太陽花學運期間藉由善加操作數位平台，激起一股臺灣人民的民主力量，更彰顯公民團體及公民監督的卓越成效。太陽花學運後，臺灣社會在這場公民運動結束後產生諸多變遷，這場震撼全世界的學運，甚至被譽為外媒譽為「臺灣之春」。 本研究透過文獻檢閱，探討太陽花學運對臺灣政治參與之影響，亦透過質性的深度訪談，篩選實際參與太陽花學運的公民社團成員、學運社團成員進行與本研究各章節主題相關的深度訪談。 這次抗爭顯示出臺灣公民的政治覺醒，觸發起臺灣青年的政治意識，也打擊政府的威望，甚至打亂北京政府的佈署，更激勵其他地方民眾今後爭取民主自由權利的抗爭。本文從政治參與觀點出發，來探討太陽花學運後公民積極採取反對權和相關參政行為。盼藉此研究深入了解太陽花學運對臺灣政治參與之影響，也提供公民運動及公民運動團體相關研究之參考。

臺灣公民團體監督立法院的行動並不罕見，早在1989年就有公民團體發起立委評鑑的活動，然而學界未曾對此做過系統性的研究。2007年公督盟正式成立後，自第七屆起，公督盟每會期結束後定期公布立委評鑑，引發民眾與不少朝野立委的重視，但也引起名列待觀察名單立委的反彈。本文有兩個層次的研究問題，首先，公督盟究竟如何做評鑑以及他們怎麼看立委評鑑這件事，本文除了分析公督盟的檔案資料外，也深度訪談其成員。公督盟做評鑑的目的希望為選民篩選出好立委，淘汰劣立委，也希望透過監督推動立法院更加透明開放。公督盟實際上在評鑑過程相當嚴謹，卻一直受到國民黨立委的抵制。然而，解決資源有限與強化質化評鑑是公督盟未來急迫的目標。 　　其次，什麼樣特質的立委較為關心立委評鑑？立委又是如何去看立委評鑑？為了解答本研究問題，本文使用質化的深入訪談以及量化的調查研究兩者混合的方法進行分析。在質化分析上，作者發現：國民黨立委普遍對公督盟持有敵意，民進黨立委則較為友善；此外，立委不分藍綠對評鑑指標過於量化表示不滿；同時，個人形象以及連任考量是影響立委關心評鑑的主因，因為選舉時可以加以宣傳政績；不過，立委評鑑看似使許多立委對立法問政較為積極認真，但不少立委卻是以做業績方式應付評鑑，諸如增加提案量、質詢次數以及高出席率等。而在量化分析上，統計模型顯示，區域立委、民進黨籍、重視立法問政、高教育程度以及女性的立委較為關心評鑑；而民進黨籍立委以及女性立委則較積極提供評鑑資料給公督盟；最後，立委關心評鑑的程度與其評鑑成績表現有正相關關係。總結來說，這些發現均說明了公督盟對立委的問政行為多少產生影響力，後續效應值得學界繼續追蹤研究。 / The NGO’s activities of supervision on the Legislative Yuan is not rare in Taiwan. As early as 1989, there were campaigns called “legislator-evaluation (hereafter ‘LE’)” held by a few NGOs. However, there are scarce systematic researches on it. In 2007, many NGOs allied into an alliance called “Citizen Congress Watch, CCW”. Since the 7th term, the reports of LE were regularly published by CCW after the end of each session. The reports of LE not only attracted the public and the legislators’ attentions, but also received serious criticism from legislators listed on the ‘watch-list’. This thesis has two levels of research questions: First level question is how the CCW conducts and treats the LE. I analyzed the archives and interviewed with the members of CCW to understand how and why they conducted the LE. The purposes of CCW are not only to filter out excellent legislators and to eliminate infamous legislators through LE for the electorate, but also to promote the transformation of Legislative Yuan to more transparency by supervision. Actually, the process of LE is rigorous, but the CCW still confronts the KMT legislators’ boycotts. However, under the situation of limited resource, it’s CCW’s urgent problem to solve and to reinforce the qualitative indicators. 　The second level questions intend to discern the characteristics of legislators more concerned about the LE, and how the legislators regard the LE. I combined the methods of in-depth interview and survey on legislators and their assistants. From the in-depth interview, I have several findings: First, because of suspicion on the CCW’s stand towards to the DPP, the KMT legislators are hostile to the CCW; in contrast, the DPP legislators are friendly to it. However, both the KMT and the DPP legislators are unsatisfied with the ways of conducting LE because it overly weights on quantitative indicators. In addition, the reasons legislators care about the LE is mainly due to their values on personal image and re-election considerations. Last, it seems that legislators had become more actively participating in the legislative process because of the LE. Actually many legislators purposefully cope with it by “upping grades”—the number of proposals, interrogations, and the attendance rates were magnified or boasted by the legislators. Also, my hypothses are verified. From the statistic model, it shows that district legislators, the DPP legislators, those who emphasize on legislative affairs rather than constituency service, and the females, are more concerned about the LE. Besides, the DPP and the female legislators are more willing to offer documents for LE to the CCW. In addition, there is a positive relationship between the degrees of legislators’ concern and their grades of LE. In conclusion, these findings imply that the CCW has more or less influence on legislators’ legislative behaviors. It worths conducting follow-up studies in the future.