人力資源管理為公司營運管理之中日趨重要之學門；而其中績效管理與薪酬管理為人力資源管理中極重要之一環。根據過去實習經驗，績效管理與獎酬制度時常有制度流於形式、分配不公平、激勵效果不彰等議題；是以希望透過本研究來釐清上述問題於公司中，實際發生情況，並對照學術理論架構來思考對應策略，期待可以對歸納公司實務之員工獎酬與績效衡量指標之執行方式、與學術理論之對應性與出入、找出公司問題之痛點、並進一步提出改善建議。 本研究乃以質化方式來探討欲研究之議題，採用三段式之訪談架構，約訪個案公司之人力資源主管、業務單位主管與公司統籌營運之高階主管。透過人資主管，彙整歸納訪談紀錄，了解該公司乃之績效考評制度與獎酬分配方式；與業務主管訪談，則了解該公司該套管理制度之實際運行程效以及所面臨之問題；與高階主管訪談，則進一步釐清該公司所面臨的問題，並討論各項問題之解套方式。 而個案公司之績效考評制度乃採用等級評分法、硬性分配法、評語法與目標評分法，並依照職等與職位別來設計每一單位之績效評核表，每年進行一次年度總體員工績效衡量。其獎酬制度，則依據其績效考評結果，有年度年終獎金、酬勞金，季度專案獎金，月度績效獎金等類別。個案公司於績效獎酬制度之架構雖完整，但仍存在獎勵不夠及時、激勵效果不佳等議題。彙整語對照學術理論與業界實際執行情況後，本研究認為，業界與學術界績效衡量與獎酬制度之相對應性；而績效衡量辦法實務衍伸之問題，包含：業務單位之獎酬策略與績效衡量指標探討、內勤單位之績效衡量議題、主管主觀意識影響績效衡量結果，需要依賴公司持續檢討制度之問題點、教育訓練主管、以及協助主管除了執行績效評定之外，善用其他管理工具，方能達成績效衡量指標予員工獎酬策略之效率與管理意涵。

本文以實地實證研究方法，探討「非財務性績效衡量指標」與「工作設計」此二項誘因工具對員工績效的影響。實地研究對象為一家商業銀行，研究期間為1993-1997；該行於1995年7月開始採用非財務性績效衡量指標，並自1996年1月選擇五家分行實施徵、授信分工。 本文首先利用個案銀行17位授信員連續60個月所構成的縱查資料（panel data），以固定影響模型（fixed-effects model）分析非財務性績效衡量指標誘因工具對員工績效的影響，發現銀行授信人員之績效考核制度中，加入授信不良率與脫落率非財務性衡量指標後，雖然授信員努力的重分配導致其授信金額與利息收入財務績效變差，但授信員的授信不良率與脫落率非財務績效變佳，整體而言，授信利潤有顯著的改善。 本文另以實施徵、授信分工前後，51名授信員的績效資料，採中斷的時間序列設計（interrupted time-series design），檢定非財務性績效衡量指標與工作設計配合採用後，員工的績效是否較佳。分析結果顯示，存在非財務績效衡量指標之獎酬制度下，配合實施徵、授信分工的授信員，其授信金額及授信不良率績效顯著較徵、授信合一之授信員為佳。 / This thesis reports the results of a longitudinal field study examining the impact of nonfinancial performance measures and job design on employee performance. A commercial bank was the research site. The bank adopted nonfinancial performance measures in July 1995 and redesigned jobs in retail banking credit underwriting at five branches in January 1996. Prior to the job redesign, sales representatives were jointly responsible for all credit underwriting functions including credit extension and credit servicing. After the change, sales representatives were only responsible for credit extension while credit servicing was handled by credit decidion-makers. Panel data for 17 sales representatives over 60 months (1993 through 1997) were obtained to assess the effects of adopting nonfinancial measures on employee performance. Using fixed-effects regression analysis, the results are consistent with the predictions of agency theory: although loan volume and interest revenue decreased following adoption of nonfinancial measures to evaluate and compensate the performance of sales representatives, loan profit increased significantly. This thesis also hypothesizes that employee performance increases with the fit between incentive systems based on nonfinancial measures and job design. The empirical tests of this prediction rely on an interrupted time-series design, using performance data of 51 sales representatives in the 1995-1997 period. After the change in job design-separation of the credit underwriting jobs-alogn with introduction of incentive systems based on nonfinancial measures, the treatment group demonstrated greater improvements in productivity and quality performance. This result supports the hypothesis developed.

本研究主要探討裁量性紅利對企業未來財務績效之激勵效果，而本研究係以2010年美國S&P500公司作為研究對象，研究期間為2006年至2010年。實證結果顯示：(1)依據主觀績效衡量所發放的裁量性紅利確實可以對企業未來財務績效產生激勵效果；(2)獎酬契約運用主觀與客觀績效衡量時，主觀績效衡量所發放的裁量性紅利佔總紅利比重愈高，對於企業未來財務績效激勵效果愈高；(3)裁量性紅利對於企業未來後續財務績效具有長期激勵效果；(4)績效較低之企業發予高階經理人主觀績效衡量之裁量性紅利，對於企業未來財務績效仍具有激勵效果。 / The study investigate the impact of discretionary bonus on the future firm financial performance. Based on a sample of 2010 S&P500 companies spanning from 2006 and 2010. I find : (1) Discretionary bonus, which was measured subjectively, can improve future firm financial performance. (2) The more proportion of discretionary bonus to total bonus can improve more future firm financial performance. (3) Discretionary bonus can improve the long-term future firm financial performance. (4) Using subjectively discretionary bonus to CEOs on low-profit-company can improve the future firm financial performance.