本文討論台灣縣市長選舉中，財政健全程度及收入支出決算狀況會如何影響選舉結果。以台灣21個縣市在1989年至2005年間共5屆的縣市長選舉為實證研究，探討縣市長選舉結果出現政黨輪替的可能因素，在經濟投票及政治意識形態的研究方向以外，就縣市政府財政表現的角度進行分析。實證模型採用Probit model進行估計，本文實證假定為：如果縣市長致力於提升財政健全或是提供符合選民需要的公共支出時，便不容易出現政黨輪替。由實證結果發現，在財政變數方面，選舉年財政健全度及選前一年歲出成長率提高時，有助於執政黨持續執政。然而，選前二年竊案發生率較高的縣市，反而使執政黨被輪替的機率提高。對於與總統相同政黨的縣市長而言，只有在面對較高的選前一年全國及地方失業時，容易受到拖累而出現政黨輪替。競選連任的縣市長具有優勢。桃竹苗區與中彰投區相較其他地區而言，顯然較容易出現政黨輪替。 / By the five campaigns from 1989 to 2005 of the 21 local jurisdictions (includes 16 counties and 5 townships) in Taiwan, this paper discusses how fiscal health, revenue and expenditure conditions affect the election results. We analysis that the possible factors that cause election results to appear party rotation. Except for economic voting and other political factors, we mainly examine if fiscal performance results in party rotation. We adopt the Probit model to setup our empirical model. Our hypothesis is that party rotation possibly happens if local officers do not devote in fiscal health or fiscal policy that voters need. For the fiscal variables, the empirical evidence shows that increasing fiscal health in election year and total expenditures growth rate in one year before election help incumbents persist in political power. However higher crime rate on burglaries and larcenies in two year before election will reduce the probability in party rotation. If the president and incumbents are the same party affiliation, incumbents will be implicated while national and local unemployment rate worsen. Besides, incumbents who run for reelection will be in dominant position. The jurisdictions in the northeast and middle areas of Taiwan compare to the others, it is more possible to occur party rotation.

「預測市場」以未來事件為交易標的，透過網路平台彙整即時資訊，運用價格來判斷未來事件的發展，此研究方法同時具有「適當獎懲」與「連續修正」兩項特性。 本研究以文獻分析途徑探究預測市場在不同交易機制下的運作方式與市場價格決定過程，並據此分析不同交易機制之間的差異與影響預測市場運作的因素；除此之外，本研究另以個案研究途徑來探討「連續雙向拍賣」與「市場計分法則」兩個交易機制在價格準確度、市場流動性、價格炒作、參與誘因與莊家風險之間的差異。 本研究發現：若交易機制是連續雙向拍賣，則「0-100型」合約價格的預測準確度較高；若交易機制是市場計分法則，則「落點預測型」合約價格的預測準確度較高。連續雙向拍賣機制具有市場流動性不足的問題；市場計分法則機制面臨莊家風險的危機且不適用於市場競爭度高的環境；而上述兩種交易機制皆會出現價格炒作的現象。 / “Prediction market” is a research method based on immediate information collecting and organizing on the internet platform. With future events as the object of transaction, variations of the price of each transaction thus immediately provide the prediction of the development of future events. Therefore, this method has two properties including “appropriate incentives” and “continuous correction”. In this study, document analysis is first conducted to review the operation modes of different trading mechanisms for prediction markets and the process of price making. Accordingly, differences between trading mechanisms and the factors that affect the operation of prediction market will also be analyzed. Furthermore, comparisons of the price accuracy, market liquidity, price speculation, incentives and maker risks between "continuous double auction" and "market scoring rule" are discussed in case study. The findings of this study: if the trading mechanism is “continuous double auction”, the price accuracy of “winner-take-all” contract is higher; if the trading mechanism is “market scoring rules”, the price accuracy of “index” contract is higher. There exists insufficient market liquidity in “continuous double auction;” while in “market scoring rule,” there exists maker risks and it is hard to be applied in highly competitive market. The phenomenon of price speculation exits in both trading mechanisms.