reforms of the UI system. To quantify the impact of this channel on labor supply, we use our reduced-form evidence to estimate a dynamic lifecycle model of labor supply that endogenizes unemployment and retirement transitions. We show that the increase in potential benefit durations in the late 1980s increased unemployment rates for workers aged 55-59 by around three percentage points (or about a 30 percent increase), playing a significant role in the large increases in unemployment rates for older workers.

<p>A common assumption of in literature regarding unemployment insurance (UI) take-up is unemployed individuals will claim UI benefits immediately after job loss. Using SIPP 2008 panel, I find that this assumption about immediate unemployment insurance take-up can not be supported in the data. I constructed a revised McCall search model to provide a mechanism to explain the delay of UI take-up found in the data. This dissertation contains three chapters. In Chapter 1, I provide evidence that UI application delay is significant. Many people delay at least one week -- 87\% of unemployed individuals delay at least one week, 37\% delay at least 4 weeks and 27\% individuals delay at least 12 weeks. The average delay is large -- unemployed individuals on average have 12.99 weeks of delay before claiming UI benefits after job loss. I also analyze factors that correlate with application delay. I find a lower age, being disabled, being female, facing good economic conditions and fewer experienced number of job separations make delay more likely and increase length of delay. In Chapter 2 , I provide a job search and separation model to explain the findings from the data in Chapter 1. I find that the application costs are large compared to benefits received. Counterfactual analysis show that reducing hassle of aplying for UI can have large impacts on delay of application. In Chapter 3 , I extend the methodology to study the effect of availability of other welfare programs such as Supplemental Security Income (SSI) on the application delay of UI for people who have reported disability. I find that the availability of other welfare programs such as SSI is a contributing factor that make delay more likely and longer for people with disability. </p>

Thesis (Ph. D.)--McMaster University, 2003. / Advisor: Charlotte A.B. Yates. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 272-299). Also available via World Wide Web.

Cette thèse consiste en trois essais sur les réponses des individus aux systèmes fiscaux et à la taxation. Le premier chapitre, "Partial Unemployment Insurance and Hour Decisions", mesure l'impact des incitations contenues dans le programme d'activité réduite. L'activité réduite (AR) permet aux chômeurs qui travaillent de garder leurs allocations chômage sous conditions. Nous exploitons comme quasi-expérimentation la réforme de 2006 en France, qui consiste en une baisse de 20% du seuil horaire. La réforme a significativement augmenté la probabilité conditionnelle de choisir une AR peu intensive. Le second chapitre, "Potential Drivers of Undeclared Work", explore les déterminants potentiels de l'activité dissimulée en France et en Europe. Cette étude utilise une enquête pilote examinant les comportements d'activité dissimulée des ménages en France (EPMF). Nos résultats montrent que l'hétérogénéité individuelle (la perception de l'entourage, les sanctions et les valeurs civiques) sont positivement corrélées à l'activité dissimulée. A l'aide d'une enquête semblable, nous obtenons des résultats comparables au niveau européen. Le troisième chapitre, "Top-income tax avoidance and preferences for redistribution: Evidence from the Panama Papers" explique l'impact des scandales sur les préférences pour la redistribution. Les Panama Papers sont utilisés comme quasi-expérimentation: ce scandale exogène a mis en lumière les comportements d'optimisation fiscale des ménages. Après le scandale, les individus sont plus en faveur des politiques de redistribution: les scandales financiers encouragent une mise à jour de la perception des inégalités. / This dissertation gathers three essays on behavioral responses to fiscal systems and benefits.The first chapter, ``Partial Unemployment Insurance and Hour Decisions", measures how financial incentives in Partial Unemployment Insurance (PUI) programs affect job uptake. PUI programs allow jobseekers to keep their benefits when working if the job abides by eligibility conditions. We exploit as a quasi-experiment the 2006 French PUI reform consisting in a decrease in the hour threshold. The main finding is that the reform significantly increased the conditional probability to take up a PUI job below the new hour threshold. A narrowed benefit availability contributes to a decline in worked hours for PUI claimants.The second chapter, ``Potential Drivers of Undeclared Work", investigates undeclared work in France and Europe. This study exploits a unique pilot survey on supply and demand of households. We find that the social circle, autoestimated risk and sanctions and civic values are strongly correlated with undeclared work. Individual heterogeneity adds up but is not substitutable to standard socio-demographic variables. Using the Eurobarometer survey, we find comparable estimates at the European level.The third chapter, ``Top income tax evasion and redistribution preferences: Evidence from the Panama Papers" attempts to explain changes in perceived inequality after worldwide fiscal scandals. I exploit as an exogeneous shock the 2016 Panama Papers scandal revealing top-income households' tax avoidance. I find that, post-scandal, stated preferences for redistribution strongly increases. Using additional data, I find consistent results at the European level.

Thesis (doctoral)--Uppsala universitet, 2002. / Added t.p. with thesis statement inserted. Includes bibliographical references.