摘要 本文主要檢視中國大陸連續虧損公司面臨下市緩衝機制壓力時之盈餘管理行為。本文所謂的下市緩衝機制係指特別處理(簡稱ST)與特別轉讓(簡稱PT)的管制。具體而言，ST管制要求連續兩年虧損的公司，必須冠上ST標記，漲跌幅限制為5%(一般股票為10%)，中報需審計；PT管制要求連續三年虧損的公司，必須冠上PT標記，同樣有停板限制，僅允許週五交易。ST與PT管制設計原意係希望提高整體市場新陳代謝與營造理性投資的環境，但盈餘基礎的本質與保守的配套措施反而衍生盈餘管理與投機炒股。此下市緩衝機制實質之經濟後果為管制機關與投資大眾高度關注，但過去相關研究相當有限，本文希望藉由下列研究問題的探索以補充文獻缺口。 第一，中國大陸上市公司面臨下市緩衝機制漸進懲處時，管理當局如何進行盈餘管理以因應連續虧損門檻？第二，各群虧損公司次年扭虧次數與盈餘管理行為差異為何？第三，零損失的法規門檻如何引發盈餘分配的特殊型態；操控前盈餘與盈餘管理關係為何？ 依據1998年至2000年267家虧損公司樣本，實證結果簡要彙總如下：第一，虧損公司裁決性應計數字(營業外所得)顯著降低盈餘，特別在虧損第一個年度，此結果顯示管理當局意圖儲存盈餘以因應未來更嚴格制裁之緩衝。第二，ST股與PT股盈餘劇烈震盪，其盈餘型態分別呈現V字型與W字型。第三，1998與1999年連續三年虧損的公司次年扭虧百分比小於其他虧損公司；但2000年結果相反。主要理由乃中國證監會於2001年2月22日要求PT股在未來一年扭虧(過去為三年)，否則必須下市。第四，虧損公司次年盈餘分配集中於略高於零損失門檻的區間，隱含實質小虧的公司預支未來盈餘，實質大盈的公司儲存本期盈餘的可能性。第五，虧損公司次年扭虧時，操控前盈餘與盈餘管理呈現負向關係，且操控前盈餘越小的組別其盈餘管理越大。但持續虧損公司操控前盈餘與盈餘管理的關係並沒有系統性的結論。 本文實證結果顯示，中國大陸下市緩衝機制由於仰賴會計基礎管制，衍生相當普遍的盈餘管理行為。建議中國證監會應在下市決策中考量非盈餘資訊，投資大眾亦應關注盈餘以外的訊息以避免功能固著的迷失。 / Abstract This study investigates earnings management of Chinese listed companies subject to delisting buffer mechanism for reporting losses for consecutive years. The delisting buffer mechanism in China means Special Treatment (ST) and Particular Transfer (PT) regulations. Specifically, it requires that companies with two and three consecutive losses be labeled as ST shares and PT shares respectively. ST shares are subject to 5% price limits (one half of common shares) and their interim reports should be audited. PT shares are also subject to price limits and they are allowed be traded only on Friday. Although these regulations originally aim to maintain market’s metabolism and foster rational investment environment, their earnings-based nature and conservative schemes are likely to induce pervasive earnings management and speculation. Their economic consequences are a source of concern by regulators and investors, but previous study is relatively limited. Thus, this paper explores the following research questions to fill this void. First, how do Chinese listed firms manage earnings in response to consecutive loss thresholds, while facing the progressive sanctions of the delisting buffer mechanism? Second, what differences in positive earnings frequencies and earnings management exist among different group of loss firms in the following year? Third, how does the zero-loss regulatory threshold induce specific types of earnings distribution, and what relationship can be found between pre-managed earnings and earnings management? Based on a sample of 267 loss firms from 1998 to 2000, the empirical results are briefly summarized as follows. First, discretionary accruals (nonoperating income) of loss firms show significant earnings decreases, especially in the initial loss year, which is consistent with managerial incentives to save earnings for future more severe regulations’ cushion. Second, ST shares and PT shares experience large earnings volatility, and the patterns of ST shares and PT shares’ earnings generally look like V and W respectively. Third, percentage of positive earnings of firms with 3-year losses in the following year is less than that of other loss firms in 1998 and 1999, but more than in 2000. The underlying reason is the Chinese Securities Regulatory Committee requires PT shares have positive earnings within the next year rather than next three years after Feb 22, 2001, otherwise they are delisted. Fourth, earnings distribution of loss firms heavily clusters slightly above zero-loss threshold in the following year, which implies firms with small latent losses likely to borrow future earnings and firms with large latent earnings likely to save current earnings. Fifth, the pre-managed earnings and earnings management for loss firms reporting profits in the following year are negatively correlated. Furthermore, the smaller the pre-managed earnings are, the larger the earnings management is. However, the data reveal no systematic relationship between pre-managed earnings and earnings management for firms with persistent losses. Overall, the empirical results indicate that China’s delisting buffer mechanism, relying mainly on accounting-based regulation, induces pervasive earnings management. The findings therefore suggest that the Chinese Securities Regulatory Committee should consider non-earnings information into delisting decisions and investors look beyond bottom-line to avoid functional fixation.