本研究以民國97年5月23日總統公布民法總則編修正條文第14條、15條，增訂第15條之1及第15條之2，民法親屬編第4章監護與輔助制度之新規定，以及法院實務運作為探討重心，輔以分析比較大陸法系國家--德國成年照護制度與日本成年後見制度，以及英美法系國家--英國2005年意思能力法案與美國2006年統一代理權授與授權法之制度，以針對我國學者對於新成年監護制度之見解與目前實務運作所產生之問題為之探討，以提出以下結論與建議：一、基於尊重本人自主權之理念，未來應制定意定監護制度。二、法定監護制度之修正：(1)意思能力之判斷原則應有明確規範，並以英國2005年意思能力法五項指導原則為判斷守則。(2)不應一律剝奪受監護宣告人之行為能力。(3)監護聲請權人應增列未成年監護人、同居人與同性生活伴侶。(4)受破產宣告之人雖不可為財產管理之監護人，但可為身上照護之監護人。(5)監護事務方面，關於重大醫療照護等身上監護事項應明文規定交由法院審查。(6)受監護人之自主權與保護受監護人之利益應有所平衡。(7)建議增列繼任監護人，以及解決監護關係相對終了，因監護人無繼承人時，無人管理受監護人財產移交與結算事項等問題。(8)輔助宣告方面：因輔助人只有同意權無代理權可代受輔助人行使所物返還請求權，為保護受輔助人，可由法院賦予輔助人行使特定財產行為之代理權。(9)最佳利益原則：法院應鼓勵受監護人參與監護事務之決定，並考量受監護宣告之人過去、現在願望與感受，以及受監護宣告之人之價值觀和信仰如何影響其決定，亦即受監護人即便現在欠缺意思能力，其意見仍應予以尊重。三、監護監督制度是監護制度成功與否之重要機制，鑒於國外成年監護制度均設有監護監督機構，以支援法院為監護監督工作，又考量監護品質之維護，我國未來應設立協助法院監督之機關。 / This research is intended to study the amendments of Civil Code, Article 14, Article 15, Article 15-1, Article 15-2, and Section 2 Guardianship and Assistantship over Adults of Chapter IV announced by the President on May 23, 2008, and to investigate the adult guardianship cases. Furthermore, this research chooses four advanced countries--Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States to compare and analyze their legal systems of adult guardianship. Those countries’ adult guardianship legal systems and the scholars’ viewpoint provide the following conclusions and suggestions: First, according to the underlying philosophy of respecting decision-making power of the ward, we should establish the voluntarily nominated guardian model. Secondly, the Adult Guardianship Act should be amended：(1) A definite standard for a person’s capacity of evaluation should be clarified. We can adopt the UK Mental Capacity Act 2005, the five statutory principles to help evaluate if a person lacks capacity. (2) The Act should not deprive a person of all his legal capacity, when once a person is declared incapacity by the family court. (3) The Act’s applicants should include minor guardian and civil partnership. (4) Guardians who are bankrupt will no longer be allowed to act as guardians for property and affairs but can still act as guardians for personal welfare. (5) The ward’s personal welfare decisions on serious healthcare and treatment should be put before the family court for approval. (6) The act should aim to balance an individual’s right to make decisions for themselves with their right to be protected from harm if they lack capacity to make decisions to protect themselves. (7) The guardian’s authority terminates when the guardian dies. However, a problem will arise from it. The problem is that if the guardian does not have a successor, the guardian cannot transfer the ward’s property to a new guardian. To solve the problem, adopting a successor guardian may be a good method. (8)The assistance (advisory) system：Because assistants do not have authority to take actions to ask the third person to give back the person’s property, the authority should be granted to assistants by the family court in order to protect their interests. (9) Best interests: The family court must consider the ward’s past and present wishes, feelings, beliefs and values that would be likely to influence his/her decision if he or she had capacity. Thirdly, monitoring guardian system can help adult guardianship system to operate successfully, and protect those wards. Many countries such as Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States are all devoted to developing their monitoring guardian system. In taking the quality of the adult guardianship into consideration, our country should establish monitoring guardian system in the future.

台灣不動產投資信託（T-REITs）自2005年發行至今已逾六年，然其市場表現仍不如發行之初所預期。過去國內已有許多研究針對T-REITs市場發展進行探討，然而目前就T-REITs與直接不動產投資市場價格表現間之相關研究尚付之闕如。有鑑於此，本研究藉由共整合與Granger因果關係檢定，檢視REITs與直接不動產市場間之關聯性，了解台灣與美國之REITs市場表現差異及其影響因素，進而作為改進T-REITs運作機制或架構之參考依據。 實證結果發現，美國之REITs與直接不動產市場之間存在共整合關係。此結果表示，長期而言，這兩者可能具有相似之風險分散效益。此外，透過Granger因果關係檢定發現REITs領先於直接不動產，乃因前者市場較具效率。另一方面，台灣之REITs與直接不動產市場之間則不具有共整合以及領先或落後關係，然直接不動產當期價格仍會受到本身與REITs之前期價格影響。 本研究進一步分析台、美兩國實證結果之差異原因如下：資料的樣本期間、REITs市場規模、存在於T-REITs市場之集中性風險以及潛在的代理問題。其中，針對T-REITs潛在代理問題，本研究藉由分析股票與T-REIT報酬率之波動性，發現T-REIT之不動產管理機構若與母集團相關者，則其市場表現較差。因此，我們得出T-REITs市場發展主要是受限於代理問題之結論。本研究成果不僅有助於改善T-REITs市場效率，亦可提供學術與實務之參考。 / The mechanism of Real Estate Investment Trusts in Taiwan (or T-REITs) was launched in 2005, however, T-REITs market did not perform as expected. What caused the limited development of T-REITs market? Current literature on the performance between T-REITs and direct real estate investment is limited. Through the cointegration and Granger causality tests, the purpose of this study is hence to explore the short-term and long-term dynamics between REITs and direct real estate markets in the U.S. and Taiwan, respectively. This study presents evidence of the cointegration relationship between REITs and direct real estate in the U.S. It implies that the diversification properties of these two assets are likely to be similar over the long horizon. According to the Granger causality test, REITs leads direct real estate due to the market information efficiency. These findings are consistent with those of previous studies. On the other hand, we find no cointegration and lead-lag relation between T-REITs and commercial real estate. Moreover, the current commercial transaction price is affected by both its and T-REIT previous price. By comparing the difference between the results of these two countries, there are several possible explanations for the different results between the U.S. and Taiwan, including difference in sample period, market capitalization, concentrated risk, and most importantly, the potential agency problem existing in T-REITs market. Finally, the underperformance of parent-related management T-REIT is verified through the volatilities of stock and T-REIT returns. Therefore, we conclude that the limited development of T-REITs is caused by the agency problem in REITs market. Results of this study may provide T-REITs market for improving its efficiency, as well as for the reference for both academics and real practices.

股份有限公司在「企業經營與企業所有分離」之原則下，公司經營事務固專由法定必備業務機關—董事會職司之，然為保障股東權益，公司法乃賦予各股東表決權，使股東能在股東會中，透過作成決議之方式，形成股東之意見並參與公司之經營決策。因而，表決權可謂股東之重要權利。如欲禁止股東行使此項權利，實應格外慎重。公司法第178條規定「股東對於會議之事項，有自身利害關係致有害於公司利益之虞時，不得加入表決，並不得代理他股東行使其表決權」，為我國公司法制下，股份有限公司之股東表決權利益迴避制度。然此一規定及其規範模式，是否有其正當性及合理性，不無探討之空間。 首先，由於此一規定使用不確定法律概念，「有自身利害關係」、「有害公司利益之虞」等要件之意義、範圍，學說及實務解釋適用上均有不同看法。又因該規定之規範主體為「股東」，當遇有政府或法人股東時，所謂「自身利害關係」之判斷應為「股東」本身，或及於股東之「代表人」，即不無疑義。另構成該規定，法律效果為具有利害關係之「股東」不得加入表決，並不得「代理」他股東行使其表決權，然如有自身利害關係之股東委託他人代理行使表決權時，或受委任者不具股東身分，或受委任者為股東之「代表人」時，應如何解釋適用，亦值探討。此部分將置於本文第二章討論。 其次，整理我國司法判決對公司法第178條之實際運用案例，約略可分為「會計表冊承認」、「董事競業禁止義務解除」及「解任董監事」等三類。另外，「台電求償案」除涉及台灣電力股份有限公司大股東經濟部，應否對「就核四停建一事向政府求償」議案利益迴避之爭議，亦涉及股東會決議權限與股東利益迴避制度間之關係、股東權利義務變動之時點限制、系爭議案求償對象之解釋及股份多數決原則與表決權利益迴避制度之衝突等問題。上開實務見解對於相關規定之解釋適用，是否妥適，本文第三、四章，將先就相關判決予以摘要臚列，復就其中所涉及之爭議，提出一己拙見。 最後，觀諸日本法對於股東表決權利益迴避制度之演變，可知日本最早亦採我國公司法第178條事前禁止之規範模式，惟在1981年（昭和56年）即全面改採事後救濟制。對照日本法制，恰可凸顯我國現行制度下，出現適用範圍不明確、配套措施不足及議事難以進行等問題。本文以為，回歸資本多數決之精神，並考量公司法第178條之規範目的，既係在於確保決議的公正性及公平性，應直接針對不當的決議設計救濟途徑，當更為妥適。如將公司法第178條修改為「股東會決議如因有特別利害關係者行使表決權，而作出顯著不當決議時，股東得訴請法院撤銷該決議」。或逕將此條刪除，改設立多數決濫用禁止之規定，在現行公司法第189條下，新設後段或第2項之規定：「股東會之決議內容，有害公司或少數股東利益而顯著不當者，亦同」，賦予小股東在多數決濫用時一定之救濟管道。過去在我國現行制度下所產生之許多爭議事例，即得以迎刃而解。