This Ph.D. thesis aims to clarify the notion of will of Arthur Schopenhauer in a historical context. The understanding of will in Schopenhauer's predecessors - Descartes, Leibniz, Kant and Hegel - will also be covered. The paper will try to discover what impact their notion of will had on Schopenhauer's philosophy, which is the topic of the second, most important part of the thesis. It will present Schopenhauer's understanding of the world as will and idea. According to Schopenhauer, everything in the world is subordinate to causal laws, which the thesis also presents. There are even more topics to be covered - the partition of the world to subject and objects, which exist only for the subject, examples of manifestation of the will in nature and different branches of science, the impossibility of freedom and so on. Our attention will also be focused on what impact Schopenhauer's notion of will had on his aethetics and ethics. The last part deals with the voluntarism of Friedrich Nietzsche, who transforms Schopenhauer's pessimistic notion of a cruel will to life to an optimistic will to power. In relation to this, several topics will be covered - ressentiment as a consequence of the massive spread of slave morality, the cruitique of Christianity and Nietzsche's expectation of the overman's arrival.

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Le droit et la conscience entretiennent une relation évidente, mais ambigüe. Plusieurs auteurs ont déjà été séduits par ces rapports, mais aucun ne s’est encore intéressé aux relations qui existent entre la conscience et le domaine spécifique de la science juridique qu’est le droit d'auteur. Pourtant, le droit d'auteur n'est pas indifférent à la notion de conscience. La conscience s’entend de deux acceptions : la conscience morale, qui renvoie à la distinction du bien et du mal, et la conscience psychologique, qui désigne l’appréhension que l’homme a de lui-même et du monde qui l’entoure. Chacun de ces deux aspects de la conscience se retrouve en doit d’auteur. La conscience morale est en principe indifférente en droit d’auteur : ses liens avec la liberté artistique en font un domaine amoral. Mais la liberté artistique n’est pas sans limite. Or ces limites posées à la liberté artistique se répercutent sur l’exercice, et parfois même sur l’existence du droit d’auteur. L’indifférence affichée du droit d’auteur pour la conscience morale s’effrite alors, laissant apparaître des hypothèses de prise en compte de la moralité, ou plutôt de l’immoralité de l’œuvre. La conscience psychologique, au contraire, semble jouer un rôle nettement plus fondamental en droit d’auteur. Malgré le silence du législateur, la majorité des membres de la doctrine conditionnent la reconnaissance de la protection par le droit d’auteur à la conscience de la création. Il faut alors distinguer les différents éléments de la conscience psychologique de l’auteur : son discernement, sa volonté de créer et sa maîtrise du processus de création sont les trois conditions doctrinales rattachées à la conscience de la création. Or aucune de ces trois conditions n’est appliquée systématiquement et il apparaît qu’elles ne sont pas justifiées, ni même nécessaires. Une relecture de la conscience de la création s’impose alors. Dans un jeu de miroir, la conscience morale et la conscience psychologique jouent un rôle en droit d’auteur qui n’est pas celui que l’on attend d’elles : la conscience morale entre inévitablement en compte alors qu’elle est affichée comme indifférente, la conscience psychologique joue selon la doctrine un rôle discriminant qui n’est pas celui qui lui revient. / Connections between law and consciousness are obvious but ambiguous, and this statement is undeniable in the specific field of legal science that is copyright law. Consciousness can have two sides: a moral one, which refers to the distinction of right from wrong, and a psychological one, which mainly refers to a man’s awareness. Each of these two aspects of consciousness can be found in copyright law. In theory, moral conscience is irrelevant in copyright law: its links with artistic freedom make it an amoral field. But artistic freedom has its limits, which often impact on the exercise, and even sometime on the very existence of copyright. Then the indifference displayed by copyright law towards moral conscience crumbles. At the opposite, the awareness seems to play a key role regarding copyright law. In spite of the legislator’s silence, most of the doctrine’s members grant copyright protection based on the artist’s awareness of his creation. His judgment, his will to create, and his control of the creating process are the three doctrinal conditions resulting from the requirement of awareness. However, none of these three conditions is systematically applied, and it seems like they are not grounded, or even necessary. The requirement of awareness creation then must be rethought. Through a game of mirrors, moral conscience and awareness play unexpected parts in copyright law. While being displayed as irrelevant, moral conscience is inevitably taken into account, whereas awareness is interpreted as a discriminatory exigency, role it should not play.

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Though philosophers have invested great amounts of time and energy probing the dimensions of freedom as it relates to the human situation, psychologists have tended to avoid the topic. However, the relevance of freedom to the empirical investigations of psychology does not reside in an extension of its philosophical roots. The pertinent aspect of freedom for psychology is the freedom a person perceives himself and others to possess. Thus, it is the perception of freedom, be it valid or invalid, and how it influences behavior, that is relevant to psychology.

I sketch a more-or-less compatibilist solution to the free will/determinism problem, defining free will as that which an agent must exhibit in order to be legitimately held accountable for his/her actions. Based on this definition it would seem that, judging by fairly widespread social conventions, free will consists in a series of capacities, such as the ability to respond rationally to information. I argue that these capacities are not undermined by the potential truth of universal determinism, but I would like. not to settle for a compatibilism that stops at the recognition of that fact. After all, why should we feel obliged to reconcile our free will with metaphysical determinism? I argue that the deterministic character of the universe is not so much a discovery that has been made by scientists as it is a methodological presupposition that is mandatory for doing science in the first place. With that in mind, determinism is, at its core, an epistemic notion and not an ontological one. My guiding idea is that free will exists insofar as it is a category mistake to conceive of the futures of intentional systems (like human beings) as facts of nature. I take "nature" to be that which is the subject of scientific research and therefore necessarily objective, where a fact's being objective consists in it being the way it is regardless of what anyone thinks about it. The future of any individual does not meet these criteria (that is, it is not a fact of nature) because one's future (unlike, say, the chemical composition of water) is not something that is the way it is regardless of what one thinks about it. We form different attitudes toward different futures and these attitudes contribute to our behavior. Since "deterministic" is a property predicated of events in nature, it is a category mistake to apply the term outside of that domain.

v anglickém jazyce: The aim of the thesis is to provide description of nursing and medical aspects and offer ethical and legal context concerning the issue of living will. The body of the thesis is divided into theoretical section and practical section. The theoretical section deals with the issue of living will from the nursing and medical point of view with characterization of several serious conditions in intensive care such as apalic syndrome, terminal state etc. The chapter on legal aspects of living will defines the term 'lege artis', 'do not resuscitate - DNR', and characterizes the matter of decision making in the case of serious and terminal states. The chapter on ethical perspective discusses the process of dying and the Christian point of view on the issue of dying. The practical section processes the results of a survey based on 104 non-professional respondents and their replies to a provided questionnaire. The research section analyzes the level of knowledge which non-professional population has of the issue of living will. The closing discussion evaluates the confirmation of established hypotheses and provides practical suggestions. Keywords: living will, dying, ethic, resuscitation, terminal state.

Esta tese aborda alguns aspectos da recepção de Schopenhauer durante o percurso da obra de Nietzsche, procurando compreender sobretudo o papel desempenhado pelo autor de O mundo como vontade e representação no desenvolvimento do pensamento nietzschiano. A primeira parte analisa o período de juventude da obra nietzschiana, almejando evidenciar uma peculiaridade na relação de filiação existente entre o jovem filólogo e seu denominado educador. A aparente simplicidade da relação entre um discípulo e seu mestre, sugerida pela constatação de que Nietzsche assume grande parte da doutrina schopenhaueriana durante este período de sua obra, torna-se problemática ao percebermos uma diferença crucial de posicionamento ante a questão fundamental proposta por Schopenhauer e recebida por Nietzsche como orientadora de seu pensamento: a questão do valor da vida. Esta análise insere-se numa reflexão sobre a própria concepção de filosofia. Já na segunda parte, trata-se de abordar o período intermediário da obra de Nietzsche, procurando matizar a conhecida ruptura nietzschiana em relação a Schopenhauer durante este período. O intuito principal desta parte é expor como, ao mesmo tempo em que passa a rejeitar e tecer diversas críticas à doutrina schopenhaueriana, Nietzsche permanece ainda orbitando no horizonte daquela questão fundamental proposta por Schopenhauer. Na terceira parte, procura-se demonstrar como Nietzsche efetua uma autossuperação da filosofia da vontade ao elaborar uma nova concepção do querer, na medida em que a noção de vontade de potência é erigida tendo como pano de fundo o questionamento de um pressuposto velado que sustentava a filosofia de Schopenhauer. A partir dessa nova compreensão do querer, Nietzsche é capaz tanto de reelaborar algumas noções que apareciam desde o início de sua trajetória quanto de formalizar o derradeiro papel de Schopenhauer na constituição de seu próprio pensamento: para isso, será necessária uma contextualização e depuração daquela questão fundamental. / This thesis deals with some aspects of Schopenhauers reception during the course of Nietzsches work, aiming mainly at understanding the role played by the author of The World as Will and Representation in the development of Nietzschean thought. The first part analyzes the period of the youth of Nietzschean work, intending to evince a peculiarity in the relation of filiation existing between the young philologist and his so-called educator. The apparent simplicity of the relation between a learner and his master, suggested by the verification that Nietzsche largely assumes Schopenhauerian doctrine during this period of his work, becomes problematic as we notice a crucial difference of position when facing the fundamental question proposed by Schopenhauer and received by Nietzsche as a guideline for his thought: the question of the value of life. This analysis is part of a reflection on the conception of philosophy itself. The second part approaches the middle period of Nietzsches work, looking for the nuances of the known Nietzschean rupture in relation to Schopenhauer during this period. The main goal of this part is to show how, while rejecting and criticizing Schopenhauerian doctrine, Nietzsche continues to orbit in the horizon of that fundamental question proposed by Schopenhauer. In the third part, we seek to demonstrate how Nietzsche overcomes the philosophy of Will as he elaborates a new conception of will; the notion of will to power is built having as background the questioning of a hidden presupposition that held Schopenhauers philosophy. From this new way to understand the will, Nietzsche is able to re-elaborate some notions that were present since the beginning of his work and to formalize the last role of Schopenhauer in the constitution of his own thought: for this, it will be necessary to contextualize and depurate that fundamental question.

L’encadrement juridique d’une personne décédée par le prisme de ses dernières volontés est une situation ordinaire offerte à tout testateur, afin d’anticiper la gestion des conséquences de son décès. Bien que reconnues par le discours juridique comme un indicateur précieux des traitements posthumes à opérer, les dernières volontés ont un caractère supplétif et détiennent, en conséquence, une assise relative dans le discours juridique. Si ce constat prévaut toujours à la lecture des règles formelles, il n’en demeure pas moins que nombre de dernières volontés trouvent à éclore au moment du décès du sujet du droit, sans précisément que ce dernier n’ait effectué une démarche positive. Consacrées depuis la loi Cavaillet dans le cadre spécifique du don d’organes, les présomptions de dernières volontés se développent insidieusement, sans qu’il ne soit toujours possible, y compris pour la personne de son vivant, de connaître leur contenu et leur amplitude. En opérant de la sorte, le discours juridique livre un message inaudible qui atténue la légitimité des dernières volontés. Pourtant, si le travail législatif entrepris est indéniablement perfectible, il a le mérite de laisser entrevoir le statut juridique auquel pourrait désormais prétendre la personne décédée. Ne faut-il pas y voir le signe que l’encadrement juridique des personnes décédées ne devrait pas pouvoir s’opérer autrement que par les dernières volontés ? / The legal framework of deceased people through their last wills is an ordinary situation offered to any testator, in order to anticipate the management of the consequences of their death. Though acknowledged by the legal writings as a valuable indicator of the posthumous process to follow, last will and testament being, by nature, ancillary; it only holds a relative base in the legal discourse. If this observation always prevails over the reading of formal rules, many of the last wishes come out and take effect nonetheless when people die without them having necessarily actively carried out any procedure. Codified since the Cavaillet bill in the specific framework of organ donation, the presumption of last will has developed insidiously, without it being necessarily possible, including for the person during his or her lifetime, to have knowledge neither of their substance nor of their extent. Thus, the implied message one can read between the lines of our current legislation reduces the legitimacy of the last will. However, if the legislative work which has been undertaken is undeniably perfectible, it has the merit of showing the legal status which deceased people could now access. Shouldn’t one take this as a sign that the legal framework of deceased people should only be possible through the respect their last wills?