L'éducation est un investissement qui trouve son rendement sur le marché du travail.Cependant, les frictions à l'œuvre sur ce marché affectent aussi bien le niveau que la nature des investissements éducatifs. Dans le même temps, les compétences acquises lors de la scolarité conditionnent le design des institutions du marché du travail.Nous proposons trois chapitres qui examinent chacun une question particulière.Le premier présente un modèle de mismatch sur le marché du travail où le degré d'inadéquation entre travailleurs et emplois est endogène : il dépend des efforts éducatifs (qui réduisent le mismatch) et des investissements technologiques (qui l'augmentent). Nous examinons l'impact de l'incertitude concernant le futur partenaire de travail, de l'hétérogénéité des travailleurs vis-à-vis de leur capacité scolaire, et de l'aversion au risque.Le deuxième construit un modèle d'appariement avec spécialistes et généralistes dans lequel la proportion de spécialistes est endogène. La nature du capital humain détermine le nombre de files d'attentes dans lequel le travailleur peut prospecter ainsi que son rang dans chacune d'elles. L'éducation véhicule plusieurs externalités : les spécialistes favorisent la création d'emplois dans chaque secteur ; les généralistes améliorent l'efficience de la technologie d'appariement mais aggravent le problème de coordination des firmes. Nous calibrons le modèle sur données agrégées pour 20 pays de l'OCDE. L'auto-sélection s'avère toujours inefficace : taxer la formation professionnelle pourrait réduire le taux de chômage de plus d'un point de pourcentage.Le troisième étudie le design de l'assurance chômage dans un contexte où les travailleurs diffèrent quant à la nature de leur capital humain. Nous montrons que selon le scénario retenu pour la gestion de la caisse d'assurance, la proportion de spécialistes peut conduire à diminuer ou accroître le taux de remplacement de l'indemnité chômage optimale. / Education is an investment that has its return on the labor market. However, frictions at work in this market affect both the level and the nature of educational investments. At the same time, the skills gained during schooling time determine the design of labor market institutions.This thesis is made of three chapters examining, each of them examines a particular issue.The first one presents a mismatch model on labor market where the efficiency of the assignment mechanism is endogenous: it depends on educational efforts (which reduce the mismatch) and on technological investments (which increases it). We examine the impact of uncertainty regarding the future work associate, of the worker's heterogeneity toward scholastic ability, and of risk aversion.In the second one we build a two-sector matching model with generalists and specialists, in which the proportion of specialists is endogenous. The nature of human capital determines the number of job queues in which worker can candidates as well as its rank in each of them. Self-selection in education type leads to three main externalities: specialists enhance job creation in each sector; generalists improve the efficiency of the matching technology, but nevertheless exacerbate firm's coordination problems. We calibrate the model on aggregate data for 20 OECD countries. Self-selection is always inefficient: taxing vocational education, to reduce the proportion of specialists down the efficient level, could reduce unemployment rates by more than one point of percentage.The third one studies the unemployment insurance scheme in a context where workers have different kind of human capital. We show that, depending on the scenario chosen for the management of the insurance fund, the proportion of individuals with specific human capital can lead either to a decrease or to an increase of the replacement rate of the optimal unemployment benefit.

[pt] A tese se constitui em três artigos que têm como tema comum a questão de imperfeições no mercado de trabalho. No primeiro artigo se analisa a relação entre rotatividade da força de trabalho e investimento em treinamento quando essas decisões são tomadas em dois períodos e há informação assimétrica sobre o tipo do trabalhador no mercado de trabalho. A principal conclusão do artigo é que não há necessariamente um trade-off entre rotatividade e investimento líquido em treinamento, uma vez que embora em um equilíbrio com rotatividade o investimento corrente venha a ser reduzido, se rotatividade é explicada pela busca de melhores parcerias estas devem induzir maior nível de treinamento no futuro. No segundo artigo, considera-se uma economia onde a habilidade dos trabalhadores é informação privada desses e discute-se um esquema de seguro-desemprego que seja capaz de induzir maior eficiência econômica. A idéia básica é conferir ao seguro-desemprego, que é originalmente um instrumento de transferência, um caráter de sinalização, o que tende a gerar mais eficiência econômica e pode permitir uma redução no custo do governo em prover essa transferência. O terceiro artigo estuda a relação entre distribuição de riqueza e desenvolvimento econômico. A contribuição do artigo é combinar imperfeição no mercado de trabalho (associada à existência de um salário de eficiência) à imperfeição do mercado de crédito dentro de um modelo de escolha ocupacional. A principal conclusão é que dentro do contexto analisado essa imperfeição do mercado de trabalho combinada com perspectiva de mobilidade social ascendente elevada tende a levar a economia a um estado de prosperidade, enquanto que se o mercado de trabalho fosse competitivo um equilíbrio com prosperidade não seria alcançado em casos onde a fração inicial de agentes pobres na economia fosse alta. / [en] The thesis is composed by three articles that are connected by the commom assumption of imperfections in the labor market. In the first article we study the relation between turnover of the labor force and investment in training when these decisions are taken in two periods and there is assimetric information about the type of the worker in the labor market. The main conclusion of the article is that not necessarily there is a trade-off between turnover and liquid investment in training, once although in an equilibrium with turnover the actual investment is reduced, if turnover is explained by the search for better matchings these must induce a greater level of training in the future. In the second article is considered an economy where worker`s ability is private knowledge and is discussed an arrangement of unemployment insurance that could induce more economic efficiency. The basic idea is to incorpotate in the unemployment insurance, originally a transfer instrument, an aspect of signaling, what can improve economic efficiency and can also reduce the cost for the government in providing this transfer. The third article studies the relation between wealth distribution and economic development. The contribution of the article is to match imperfection in the labor market (associated to the existence of an efficiency wage) and imperfection in the credit market in a model of occupational choice. The main conclusion is that into this context this imperfection in the labor market together with the perspective of high ascendent social mobility should conduce the economy to an state of prosperity, while were the labor market competitive an equilibrium of prosperity wouldn`t be reachead in cases when the inicial share of poor agents in the economy were high.

This study deals with the consequences for household economy in connection with unemployment. Various mechanisms that influence the relationship between unemployment and the reception of supplementary benefits are described and analyzed. The labour market, the social insurance system and the adjustment strategies of families are fields of particular interest to this study. The economic systems of support that have developed are dominated by the unemployment insurance. Those, whose unemployment benefits have ceased or who for some other reason are not covered by the insurance, have to resort to supplementary benefits. The differences in level between working, receiving unemployment benefits or supplementary benefits can be described in terms of a scale of income. The aspect of the scale varies strongly between different types of families. The empirical point of reference for this dissertation is the close-down of a pulp industry (Ncb in Köpmanholmen 130 km south of Umeå in the north of Sweden). The development of those made redundant has been studied with regard to reception of supplementary benefits, income and adjustment strategies. Data about income and supplementary benefits were collected from registers at the local tax charge office and the local administration of social services. 83 out of 444 households were interviewed about adjustment strategies. The close-down in question proved to be exceptional in many aspects. The expected "social catastrophe" never occured due to the economic upswing, raised unemployment benefits and ambitious labour market policy efforts, among other things. Only a very small minority of those made redundant have received supplementary benefits after the close-down. This has been the case although many of those made redundant have been removed from the open labour market with a subsequent lowering of their income level. Amongst those made redundant many different patterns of adjustment havè been observed. It appears that those who lack work after a couple of years after the close-down are often characterized by passivity, whereas those who have been employed are often characterized by activity. Finally the variation in patterns of adjustment can be seen as a social policy problem. Judging from the results a combination of the institutional and marginal social policy strategies would be desirable. Reform schemes can be suggested that are based on a wish to supplement the preventive and institutional social policy with selective features where the adjustment strategies of families should provide an important resource potential. / digitalisering@umu

本文探討我國失業保險實施之後，對不同教育程度勞工所得分配之改善程度。利用我國行政院家計收支調查報告、勞工保險統計年報，計算失業者因為失業保險所提供的保障之下，於民國八十八年至九十二年間，其所得的變化，以及整體就業者所得分配改善的效果。 本文依據Moene and Wallerstein (2001)，提出衡量所得重分配概念之指標，利用薪資中位數除以薪資平均數之值來衡量。本文將指標調整為，可支配所得中位數除以可支配所得平均數之值，計算失業保險實施對不同教育程度勞工所得分配改善幅度。 研究結果顯示，未考量失業保險時，所得分配的效果，較平均的為「國中及以下」，其次為「大專及以上」，最後為「高中職」。而失業保險之淨給付，最高者為「國中及以下」、次高者為「高中職」、最後為「大專及以上」這個教育程度的就業人口。「國中及以下」這個教育程度的就業人口，拿到的淨給付是最多的，這呼應了失業保險原先設計的目的即為達成所得分配改善的功能。失業保險實施後的所得分配狀態，「國中及以下」之可支配所得中位數除以可支配所得平均數是最高的，其次為「大專及以上」，最低為「高中職」。所以，失業保險實施，使得「國中及以下」這個較低的教育程度的就業人口，所得重分配的狀況是最好的。這呼應了失業保險原先設計的目的即為達成所得分配改善的功能。 在這三種教育程度下，各年度之所得分配改善的情況。未考量失業保險時，社會所得分配狀態以八十九年較平均，九十一年、九十二年較不平均。淨給付，以九十二年、九十一年較大、八十八年較小。考量失業保險實施後所得分配狀況，以八十八年、八十九年較平均，九十年、九十一年較不平均。所得分配改善的程度而言，皆以九十一年、九十二年改善程度較大，八十八年改善程度較小。

Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2008

This thesis comprises three chapters which share an emphasis on the importance of agent heterogeneity in different areas of macroeconomics. The first chapter shows that the introduction of heterogeneous risk aversion into a consumption based asset pricing model with Epstein-Zin preferences allows to replicate several features of stock markets such as the counter-cyclical variation in the equity premium and its predictability from the price dividend ratio. The second chapter complements a Mortensen-Pissarides matching model with individual savings for precautionary reasons in order to analyze the welfare effects of reforming unemployment insurance. Our fully dynamic analysis reveals significant transition costs that static comparisons miss. The third chapter is concerned with optimal capital and labor taxation when agents differ in their wage-wealth ratio. We find that if all agents are to benefit from a reform (vis-à-vis the status quo) capital taxes are abolished only after a long period. / Esta tesis se compone de tres capítulos que enfatizan en la importancia de la heterogeneidad de agentes económicos en distintas áreas de la macroeconomía. El primer capítulo demuestra que la introducción de heterogeneidad en la aversión al riesgo en un modelo de consumption based asset pricing con utilidad de tipo Epstein-Zin permite reproducir algunas regularidades empíricas de los mercados financieros como por ejemplo la variación anticíclica de la prima de riesgo y su previsibilidad a través del cociente precio-dividendos. El segundo capítulo introduce en un modelo de matching tipo Mortensen-Pissarides ahorros precaucionarios con el objetivo de analizar los efectos sobre el bienestar de reformas del seguro de desempleo. Nuestro análisis dinámico revela costes significativos de transición no presentes en comparaciones estáticas. El tercer capítulo investiga la imposición óptima de capital y trabajo cuando los agentes son heterogéneos con respecto a su cociente sueldo-patrimonio. Encontramos que, para que todos los agentes se beneficien de la reforma (respecto al status quo), el impuesto del capital debería eliminarse sólo después de un periodo largo.

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / This thesis gathered survey data to investigate American willingness to participate in short-time compensation programs and what attributes found in other countries’ programs they find palatable. Because multiple workers in similar states were surveyed online, the data show what various workers need from a short-time compensation program.

This thesis covers two areas of the labour market not commonly studied in the context of discrimination: potential bias of job seekers against employers based on ethnicity and gender, and discrimination against employment seekers in the context of the unemployment insurance system. Utilizing survey experiments, both studies yield robust null results. Overall, these studies contribute to the understanding of discrimination dynamics in the labour market and welfare systems. Paper I shows that job seekers may not be motivated by discriminatory practices when seeking employment. However, more research is needed, and future work should be focused on natural experiments to prevent limitations similar to those in our study. Paper II highlights the importance of strict legal frameworks and of maintaining rigorous standards in public service delivery to mitigate discriminatory practices. / <p><strong>Funding:</strong> Swedish Unemployment Insurance Inspectorate</p>

任何一個制度或政策的形成，他國的實施經驗是相當重要的參考依據。我國就業保險制度從規劃至實際執行，加拿大就業保險制度的規劃方式與實施經驗一直都是我國重要的參考範例之一。本研究針對加拿大就業保險制度為研究對象，先探討加拿大就業保險制度形成之環境背景，研究該國失業狀況及就業保險制度之間的關聯，瞭解加拿大就業保險制度之發展過程，分析加拿大就業保險制度之運作方式及實施內涵，探討該國就業保險制度之實施對於該國人民以及經濟上的影響。並參考加拿大制度之實施經驗，比較分析我國新實施之就業保險制度，並觀察加拿大就業保險制度之優缺點，進而提供我國就業保險於未來可能之改進參考。 就目前加拿大就業保險制度之實施，本研究發現加拿大就業市場存在以下重要現象：(一)經濟景氣深受美國影響；(二) 勞動力老化與青壯年失業率持續居高不下；(三) 申請津貼者以部分工時者居多，以女性及初次就業青年為主；(四) 就業保險基金之帳戶餘額大幅增加。 加拿大就業保險制度有以下數點特色：一、在政策方面：(一)以特殊津貼的方式，加強對特定失業族群的社會扶助功能；(二)對詐領保險者的多重罰則，防止不當詐騙意圖；(三)嚴格限制津貼領取資格，強固就業保險基金之基礎。二、在執行方面：(一) 採用更準確的保險年資計算方式；(二) 更彈性的津貼申請與給付標準；(三)依據當地人口結構與經濟狀況規劃的行政組織；(四)獨立的保險督察機構。三、在財務規劃方面：(一)運用特殊基金創造就業機會；(二)保險費由雇主與勞工分攤，政府不另負擔。 而加拿大就業保險制度之優點為：一、就業促進措施發揮促進積極就業的功能；二、以工作時數為單位的保險年資計算，使投保資格更為公平準確；三、對於特定族群之特殊津貼給付有助於社會安定；四、因地制宜的行政組織，有效反映市場需求；五、由勞資政三方共同組成保險督察機構，可獨立且客觀的執行評估與監察功能；六、整合的資訊系統，使得就業資源的運用更有效率。缺點則是：一、津貼給付對象無法有效針對真正弱勢的失業族群；二、津貼給付對象過度限縮，就業保險基金大幅增加；三、保費僅來自雇主與勞工，缺乏穩定的支撐。 對加拿大之就業保險制度，本研究提出下列數項建議：一、放寬被保險人申請失業津貼的資格限制，造福更多失業者；二、修正津貼給付的方式，使資源集中在就業弱勢族群；三、修正保費支付額度與比例，以穩固就業保險基金來源。 同時，對我國就業保險之實施提出下列建議：壹、在制度方面：強化我國勞工行政體系，建立事權專一之就業保險制度；貳、在政策方面：強化就業保險之社會扶助功能、提高社會安定功能；參、在執行方面：一、採用更為彈性的資格認定方式，使資源有效分配；二、整合各部會機關之就業資訊網絡，使就業資訊更易於流通；三、避免過度限制津貼申請人的資格，以防止津貼給付之疏漏；四、強化就業服務機關的彈性，以利就業保險於各地之執行；五、持續就業保險的宣傳與教育。參、在財務面：調整現有的保費比例。

La thèse étudie les liens qui existent entre les recommandations issues de la littérature sur l'assurance chômage optimale et la qualité des emplois repris par les chômeurs. Nous nous intéressons en particulier à une dimension de la qualité de l'emploi qu'est la stabilité des emplois dans un contexte où les contrats de courte voire de très courte durée sont en pleine expansion en France. En utilisant les modèles théoriques de recherche d'emploi et d'appariement, nous analysons la manière dont les caractéristiques de l'assurance chômage affectent la stabilité des emplois repris. La particularité de notre analyse consiste à intégrer la manière dont les employés sont influencés par les paramètres de l'assurance chômage. En effet, si l'on souhaite analyser de manière globale l'impact des paramètres du système d'indemnisation sur l'évolution du taux de chômage, il convient de déterminer comment ces derniers influencent le taux de sortie du chômage (analyse du comportement des demandeurs d'emploi) mais aussi comment ils affectent le taux d'entrée au chômage (analyse du comportement des employés). Pour étudier le comportement des employés nous considérons que ces derniers influencent leur probabilité de conserver leur emploi en fournissant des efforts de rétention d'emploi. Nous montrons notamment que les chômeurs qui quittent rapidement le chômage retrouvent fréquemment des emplois peu stables. Une fois en emploi, ils exercent relativement peu d'efforts pour conserver leur emploi augmentant par là même leur probabilité de retourner rapidement au chômage. L'impact final d'une réduction du montant de l'indemnisation sur l'évolution du chômage est donc indéterminé dès lors que l'on intègre les employés dans l'analyse. / The thesis studies the relationships between the Optimal Unemployment Insurance (UI) literature recommendations and post unemployment job stability. We focus on one particular job quality dimension that is job stability within a context of a huge increase of very short duration job contracts in France since the 2000’s. Using job search and matching frameworks, we analyse how the features of the UI system affect job stability. The particularity of our approach is that we account for employees’ behaviors while the majority of the literature on optimal UI focuses only on jobless workers behaviors. We show notably that job-seekers who leave quickly unemployment tend to find unstable jobs. Once employed they have a greater probability to return to unemployment because the job-retention efforts they exert are not sufficient.