特別處理(special treatment，簡稱ST )制度是中國大陸針對營運產生問題的公司，所建立的一項下市緩衝機制。本研究以1998年至2007年曾實行特別處理的134家公司為研究對象，探討ST公司重返正常市場之策略作法及其效果。 單變量分析結果顯示，成功返回正常市場之樣本公司，採行調整營業效率以及調整營運架構作法之比率高於失敗組，採行調整經營階層以及調整財務結構作法之比率則略低於失敗組。探討策略性作為與是否成功返回正常市場關聯性之迴歸結果發現，策略性作為於控制變數之外，提供增額的解釋能力。其中，調整經營階層(異動董事長或總經理)、調整營業效率(降低成本、增加收入及出售固定資產)及調整營運架構(強化資訊系統與策略聯盟)有助於ST公司返回正常市場。至於調整財務結構策略則與預期不符，對公司返回正常市場有顯著負向的影響。 / Put listed companies under special treatment (ST) is a mechanism implemented in China capital market for suspending and terminating listed companies that suffer continuous losses. Based on a sample of 134 ST firms over the period of 1998 to 2008, this research investigates the types and their related effects of turnaround strategies employed by the China ST companies. The univariable anaysis shows that the turnaround ST firms are more inclined to adopt strategies associated with operating and asset restructuring activities, while the firms failed to recover are more likely to adopt strategies related to managerial and financial restructuring activities. In the regression analysis, the empirical results show that turnaround strategies have incremental explanatory power beyond the control variables. In addition, the findings also indicate that strategies related to managerial restructuring (changes in board directors or managers), operating restructuring (cost reduction, revenue generation and sales of fixed assets) and asset restructuring (improve information system and the relationship with strategic alliance) activities contribute most to successful corporate turnarounds. However, inconsistent with the expectation, the strategy related to financial restructuring activities is negatively associated with the ST turnaround.

中國證監會於1998年設置特別處理政策（special treatment policy, ST）以管理上市公司是否得持續保有上市的狀態，在該制度下，上市公司如果連續報導二年虧損，其股票將被標記「特別處理」。為了瞭解中國證券市場避免虧損的盈餘管理現象是證券市場誘因或是ST政策誘因所致，本文以ST監管政策的臺灣證券市場為對照樣本，以檢視ST政策影響中國上市公司盈餘管理的證據。主要研究結果為： 一、不論是臺灣上市公司或中國上市公司，都可以很清楚的看到在0%附近出現了明顯的跳動，都有為了避免虧損的盈餘管理現象。 二、中國大陸證券市場在1998年特別處理制度實施後，小額利潤佔利潤公司家數比例與小額虧損公司佔虧損公司家數比例之差異比呈現顯著上升趨勢，足見有比較多的公司會操弄盈餘通過零盈餘的門檻。 三、在排除非ST政策環境下所固有的避免虧損之證券市場誘因盈餘管理現象後，中國證券市場的差異比仍明顯集中於0%上方，這種避免虧損的嚴重傾向說明了ST監管制度為中國大陸上市公司避免虧損盈餘管理的政策誘因。

摘要 本文主要檢視中國大陸連續虧損公司面臨下市緩衝機制壓力時之盈餘管理行為。本文所謂的下市緩衝機制係指特別處理(簡稱ST)與特別轉讓(簡稱PT)的管制。具體而言，ST管制要求連續兩年虧損的公司，必須冠上ST標記，漲跌幅限制為5%(一般股票為10%)，中報需審計；PT管制要求連續三年虧損的公司，必須冠上PT標記，同樣有停板限制，僅允許週五交易。ST與PT管制設計原意係希望提高整體市場新陳代謝與營造理性投資的環境，但盈餘基礎的本質與保守的配套措施反而衍生盈餘管理與投機炒股。此下市緩衝機制實質之經濟後果為管制機關與投資大眾高度關注，但過去相關研究相當有限，本文希望藉由下列研究問題的探索以補充文獻缺口。 第一，中國大陸上市公司面臨下市緩衝機制漸進懲處時，管理當局如何進行盈餘管理以因應連續虧損門檻？第二，各群虧損公司次年扭虧次數與盈餘管理行為差異為何？第三，零損失的法規門檻如何引發盈餘分配的特殊型態；操控前盈餘與盈餘管理關係為何？ 依據1998年至2000年267家虧損公司樣本，實證結果簡要彙總如下：第一，虧損公司裁決性應計數字(營業外所得)顯著降低盈餘，特別在虧損第一個年度，此結果顯示管理當局意圖儲存盈餘以因應未來更嚴格制裁之緩衝。第二，ST股與PT股盈餘劇烈震盪，其盈餘型態分別呈現V字型與W字型。第三，1998與1999年連續三年虧損的公司次年扭虧百分比小於其他虧損公司；但2000年結果相反。主要理由乃中國證監會於2001年2月22日要求PT股在未來一年扭虧(過去為三年)，否則必須下市。第四，虧損公司次年盈餘分配集中於略高於零損失門檻的區間，隱含實質小虧的公司預支未來盈餘，實質大盈的公司儲存本期盈餘的可能性。第五，虧損公司次年扭虧時，操控前盈餘與盈餘管理呈現負向關係，且操控前盈餘越小的組別其盈餘管理越大。但持續虧損公司操控前盈餘與盈餘管理的關係並沒有系統性的結論。 本文實證結果顯示，中國大陸下市緩衝機制由於仰賴會計基礎管制，衍生相當普遍的盈餘管理行為。建議中國證監會應在下市決策中考量非盈餘資訊，投資大眾亦應關注盈餘以外的訊息以避免功能固著的迷失。 / Abstract This study investigates earnings management of Chinese listed companies subject to delisting buffer mechanism for reporting losses for consecutive years. The delisting buffer mechanism in China means Special Treatment (ST) and Particular Transfer (PT) regulations. Specifically, it requires that companies with two and three consecutive losses be labeled as ST shares and PT shares respectively. ST shares are subject to 5% price limits (one half of common shares) and their interim reports should be audited. PT shares are also subject to price limits and they are allowed be traded only on Friday. Although these regulations originally aim to maintain market’s metabolism and foster rational investment environment, their earnings-based nature and conservative schemes are likely to induce pervasive earnings management and speculation. Their economic consequences are a source of concern by regulators and investors, but previous study is relatively limited. Thus, this paper explores the following research questions to fill this void. First, how do Chinese listed firms manage earnings in response to consecutive loss thresholds, while facing the progressive sanctions of the delisting buffer mechanism? Second, what differences in positive earnings frequencies and earnings management exist among different group of loss firms in the following year? Third, how does the zero-loss regulatory threshold induce specific types of earnings distribution, and what relationship can be found between pre-managed earnings and earnings management? Based on a sample of 267 loss firms from 1998 to 2000, the empirical results are briefly summarized as follows. First, discretionary accruals (nonoperating income) of loss firms show significant earnings decreases, especially in the initial loss year, which is consistent with managerial incentives to save earnings for future more severe regulations’ cushion. Second, ST shares and PT shares experience large earnings volatility, and the patterns of ST shares and PT shares’ earnings generally look like V and W respectively. Third, percentage of positive earnings of firms with 3-year losses in the following year is less than that of other loss firms in 1998 and 1999, but more than in 2000. The underlying reason is the Chinese Securities Regulatory Committee requires PT shares have positive earnings within the next year rather than next three years after Feb 22, 2001, otherwise they are delisted. Fourth, earnings distribution of loss firms heavily clusters slightly above zero-loss threshold in the following year, which implies firms with small latent losses likely to borrow future earnings and firms with large latent earnings likely to save current earnings. Fifth, the pre-managed earnings and earnings management for loss firms reporting profits in the following year are negatively correlated. Furthermore, the smaller the pre-managed earnings are, the larger the earnings management is. However, the data reveal no systematic relationship between pre-managed earnings and earnings management for firms with persistent losses. Overall, the empirical results indicate that China’s delisting buffer mechanism, relying mainly on accounting-based regulation, induces pervasive earnings management. The findings therefore suggest that the Chinese Securities Regulatory Committee should consider non-earnings information into delisting decisions and investors look beyond bottom-line to avoid functional fixation.