判斷目標公司董事出售公司或控制權的決策是否符合受任人義務是一個困難且重要的問題，因為此種類型的決策董事有可能是出於自身利益也可能是為全體股東利益而為，在此種利益衝突屬於晦暗不明的情況，法院應該要採取怎樣的審查態度一方面可以尊重董事決策的空間，另一方面又可以確保股東的利益被保全，成為本論文最關心的問題。 以我國為例，近年公股銀行民營化或是私募基金收購案例屢見不鮮，共同引發的擔憂就是目標公司董事同意此項併購案到底是因為併購條件有利於全體股東，還是嘉惠特定合作對象而決定？我國企業併購法第5條及第6條要求目標公司董事為併購決議時應盡其注意義務及忠實義務，然董事到底是為「公司」還是「股東」盡其義務似乎仍有疑義；再者，法院似乎亦尚未發展出在個案中判斷董事具體行為是否符合受任人義務的標準，因此本文擬參考美國法上的相關規範，以期解決我國現狀的困境。 德拉瓦州法院在1980年代提出一項標準，當目標公司董事決定要出售公司或控制權時，董事有義務要為股東爭取最好的價格，又稱為「露華濃義務(Revlon Duty)」或「標售公司義務」，有兩個重點值得關注：第一，目標公司董事同意何種併購交易會觸發露華濃義務？此即露華濃適用範圍的討論；第二，目標公司董事一旦觸發露華濃義務，董事應該要採取何種具體措施以符合要求？此即露華濃義務內涵的討論。對應到我國現況，應不應該在特定的併購交易中限縮董事的裁量空間？或提出可供法院參考之指標？

近年來，國際經濟危機層出不窮，產生各式各樣之公司治理問題；全球化之企業經營模式的崛起與迅速發展，企業之經營從國內走向國際，使得公司治理成為國際性之重要議題，美國之公司治理模式的移植亦於世界各國蔚為風潮。 公司治理之架構下，鑑於所有權與經營權分離原則，掌握公司經營權限之董事係公司核心，為避免擴大董事之經營權限的同時，會損及公司與股東之利益，美國法對於董事乃課以受託義務，其內涵包含忠實義務、注意義務與善意義務。然基於商業環境詭譎多變且有限司法審查能力，如董事必須為做出失誤經營決策負擔法律責任，將造成具有能力之人不願意擔任董事而不利於經濟社會之發展，故美國法院判決乃發展出經營判斷法則。經營判斷法則係推定董事係立於充分資訊、出於善意且誠實確信其係為公司之最佳利益，當原告主張董事違反受託義務時，應負有先行舉證證明董事行為不符合經營判斷法則之構成要件。 我國公司法第23條係忠實義務與注意義務之規定，惟對於經營判斷法則尚無明文規範，學說見解對於我國是否應引進經營判斷法則仍有爭議，法院實務雖早已援用經營判斷法則作為公司經營者之責任標準，卻存在諸多誤解導致誤將該法則視為行為標準。因此，似有必要重新審視經營判斷法則之定位，故本文嘗試提出對於經營判斷法則於我國之應用的見解與省思。然經營判斷法則與我國現有法制應如何相互融合仍有待立法配合與後續觀察。 / In recent years, the world has been engulfed by international economic crises, resulting in a wide range of corporate governance matters. The rise and rapid development of the global business model has made the management of enterprises go from a single country toward the whole world, making corporate governance an important international issue. The transplantation of corporate governance of America legal model has emerged as a global trend. Under the framework of corporate governance and in view of the principle of separation of ownership and control, the directors empowered decision-making authority are the core of the company. To avoid the expanding of directors’ decision-making authority and protect the interests of both the corporation and its shareholders, the directors has fiduciary duty which includes duty of loyalty, duty of care and duty of good faith. However, based on the complexity of the business environment and the limit of the capability of the judicial review, if the directors burden the responsibility for making wrong decisions will make capable people unwell to be directors and affect the development of the economy. The business judgment rule is the presumption that in making decisions not involving self-interest and self-dealing, corporate directors act on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that their actions are in the corporation’s best interest. Article 23 of Taiwan Company Act is the regulation of duty of loyalty and duty of care. However, the business judgment rule is not regulated in Taiwan Company Act. The opinion of whether the business judgment rule should be introduced to Taiwan is still controversial. Therefore, it is necessary to reexamine the position of the business judgment rule in Taiwan legal structure and this article attempts to provide points of view in the issue. Last but not least, the interaction of business judgment rule and Taiwan legal structure still needs the cooperation of the legislation and following observation.