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不同的交易機制對於預測市場運作表現之影響分析:以2009年縣市長選舉為例 / The analysis of different trading mechanisms for prediction market performance: the case of 2009 mayoral elections郭峻宇, Kuo, Chun Yu Unknown Date (has links)
「預測市場」以未來事件為交易標的,透過網路平台彙整即時資訊,運用價格來判斷未來事件的發展,此研究方法同時具有「適當獎懲」與「連續修正」兩項特性。
本研究以文獻分析途徑探究預測市場在不同交易機制下的運作方式與市場價格決定過程,並據此分析不同交易機制之間的差異與影響預測市場運作的因素;除此之外,本研究另以個案研究途徑來探討「連續雙向拍賣」與「市場計分法則」兩個交易機制在價格準確度、市場流動性、價格炒作、參與誘因與莊家風險之間的差異。
本研究發現:若交易機制是連續雙向拍賣,則「0-100型」合約價格的預測準確度較高;若交易機制是市場計分法則,則「落點預測型」合約價格的預測準確度較高。連續雙向拍賣機制具有市場流動性不足的問題;市場計分法則機制面臨莊家風險的危機且不適用於市場競爭度高的環境;而上述兩種交易機制皆會出現價格炒作的現象。 / “Prediction market” is a research method based on immediate information collecting and organizing on the internet platform. With future events as the object of transaction, variations of the price of each transaction thus immediately provide the prediction of the development of future events. Therefore, this method has two properties including “appropriate incentives” and “continuous correction”.
In this study, document analysis is first conducted to review the operation modes of different trading mechanisms for prediction markets and the process of price making. Accordingly, differences between trading mechanisms and the factors that affect the operation of prediction market will also be analyzed. Furthermore, comparisons of the price accuracy, market liquidity, price speculation, incentives and maker risks between "continuous double auction" and "market scoring rule" are discussed in case study.
The findings of this study: if the trading mechanism is “continuous double auction”, the price accuracy of “winner-take-all” contract is higher; if the trading mechanism is “market scoring rules”, the price accuracy of “index” contract is higher. There exists insufficient market liquidity in “continuous double auction;” while in “market scoring rule,” there exists maker risks and it is hard to be applied in highly competitive market. The phenomenon of price speculation exits in both trading mechanisms.
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