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雙層股權結構之法律研究 / A Study on Dual Class Structure陳韋辰 Unknown Date (has links)
2014年9月阿里巴巴集團於紐約證交所以每股掛牌價68美元進行IPO,籌資總額達到250億美元,成為美國史上最大規模之IPO案,此外阿里巴巴於掛牌首日股價上漲38%也是規模100億美元以上公司IPO首日漲幅的最高紀錄。在阿里巴巴於美國掛牌上市之前,原本預計於香港交易所上市,然而遭香港證監會拒絕,其中之一的原因為阿里巴巴所採行之「合夥人制度」,使馬雲的管理階層團隊雖僅持有約10%之股份但卻掌握公司董事會過半數董事之提名權而常保控制權,該制度違反香港交易所堅持之違反一股一權原則。在失去阿里巴巴這宗全球最大規模IPO案後,也引發香港金融界討論「雙層股權結構」的制度是否應在香港開放,香港聯交所更在2014年8月發布不同投票權架構文件(Weighted Voting Rights Concept Paper),徵詢市場參與者意見。不禁使本文思考在同樣以發展金融為重之台灣,雙層股權結構在我國現行法下的適法性與可行性。
而在2015年公司法新增閉鎖公司專節,閉鎖公司在體系上屬於股份有限公司較特殊的組織型態,其顛覆了大部分台灣公司法就有限公司的定義,其中更開放閉鎖公司得發行一股多表決權之複數表決權特別股,此為過去主管機關所不允許。本文透過國內外文獻上對雙層股權結構制度存在正反兩方看法之討論、外國雙層股權結構制度現況及其監理模式,探討我國法上對於雙層股權結構應否開放至一般公司甚至上市公司,若開放,又應如何進行監理政策以保障投資人大眾。
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股東會通訊投票之法制研究顏敏靜 Unknown Date (has links)
在「公司法自一九二九年十二月二十六日制定公布以來,歷經十一次修正。資為因應資訊科技時代,順應企業國際化,協助企業提升全球競爭力,追求企業永續發展,並保護股東基本權利,推動建立完善之公司治理制度,營造良好公司法制環境」之立法總說明下,二00五年六月二十二日總統令公布增刪修正條文共十五條之公司法部份修正條文。
近年來電子科技發展迅速,法律制度亦需配合調整,以善用嶄新科技(如網路)所帶來的便利,同時解決此種便利所衍生的問題。在表決權相關法制方面,電子科技之影響無遠弗屆,從會議召開方式、資訊揭露方式、至投票表決方式,均產生相當衝擊,因此如何結合科技與法律,成為公司治理之重要議題。
公司法新增定之通訊投票制度,使股東能更便利行使其表決權,有助於公司治理,而「公司民主」亦因而得以落實,從而值得深入研究。本論文就公司法所增訂之通訊投票制度,加以剖析,輔以與美國及日本立法例之比較,檢視新法內容不合理及不足之處,並進而提出修改之建議,以供下次修法之參考,期使通訊投票制度在未來能更臻完善。
至於立法論上虛擬股東會是否適宜取代實體股東會,虛擬股東會所帶來的時間跟費用的節省也許看起來很吸引人,如果可以不用召開傳統實體股東會,勢必能免除繁瑣的作業程序,節省大量人力、金錢及時間,特別是當議程上的項目並不具爭議性時,但是考慮採取這些程序的公司必須把這些益處跟股東可能反對的潛在負面後果相衡量,也就是股東對於取消傳統股東會,使他們喪失可以接觸經營階層與其溝通的機會,可能會抱持負面觀感,故公司無法只著眼於時間及金錢的節省即貿然考慮採行。然這些危險並不是斷然拒絕虛擬會議可能帶來的益處的理由,尤其是可以使更多股東參與這點,所以仍應在維持現行實體股東會外,結合網路轉播實體集會,且讓遠距收看者也能藉由以電子郵件提出問題參與,加上(或是)同步電子投票,以利用科技便利股東參與股東會,提高股東對股東會之參與。一言以蔽之,如前所述,在股權分散的公開發行公司虛擬會議不應完全取代實體會議,除非能設計出一個電子方式能等同經營者對散戶股東面對面負責(face-to-face accountability),而且也能提供現行實體會議所具有的商議機會(deliberation),才宜改以虛擬會議取代傳統實體集會之股東會。 / Stockholder meetings are the most important means for corporations to reach decisions, and are also how stockholders participate in the management of corporations, thus it is a significantly important legal issue to make sure stockholders can express their viewpoints of how to run the corporation through exercise of stockholder rights and stockholder meetings.
Moreover, it is very common that one person is the stockholder of several or even hundreds of corporations nowadays. Though it is inevitable that several corporations conduct stockholder meetings at the same day for there are far more corporations than the dates capable to conduct stockholder meetings, it is quite obvious that corporation conduct meetings during the same period of time intentionally. It might be a result of preventing some nasty stockholders disturbing meetings through choosing the same day conducting stockholder meetings to decrease the risk, but it deprives other stockholders of attending stockholder meetings and consequently sacrificing their stockholder rights.
There is proxy voting for stockholders who are unable to attend stockholder meetings, but it has pitfalls in practice and for stockholders it is not that safe comparing with voting directly.
In order to increase the ways for stockholders to vote in stockholder meetings, there is a change in corporation that is to add article 177-1:
“The voting power at a shareholders' meeting may be exercised in writing or by way of electronic transmission, provided, however, that the method for exercising the voting power shall be described in the shareholders' meeting notice to be given to the shareholders if the voting power will be exercised in writing or by way of electronic transmission.
A shareholder who exercises his/her/its voting power at a shareholders meeting in writing or by way of electronic transmission as set forth in the preceding Paragraph shall be deemed to have attended the said shareholders' meeting in person, but shall be deemed to have waived his/her/its voting power in respective of any extemporary motion(s) and/or the amendment(s) to the contents of the original proposal(s) at the said shareholders' meeting.”
Electronic technology has improved a great deal these years, therefore legal system has to change or amend to make use of the new technology e.g. internet as well as solve problems stemmed from new technology. Concerning the regulations of voting right there is a great impact of electronic technology from the way of conducting meetings, to the way of exposing information and voting, thus to combine technology and law is an important issue in corporate governance.
Electronic voting has been put into practice in the United States for a long time, but it is not as successful in our country, and to date there has been only one company, Taiwan Integrated Shareholder Service Company, to adopt electronic voting, therefore it is worth studying why The United States can promote electronic voting successfully and then have a better understanding of what obstacles they have encountered initially to prevent our country from making the same mistake.
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敵意併購防禦措施之研究—以交易保護措施之種類與適法性為中心林明慧 Unknown Date (has links)
透過企業併購進行組織調整,能整合資源及促進外部成長,或者取得技術、市場行銷管道或品牌並發揮企業經營效率。而敵意併購普遍被認為可促進「控制權市場」的形成,扮演著公司治理外部機制的重要角色。惟敵意併購在某些情況下可能不具有外部制衡的功能且有害於公司之發展,因此若允許目標公司經營者採取防禦措施,應具有一定的實益。然而我國企業併購法尚欠缺規範敵意併購防禦措施的規定,其他如公司法、證券交易法等相關法規對於敵意併購防禦措施之態度亦不明確,將來若發生相關案例,該如何處置即有疑問,故本文將從比較法的觀點討論各國相關立法,希冀藉此探尋適合我國市場環境的法制政策。
此外,目前國內已有不少研究敵意併購防禦措施之相關文獻,惟多半係概括、整體地介紹,針對交易保護措施類型的防禦措施則少有討論。由於交易保護措施除了有確保併購雙方順利完成合併契約的功能外,在面臨敵意併購時,亦可能具有抵制敵意併購的防禦效果,因此在美國實務上也有不少公司採取交易保護措施作為敵意併購的防禦措施,且在訴訟上爭執交易保護措施合法性的案例亦不在少數;有疑問的是在美國司法實務上,相關案例所發展出來的司法審查標準與其他一般防禦措施所適用的司法審查標準是否有所不同?是否有其他特別因素需要考量?又該等交易保護措施是否適合於我國發展等問題,皆有進一步釐清與分析之必要,此乃筆者撰寫本文的主要動機及研究重點。
本文將以交易保護措施發展較蓬勃之美國法為比較之對象,針對美國實務上常見的交易保護措施(如鎖定選擇權、禁止接觸條款、終止費、表決權拘束契約等)之定義、功能及內容加以介紹,並輔以相關案例具體說明交易保護措施於美國實務上之操作情形,最後配合我國現行法之相關規定,探討
於我國現行法制下適用該等交易保護措施之可行性,希冀未來可作為我國企業經營者採行該等防禦措施之參考依據。
本文共分為六章。
第一章為「緒論」,分為研究動機及目的、研究範圍及研究方法、研究架構等三部分,主要係在介紹本文之基本理念與架構。
第二章是「敵意併購防禦措施之理論與法制政策」。本章分為四節,除了討論是否允許目標公司經營者採行敵意併購防禦措施之議題外,亦介紹比較法上關於敵意併購防禦措施之相關法律規範;最後則以我國現行法已有的相關規範為基礎,綜合比較各國法制政策於我國繼受的可能性,並以此作為本章之小結。
第三章為「美國敵意併購防禦措施之分類」。本章分為二節,以美國司法實務上常見之防禦措施為主,依序介紹有備無患型與臨時抱佛腳型之防禦措施,以及簡略就單純防禦型與交易保護措施型此一分類做介紹,至於交易保護措施型的防禦措施,亦即本文研究重點,將於第四章為進一步之討論。
第四章為「美國交易保護措施之種類與司法審查」。本章分為六節,主要就常見的交易保護措施類型、意義及其在美國司法實務上的運作情形一一加以介紹與分析,其中包含了鎖定選擇權、禁止接觸條款、終止費條款、表決權拘束契約與表決權信託等。
第五章「交易保護措施於我國法制下的適用可能性」。本章分為五節,分別就鎖定選擇權、禁止接觸條款、終止費條款、表決權拘束契約與表決權信託等防禦措施與我國相關法規範加以聯結與分析,並討論該等防禦措施於我國現行法下運作的可能性。
第六章「結論」。
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論通訊投票與臨時動議、議案修正之容許性 / A Study on the Electronic Voting and Admissibility of the Extemporary Motions and Motion Amendments張鵬元, Chang, Peng Yuan Unknown Date (has links)
一般而言,股東會議程所有議案資訊必須事前揭露給全體股東,提供股東充分資訊,其方能在充分瞭解下作成投票決定。惟我國公司法長久以來承認股東有臨時動議與議案修正之權利,允許出席股東就第一七二條第五項規定除外事項之其他一切事項,在股東會現場提出臨時動議或原議案之修正,此舉不但將形成股東會議程資訊之漏洞,復以實務一般認為只要未違反第一七二條第五項之規定,股東可以在現場以臨時動議提議召開股東臨時會針對法定除外事項進行決議,或在同一議題下,可以提出任何修正案,而架空第一七二條之一股東提案權制度所寓有之資訊揭露功能。在無法獲得充分資訊之下,股東應當如何行使表決權,尤其未出席股東以書面或電子方式事前行使表決權時,更是需要充分資訊,否則一旦面對臨時動議或議案修正時,其表決權將依法視為棄權,更進一步衍生出表決權操縱和應否親自出席之問題,橫生枝節,臨時動議與議案修正之突襲性問題,亟待解決。
因此,參考美國、日本、德國、英國、香港、韓國和中國大陸公司法制,公司法應明文要求將股東會議程之主要內容或要領記載於召集通知中,股東會不得就召集通知所未記載之議案進行決議,股東如欲發表任何意見,應循事前提案權提出,而非在現場提出臨時動議或議案修正突襲其他股東。因此,本文建議禁止在現場提出任何臨時動議或議案修正。 / Generally speaking, the agenda of general meeting, including all motions, should be disclosed to all shareholders of the company in advance of a general meeting to provide them with sufficient information to vote (informed voting). However, according to Taiwan Company Act, shareholders have right to move extemporary motions or amendments all but any items as set forth in §172(5) hereof at the meeting. This will not only come to be a loophole resulting from blank statements in a notice of a general meeting, but also sideline the information disclosure function by implication of shareholder proposal in §172-1, because the court hold that the shareholder are entitled to move an extemporary motion to call a meeting to make a resolution on exclusion items in §172(5), or any amendment under the same subject. Thus shareholders are unable to vote without sufficient information, especially who cast their vote through writing or electronic transmission without participating in person in advance of the meeting. In case of extemporary motions or amendments, shareholders who cast vote through writing or electronic transmission shall
be deemed to withhold their voting power. This result would bring some issues of manipulation of voting power and whether shareholders who have cast their vote through writing or electronic transmission should participate
in person afterwards or not. However, extemporary motions and amendments with surprising nature shall be or shall not be, that is the question.
In order to deal with this problem, the main component or general nature of items in the agenda of a general meeting shall be stated in the notice, and only the items stated in the notice could be validly passed at the
general meeting by referring to the Company Act of the U.S., Japan, Germany, U.K., Hong Kong, South Korea, and Mainland China. If shareholders are willing to express their opinions, they should propose to ask to put in the agenda in advance of the meeting, instead of moving
extemporary motions and amendments to surprise the others. This study suggests that no extemporary motion or amendment shall be allowed to move at the general meeting.
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股東表決權利益迴避制度之研究—台電求償案之分析與檢討 / Study on The Exclusion of Shareholder’s Voting Right周宛蘭, Chou, Wan Lan Unknown Date (has links)
股份有限公司在「企業經營與企業所有分離」之原則下,公司經營事務固專由法定必備業務機關—董事會職司之,然為保障股東權益,公司法乃賦予各股東表決權,使股東能在股東會中,透過作成決議之方式,形成股東之意見並參與公司之經營決策。因而,表決權可謂股東之重要權利。如欲禁止股東行使此項權利,實應格外慎重。公司法第178條規定「股東對於會議之事項,有自身利害關係致有害於公司利益之虞時,不得加入表決,並不得代理他股東行使其表決權」,為我國公司法制下,股份有限公司之股東表決權利益迴避制度。然此一規定及其規範模式,是否有其正當性及合理性,不無探討之空間。
首先,由於此一規定使用不確定法律概念,「有自身利害關係」、「有害公司利益之虞」等要件之意義、範圍,學說及實務解釋適用上均有不同看法。又因該規定之規範主體為「股東」,當遇有政府或法人股東時,所謂「自身利害關係」之判斷應為「股東」本身,或及於股東之「代表人」,即不無疑義。另構成該規定,法律效果為具有利害關係之「股東」不得加入表決,並不得「代理」他股東行使其表決權,然如有自身利害關係之股東委託他人代理行使表決權時,或受委任者不具股東身分,或受委任者為股東之「代表人」時,應如何解釋適用,亦值探討。此部分將置於本文第二章討論。
其次,整理我國司法判決對公司法第178條之實際運用案例,約略可分為「會計表冊承認」、「董事競業禁止義務解除」及「解任董監事」等三類。另外,「台電求償案」除涉及台灣電力股份有限公司大股東經濟部,應否對「就核四停建一事向政府求償」議案利益迴避之爭議,亦涉及股東會決議權限與股東利益迴避制度間之關係、股東權利義務變動之時點限制、系爭議案求償對象之解釋及股份多數決原則與表決權利益迴避制度之衝突等問題。上開實務見解對於相關規定之解釋適用,是否妥適,本文第三、四章,將先就相關判決予以摘要臚列,復就其中所涉及之爭議,提出一己拙見。
最後,觀諸日本法對於股東表決權利益迴避制度之演變,可知日本最早亦採我國公司法第178條事前禁止之規範模式,惟在1981年(昭和56年)即全面改採事後救濟制。對照日本法制,恰可凸顯我國現行制度下,出現適用範圍不明確、配套措施不足及議事難以進行等問題。本文以為,回歸資本多數決之精神,並考量公司法第178條之規範目的,既係在於確保決議的公正性及公平性,應直接針對不當的決議設計救濟途徑,當更為妥適。如將公司法第178條修改為「股東會決議如因有特別利害關係者行使表決權,而作出顯著不當決議時,股東得訴請法院撤銷該決議」。或逕將此條刪除,改設立多數決濫用禁止之規定,在現行公司法第189條下,新設後段或第2項之規定:「股東會之決議內容,有害公司或少數股東利益而顯著不當者,亦同」,賦予小股東在多數決濫用時一定之救濟管道。過去在我國現行制度下所產生之許多爭議事例,即得以迎刃而解。
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從公司治理論機構投資人股東權之行使-以公共基金為中心王育慧 Unknown Date (has links)
隨著企業經營規模日趨複雜、專業化,股東因人數眾多、股東意見不一,在面臨公司所有與經營分離所產生的代理成本控制上,實有困難。一般小股東因持股過低,對於公司經營事務只能消極以待,若對公司經營成果不滿意,只能選擇華爾街準則(Wall Street Walk or Vote with Feet),而賣掉股票,甚難對管理階層進行更進一步的影響。相較之下,機構投資人基於其人力及資源優勢,能深入參與公司治理、監督管理階層,進而提昇公司經營績效,增進股東投資價值,此即為機構投資人積極主義。
本篇論文探討機構投資人行使股東權以促進公司治理發展。首先討論機構投資人積極主義之兩大基礎支柱-其一,良好公司治理確能對公司績效表現有所助益,其二機構投資人促進公司治理乃其善盡受託義務之體現。
由於美國機構投資人主義高度成熟發展,而國內機構投資人積極主義仍屬起步階段,本篇論文即以比較研究法,探討美國機構投資人行使股東權如股東提案、委託書投票、直接與管理階層溝通、發布黑名單、團體訴訟與股東提名董事草案等,及分析說明我國公司治理相關條文與機構投資人行使表決權時所會遭逢之困境。
此外,本論文經由案例研究,深入蒐集資料並訪談兩個在促進公司治理領域夙負盛名的退休基金-美國威斯康辛州投資委員會與加拿大安大略省教師退休計畫,從而細膩地觀察美國及加拿大機構投資人積極主義之發展、瓶頸與挑戰。
最後,本論文提出促進機構投資人提出公司治理及表決權行使政策、鼓勵機構投資人於股東提案權與表決權等議案進行合作及建置對機構投資人餐與公司治理友善之法規環境等建議,期能對於我國機構投資人積極主義之發展有所助益。 / The increase in institutional funds has been extraordinarily rapid. Comparing with the minority shareholders, the institutional shareholders’ size and expertise can minimize the collective choice problem and agency costs. Their resources enable them to investigate and monitor management in corporate governance field. This is the “Institutional Shareholder Activism“.
This article discusses the institutional shareholder’s enhancement of corporate governance. It explores from the two backbones of the Institutional Shareholder Activism: Firstly, the correlation between corporate governance and corporate performance, and secondly, fiduciary duties of the Institutional Shareholder. It makes two conclusions: Good corporate governance certainly helps protect shareholder interests, and contributes to superior long-term economic performance, and institutional shareholders can comply with fiduciary duties by enhancing corporate governance.
Furthermore, due to America institutional shareholder activism is highly developed, while Taiwan institutional shareholder activism is not developed. This paper compares America institutional shareholder activism with Taiwan’s. It discusses America institutional shareholder activism in many aspects, such as shareholder proposal, proxy solicitation, vote, direct negotiation with the corporate management, focus list, class action, security holder director nominations bill etc. Then, it analyses some of Taiwan’s corporate governance related articles such as shareholder proposal and security holder director nominations, and some difficulties which the pension fund and the security investment trust fund face when they vote as shareholders.
Moreover, through case study, this paper analyses two prestigious pension funds: State of Wisconsin Investment Board (SWIB) and The Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan (OTPP), and investigates their stages of development and current operation and future challenges in the corporate governance field.
At last, this paper provides some suggestions and inspirits the institutional shareholder activism in our country.
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我國股東會通訊投票制度之研究 / A Study of Electronic Voting in Taiwan謝昀芳 Unknown Date (has links)
我國於2005年時,為促進我國公司治理之發展,提升股東行使表決權之便利性以鼓勵股東參與股東會之議決,落實股東民主與股東行動主義之精神,並因應我國上市櫃公司股東會開會日期過度集中之問題,引進於國外行之有年之通訊投票制度,使股東除得選擇親自出席或委託他人出席股東會外,尚得選擇使用書面或電子投票方式行使表決權,立意甚為良善。然此制引進至今,實務上自願採用之公司甚少,使此制度之優點無法充分發揮。
為檢討我國通訊投票制度使用率偏低之問題,本文先自公司治理原則之觀點,探討股東參與對公司治理原則而言之意義,並建立通訊投票制度與公司治理原則之關聯,突顯通訊投票制度之價值。其次,介紹美國、英國、日本、歐盟等之通訊投票法制與實務運作情形,以了解國際脈動、發掘我國制度之現存問題,並藉由國外實施通訊投票制度之經驗,反思我國通訊投票制度未來之發展方向。
另就我國通訊投票之法制與實務部分,與股東資訊權有關之規範,如我國召集通知之發送或公告時點、召集通知之記載與臨時動議、召集通知之電子化、議事手冊及會議資料之製作與周知方式等,應朝更透明化之方向發展,並應使股東得以更直接之方式獲取相關資訊。另一方面,亦應使符合一定條件之公司負有提供英文版召集通知與議事手冊之義務,以利機構投資人妥適行使表決權。
其次,就通訊投票之規範上,公司法第177條之1與第177條之2之規範內容,有諸多過度遷就股務作業之規定,有所不妥,書面或電子投票之方式與作業程序規範密度亦有不足。另在電子投票制度上,未能顧及電子投票方式之即時性與互動性,僅採「事前的」電子投票制度,亦過於保守。此外,與通訊投票相關之制度,如分割行使表決權制度、董監候選人提名制、股東提案權制度等,亦宜一併檢視。
本文認為,為符合現今國際潮流、提升我國公司治理、促進電子投票制度之使用,前揭我國規範之未盡之處,未來皆有進行全盤檢討並加以修正之必要。
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員工持股計畫中受任人義務之研究 / A study of fiduciary duty under employee stock ownership plan李松諺 Unknown Date (has links)
員工持股計畫是由財經律師Louis Kelso所創,在美國已行之多年,廣為美國企業所採。最早的員工持股計畫是一種為了和平地從資本家手中移轉資本給員工、縮減貧富差距的工具。為了使這個計畫可以持續有效地運作下去,立法者將員工持股計畫為退休金計畫的一種,使員工必須長期持有股票,直到退休。然而在實務運作上,員工持股信託經常被運用為防止敵意併購的工具。尤有甚者,某些公司內部人會利用員工持股計畫為自己取得大量資金、移轉投資風險,但仍可保留對於公司的控制力。這些行為都有可能對股東及員工造成不利的影響,但在現行法制下,只能仰賴司法者透過判決保護這些經濟及資訊上的弱勢族群。
在台灣,員工持股計畫雖然已廣為許多企業所採用,但是發展了將近20年,只能成為另一種員工持有股票的工具。員工擁有的股票數量並不足以使其在股東會上贏得一個受公司內部人重視的地位,也不足以倚賴這些股票作為退休金之用。這種規模上的差異是台美員工持股計畫最關鍵的不同點。小規模雖然使員工持股計畫帶來的優勢少了許多,但相對地也減低許多代理成本,至今未有員工持股計畫侵害大量員工利益的事件爆發。然而這不表示員工持股計畫在台灣就是個可以被忽略的問題,若能在未來建立一套有效率的立法制度,使員工持股計畫的規模擴大,員工將可因此享受到更多公司盈餘,並且使其退休生活受到保障。相對地,參考美國員工持股計畫的問題後,也可以預先設想未來可能發生的弊端,未雨綢繆。本文相信,一個有效率的員工持股計畫,可以實現解決貧富不均的理想。 / Employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) which is created by Louis Kelso is brought to practice for many years. Many enterprises use it as their retirement pension plan. The earliest employee stock ownership plan to transfer the capital frome capitalists to labors and reduce the disparity between the rich and the poor.In order to make the plan work out continueously and effectively, the legislator devise ESOP as a pension fund which makes employee own stock chronically until they retires. However, in practice, ESOP is usually exercised for preventing hostile takeover. Moreover, some company insiders may use ESOP TTO get a great deal of capital and transfer the investment risk, but still own the controlling power to their company. This behaviors will cause some harmful effects to the shareholders and the employees, but in the current legal system,the only one we can depend is the judge who can protect the minority in the economic and the information.
ESOP is exercised by many enterprises in Taiwan. But after 20 years, it can only become one of the tools which assist employees to acquire company stocks.The number of shares which employees owns can’t make them have a posi-tion which let the company insiders take account in the shareholder committee and have enough amounts for their retirement pensions.This disparity in scale is the keypoint what is different between Tiwan and the U.S. ESOP. Althoygh small scale makes the adventage of ESOP decrease, it reduce lots of agency costs. To this day, there’re not any events which injure the interests of employees by ESOP. Never-theless, it doesn’t mean that ESOP in Taiwan is a issue which can be neglected. If we can establish an efficient legal system and extend the scale of ESOP, employees can obtain more company interests and have a security of their retirement life.In the opposite, after researching the problem of the U.S. ESOP, we can assume the culpably misconduct which will happen in the future and repair the house before it rains。I believe that a efficient ESOP can realize the ideal to solve the problem of uneven distribution of the wealth.
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