近年來國內之併購事件隨世界之潮流日趨普遍，然於併購交易中常伴隨著控制權之交易，而我國法規對於控制權和控制股東之定義未明，因而常有不同之解釋空間而有諸多疑問，更遑論進一步討論控制股東之責任或義務。因此，於西元2006年所發生之凱雷收購東森媒體科技一案，論者雖多側重討論所謂「控制權溢價」是否應由全體股東均享，或得由控制股東獨享之議題，然本案實則牽涉議題甚廣，包括控制股東或經營階層的受託義務、公平價格之決定與少數股東之保護等相關問題。 本文認為，控制權之交易在追求效率極大化之同時，仍須於法律追求公平正義下之框架中進行，凱雷收購東森媒體科技案探討的「控制權溢價」存在與否，應僅為評估公平價格的其中一個考量因素。此外，控制權溢價實為一模糊之概念，從經濟學或法律學之角度觀察，其定義與計算方式或有不同，將會有不同的邏輯結果發生。因此，本文將以「控制權溢價」之概念為主軸，貫穿各章節探討控制權交易各層面之問題，並以歐盟與美國德拉瓦州之控制權交易的概念相互比較之，兩者對控制權交易所持立場之不同，因而有不同之法規建構。如歐盟採行之強制公開收購原則，雖直接防堵控制股東利用控制權不當攫取私利，然卻增加了收購成本，從而有礙有效率之控制權交易的進行；反觀美國德拉瓦州，雖允許控制權私利之存在，但亦強調交易程序之公平性，並以各種事前與事後機制，衡平控制股東與少數股東之權益。 本文認為，美國德拉瓦州關於控制權溢價之相關法規範設計較為可採，意即在控制權交易中，應肯認控制權私利的存在以及控制權溢價應可由控制股東獨享之原則，但必須同時強調控制股東之資訊揭露義務以及受託義務之履踐，以確保公平正義之結果。觀察美國法於控制權交易透過法院於具體個案中之細緻處理，我國法規範以及司法實務在相關議題上之論述則似有不足。本文期透過凱雷收購東森媒體科技一案為例，以控制權溢價與控制股東以及小股東之權益衡平為核心，分析美國法院判決及學說理論，並提出本文建議，以作為我國司法實務之基礎。

近年來，國際經濟危機層出不窮，產生各式各樣之公司治理問題；全球化之企業經營模式的崛起與迅速發展，企業之經營從國內走向國際，使得公司治理成為國際性之重要議題，美國之公司治理模式的移植亦於世界各國蔚為風潮。 公司治理之架構下，鑑於所有權與經營權分離原則，掌握公司經營權限之董事係公司核心，為避免擴大董事之經營權限的同時，會損及公司與股東之利益，美國法對於董事乃課以受託義務，其內涵包含忠實義務、注意義務與善意義務。然基於商業環境詭譎多變且有限司法審查能力，如董事必須為做出失誤經營決策負擔法律責任，將造成具有能力之人不願意擔任董事而不利於經濟社會之發展，故美國法院判決乃發展出經營判斷法則。經營判斷法則係推定董事係立於充分資訊、出於善意且誠實確信其係為公司之最佳利益，當原告主張董事違反受託義務時，應負有先行舉證證明董事行為不符合經營判斷法則之構成要件。 我國公司法第23條係忠實義務與注意義務之規定，惟對於經營判斷法則尚無明文規範，學說見解對於我國是否應引進經營判斷法則仍有爭議，法院實務雖早已援用經營判斷法則作為公司經營者之責任標準，卻存在諸多誤解導致誤將該法則視為行為標準。因此，似有必要重新審視經營判斷法則之定位，故本文嘗試提出對於經營判斷法則於我國之應用的見解與省思。然經營判斷法則與我國現有法制應如何相互融合仍有待立法配合與後續觀察。 / In recent years, the world has been engulfed by international economic crises, resulting in a wide range of corporate governance matters. The rise and rapid development of the global business model has made the management of enterprises go from a single country toward the whole world, making corporate governance an important international issue. The transplantation of corporate governance of America legal model has emerged as a global trend. Under the framework of corporate governance and in view of the principle of separation of ownership and control, the directors empowered decision-making authority are the core of the company. To avoid the expanding of directors’ decision-making authority and protect the interests of both the corporation and its shareholders, the directors has fiduciary duty which includes duty of loyalty, duty of care and duty of good faith. However, based on the complexity of the business environment and the limit of the capability of the judicial review, if the directors burden the responsibility for making wrong decisions will make capable people unwell to be directors and affect the development of the economy. The business judgment rule is the presumption that in making decisions not involving self-interest and self-dealing, corporate directors act on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that their actions are in the corporation’s best interest. Article 23 of Taiwan Company Act is the regulation of duty of loyalty and duty of care. However, the business judgment rule is not regulated in Taiwan Company Act. The opinion of whether the business judgment rule should be introduced to Taiwan is still controversial. Therefore, it is necessary to reexamine the position of the business judgment rule in Taiwan legal structure and this article attempts to provide points of view in the issue. Last but not least, the interaction of business judgment rule and Taiwan legal structure still needs the cooperation of the legislation and following observation.

全球併購浪潮下，敵意併購向來是併購議題中備受矚目的焦點，許多國家均針對敵意併購設有明確的法規範，而我國自2002年通過企業併購法以來，已歷經十五年，在敵意併購相關法制的建構上卻顯有不足，導致實務上面臨許多問題。蓋我國近年來引發高度關注的敵意併購案件，幾乎皆以失敗收場，且雙方攻擊防禦的過程中往往演變為經營權惡鬥，不僅兩敗俱傷，亦使公司及股東利益蒙受損失。 有鑑於前述情況，本文擬從實證觀點探討我國企業環境與文化脈絡對於敵意併購之影響，並透過國內曾發生過的案例、主管機關的態度與法院見解，對我國現行法制進行反思。另外，本文亦藉由美國、英國、德國、歐盟和日本之比較法研究，從目標公司採行防禦措施之相關規範、對於股東之資訊揭露以及少數股東權益保障等面向，討論出可能且適合用於我國之規範方向，以作為建構我國敵意併購法制之參考。 / In the wave of global mergers and acquisitions, hostile takeover has long been a focal point on the issues relating to mergers and acquisitions. Many countries have already built up more transparent regulatory regimes specifically for hostile takeover activities. However, since Taiwan promulgated the Business Mergers and Acquisitions Act in 2002, the relevant laws and regulations were not sufficient to govern hostile takeover activities during the past fifteen years and a number of issues arose in practice. In recent years, the well-known hostile takeover cases in Taiwan all ended up in failure. The actions taken by the party initiating hostile takeover and the target company often led to corporate control contests, making both parties and the shareholders suffer losses. This thesis examines the influences of Taiwanese culture and corporate environment on hostile takeover. It also marks the deficiencies of the current regulatory regime in Taiwan by reviewing the hostile takeover cases, the opinions of the competent authority and the judicial judgements. In addition, this thesis introduces the legislations of the United States, England, Germany, European Union, and Japan on anti-takeover tactics, information disclosure as well as the protection of minority shareholders’ rights and interests. The thesis then analyzes whether these legal systems are suitable as a reference for Taiwan to establish relevant laws and regulations in the future.

隨著企業經營規模日趨複雜、專業化，股東因人數眾多、股東意見不一，在面臨公司所有與經營分離所產生的代理成本控制上，實有困難。一般小股東因持股過低，對於公司經營事務只能消極以待，若對公司經營成果不滿意，只能選擇華爾街準則(Wall Street Walk or Vote with Feet)，而賣掉股票，甚難對管理階層進行更進一步的影響。相較之下，機構投資人基於其人力及資源優勢，能深入參與公司治理、監督管理階層，進而提昇公司經營績效，增進股東投資價值，此即為機構投資人積極主義。 本篇論文探討機構投資人行使股東權以促進公司治理發展。首先討論機構投資人積極主義之兩大基礎支柱－其一，良好公司治理確能對公司績效表現有所助益，其二機構投資人促進公司治理乃其善盡受託義務之體現。 由於美國機構投資人主義高度成熟發展，而國內機構投資人積極主義仍屬起步階段，本篇論文即以比較研究法，探討美國機構投資人行使股東權如股東提案、委託書投票、直接與管理階層溝通、發布黑名單、團體訴訟與股東提名董事草案等，及分析說明我國公司治理相關條文與機構投資人行使表決權時所會遭逢之困境。 此外，本論文經由案例研究，深入蒐集資料並訪談兩個在促進公司治理領域夙負盛名的退休基金-美國威斯康辛州投資委員會與加拿大安大略省教師退休計畫，從而細膩地觀察美國及加拿大機構投資人積極主義之發展、瓶頸與挑戰。 最後，本論文提出促進機構投資人提出公司治理及表決權行使政策、鼓勵機構投資人於股東提案權與表決權等議案進行合作及建置對機構投資人餐與公司治理友善之法規環境等建議，期能對於我國機構投資人積極主義之發展有所助益。 / The increase in institutional funds has been extraordinarily rapid. Comparing with the minority shareholders, the institutional shareholders’ size and expertise can minimize the collective choice problem and agency costs. Their resources enable them to investigate and monitor management in corporate governance field. This is the “Institutional Shareholder Activism“. This article discusses the institutional shareholder’s enhancement of corporate governance. It explores from the two backbones of the Institutional Shareholder Activism: Firstly, the correlation between corporate governance and corporate performance, and secondly, fiduciary duties of the Institutional Shareholder. It makes two conclusions: Good corporate governance certainly helps protect shareholder interests, and contributes to superior long-term economic performance, and institutional shareholders can comply with fiduciary duties by enhancing corporate governance. Furthermore, due to America institutional shareholder activism is highly developed, while Taiwan institutional shareholder activism is not developed. This paper compares America institutional shareholder activism with Taiwan’s. It discusses America institutional shareholder activism in many aspects, such as shareholder proposal, proxy solicitation, vote, direct negotiation with the corporate management, focus list, class action, security holder director nominations bill etc. Then, it analyses some of Taiwan’s corporate governance related articles such as shareholder proposal and security holder director nominations, and some difficulties which the pension fund and the security investment trust fund face when they vote as shareholders. Moreover, through case study, this paper analyses two prestigious pension funds: State of Wisconsin Investment Board (SWIB) and The Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan (OTPP), and investigates their stages of development and current operation and future challenges in the corporate governance field. At last, this paper provides some suggestions and inspirits the institutional shareholder activism in our country.

控制公司與從屬公司在法律面各具有獨立法人格，但在經濟面共同為聯盟經濟體。法律上允許控制公司與從屬公司不對等的控制支配關係存在，控制公司對從屬公司之財務、經營或人事具有控制支配力，可使從屬公司為或不為一定行為，當該行為不合於一般營業常規（本研究簡稱非常規交易）時，從經濟學角度，非常規交易或因集團整體運作需要，或因風險彼此瞭解或共同承擔等，致交易條件與一般常規不同，並非絕對無效率或涉有不法目的，完全禁止反有礙市場效率，故先進國家如美國、德國及我國等，對於非常規交易行為立法採不禁止，只是管制方式不同。我國公司法重視從屬公司權益之保障，制約控制公司適當補償或損害賠償責任；證券交易法則就行為致公司遭受重大損害，以刑責相繩；所得稅法基於租稅公平，按營業常規予以調整納稅，所謂不同法律立法目的所欲保護的法益不同，對於非常交易行為課以的法律效果也不同。 　　本研究以公司法第369條之4規定作為探討主軸，除認識、剖析我國公司法、證券交易法及所得稅法對非常規交易的規範目的及構成要件外，釐清控制關係、非常規交易等意涵也是很重要的，概實務案例上，非常規交易的確是不法利益輸送或掏空公司資產行為最常藉用的手法，主要原因除了控制與從屬關係外，非常規交易複雜難辨亦是原因之一。又控制公司支使從屬公司為非常規交易行為可能產生三種法律後果，一為直接損害從屬公司的權益；二為直接損害控制公司少數股東或債權人權益；三為同時損害從屬公司少數股東及其債權人權利。我國公司法、證交法及所得稅法基於不同立法目的而律定規範制約控制者責任，引進控制股東之受託義務、公司法人格否認、揭穿公司面紗原則、深石原則及代位訴訟等法理基礎與實務判例來作制約，保障受害者權益，立法意義值得肯定。但沒有一種責任機制能夠在所有情況下都發揮作用，水能載舟，亦能覆舟，加強控制公司責任，並賦予從屬公司或少數股東相對應的防衛工具，某種程度也影響了企業集團整體利益之運作，又法律正義權益平衡的設計，恐因舉證責任的關係，而難以落實。國內非常規交易規範行之有年，但商業交易行為推陳出新，以及跨境交易查證困難等，法制上及實務上面臨一些問題，本研究試著歸納並提出建議意見，希望法律正義得以伸張，經濟發展與利益保護得以衡平。 / The controlling company and the subsidiary company is independent in law, but in the economic side together for the Union economy. The law allows them to non-arm’s length transactions. From an economic perspective, it is not absolute inefficiency, so the advanced countries does not prohibit, but different control mode. Different legal legislative purpose is seeking to protect legal interests of different, so legal effect is different. 　　In this study, First, introducing and analyzing the legislative purposes and constituent elements of non-arm’s length transactions in the Company Act, the Securities and Exchange Act and the Income Tax Act. Second, understanding and clarifying the meaning of control relationship, non-arm’s length transactions, etc. Third, jurisprudencing fiduciary duty, disregard of the corporate fiction, piercing the corporate veil, doctrine of deep stone and derivative suit. Finally, summarizing cases from the substantive issues, concludes with recommendations observations.