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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
1

從監理動機探析我國保險業之盈餘管理行為

李世欽 Unknown Date (has links)
本研究係探析保險業在監理管制下,若有違監理標準之虞時,其經理人是否興起盈餘管理的動機,以避免不必要的監理成本。蓋保險監理最重要的目的為預防保險公司失卻清償能力,以保障被保險人的權益,並維持金融安定。在實施風險基礎資本制前,邊際清償能力的標準仍以保險法第143條第一項之規定為依歸,即保險業認許資產減除負債之餘額,未達實收資本之45%時,主管機關應命其於限期內,以現金增資補足之。若保險業不依第143條規定限期增資補足者,保險法第149條第二項授權主管機關應依情節輕重,分別處以派員監理、撤換負責人或有關人員、限期改組、甚至命其停業或解散。故本研究預期清償能力不佳的保險公司,其經理人會動用裁量性應計項目調整財務狀況,以跨過清償能力標竿,避免受到監理機關的注意與查核。另外,保險法對於保險業資金運用管道有所縮限,以驅使保險公司穩健地運用資金,預防保險公司因巨額投資損失致使清償能力敗壞。但隨著產業競爭度增強與低利率時代的來臨,保險公司在經營績效與保單預定利率的壓力下,是否會安於目前的投資限制,而放棄賺取投資報酬的機會。據此,本研究預期年度中持有短期有價證券總額超過或可能超過35%資金門檻的保險公司,其經理人會選擇處分位於利得部位的短期有價證券,以規避超過保險法第146條之1第一項第二款的門檻限制。同理,年度中持有合格的公司股票及公司債超過或可能超過35%資金門檻的保險公司,其經理人可能會選擇出售位於利得部位的股票或公司債,以規避超過146條之1第一項第三款的門檻限制。   在研究設計上,為捕捉各類操縱財務報表的淨影響,本研究採用總裁量性應計項目作為代理變數。在所有可用的裁量性應計項目估計模型中,研究指出Modified Jones模型顯示了相對較強的檢定力(Dechow et al. 1995)。因此本研究援引Modified Jones模型估計裁量性應計數字。其次,將該模型析出的裁量性應計數字與各類監理門檻距離組成一迴歸模型,以測試其關聯性強弱。實證結果如下:一、在產險業,保單持有人盈餘與實收資本之45%的距離愈小者,其盈餘管理幅度愈大。二、壽險業比較沒有利用裁量性應計項目來達到監理標準的動機。但依公司規模來看,大小公司行為仍有所差異,即相較於大公司,小公司利用裁量性應計項目來達到監理標準的動機較為強烈。根據本文實證研究結論,建議監理機關與被保險人應特別注意產險業及小壽險公司的財務狀況,並確認其清償能力之品質。 / This paper examined whether insurance companies have incentives to manipulate accounting accruals to appear more solvent and less risky. In Taiwan, virtually all industries are regulated to some degree, but insurance industry faces regulatory monitoring that is explicitly tied to accounting data. Insurance regulators required that insurers meet conditions for minimum financial health. It is frequency asserted that such regulations create incentives to manipulate financial statement to avoid regulatory intervention The primary hypothesis of this paper is that the incentive to manipulate financial statement is a decreasing function of the insurers’ difference between policyholders’ surplus and 45% of capital. This paper assumes that insurance managers use their reporting discretion to achieve solvency goal and avoid exceeding investment limits. Following Healy (1985), accruals-based measures are wide employed in test of earnings management hypothesis. In the past, the most frequency used techniques for estimating discretionary accruals are the cross-sectional versions of the modified Jones model. In this paper, the magnitude of earnings management is proxied by the discretionary accruals which are estimated by using a cross-sectional version of the modified Jones model and regressed by three differences of regulatory requirements which measure the insurers’ behavior under the regulation. The evidence indicates that when policyholders’ surplus of property-casualty insurers is closer to 45% of capital, the incentive to manipulate financial statement is stronger. On the other hand, life insurers have less incentive to manipulate financial statement, but relative to big size insurers, small size insurers have stronger incentive to meet regulatory requirements.
2

中國大陸下市緩衝機制與盈餘管理之實證研究 / An Empirical Study of the Chinese Delisting Buffer Mechanism and Earnings Management

官月緞, Yue-Duan Guan Unknown Date (has links)
摘要 本文主要檢視中國大陸連續虧損公司面臨下市緩衝機制壓力時之盈餘管理行為。本文所謂的下市緩衝機制係指特別處理(簡稱ST)與特別轉讓(簡稱PT)的管制。具體而言,ST管制要求連續兩年虧損的公司,必須冠上ST標記,漲跌幅限制為5%(一般股票為10%),中報需審計;PT管制要求連續三年虧損的公司,必須冠上PT標記,同樣有停板限制,僅允許週五交易。ST與PT管制設計原意係希望提高整體市場新陳代謝與營造理性投資的環境,但盈餘基礎的本質與保守的配套措施反而衍生盈餘管理與投機炒股。此下市緩衝機制實質之經濟後果為管制機關與投資大眾高度關注,但過去相關研究相當有限,本文希望藉由下列研究問題的探索以補充文獻缺口。 第一,中國大陸上市公司面臨下市緩衝機制漸進懲處時,管理當局如何進行盈餘管理以因應連續虧損門檻?第二,各群虧損公司次年扭虧次數與盈餘管理行為差異為何?第三,零損失的法規門檻如何引發盈餘分配的特殊型態;操控前盈餘與盈餘管理關係為何? 依據1998年至2000年267家虧損公司樣本,實證結果簡要彙總如下:第一,虧損公司裁決性應計數字(營業外所得)顯著降低盈餘,特別在虧損第一個年度,此結果顯示管理當局意圖儲存盈餘以因應未來更嚴格制裁之緩衝。第二,ST股與PT股盈餘劇烈震盪,其盈餘型態分別呈現V字型與W字型。第三,1998與1999年連續三年虧損的公司次年扭虧百分比小於其他虧損公司;但2000年結果相反。主要理由乃中國證監會於2001年2月22日要求PT股在未來一年扭虧(過去為三年),否則必須下市。第四,虧損公司次年盈餘分配集中於略高於零損失門檻的區間,隱含實質小虧的公司預支未來盈餘,實質大盈的公司儲存本期盈餘的可能性。第五,虧損公司次年扭虧時,操控前盈餘與盈餘管理呈現負向關係,且操控前盈餘越小的組別其盈餘管理越大。但持續虧損公司操控前盈餘與盈餘管理的關係並沒有系統性的結論。 本文實證結果顯示,中國大陸下市緩衝機制由於仰賴會計基礎管制,衍生相當普遍的盈餘管理行為。建議中國證監會應在下市決策中考量非盈餘資訊,投資大眾亦應關注盈餘以外的訊息以避免功能固著的迷失。 / Abstract This study investigates earnings management of Chinese listed companies subject to delisting buffer mechanism for reporting losses for consecutive years. The delisting buffer mechanism in China means Special Treatment (ST) and Particular Transfer (PT) regulations. Specifically, it requires that companies with two and three consecutive losses be labeled as ST shares and PT shares respectively. ST shares are subject to 5% price limits (one half of common shares) and their interim reports should be audited. PT shares are also subject to price limits and they are allowed be traded only on Friday. Although these regulations originally aim to maintain market’s metabolism and foster rational investment environment, their earnings-based nature and conservative schemes are likely to induce pervasive earnings management and speculation. Their economic consequences are a source of concern by regulators and investors, but previous study is relatively limited. Thus, this paper explores the following research questions to fill this void. First, how do Chinese listed firms manage earnings in response to consecutive loss thresholds, while facing the progressive sanctions of the delisting buffer mechanism? Second, what differences in positive earnings frequencies and earnings management exist among different group of loss firms in the following year? Third, how does the zero-loss regulatory threshold induce specific types of earnings distribution, and what relationship can be found between pre-managed earnings and earnings management? Based on a sample of 267 loss firms from 1998 to 2000, the empirical results are briefly summarized as follows. First, discretionary accruals (nonoperating income) of loss firms show significant earnings decreases, especially in the initial loss year, which is consistent with managerial incentives to save earnings for future more severe regulations’ cushion. Second, ST shares and PT shares experience large earnings volatility, and the patterns of ST shares and PT shares’ earnings generally look like V and W respectively. Third, percentage of positive earnings of firms with 3-year losses in the following year is less than that of other loss firms in 1998 and 1999, but more than in 2000. The underlying reason is the Chinese Securities Regulatory Committee requires PT shares have positive earnings within the next year rather than next three years after Feb 22, 2001, otherwise they are delisted. Fourth, earnings distribution of loss firms heavily clusters slightly above zero-loss threshold in the following year, which implies firms with small latent losses likely to borrow future earnings and firms with large latent earnings likely to save current earnings. Fifth, the pre-managed earnings and earnings management for loss firms reporting profits in the following year are negatively correlated. Furthermore, the smaller the pre-managed earnings are, the larger the earnings management is. However, the data reveal no systematic relationship between pre-managed earnings and earnings management for firms with persistent losses. Overall, the empirical results indicate that China’s delisting buffer mechanism, relying mainly on accounting-based regulation, induces pervasive earnings management. The findings therefore suggest that the Chinese Securities Regulatory Committee should consider non-earnings information into delisting decisions and investors look beyond bottom-line to avoid functional fixation.
3

盈餘管理之特性與審計品質之影響 / Characteristics of Earnings Management and Effects of Audit Quality

張文瀞, Chang, Wen Jing Unknown Date (has links)
本研究係以裁量性應計數字及其組成成分衡量盈餘管理,以審計人員產業別市場佔有率與產業別客戶集中度之綜合衡量捕捉審計品質,探討不同樣本公司之盈餘管理特性,以及審計品質對不同盈餘管理特性之影響。管理者對應計項目的認列通常有某種裁量權,此裁量權可用以顯露私有資訊而增進盈餘的價值攸關性,或可投機性地管理盈餘而減低盈餘為公司績效衡量的可靠性。所以探究盈餘管理行為是增加財務報告資訊性(information)或雜訊(noise)即非常重要。研究內容依盈餘管理特性區分為投機性盈餘管理與訊息發放性盈餘管理二大部分。每一研究內容則是先辨認盈餘管理本質,其次探討審計品質對盈餘管理之影響。在研究設計上,為避免實證代理變數之衡量誤差重大影響結果,乃採用實驗組公司與控制組配對公司相比較,以凸顯出前者之盈餘管理型態。   研究結果顯示,門檻公司從事盈餘管理以達前期盈餘門檻,且此盈餘管理不具未來現金流量持續性之涵義,係符合「隱藏當期不利績效、遞延本期不尋常盈餘至未來年度」以減低會計盈餘數字波動性之特性。就自願性盈餘預測此一資訊揭露工具而言,在盈餘預測偏屬樂觀之傾向下,仍有管理者自願揭露壞消息預期,即可知管理者之誠意,不失為一可資信賴之訊號。但自願預測盈餘增加,則不必然具有高公信力。甚至在管理者降低盈餘差距之動機下,易引起管理者操縱盈餘。此為財務報表使用者所需注意。就持股變動此一資訊揭露工具而言,在我國家族企業居多之情形下,增加持股並未代表任何特定之涵義。反而是減少持股所透露之訊息,值得投資人注意,尤須慎防其盈餘操縱行為。   面對增加所得之裁量性應計數字,審計品質有效阻止投機性盈餘管理。面對顯露私有資訊之盈餘管理,審計品質能夠協助管理者選擇最能彰顯未來現金流量預期之會計方法,以增強裁量性應計數字與未來現金流量變動之關聯性。在高審計品質所賦予之資訊公信力下,盈餘資訊在投資人之決策過程中有一定之重要性,故投資人發現裁量性應計數字增加(減低)盈餘價值攸關性,因而增加(減低)盈餘評價係數。然而對低審計品質所查核的財務報表,較低的資訊公信力,使盈餘未在投資人評價過程中扮演重要角色,因而盈餘管理特性亦不受投資人重視。 / This research examined characteristics of earnings management and effects of audit quality therein. Specifically, the magnitude of earnings management was proxied by the discretionary accruals, which are estimated using a cross-sectional version of the Jones model. Different from prior research, the audit quality was captured by a combined measure of the auditor's market share and client concentration. The market share measured the auditor's competence (industry specialty) and the client concentration measured the auditor's independence. Managers usually exercised discretion to recognize accruals. They could either signal private information to enhance earnings' value relevance, or opportunistically manage earnings to reduce the reliability of earnings as the performance measure of the firm. As a result, it was important to examine earnings management and to identify whether it would increase the informativeness or noise of financial reports. This study was organized according to the characteristics of earnings management: opportunistic earnings management and signaling earnings management. For both parts, the nature of earnings management was identified first, and then the effects of audit quality therein examined. To reduce the impact of measurement errors of proxy variables, the treatment group and controlled group were compared and contrasted to make earnings management pattern of the treatment group more evident.   The results showed that threshold firms managed earnings to sustain last year's earnings level. Discretionary accruals of the threshold firms were not significantly associated with future cash flow changes. Those discretionary accruals were used to hide the current unfavorable performance, or to defer current unusual earnings to the future, so that managers could reduce the volatility of accounting earnings. As a means of information disclosure, voluntary earnings forecasts tended to be optimistic, but we still could observe some voluntary forecasts which decreased earnings. In those situations, we might conclude that managers tried to convey credible signals. However, it was not necessarily credible in the case of voluntary forecasting which increased earnings. Managers would manipulate earnings to reduce the difference between forecasted earnings and reported earnings. In respect of the information signal of changes in directors' share holding percentages, it signaled nothing when directors increased holding percentages because most companies were family businesses in Taiwan. Nonetheless, investors should look out the possibility of earnings manipulation when directors decreased their holding percentages.   Audit quality could effectively deter opportunistic earnings management but not the income-decreasing discretionary accruals. Based on information signaling perspective of earnings management, auditors with higher audit quality tended to assist managers to choose accounting methods that might signal cash flow expectations. Stronger associations between discretionary accruals and future cash flows were observed for firms audited by higher quality auditors. Because higher audit quality might increase information credibility, earnings would play a more important role in the decision process of investors. When discretionary accruals increased (decreased) earnings' value relevance, earnings association coefficients would be increased (decreased). However, for the financial reports audited by lower quality auditors, earnings did not play an important role in the valuation process because of lower information credibility. Therefore, empirical results showed that investors of firms audited by lower quality auditors did not make decisions according to different characteristics of earnings management.

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