本論文將研究在2013年習近平主席上任不到幾個月以來，並在中國共產黨不斷承諾要改善國家法治的情況下，中國為何在國家電視台上開始播出犯罪嫌疑人的電視認罪。這些電視認罪的播出引起了來自海外的廣泛譴責，從某種程度上在國內也受到了批評，因為電視認罪的播出被視為國家非法壓迫人的手段，並被認為是在重演當年毛澤東時代不公正的批判鬥爭行為。本論文是第一項對這種新侵權行為的系統研究，並試圖填補該研究領域的空白。本作者通過採訪在電視上曾經認罪過的人發現許多電視認罪是有“表演”色彩，往往犯罪嫌疑人被迫“背台詞”、穿著特定的服裝、在攝像頭面前“演戲”等。這表明國家在利用電視認罪來達到某種特定的目的。作者對90個2013年至2016年之間播出的電視認罪進行了分析並發現認罪者當局故意讓嫌疑人感到恥辱來強調他們有罪，使用嫌疑人認罪時所使用的話來牽連他人或貶低他人，以支持中共的這種行為並對於來自國外批評的聲音做出回應。本論文借用François Bourricaud （1987年）對合法性的概念作為一種活躍的合法化進程以表明中國新的電視認罪行為不只是簡單的進行壓迫的工具，而更多是一種強制性推動共產黨合法性的戲劇表演。 / This study asks why China started broadcasting confessions of suspects on national television in 2013, just months after the accession of President Xi Jinping, and despite the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) repeated promises to improve the country’s rule of law. The broadcasts have triggered widespread condemnation overseas, and to a lesser extent at home, for being illegal, another example of state repression, and resembling the unjust public struggle sessions of the Mao era. This thesis attempts to fill a gap in scholarship and provide the first systematic study of this new and understudied human rights violation. Interviews conducted with those who had confessed on television revealed that many are “show” confessions, where the suspect is made to memorise “lines,” get in “costume,” and “act” in front of the camera, indicating that they are “produced” for a specific purpose. In addition, an analysis of 90 confessions aired between 2013 and 2016 revealed that deliberate efforts were made to shame the confessor, emphasize their guilt, and use the words of their confession to incriminate and denigrate others, promote support for the CCP and its actions and respond to outside criticism. Borrowing François Bourricaud’s (1987) concept of legitimacy as a dynamic process of legitimation, China’s new televised confessions can be seen as much more than simply another tool of repression, rather they are acts of forced theatre aimed at furthering CCP legitimacy.

本論文是在研究西藏自一九五○到二○○八年三月間發生過的反共抗暴所引發並受國際與國際人權組織所觀著之西藏人權問題。文中討論美國、歐盟與國際非政府組織(如，人權觀察(Human Rights Watch)和國際特赦組織 (Amnesty International))如何提出相對的策略來抵制中共對西藏的人權政策，並研究中共在即將舉辨奧運的同時如何面對來自各方的抵制與強大壓力，這些問題也隨著奧運的接近而更加顯著。 也許西方文化與中國文化有所不同而在人權的定義也有著些許的差異，但是這並不構成一個適當的理由來否認聯合國所定義用來參考的世界人權宣言（Universal Declaration of Human Rights）。同時本論文的研究範圍也涵蓋到因西藏宗教、政治、經濟與教育上的不自由而今年三月所引發之抗議示威遊行 ，並討論因中共近年來之掘起而美國與歐盟在此次事件上對中共的影響力與態度，這也許與中共的貿易關係不同而產生的影響力與表達的態度會有所不同。 / 中共雖然受到西方政治與國際非政府組織之強大壓力，可是西藏之人權問題仍然未得到改善，也許中共擔心若給予藏民太多的由自而可能造成更多的混亂，但西方政府與國際非政府組織持續在些問題上觀著，並積極保護西藏之宗教、語言與文化，因而讓中共當局在西藏問題上受到極大之挑戰，也必須注入更多的資源來因應。 / This research project focuses on the Human Rights situation in Tibet under the occupation of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) since the 1950s right up to the present times when popular protests against China in Tibetan areas since March 10 this year has put the issue Tibet right back on the international arena. China’s policy stand on human rights and how it refutes accusations by International NGOs of human rights violations in China and Tibet are examined through case studies of the works and reports of Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the current international attention on human rights in the run up to the Olympic Games in Beijing in August, 2008. Contrasting definition of ‘Human Rights’ between China and the west is also examined to suggest that arguments about cultural distinctiveness are no excuse for the denial of the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Case studies of lack of religious freedom and the general discrimination suffered by Tibetans in political, economic and educational spheres suggest why the recent popular Tibetan uprisings have erupted. An examination of the influence of International NGOs on the human rights policies of western governments like the US, France, UK, Germany as well as the EU that constitute China’s largest trading partners, show considerable influence and impact through their reports and monitoring of violations of human rights by China. / By adopting a judicious mix of the two approaches of ‘silent constructive engagement’ as well as direct, confrontational ‘naming and shaming’ of individual instances of human rights abuses and violations, the International NGOs and western trading partners of China have achieved incremental success in forcing China to make changes to its human rights policies. Despite the enormous international pressure from International NGOs and western Governments, the leadership of the Communist Party that effectively runs China, is found to be extremely uncooperative in terms of improving human rights in China or Tibet where the current spate of protests have reaffirmed their abiding fear that allowing more freedom and rights to the people could risk a challenge to the supremacy of the Party in continuing to run the PRC and leading it into the 21st century as the undisputed global power. This makes it obvious that International NGOs campaigning for human rights in China and Tibet in particular will continue especially in light of China’s policy of assimilation of minority nationalities like the Tibetans and the Uighurs and the destruction of their distinct national, cultural and religious identity.